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[Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading

Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. 

I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many questions but they are related at least for me. 

I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , determinate being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? 

Could we say parts of a clock are moments of its wholeness ? Surely No. Does its wholeness refer to its functioning as measuring of time ? I would not enter topic of activity. But David's 'uncongealed relations' could be a case in point. Could say phenomena and processes if looked at in their unified oneness , contiguous cosmos/world/universe , are wholes and thencefrom moments in each angle of visioning . 

 Right with 'sum of the parts etc. part=component yet 'exclusive' does not work. In the entity or body of the clock , parts/components find a meaning not in their disparity and separateness/discreteness . A matter of 'inclusion' . This takes us right to the Theses in regard to objects not dealt with sensually and the very congealed human relations in 'commodities' . 

I wonder if so far 'realm' is elucidated. 

Again with permission , if determinate being is 'emptiness' as for Hegel , nothingness also emptiness for him , 'becoming' attained out of their interaction . Am I mistaken with these terms in Hegel. He repeatedly returns to these terms and I cannot understand or imagine such mechanism with 'material' and 'ideal' in Mind. In our previous discussion I talked of Hegel as the Master of Categories and Concepts (Notion) but not of 'matter' as Marx was ; Such argumentation in the body of the Logic puts me in doubt again as to the very small difference you mentioned. I do confirm your sagacity in such matters but the fact is that I really struggle with the complications . Determinate being 'part' of Being as nothing? Being=Notion , not least close to 'matter' ? Actuality part of 'reflection' ? What reflection? Reflection of Nothingness ? I still continue to understand , Andy. 

With 'who' I meant types of philosophers . This I should pursue to know myself. I'm still bound to materialism vs idealism as this latter one as taking us to nowhere where nothing is full of everything not the idea emanating from complex matter. 

 Thank you ! Whole is a Relative term ! That's it !
Figuring out what IS mediating between actions , as you strongly grasp to it and teach us , is , artefacts as signs . Either I'm erring or artefacts ARE NOT thoughts. Evidence is 'Thinking and Speech' . 
Many thanks for this : [Lenin was fully aware of the 'different senses' in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage.]
Today I should repeatedly give my thanks to you , Andy , because I feel so close to you in understanding. Of course Hegel does not stop at criticizing Spinoza maybe because Spinoza is not a man of Notion as he himself is or maybe for some Spinoza is more idealistic than Hegel is . I'd like to quote just one reference in this respect. But it needs another post.
Thank you you were so patient as to be ready and willing to answer my questions . It's very good to learn from others in an appropriate manner. I'll be back to learn more when necessary. Have a sweet good night!
Best wishes
      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
 To: ‪Haydi Zulfei‬ ‪ <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
 Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 19:22:39
 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
 Haydi, you know that is far too many questions at once for me. But I will try some quick-fire answers and see how far I can get. 'Moment' has a special meaning in Hegel, not unrelated to its mathematical meaning: each moment is the whole, but at a different level of generality.
 'Part' and 'component' are not really scienific words, but I would say that 'components' are implicitly mutually exclusive parts that add up to the whole, whereas 'part' has not such connotation, but could be overlapping, but in "the sum of the parts etc ..." parts means components.
  Don't really know what you mean by "realm". Are we talking Hegelian categories here? "Determinate Being" (Dasein) is part of Being, whereas Actuality is part of Reflection.
  "Who affirms?" Don't see how "who comes in here. "Whole" is a relative term, so yes, we can hierachies of wholes. "How do we determine thought from action?" We have to figure out what is mediating between actions, so as to make sense of actions. Lenin was fully aware of the different senses in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage. I think "Being is Nothing" is Hegel's idea, though he is recapitulating early Greek thought. SPinoza did not see it that way. I follow Lenin for a definition of "Matter" - "a philosophical category denoting everything that exists outside of consciousness." But yes, it is a Substance. 
  ... time for me to go to bed. Andy
    Andy Blunden
 https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research  On 23/08/2017 12:14 AM, ‪Haydi Zulfei‬ ‪ wrote:
First I confess my limits in discussion.
David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood.
Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts."

What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each?
You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' . 
Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus?
Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel?
Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared.
Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel? 
I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received . 
Still student

----- Forwarded Message -----
 From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
 To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
 Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44
 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the 
Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails 
Marx's Capital.

The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine 
whole) not because there are some additional parts you 
forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite 
being not made up of anything other than the parts.

I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking 
/perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical 
circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through 
which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies 
the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of 
the child,” that is, determining the child’s 
/ perezhivanie/“... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev 
seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is 


Andy Blunden

On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
 What other than commodities are the units of capital 
composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations 
in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of 
human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a 
fetishist, are you?

My point about actions and activities was precisely that 
activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; 
that's why activity fails the third test.

I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract 
rules, the community relations and the division of labor 
that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions 
between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of 
labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, 
blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an 
analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the 
distinctiveness) of parts.


David Kellogg
Macquarie University

Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards 
Conceptual Complementarity

Free E-print Downloadable at:


On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden 
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things
    (or events) are activities composed of??

    And while you're at it, what other than commodities
    are units of capital composed of?


    Andy Blunden
    http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>

    On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote:


        Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions,
        and that if we take away
        actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev).
        To me, this is an
        admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts.
        Compare Vygotsky's
        thought experiment of structuring a game in such a
        way that we take away
        all the roles and we see that abstract rules
        remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind
        in Society")*.