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[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza



I think you are right Peter, that "we control ourselves from the outside," by signs. And signs are of course not made by us, but by those who went before us. This was Vygotsky's view. But I think that bit about the present and future doesn't work. Where did my will come from? It is a product of the past (including ideology and social conditions). Unless of course we are outside of the world.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 28/07/2017 2:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote:
Dear friends,

I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces that are in play, to bend them to our will.

If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at the future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward than the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use.

Hope this helps.

Cheers,
Peter




On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    If everything is determined, then all that a human
    being can do is whatever is necessary, and if they are
    enlightened, be aware of that. In a determined world
    free will is impossible because there is no choice.


    At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany
    around the 1790s, there was a lot of debate about the
    seeming impossibility of free will (which is of course
    still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which is
    probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking
    for Spinoza.) In my opinion, Fichte made the decisive
    breakthrough in saying that a person becomes free when
    they were *recognised* as a free being by another free
    being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by
    exercising restraint and recognising the rights of
    others (the child development people will relate to
    this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will
    with the formation of states in which citizens had
    rights; without the basic freedoms enjoyed by citizens
    of a state, we are reduced to the animal condition.
    Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or
    quantum mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just
    social relations.


    If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh
    obedient to the laws of physics, chemistry and
    biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to solve.


    Andy

    ------------------------------------------------------------
    Andy Blunden
    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>

    On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:


        Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would
        determinism ​​imply the absence of free will* ...
        In any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a
        student, ​​​only that with quite more left to read
        yet!


        Alfredo

        ------------------------------------------------------------
        *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
        *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16
        *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture,
        Activity
        *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov,
        Marx, & Spinoza

        It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will
        (as everywhere outside of human life) does not
        imply determinism. But Spinoza held both
        positions. It is a long time since I studied
        Spinoza and I don't have notes from that time, so
        I can't source my own recollections on this.

        The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains
        it thusly:
        https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.stanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=
        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.stanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=>

        Andy

        ------------------------------------------------------------
        Andy Blunden
        https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
        https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>

        On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:

            Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was
            sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this
            was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not
            sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza
            is] the antithesis to parallelism and,
            consequently to the dualism of Descartes'
            (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122).

            In any case, I know of no one arguing these
            days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's
            ontology to psychology either.

            I am not sure how you are using the notion
            *determinist* or why determinism would be
            involved in ruling out *free will*.
            Understanding this would greatly help me see
            your points.

            Alfredo

            ________________________________________
            From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
            <mailto:From%3Axmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
            <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
            <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on
            behalf of Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net
            <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
            Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39
            To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
            Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx,
            & Spinoza

            Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual
            evidence that
            Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in
            Spinoza. My guess
            is that it was Spinoza's place in the history
            of philosophy
            as the first person to attempt to overcome
            Descartes'
            dualism by building a monist, material
            philosophy, based on
            Descartes' "geometric" method, which held
            Vygotsky's
            interest and respect. This effort, for which
            Spinoza was
            persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite
            Spinoza being
            banned across Europe for more than a century.

            However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky
            entertained for a
            moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single
            substance,
            a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you
            want to call it,
            with infinitely many attributes, one being
            extension and
            another being thought and the infinitely many
            others being
            God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that
            Vygotsky
            followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of
            that one
            substance as Activity - for Hegel under the
            name of "Spirit."

            As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's
            works are full of
            insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic
            project (a monist
            materialism) is right. But his solution is
            hopeless and I
            have not met a single soul who has usefully
            appropriated
            this substance with infinite attributes. Apart
            from its
            mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes)
            *determinist* and rules
            out free will, and is a thinly disguised
            dualism: one
            substance with two attributes instead of two
            substances. Any
            attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in
            experimental
            Psychology is a charade.

            In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a
            dead dog, but he
            is a dead end.

            Andy

            ------------------------------------------------------------
            Andy Blunden
            https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
            <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
            https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
            <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>

            On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:

                Hi Alexander,

                a very interesting text, written in
                brilliant prose. I very much appreciate
                your observations that 'the psychophysical
                (and not the psychophysiological) ...
                poses a REAL task akin to that which arose
                in the course of the evolution of living
                and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent
                action ... is itself ... congruent with
                the real corporeal form of some other
                body'. These propositions interest me a
                lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did
                last year co-author a book where we
                entertained such propositions with respect
                to educational psychology (front matter
                attached, link here: ).

                Like you, in that book, we are critical to
                Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs,
                specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon
                reading your article, on the whole, I
                wondered whether your characterisation was
                fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You
                describe Vygotsky's position as this:

                'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet
                acquires freedom through overcoming
                natural determination (the SR reaction,
                the mechanical triggering of a response by
                an external stimulus) in the act of
                mediation by a cultural sign'

                I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the
                term 'sign' in many instances in the
                conventional sense you refer to. But this
                way of writing sharply contrasts with
                other important tenets and arguments in
                his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's
                characterisations of the 'word' in
                Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not
                think he 'understands the word
                unambiguously as an arbitrary,
                conventional sign', as you suggest in your
                article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and
                paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that
                'the word  is what ... is absolutely
                impossible for one person but possible for
                two. The word is the most direct
                manifestation of the historical nature of
                human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p.
                285). To me, that suggests a very
                different view of words as signs than
                simply conventional, arbitrary (as if
                unconstrained and magic) means.

