6

296
Chapter 15
separate disciplines which tend to turn into a general psychology, i.e., to the subordination and exclusion of the other disciplines. We have seen both the meaning and the objective features of this tendency toward a general science. There can be no bigger mistake than to take this struggle for a struggle of views. Binswanger (1922, p. 6) begins by mentioning Brentano’s demand and Windelband’s50 remark that with each representative psychology begins anew. The cause of this he sees neither in a lack of factual material, which has been gathered in abundance, nor in the absence of philosophical-methodological principles, of which we also have enough, but in the lack of cooperation between philosophers and empiricists in psychology: “There is hardly a single science where theorists and practitioners took such diverse paths.” Psychology lacks a methodology—this is the author’s conclusion, and the main thing is that we cannot create a methodology now. We cannot say that general psychology has already fulfilled its duties as a branch of methodology. On the contrary, wherever you look, imperfection, uncertainty, doubt, contradiction reign. We can only talk of the problems of general psychology and not even of that, but of an introduction to the problems of general psychology [ibid., p. 5]. Binswanger sees in psychologists a “courage and will toward (the creation of a new) psychology.” In order to accomplish this they must break with the prejudices of centuries, and this shows one thing: that to this day, the general psychology has not been created. We must not ask, with Bergson, what would have happened if Kepler, Galileo,51 and Newton had been psychologists, but what can still happen despite the fact that they were mathematicians [ibid., p. 21].
Thus, it may seem that the chaos in psychology is entirely natural and that the meaning of the crisis which psychology became aware of is as follows: there aist many psychologies which have the tendency to create a single psychology by developing a general psychology. For the latter purpose it is not enough to have a Galileo, i.e., a genius who would create the foundations of the science. This is the general opinion of European methodology as it had evolved toward the end of the nineteenth century. Some, mainly French, authors hold this opinion even today. In Russia, Vaguer (1923)—almost the only psychologist who has dealt with methodological questions—has always defended it. He expresses the same opinion on the occasion of his analysis of the Annés Psychologiques, i.e., a synopsis of the international literature. This is his conclusion: thus, we have quite a number of psychological schools, but not a unified psychology as an independent area of psychology [sic]. From the fact that it doesn’t exist does not follow that it cannot exist (ibid.). The answer to the question where and how it may be found can only be given by the history of science.
This is how biology developed. In the seventeenth century two naturalists lay the foundation for two areas of zoology: Buffon52 for the description of animals and their way of life, and Linné for their classification. Gradually, both sections engendered a number of new problems, morphology appeared, anatomy, etc. The investigations were isolated from each other and represented as it were different sciences, which were in no way connected but for the fact that they both studied animals. The different sciences were at enmity, attempted to occupy the prevailing position as the mutual contacts increased and they could not remain apart. The brilliant Lamarck succeeded in integrating the uncoordinated pieces of knowledge into one book, which he called “Philosophy of Zoology.” [43] He united his investigations with those of others, Buffon and Linné included, summarized the results, harmonized them with each other, and created the area of science which ‘freviranus called general biology. A single and abstract science was created from the uncoordinated disciplines, which, since the works of Darwin, could stand on its own feet. It is the opinion of Vagner that what was done with the disciplines of biology before

6