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[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler

Dear all,

In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway).

I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a contradiction in terms.

That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole vs parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead.

Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define parts without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs?

(Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a "fundamental particle"?)

Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a part of *something*?

Or is this just a game of semantics?

I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* to Watson, et al.?

I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or by Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for Watson or Descartes?

I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before all of them?"

Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by.

Kind regards,