[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Larry Purss]

Paul,
Once any ideology becomes reified it becomes the *nature of reality* and
therefore can become an object of scientific investigations.
However, taking a wider perspective [bild] the ontological nature of THIS
transformation may come into view. Therefore any ideology is a reification
of this ontological *realm*when it  comes into view as this
transformational process [dialectical, dialogical, analogical]

Returning to the question of *intersubjectivity*, I wonder how central the
question of *friendship* [philia] is to this concept.  I am attempting to
*bridge* back to the notion of *intimacy* [what the medieval called
*tenderness*] whichconcept has become transformed into a confidence in
private judgement
Ardent suggests, as a consequence of THIS HISTORY [transformation] philia
and the common good has withdrawn [dispersed] and civil society becomes
transformed from civic *virtues* to realms of power.
For the ancient Greeks the essence of philia was not solely a matter of
*intimacy* but was fundamentally a realm of DIALOGUE. tHE CONSTANT
INTERCHANGE OF TALK CREATED THE COMMON GOOD.

This is one aspect of *intersubjectivity* and the dialectic of private and
public realms of intersubjectivity
Larry


On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:

> Larry I agree with althusser because  once capitalism becomes reified
> through ideologies and ideological apparatuses in the material world it
> becomes the nature of reality as such...hence the realm for scientific
> investigations.  However, I do not believe that that Gramscian/althusserian
> reification negates the ontological nature of being as such highlighted by
> heidegger in "being and time"  the job of the social philosopher is to
> outline where ideology attempts to be ontology and correct it.
>
>
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>
>
>
> -------- Original message --------
> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Date: 12/01/2013 10:04 AM (GMT-05:00)
> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>,"eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Cc: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
> russkii
>
>
> Paul,
> Your comment that Hegel, and Marx begin their analysis at the level of
> *scientific rationality* AS species-being is an interesting opening.
> I went to Wikipedia to search out *structural Marxism* and this is the
> first paragraph.
>
> :Structural Marxism arose in opposition to the humanistic Marxism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>that dominated many western universities during the 1970s.
> [*citation needed
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed>*] In contrast to
> Humanistic Marxism, Althusser stressed that Marxism was a science<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science>that examined objective structures,
> [1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-1> and he
> believed that humanistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>,
> historistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism#Karl_Marx> and phenomenological
> Marxism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Marxism>, which was based on
> Marx's early works, was caught in a "pre-scientific humanistic ideology".
> [2] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-2>
>
> So scientific rationality is merely one *level* which implies other levels
> of rationality in EXCESS [Merleau Ponty] of the scientific level of
> rationality.  In other words *extensions* of rationality that are not
> merely *scientific* but may be extended BEYOND the scientific
> *perspectives* to include humanistic, historical, and
> phenomenological/existential forms of rationality.
> I am in over my head and using this medium to extend my understanding of
> *rationality* and exploring what is dismissed as merely *pre-scientific*
> humanistic ideology.
> Your question is opening a *clearing* to imagine a *synthesis of
> heideggerian phenomenology AND structural Marxism.
> Larry
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 8:58 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>
>> I think hegel and marx begins their anaylsis where, as heidegger points
>> out, husserl does...at the level of scientific rationality.  This they
>> impute to species-being.  Heidegger's "being and time", I believe is the
>> proper place to start if we want to understand intersubjectivity and
>> empathy.  The attempt should be to synthesize heideggerian phenomenology
>> with structural Marxism.
>>
>>
>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>> President
>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>> www.mocombeian.com
>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>> Date: 11/30/2013  8:19 PM  (GMT-05:00)
>> To: ablunden@mira.net,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii
>>
>> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain that
>> mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking glass theory
>> of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from Charles Horton Cooley
>> (who is often cited as the origi ator of the looking glass theory of the
>> self). Is the looking glass theory of the self an example of perspective
>> taking?
>> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question!
>> Greg
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>
>> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the work of
>> the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the Scots in
>> his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald and Douglas
>> Stewart.
>> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on Hegel.
>> >
>> > Andy
>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> > *Andy Blunden*
>> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>> >
>> >
>> > Charles Bazerman wrote:
>> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of influence
>> from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective taking? Given
>> the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S. education, I wouldn't
>> be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  Chuck
>> >>
>> >> ----- Original Message -----
>> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
>> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>> russkii
>> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
>> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> Mike,
>> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of
>> Hegel's
>> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, self-consciousness
>> arises
>> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves. Here
>> is
>> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
>> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>> first
>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>> must
>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>> proceeds to
>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
>> >>>
>> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to
>> Hegel's
>> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). In
>> that
>> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
>> >>> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the
>> perspective
>> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for
>> the full
>> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as
>> fully
>> >>> self-conscious.
>> >>>
>> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's
>> inspiration in
>> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable
>> and, to
>> >>> my mind, of little consequence).]
>> >>>
>> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found in
>> Marx's
>> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the
>> relations of
>> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the
>> commodity
>> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the individual
>> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and rich
>> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
>> >>> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
>> >>> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not just
>> our
>> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal kinship,
