That this is so, that two psychologies, and not many psychologies, make up the meaning of the crisis, that all the rest is a struggle within each of these two psychologies, a struggle which has quite another meaning and operational field, that the creation of a general psychology is not a matter of agreement, but of a rupture—all this methodology realized long ago and nobody contests it. (The difference of this thesis from Kornilov’s three directions resides in the whole range of the meaning of the crisis: (1) the concepts of materialistic psychology and reflexology do not coincide (as he says); (2) the concepts of empirical and idealistic psychology do not coincide (as he says), (3) our evaluation of the role of Marxist psychology differs.) Finally, here we are dealing with two tendencies which show up in the struggle between the multitude of concrete cUrrents and within them. Nobody contests that the general psychology will not be a third psychology added to the two struggling parties, but one of them.

That the concept of empiricism contains a methodological conflict which a self- reflective theory must solve in order to make investigation possible—this idea was made well known by MUnsterberg [1920]. In his capital methodological work he declared that this book does not conceal the fact that it wants to be a militant book, it defends idealism against naturalism. It wants to guarantee an unlimited right for idealism in psychology. He lays the theoretical epistemological foundations of empirical psychology and declares that this is the most important thing the psychology of our day needs. Its main concepts have been gathered haphazardly, its logical means of acquiring knowledge have been left to the instinct. Münsterberg’s theme is the synthesis of Ficbte’s ethical idealism with the physiological psychology of our day, for the victory of idealism does not reside in its dissociating itself from empirical investigation, but in finding a place for it in its own area. Munsterberg showed that naturalism and idealism are irreconcilable, that is why he talks about a book of militant idealism, says of general psychology that it is bravery and a risk—and not about agreement and unification. And MUnsterberg [ibid., p. 10] openly advanced the idea of the existence of two sciences, arguing that psychology finds itself in the strange position that we know incomparably more about psychological facts than we ever did, but much less about the question as to what psychology actually is.

The psychology of our day is struggling with the prejudice that only one type of psychology exists. . . . The concept of psychology involves two totally different scientific tasks, which must be distinguished in principle and for which we can best use special designations since, in reality, there are two kinds of psychology [ibid., p. 101.

In contemporary science all sorts of forms and types of mixing two sciences into a seeming unity are represented. What these sciences have in common is their object, but this does not say anything about these sciences themselves. Geology, geography, and agronomics all study the earth, but their construction, their principle of scientific knowledge differs. We may through description change the mind into a chain of causes and actions and may picture it as a combination of elements—objectively and subjectively. If we carry both conceptions to the extreme and give them a sci