[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities
Larry Purss
lpscholar2@gmail.com
Wed Aug 14 17:08:36 PDT 2013
Greg,
Your exploration of boundary *object* as actually a boundary *relation* I
believe has the capability of drawing our attention to the fluid nature of
boundary. I believe Gadamer would shift the emphasis to boundary
*affinity*. The notion of the boundary as having *plastic* qualities and
only coming into existence within communication processes [more than
linguistic] focuses on the notion of *between*.
If you want to elaborate this way of reflection further I see real
potential.
As an aside, John Shotter suggests *motives* develop or are secondary
phenomena emerging WITHIN our ways of talking [about motives]
Larry
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 3:10 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it
> did. So here is a recap of the thread:
>
> Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object.
>
> I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity.
>
> Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose".
>
> Andy added:
> "There are important differences in the methodological implication which go
> to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly
> arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through
> different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the forms
> of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary snap-shot
> of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes."
>
> And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and
> Andy:
>
> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering
> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master
> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a
> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the
> different participants in a discussion on XMCA.
>
> I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?"
> as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and
> caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this
> doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think
> Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's
> famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although
> his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to
> do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary
> performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in
> actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an
> instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do
> these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point
> in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know
> whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not
> quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be
> the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose.
>
> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives
> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion
> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between
> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to
> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards
> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott
> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants
> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a
> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the
> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create
> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common
> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives.
>
> I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary
> Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite
> a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement
> (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: “objects which are both
> plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several
> parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity
> across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.”
>
> Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start.
>
> Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project,"
> "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that
> captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity."
>
> So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" is
> the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading
> this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through
> some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to
> simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about
> which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening
> here?
>
> I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the
> relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be.
>
> -greg
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > There are important differences in the methodological implication which
> go
> > to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly
> > arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through
> > different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the
> forms
> > of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary shap-shot
> > of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Is this going to go back on the list?
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> On 13 August 2013 16:55, <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com <mailto:
> >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it
> >> amid the flurry of activity about activity!!
> >> So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems
> >> like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity.
> >>
> >>
> >> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy regarding
> >> the interpretation/reading of these texts. Andy has reasons to
> elaborate
> >> something different he calls a project.
> >> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred
> methods
> >> rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's formulation.
> >>
> >> Does that help?
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >> Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody.
> >> (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts)
> >> Cheers,
> >> Greg
> >>
> >> Sent from my iPhone
> >>
> >> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.**com <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Greg,
> >>>
> >>> Yes. My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the
> >>> conversation is the subject's purpose(s)".
> >>>
> >>> You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish.
> >>> Best,
> >>> Huw
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >>> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Huw,
> >>> Did you get this question I posted to XMCA? I meant it
> >>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in
> >>> discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I
> >>> think it is where things start to get a little messy with
> >>> defining activity. But I may be wrong about that!
> >>> Looking forward to hearing more.
> >>> Very best,
> >>> greg
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> >>> From: <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >>> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >
> >>> >>
> >>> Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM
> >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.**edu<
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Huw,
> >>> Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is
> >>> more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity,
> >>> what is the object of this activity?
> >>> Greg
> >>>
> >>> Sent from my iPhone
> >>>
> >>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd
> >>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.**com <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >>>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> > FYI, Greg.
> >>> >
> >>> > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The
> >>> Development of Mind
> >>> > (Problems of Dev.)
> >>> >
> >>> > Huw
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>> >
> >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote:
> >>> >>
> >>> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help.
> >>> >>>
> >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists".
> >>> Wondering what
> >>> >>> this could mean.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for
> >>> the many
> >>> >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is
> >>> >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than
> >>> create
> >>> >> activities (projects).
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me:
> >>> activities don't
> >>> >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their
> >>> participants, but then
> >>> >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in
> >>> '*immanent* in the project
> >>> >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates
> the
> >>> >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in
> >>> itself account
> >>> >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which
> >>> >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by
> >>> the agents,
> >>> >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as
> >>> such, but the
> >>> >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what
> >>> this ideal
> >>> >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out
> >>> "where" the activity
> >>> >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it?
> >>> >>
> >>> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical
> >>> (logical
> >>> >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is
> >>> an aggregate
> >>> >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the
> >>> fundamental (micro)
> >>> >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life
> >>> as a whole.
> >>> >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions,
> >>> not a group
> >>> >> of people.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an
> >>> activity? What
> >>> >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous
> >>> and soon-to-be
> >>> >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity?
> >>> >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e.
> >>> writing!), or are
> >>> >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA
> >>> folks with whom the
> >>> >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly
> >>> influenced the
> >>> >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity?
> >>> >>
> >>> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science,
> >>> projects are
> >>> >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or
> >>> object which
> >>> >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects.
> >>> All the
> >>> >> concepts of a science obviously have complex
> >>> interactions and
> >>> >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of
> >>> demarcation. Their
> >>> >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who"
> >>> is part of
> >>> >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate
> >>> of actions,
> >>> >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the
> >>> particular of a
> >>> >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively
> >>> definite
> >>> >> location in time and space. But it is an instance
> >>> realising a
> >>> >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation.
> >>> So the scope
> >>> >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects,
> >>> may be larger
> >>> >> than the immediate participating actions.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity?
> >>> >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?)
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The
> >>> question is
> >>> >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the
> >>> "essence") of a project.
> >>> >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But
> >>> it has its
> >>> >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW
> >>> "project" and
> >>> >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the
> >>> etymology
> >>> >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a
> >>> different word
> >>> >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone
> >>> else says
> >>> >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the
> >>> object of a
> >>> >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly
> >>> >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object
> >>> or motive is
> >>> >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the
> >>> concepts of
> >>> >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a
> >>> new word helps.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Andy
> >>> >>
> >>> >> -greg
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >>> Department of Anthropology
> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >>> Brigham Young University
> >>> Provo, UT 84602
> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson<
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> > --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > ------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<
> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden>
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
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