>> i.e.
>> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
>> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are
>> "just
>> >>> like us".
>> >>> Isn't that perspective taking?
>> >>>
>> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have
>> made its
>> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at
>> all...).
>> >>> -greg
>> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously
>> looking
>> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop.
>> One of
>> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just a
>> >>> minute to XMCA.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 179 <
>> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has
>> come
>> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its
>> own
>> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has
>> thereby
>> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially
>> real,
>> >>> but sees its own self in the other.
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 180 <
>> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>> first
>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>> must
>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>> proceeds to
>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 181 <
>> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense
>> is at
>> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly,
>> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
>> itself
>> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it
>> likewise
>> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was
>> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the
>> other and
>> >>> thus lets the other again go free.
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 182 <
>> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
>> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action
>> of one
>> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
>> >>> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
>> other
>> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within
>> itself, and
>> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first
>> does
>> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic
>> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
>> independently
>> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for
>> its own
>> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to
>> it. The
>> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both
>> self-consciousnesses.
>> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it
>> demands
>> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only
>> so
>> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
>> useless,
>> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 183 <
>> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that
>> it is
>> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense
>> that
>> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
>> >>> regardless of their distinction.
>> >>>
>> >>> Φ <
>> >>> 184 <
>> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us
>> as the
>> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in
>> consciousness.
>> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating experience],
>> holds
>> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness
>> which
>> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this
>> interchange of
>> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
>> While
>> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being
>> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it
>> exists
>> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
>> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
>> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
>> cancels
>> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
>> >>> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
>> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each
>> is to
>> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at
>> the
>> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
>> >>> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these
>> issues.
>> >>> My
>> >>>
>> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and relational
>> >>>> perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point
>> of
>> >>> view
>> >>>
>> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to
>> interpersonal
>> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological perspective
>> taking,
>> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"?
>> Empathy
>> >>> has to
>> >>>
>> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian
>> traditionS
>> >>> we often
>> >>>
>> >>>> discuss)?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
>> >>>> mike
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>> >
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>>> Mike,
>> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that is
>> >>> referring to
>> >>>
>> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe this
>> >>> question of
>> >>>
>> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other question
>> on
>> >>> *kinds*
>> >>>
>> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems
>> to
>> >>> be
>> >>>
>> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and
>> practice
>> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a
>> clearing
>> >>> for the
>> >>>
>> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its
>> convergence
>> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is
>> explored
>> >>>> in
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting
>> exploring
>> >>> notions of
>> >>>
>> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
>> >>>>> identified as themselves
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
>> >>>> intelligible
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> but are not themselves
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or
>> between
>> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of
>> understanding,
>> >>>> a
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> distinction between
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities
>> with
>> >>> which they
>> >>>
>> >>>>> are concerned. And in
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is
>> that
>> >>> the
>> >>>
>> >>>>> understanding of identities
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be
>> 'reduced'
>> >>>>> to the understanding of
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences*
>> >>> [multiple] AS
>> >>>
>> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This
>> realm
>> >>> of KINDS
>> >>>
>> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to
>> converge
>> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Larry Purss
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity and
>> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say
>> they
>> >>> are
>> >>>
>> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me to
>> >>> wondering how
>> >>>
>> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in the
>> >>>> work I
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and
>> >>>>>> Piaget.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from
>> English
>> >>> for
>> >>>
>> >>>> these
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>> terms, the cognate
>> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase
>> for
>> >>> "point of
>> >>>
>> >>>>>> view" is literally that,
>> >>>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if
>> I
>> >>> know what
>> >>>
>> >>>>>> it
>> >>>>>> is. Any help out there??
>> >>>>>> mike
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> P
>> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
>> >>>>>> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
>> >>>>>> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am
>> asking.
>> >>> Perhaps its
>> >>>
>> >>>>>> just my bad question!
>> >>>
>> >>> --
>> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>> >>> Department of Anthropology
>> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> >>> Brigham Young University
>> >>> Provo, UT 84602
>> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>