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[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza



That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts
being discussed.

Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the
epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy:

“All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams
that untravelled world whose margin fades
forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson
Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a
loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a constrained
world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not
synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to historical
contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice"  ( i think
that i think).

mike

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:

> Dear friends,
>
> I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to
> this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and
> pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the
> future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces
> that are in play, to bend them to our will.
>
> If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at the
> future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of
> conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward than
> the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use.
>
> Hope this helps.
>
> Cheers,
> Peter
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is
> > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. In
> a
> > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice.
> >
> >
> > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s,
> > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will
> > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which
> is
> > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In my
> > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person
> > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another free
> > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising restraint
> > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will
> > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the
> > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic
> > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal
> > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum
> > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations.
> >
> >
> > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws of
> > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to
> > solve.
> >
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden
> > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
> > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
> > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
> > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
> > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
> > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ​​imply the
> >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am
> just a
> >> student, ​​​only that with quite more left to read yet!
> >>
> >>
> >> Alfredo
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16
> >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> >>
> >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere
> outside
> >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both
> positions.
> >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from
> that
> >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this.
> >>
> >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly:
> >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s
> >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh
> >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP
> >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA
> >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Andy Blunden
> >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
> >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
> >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
> >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
> >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
> >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> >>
> >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he
> >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like
> >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism
> and,
> >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works,
> vol. 6,
> >>> p. 122).
> >>>
> >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale
> >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either.
> >>>
> >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why
> >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding
> this
> >>> would greatly help me see your points.
> >>>
> >>> Alfredo
> >>>
> >>> ________________________________________
> >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu  <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net>
> >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39
> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> >>>
> >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that
> >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess
> >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy
> >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes'
> >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on
> >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's
> >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was
> >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being
> >>> banned across Europe for more than a century.
> >>>
> >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a
> >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance,
> >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it,
> >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and
> >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being
> >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky
> >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one
> >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit."
> >>>
> >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of
> >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist
> >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I
> >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated
> >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its
> >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules
> >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one
> >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any
> >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental
> >>> Psychology is a charade.
> >>>
> >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he
> >>> is a dead end.
> >>>
> >>> Andy
> >>>
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> Andy Blunden
> >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
> >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
> >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
> >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
> >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
> >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Hi Alexander,
> >>>>
> >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much
> >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the
> >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose
> in the
> >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that
> 'intelligent
> >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of
> some
> >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by
> W-M
> >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such
> >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter
> attached,
> >>>> link here: ).
> >>>>
> >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing
> >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your
> >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was
> fair to
> >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this:
> >>>>
> >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through
> >>>> overcoming natural determination (the SR reaction, the mechanical
> >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of
> mediation
> >>>> by a cultural sign'
> >>>>
> >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances
> in
> >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply
> >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy.
> When I
> >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and
> Speech, for
> >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an
> >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p.
> 40). In
> >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word  is
> what
> >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The
> word
> >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human
> >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very
> >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary
> (as if
> >>>> unconstrained and magic) means.
> >>>>
> >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of
> >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be
> only an
> >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only
> one
> >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p.
> 172).
> >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological
> >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a
> >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the
> problem
> >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to
> >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs?
> >>>>
> >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by
> >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if
> Vygotsky
> >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I
> think
> >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than
> your
> >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in
> mainstream
> >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in
> >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it
> seems to
> >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor
> >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths.
> >>>>
> >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue,
> >>>> Alfredo
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu  <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
> edu>
> >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava<avramus@gmail.com>
> >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27
> >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]       Отв:  Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi, Larry!
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article.
> >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
> >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning
> >>>> the topicunder discussion.
> >>>> Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby
> >>>> antisemiotic.
> >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’sattempts to use
> >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom
> >>>> (independence from mechanical causality).
> >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that
> >>>> ”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm
> >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the
> >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
