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[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza



Hi Sasha--

I see that your access problems are straightened out. It is very common for
members of xmca to have a chance in their email address that gets our
server to reject it. The solution is write to bjones@ucsd.edu to get off,
and then sign up yourself. This cumbersome procedure is to minimize spam
getting into the discussion.

I do not recall the relation between (uslovni) conditional and conventional
in David's note so i could not follow that part of your note.

I doknow that it was a revelation to me, trained as a third generation
Skinnerian, to learn that conditioned reflex was a mis-translation of
uslovni. If the word conditional had been used, i would have caught on to
Pavlov's basic ideas a lot more quickly and understoon more deeply how
Luria et al appropriated "second siglan system as a life preserver.

The Winn text disturbed in when we first discussed it because it contained
articles written by Leontiev in the late '40's. His defense of Lysenko and
the ways in which he formulated his ideas displayed an alarming confluences
with post WWII Stalinism.

That reading forced some, incomplete, rethinking of the LSV-Leontiev
falling out and the efforts of those, like myself, see their views as
different emphases on a common problematic. That re-thinking can be seen in
a good deal of xmca discussion.

I do not recall meeting with Bernstein after that first day at Luria's lab.
I was traumatized because Luria introduced me after his talk as a newly
minted expert on mathematical psychology from the US and asked me to speak
extemporaneously. Talk about throwing a kid in to the deep end of the pool
and requiring it to swim out on its own!

However, there was always a lot of cross talk among luria, his colleagues,
his lab members and students not only about Bernstein, but Anokhin,
Feigenberg and others, as well was as a generalized sense that they were
different branches of some (to me) indistinct theoretical family.

They all came under deadly attack in the Pavlovian sessions you refer to (
for those who do not understand what Sasha was referring to, see an
overview here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavlovian_session. Vygotskians were among the
bad guys. There is discussion of this matter in the video that accompanies
the expanded Luria autobiography volume that exists somewhere online.)

As to the discussion of Hegel and Spinoza, I'll leave that to you
cognoscenti to discuss!

