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[Xmca-l] Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza



Mike,your historical meeting with Bernshtein wassomething fabulous!!!  Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time or later, and hadyou discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein’s ideas? Thank you Mike for attachedpdf with “Soviet psychology”. It is something fantastically interesting. I am muchyounger than heroes of the book, so even from my soviet perspectiveit looks extremely colourful :-) and indeed it explains much…
Sasha 

    четверг, 27 июля 2017 6:35 mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> писал(а):
 

 Hi David--

Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal
understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning.

Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps.
Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting
times, worse his luck.

I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system"
in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special?

Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments
to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that
created a bridge to the
mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning
theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the
Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding
of him).

Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list
that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common
view.

I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A.
Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests.
Me and Nicholas Bernshtein.

Just an accident, perhaps .

mike

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's
> strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion.
>
> a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls
> Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect
> the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to
> home.
>
> b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even
> a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it
> differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists
> like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too.
>
> c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange,
> precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard
> operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular
> caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works
> either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum
> and between cerebrums.
>
> Marie is only six years old
> Information, please!
> Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee....
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc
> (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry)
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis
> was
> > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were
> > approriated by
> > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor.
> >
> > mike
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de
> > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and
> > "irrational"
> > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator"
> > that
> > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional"
> or
> > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any
> > sound
> > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has
> a
> > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named.
> > The
> > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a
> semantic
> > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic
> code
> > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or
> > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein.
> > >
> > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that
> условности
> > is
> > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality.
> > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost
> > anything,
> > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign.
> > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are
> > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex",
> > "conditionality",
> > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position
> and
> > > Spinoza's.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava <avramus@gmail.com
> >
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi, Larry!
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article.
> > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
> > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning
> > the
> > > > topicunder discussion.
> > > > Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby
> > antisemiotic.
> > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’sattempts to use
> > arbitrary
> > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom
> > > (independence
> > > > from mechanical causality).
> > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that
> > > > ”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole
> realm
> > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So
> the
> > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
> > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds
> history
> > > and
> > > > evolution together.”
> > > > («В самом широком философском смысле этого терминавесь мир истории,
> > > > культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле методусловных
> > > > рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение
> методаприродно-исторического
> > в
> > > > применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историюи эволюцию»
> > > >
> > > > ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные
> > науки в
> > > > СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
> > > >
> > > > There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical theory”
> > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse
> > Pavlov’s
> > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these
> two
> > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who
> was
> > > > Vygotsky’s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas.
> > > >
> > > > Sasha Surmava
> > > >
> > > >    вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > писал(а):
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >  I see.
> > > >
> > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
> > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
> > > > work, was a "founding exemplar."
> > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."
> > > >
> > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
> > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > Andy Blunden
> > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> decision-making
> > > >
> > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > > Andy,
> > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking
> > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
> > > > > will open another thread.
> > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
> > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
> > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009-
> > > > >
> > > > > PAGE 270:
> > > > >
> > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
> > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
> > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.  It is
> > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
> > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
> > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
> > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
> > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
> > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
> > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
> > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
> > > > > creative intellectual work. "
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
> > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
> > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative??
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
> > > > > <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >    "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
> > > > >    Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
> > > > >    only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.
> > > > >
> > > > >    Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
> > > > >    Larry.
> > > > >
> > > > >    Andy
> > > > >
> > > > >    ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >    Andy Blunden
> > > > >    http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> > > > >    http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > > decision-making
> > > > >    <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-
> > > > collective-decision-making>
> > > > >
> > > > >    On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Andy,
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Following your lead it may be preferable to say
> > > > >>    single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
> > > > >>    variable  social actions. This doubling  (by
> > > > >>    including both terms) may crystallize the intended
> > > > >>    meaning as you mention.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Andy is this vein can we also include the term
> > > > >>    (examples)?
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Then the moving TRANS forming from single
> > > > >>    (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
> > > > >>    indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
> > > > >>    actions and further movement (historicity) toward
> > > > >>    (framework) practices.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    (framework) practices being another doubling.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    So moving (transforming) from single social  examples
> > > > >>    through exemplary social  examples crystallizing in
> > > > >>    social framework practices.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Is this reasonable?
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Or not
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > >>    *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
> > > > >>    *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > >>    <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >>    *Cc: *Alexander Surmava <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
> > > > >>    *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
> > > > >>    mention
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    to say that *actions* - the individual units of
> > > > >>    *action* are
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    "individual" action. Or better, so is every
> > > > >>    "singular" action.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
> > > > >>    form, but
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
> > > > >>    activity,
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    activities) and the set of words (practice,
> > > > >>    practices) have
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    no systematic difference running across all
> > > > >>    disciplines and
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
> > > > >>    practices.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    German words for action (Handlung) and activity
> > > > >>    (Tatigkeit)
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Aktivitat at all.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Andy
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    Andy Blunden
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > > > decision-making
> > > > >>    <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-
> > > > collective-decision-making>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Alexander, Mike,
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Thanks for the article.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
> > > > >>    Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
> > > > >>    did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
> > > > >>    of practice in knowing).
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Two formulas:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
> > > > >>    do not co-incide
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Action IS individual
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Practice IS a social category.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
> > > > >>    nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
> > > > >>    individual who are separate.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
> > > > >>    They are alike in that both individual action & a
> > > > >>    single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > A philosophical criterion of (truth).
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > I do not have the background to intelligently
> > > > >>    comment, but did register this theme as provocative
> > > > >>    FOR further thought and wording.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > And for generating intelligent commentary
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > From: Ivan Uemlianin
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Cc: Alexander Surmava
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > Ivan
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > --
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    > festina lente
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
> > > > >>    <mcole@ucsd.edu> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> This article might prove of interest to those who
> > > > >>    have been discussing
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> LSV's sources in
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> marx and spinoza.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> mike
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >>    >
> > > > >>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> >
>