> >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds
> history and
> >>>> evolution together.”
> >>>> («В самом широком философском смысле этого терминавесь мир истории,
> >>>> культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле методусловных
> >>>> рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение
> методаприродно-исторического в
> >>>> применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историюи эволюцию»
> >>>>
> >>>> ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные
> науки
> >>>> в СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
> >>>>
> >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical theory”
> >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse
> Pavlov’s
> >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two
> >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who
> was
> >>>> Vygotsky’s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas.
> >>>>
> >>>> Sasha Surmava
> >>>>
> >>>>       вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>> писал(а):
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>    I see.
> >>>>
> >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
> >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
> >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar."
> >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."
> >>>>
> >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
> >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.
> >>>>
> >>>> Andy
> >>>>
> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>> Andy Blunden
> >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
> >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
> >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
> >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
> >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
> >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Andy,
> >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking
> >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
> >>>>> will open another thread.
> >>>>>   From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
> >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
> >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009-
> >>>>>
> >>>>> PAGE 270:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
> >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
> >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.  It is
> >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
> >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
> >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
> >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
> >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
> >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
> >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
> >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
> >>>>> creative intellectual work. "
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
> >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
> >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative??
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
> >>>>> <ablunden@mira.net  <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>       "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
> >>>>>       Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
> >>>>>       only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>       Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
> >>>>>       Larry.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>       Andy
> >>>>>
> >>>>>       ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>       Andy Blunden
> >>>>>       https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=   <https://urldefense.proofpoin
> >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=
> >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy
> >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA
> >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >
> >>>>>       https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril
> >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-
> >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW
> >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV
> >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-
> >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=       <https://urldefense.proofpoin
> >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_
> >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv
> >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0
> >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea
> >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >
> >>>>>
> >>>>>       On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>       Andy,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Following your lead it may be preferable to say
> >>>>>>       single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
> >>>>>>       variable  social actions. This doubling  (by
> >>>>>>       including both terms) may crystallize the intended
> >>>>>>       meaning as you mention.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Andy is this vein can we also include the term
> >>>>>>       (examples)?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Then the moving TRANS forming from single
> >>>>>>       (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
> >>>>>>       indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
> >>>>>>       actions and further movement (historicity) toward
> >>>>>>       (framework) practices.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       (framework) practices being another doubling.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       So moving (transforming) from single social  examples
> >>>>>>       through exemplary social  examples crystallizing in
> >>>>>>       social framework practices.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Is this reasonable?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Or not
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       *From: *Andy Blunden<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>       *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
> >>>>>>       *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>       <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>       *Cc: *Alexander Surmava<mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
> >>>>>>       *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
> >>>>>>       mention
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       to say that *actions* - the individual units of
> >>>>>>       *action* are
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       "individual" action. Or better, so is every
> >>>>>>       "singular" action.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
> >>>>>>       form, but
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
> >>>>>>       activity,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       activities) and the set of words (practice,
> >>>>>>       practices) have
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       no systematic difference running across all
> >>>>>>       disciplines and
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
> >>>>>>       practices.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       German words for action (Handlung) and activity
> >>>>>>       (Tatigkeit)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Aktivitat at all.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Andy
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       Andy Blunden
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
> >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
> >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
> >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
> >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=   <https://urldefense.proofpoin
> >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=
> >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy
> >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA
> >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril
> >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-
> >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW
> >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV
> >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-
> >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=       <https://urldefense.proofpoin
> >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_
> >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv
> >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0
> >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea
> >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Alexander, Mike,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Thanks for the article.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
> >>>>>>       Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
> >>>>>>       did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
> >>>>>>       of practice in knowing).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Two formulas:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
> >>>>>>       do not co-incide
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Action IS individual
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Practice IS a social category.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
> >>>>>>       nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
> >>>>>>       individual who are separate.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
> >>>>>>       They are alike in that both individual action & a
> >>>>>>       single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > A philosophical criterion of (truth).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > I do not have the background to intelligently
> >>>>>>       comment, but did register this theme as provocative
> >>>>>>       FOR further thought and wording.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > And for generating intelligent commentary
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > From: Ivan Uemlianin
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Cc: Alexander Surmava
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > Ivan
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > --
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       > festina lente
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
> >>>>>>       <mcole@ucsd.edu>  <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>  wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> This article might prove of interest to those who
> >>>>>>       have been discussing
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> LSV's sources in
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> marx and spinoza.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> mike
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>       >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >
>
>
> --
> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> Director,
> Office of Institutional Research
> <https://www.fordham.edu/info/24303/institutional_research>
> Fordham University
> Thebaud Hall-202
> Bronx, NY 10458
>
> Phone: (718) 817-2243
> Fax: (718) 817-3817
> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
>