mike

On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 1:55 PM, Alexandre Sourmava <avramus@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Dearfriends!
> First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. Among
> otherthings I met difficultieswith putting my answer here.
>
> David,thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word
> «условный». I agree with you, that the best translation willbe
> “conventional”. This term coincides well enoughwith Vygotsky’s idea that
> mature word in developmentof infant’s speech is something entirely
> "random","reason-less", and "irrational", something established by
> mereagreement (conventions). (See “Орудие и знак в развитии ребенка”)
> As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory,
> I’llagree with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's
> andPavlov's conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov’s
> “teaching” wascanonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially
> later, closer to1950 – the year of so called Pavlovian session of the
> Soviet Academy of Science.So a fresh trauma of this “historical event”
> evidently shade in Luria’s andLeont’ev’s mind the earlier situation. The
> affinity of Vygotsky's idea of HMFand Pavlov's Second Signaling System is
> not something coincidental. Anyhow, thissubject deserves seriousinquiry.
>
>
>
> Mike, yourhistorical meeting with Bernshtein was something fabulous!!!
> Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time orlater, and had you
> discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein’s ideas?
> Thank you Mike for attached pdf with “Soviet psychology”. It is
> somethingfantastically interesting. I am much younger than heroes of
> thebook, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful
> :-) and indeedit explains much…
>
>
>
> Andy, Ilike very much your witty formula “In the 21st century, Spinoza is
> no longer a dead dog, but he is adead end” :-)
> But I decisively disagree with you…
> I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but
> regarding Spinoza’s(and Marx’s) role in future psychology I agree with him
> absolutely.
> I can not agree with you that “Any attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in
> experimental Psychologyis a charade” too. Surely, it is impossible to try
> to apply Spinozian ideas to (andeven this in the best case) so called
> “experimental Psychology” which is basedon primitive Cartesian logic.
> However, I’m sure that Hegels’smotto that Spinozism is a necessary basis
> of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was twohundred years
> ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well.
> All the best!
>
> Sasha
>
> P.S. In a few days I hope to finish updating of full Russianversion of
> “Ilyenkov and revolution in psychology”. I’ll put it here and onAcademy.edu
>
>       От: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>  Кому: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>  Отправлено: четверг, 27 июля 2017 6:35
>  Тема: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>
> Hi David--
>
> Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal
> understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning.
>
> Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps.
> Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting
> times, worse his luck.
>
> I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system"
> in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special?
>
> Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments
> to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that
> created a bridge to the
> mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning
> theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the
> Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding
> of him).
>
> Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list
> that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common
> view.
>
> I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A.
> Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests.
> Me and Nicholas Bernshtein.
>
> Just an accident, perhaps .
>
> mike
>
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's
> > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion.
> >
> > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls
> > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably
> connect
> > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer
> to
> > home.
> >
> > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like
> "Even
> > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how
> it
> > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist
> physiologists
> > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too.
> >
> > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard
> exchange,
> > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard
> > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular
> > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice
> works
> > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the
> cerebrum
> > and between cerebrums.
> >
> > Marie is only six years old
> > Information, please!
> > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee....
> >
> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc
> > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry)
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis
> > was
> > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were
> > > approriated by
> > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor.
> > >
> > > mike
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de
> > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and
> > > "irrational"
> > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator"
> > > that
> > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be
> "conventional"
> > or
> > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any
> > > sound
> > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything
> has
> > a
> > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be
> named.
> > > The
> > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a
> > semantic
> > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic
> > code
> > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or
> > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein.
> > > >
> > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that
> > условности
> > > is
> > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or
> conventionality.
> > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost
> > > anything,
> > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the
> sign.
> > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov
> are
> > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex",
> > > "conditionality",
> > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position
> > and
> > > > Spinoza's.
> > > >
> > > > David Kellogg
> > > > Macquarie University
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava <
> avramus@gmail.com
> > >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi, Larry!
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article.
> > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
> > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment
> concerning
> > > the
> > > > > topicunder discussion.
> > > > > Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby
> > > antisemiotic.
> > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’sattempts to use
> > > arbitrary
> > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom
> > > > (independence
> > > > > from mechanical causality).
> > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that
> > > > > ”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole
> > realm
> > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So
> > the
> > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
> > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds
> > history
> > > > and
> > > > > evolution together.”
> > > > > («В самом широком философском смысле этого терминавесь мир истории,
> > > > > культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле
> методусловных
> > > > > рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение
> > методаприродно-исторического
> > > в
> > > > > применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историюи эволюцию»
> > > > >
> > > > > ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные
> > > науки в
> > > > > СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
> > > > >
> > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical
> theory”
> > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse
> > > Pavlov’s
> > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these
> > two
> > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who
> > was
> > > > > Vygotsky’s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas.
> > > > >
> > > > > Sasha Surmava
> > > > >
> > > > >    вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > писал(а):
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >  I see.
> > > > >
> > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
> > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
> > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar."
> > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."
> > > > >
> > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
> > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > Andy Blunden
> > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > decision-making
> > > > >
> > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > > > Andy,
> > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking
> > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
> > > > > > will open another thread.
> > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
> > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
> > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009-
> > > > > >
> > > > > > PAGE 270:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
> > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
> > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.  It is
> > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
> > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
> > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
> > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
> > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
> > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
> > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
> > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
> > > > > > creative intellectual work. "
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
> > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
> > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative??
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
> > > > > > <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
> > > > > >    Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
> > > > > >    only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
> > > > > >    Larry.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Andy
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > >    Andy Blunden
> > > > > >    http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> > > > > >    http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > > > decision-making
> > > > > >    <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-
> > > > > collective-decision-making>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Andy,
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Following your lead it may be preferable to say
> > > > > >>    single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
> > > > > >>    variable  social actions. This doubling  (by
> > > > > >>    including both terms) may crystallize the intended
> > > > > >>    meaning as you mention.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Andy is this vein can we also include the term
> > > > > >>    (examples)?
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Then the moving TRANS forming from single
> > > > > >>    (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
> > > > > >>    indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
> > > > > >>    actions and further movement (historicity) toward
> > > > > >>    (framework) practices.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    (framework) practices being another doubling.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    So moving (transforming) from single social  examples
> > > > > >>    through exemplary social  examples crystallizing in
> > > > > >>    social framework practices.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Is this reasonable?
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Or not
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > >>    *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
> > > > > >>    *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > > >>    <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >>    *Cc: *Alexander Surmava <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
> > > > > >>    *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
> > > > > >>    mention
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    to say that *actions* - the individual units of
> > > > > >>    *action* are
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    "individual" action. Or better, so is every
> > > > > >>    "singular" action.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
> > > > > >>    form, but
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
> > > > > >>    activity,
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    activities) and the set of words (practice,
> > > > > >>    practices) have
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    no systematic difference running across all
> > > > > >>    disciplines and
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
> > > > > >>    practices.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    German words for action (Handlung) and activity
> > > > > >>    (Tatigkeit)
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Aktivitat at all.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Andy
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    Andy Blunden
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > > > > decision-making
> > > > > >>    <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-
> > > > > collective-decision-making>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Alexander, Mike,
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Thanks for the article.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
> > > > > >>    Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
> > > > > >>    did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
> > > > > >>    of practice in knowing).
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Two formulas:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
> > > > > >>    do not co-incide
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Action IS individual
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Practice IS a social category.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
> > > > > >>    nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
> > > > > >>    individual who are separate.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
> > > > > >>    They are alike in that both individual action & a
> > > > > >>    single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > A philosophical criterion of (truth).
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > I do not have the background to intelligently
> > > > > >>    comment, but did register this theme as provocative
> > > > > >>    FOR further thought and wording.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > And for generating intelligent commentary
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > From: Ivan Uemlianin
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Cc: Alexander Surmava
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > Ivan
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > --
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    > festina lente
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
> > > > > >>    <mcole@ucsd.edu> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> This article might prove of interest to those who
> > > > > >>    have been discussing
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> LSV's sources in
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> marx and spinoza.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> mike
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>    >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>