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The Crisis in Psychology
257
Now let us suppose that we have various centers as in the case of a debate
between separate disciplines that aspire to become the center, or in the case of
different ideas claiming to be the central explanatory principle. It is obvious that
to these will correspond different circumferences and each new center will at the
same time be a peripheral point on the former circumference. Consequently, we
get several circumferences that intersect with each other. In our example this new
position of each circumference graphically represents the special area of knowledge
that is covered by psychology depending on the center, i.e., the general discipline.
Whoever takes the viewpoint of the general discipline, i.e., deals with the facts
of the special disciplines not on a footing of equality, but as the material of a
science, just as these disciplines themselves deals with the facts of reality, will im-
mediately change the viewpoint of critique for the viewpoint of investigation. Criti-
cism is on the same level as what is being criticized; it proceeds fully within the
given discipline; its goal is exclusively critical and not positive; it wishes to know
only whether and to what extent some theory is correct; it evaluates and judges,
but does not investigate. A criticizes B, but both Occupy the same position as to
the facts. Things change when A begins to deal with B as B does with the facts,
i.e., when he does not criticize B, but investigates him. The investigation already
belongs to general science, its tasks are not critical, but positive. It does not wish
to evaluate some theory, but to learn something new about the facts themselves
which are represented in the theory. While science uses critique as a means, the
course [of the investigation, Russian eds.] and the result of this process nevertheless
differ fundamentally from a critical examination. Critique, in the fmal analysis, for-
mulates an opinion about an opinion, albeit a very solid and well-founded ppinion.
A general investigation establishes, ultimately, objective laws and facts.
Only he who elevates his analysis from the level of the critical discussion of
some system of views to the level of a fundamental investigation by means of the
general science will understand the objective meaning of the crisis that is taking
place in psychology. He will see the lawfulness of the clash of ideas and opinions
that is taking place, which is determined by the development of the science itself
and by the nature of the reality it studies at a given level of knowledge. Instead
of a chaos of heterogeneous opinions, a motley discordance of subjective utterances,
he will see an orderly blueprint of the fundamental opinions concerning the devel-
opment of the science, a system of the objective tendencies which are inherent in
the historical tasks brought forward by the development of the science and which
act behind the backs of the various investigators and theorists with the force of a
steel spring. Instead of critically discussing and evaluating some author, instead of
establishing that this author is guilty of inconsistency and contradictions, he will
devote a positive investigation to the question what the objective tendencies in sci-
ence require. And as a result, instead of opinions about an opinion he will get an
outline of the skeleton of the general science as a system of defining laws, principles
and facts.
Only such an investigator realizes the real and correct meaning of the catas-
trophe that is taking place and has a clear idea of the role, place, and meaning of
each different theory or school. Rather than by the impressionism and subjectivism
inevitable in each criticism, he will be led by scientific reliability and veracity. For
him (and this will be the first result of the new viewpoint) the individual differences
will vanish—he will understand the role of personality in history. He will understand
that to explain reflexology’s claims to be a universal science from the personal mis-
takes, opinions, particularities, and ignorance of its founders is as impossible as to
explain the French revolution from the corruption of the king or court. He will see
what and how much in the development of science depends upon the good and

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