[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[Larry Purss]

Greg,
I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post.
You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological
accounts into CHAT.
My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness*
Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to locate
*givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events
[beyond agency]
My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as*
[something as something else] as *givenness*.
This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as given.
Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may have
been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* sense*
in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th.

I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also
an agency within *frames* or *windows*

Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or derived
phenomena.
It is not grounded in language.
It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena.

Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts.
Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an
alternative account.   WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM WITHIN
common accounts [Shotter]
He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology which
he calls psychology AS *joint action*

His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in response
to your proposal [and question]
Shorter wrote:
In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological nature
Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive*
In Shotter's words,
"I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS
*psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental
fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to
draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would
escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances;
they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving
and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate their
actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to
PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his speech."
Shorter adds,
Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally
instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so
we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves.
[in Conversational Realities:35]

Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a
fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way to
link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited
perception AS *given*]

This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action MEDIATED
THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience]

FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are
mediated.

Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal.
*Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing
*agency*
Larry




On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson
<greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:

> Antti and other inter-Actants,
> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of
> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like
> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear how
> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a
> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested).
>
> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the
> physical body in making frames.
> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see:
> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and
> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture).
>
> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations
> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" -
> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with
> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!
>
> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that
> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or
> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of
> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that one
> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than
> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find oneself
> becoming quite smaller in others!
>
> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily overlooked
> if you start from the motives of individuals.
>
> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this
> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and
> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to
> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the
> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even
> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas
> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of
> us!).
>
> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a bit
> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the
> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and
> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this
> account accords well with my reading of Marx].
>
> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on
> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that
> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The
> Return of the Myth of the Mental:
>
> http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf
> ).
> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it,
> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further
> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our
> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps
> are not warranted?
>
> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of
> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of whether
> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological
> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you
> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is
> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground?
>
> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have
> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is whether
> or not this space falls within
> the bounds of CHAT.
> Who decides that?
> -greg
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala <ajrajala@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Greg,
> >
> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction
> to
> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships
> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering
> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of
> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this project
> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile).
> >
> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory
> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching school
> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of personal
> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's
> explication
> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically
> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory
> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me
> to
> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to
> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving
> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame
> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be
> > interesting, too.
> >
> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has
> encouraged
> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a
> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting
> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add Gutierrez
> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev.
> >
> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of
> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script,
> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom;
> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the
> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script
> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and
> colleagues
> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife.
> >
> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it
> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal
> sense
> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to
> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant of
> an
> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to
> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is
> the
> > frame?
> >
> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the notion
> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring
> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies
> employed
> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev
> altogether
> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead.
> >
> > Antti
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Andy,
> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and
> > *archeTYPES*
> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities]
> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*.
> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of
> > collaboration.
> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond
> > > activities?
> > > Shotter, exploring social life says,
> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live in
> > > different realities."
> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being
> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with
> > > different properties to these realities.
> > > Shotter adds,
> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow
> of
> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC
> > KINDS
> > > of activity:
> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing
> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other
> > for
> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being
> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre)
> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order
> being
> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly,
> > unaccountable,
> > > chaotic activity.
> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos,
> > away
> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest
> to
> > us
> > > occur"
> > >
> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the
> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the
> world
> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together.
> > >
> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES].
> The
> > 3
> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se].
> > Can
> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from
> > the
> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we
> also
> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model*
> > > that is a general archetype  for understanding collaboration per se?
> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and
> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or
> > > modes of communication [collaboration].
> > >
> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a
> > CHAT
> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will  close
> by
> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*.
> > > Sense involves [revolves?]  perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt
> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as
> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings
> as
> > a
> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity
> > settings.
> > > Larry
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks Andy
> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Two things Greg.
> > > >
> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the
> > > same
> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other
> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light
> on
> > > how
> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's
> > game.
> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular
> > mode.
> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant,
> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to
> > recognise
> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to
> > force
> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to
> > misconstrue
> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different
> > > social
> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by
> different
> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and
> > action
> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and
> > actions
> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these
> > asymmetrical
> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change.
> > > >
> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist
> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make
> > the
> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of
> analysis
> > > of
> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :)
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > Greg Thompson wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> ...
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm
> > > wondering
> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not
> > > master
> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what
> > > about a
> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out
> -
> > > the
> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA.
> > > >>
> > > >> ...
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the
> motives
> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a
> > > notion
> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between
> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators
> have
> > > to
> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a
> > > side-wards
> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if
> James
> > > Scott
> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as
> > > participants
> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and,
> to a
> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the
> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants
> > > create
> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more
> > common
> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>