                In other places, he also writes that,
                'Freedom, as the opposite of nature,
                cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system].
                Freedom may be only an element of that
                nature, not an opposite to natural
                necessity but only one of the forms of
                this necessity' (English Collected works,
                vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who
                would also write that any higher
                psychological function was first a
                societal relation (and what is action if
                not a societal relation?), how could he
                believe that the solution to the problem
                of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he
                was committed to social-historical
                necessity, to human needs?

                In our book, we try to address these kind
                of contradictions by imagining what a
                Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would
                be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued
                the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I
                think there may be more common ground
                between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your
                article allows, but this is surely not
                very much explored in mainstream uptakes.
                I am only a student on these matters, and
                I can not know in advance how far we will
                come with this integrative program, but it
                seems to me that neither discarding
                semiotics for the primacy of action, nor
                discarding action for the primacy of
                semiotics are promising paths.

                In the hope to sustain productive dialogue,
                Alfredo




                From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
                <mailto:From%3Axmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
                <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
                <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
                on behalf of Alexandre
                Sourmava<avramus@gmail.com
                <mailto:avramus@gmail.com>>
                Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27
                To:ablunden@mira.net
                <mailto:To%3Aablunden@mira.net>; Larry
                Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
                Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
                Subject: [Xmca-l]       Отв:  Re:
                Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

                Hi, Larry!



                Thank you for your attentionto the article.
                Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
                However, I think it can be useful to add
                my little comment concerning the
                topicunder discussion.
                Bernstein’s position is substantially
                spinozian and thereby antisemiotic.
                Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to
                Vygotsky’sattempts to use arbitrary sign
                as a magic key designed to solve the
                problem of freedom (independence from
                mechanical causality).
                Thus Vygotsky insisted that
                ”Looking from the very broad philosophical
                perspective the whole realm ofhistory,
                culture, and language is the realm of
                arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional
                reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
                natural-historical methodconcerning human,
                of a tie that binds history and evolution
                together.”
                («В самом широком философском смысле этого
                терминавесь мир истории, культуры, языка —
                это царство условности. В этом смысле
                методусловных рефлексов приобретает
                широчайшее значение
                методаприродно-исторического в применении
                к человеку, узла, который связывает
                историюи эволюцию»

                ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в
                СССР. В кн.: «Общественные науки в
                СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)

                There exists a prejudice that so called
                “Cultural-historical theory” withits
                arbitrary signs is a sophisticated
                antithesis to coarse Pavlov’s
                mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from
                reality. In fact, these two theories are
                identical.That is the reason why Nicolai
                Bernstein who was Vygotsky’s good friend
                had neverreferred to his ideas.

                Sasha Surmava

                      вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy
                Blunden<ablunden@mira.net
                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> писал(а):


                   I see.

                This is a slightly different context. The
                original meaning
                of "paradigm," before the popularisation
                of Thomas Kuhn's
                work, was a "founding exemplar."
                "Exemplar" presumably has the same
                etymology as "example."

                The idea of "an example" as being one of
                numerous instances
                of a process is a different concept, the
                opposite really.

                Andy

                ------------------------------------------------------------
                Andy Blunden
                https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
                <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
                https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
                <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>

                On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:

                    Andy,
                    I will reference where I got the
                    notion of linking
                    [example] and [framework]. If this
                    becomes interesting
                    will open another thread.
                      From David L. Marshall titled :
                    "Historical and
                    Philosophical Stances: Max Harold
                    Fisch, a Paradigm for
                    Intellectual Historians" -2009-

                    PAGE 270:

                    "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative
                    to any intellectual
                    historical method insisting that
                    practiontioners remain
                    agnostics about the value of the ideas
                    they study. It is
                    the chief contention of this essay
                    that he is a 'paradigm'
                    for intellectual historians, a
                    paradigm in the original
                    Greek sense of an *example* and in the
                    DERIVED
                    contemporary sense of a *framework*
                    within which the
                    community of research can proceed.
                    Indeed it is just such
                    *doubling* of the philological object
                    qua example into a
                    carapace for ongoing action and
                    thought that Fisch
                    explored in a variety of ways during
                    his half century of
                    creative intellectual work. "


                    Andy, not sure if this is adequate
                    context, but the
                    relationality of [example : framework]
                    through the concept
                    *paradigm* seemed generative??

                    On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy
                    Blunden
                    <ablunden@mira.net
                    <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
                    <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
                    <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

                          "actions" or "an action" ... no
                    extra word is needed.
                          Extra words like "singular,"
                    "individual" or "single"
                          only confuse the matter.
                    "Examples" is too vague.

                          Cannot make sense of the rest of
                    your message at all,
                          Larry.

                          Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
                          Andy Blunden
                    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
                    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
                     <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
                    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=>
                    >
                    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
                    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
                    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
                    >

                          On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry
                    wrote:

                              Andy,

                              Following your lead it may
                        be preferable to say
                              single (individual) to
                        indicate the uniqueness of
                              variable  social actions.
                        This doubling  (by
                              including both terms) may
                        crystallize the intended
                              meaning as you mention.

                              Andy is this vein can we
                        also include the term
                              (examples)?

                              Then the moving TRANS
                        forming from single
                              (individual) social acts
                        towards (practices) would
                              indicate the movement from
                        examples to exemplary
                              actions and further movement
                        (historicity) toward
                              (framework) practices.

                              (framework) practices being
                        another doubling.

                              So moving (transforming)
                        from single social examples
through exemplary social examples crystallizing in
                              social framework practices.

                              Is this reasonable?

                              Or not

                              Sent from my Windows 10 phone

                              *From: *Andy
                        Blunden<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
                        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
                              *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
                              *To: *eXtended Mind,
                        Culture, Activity
<mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
                        <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
                              *Cc: *Alexander
                        Surmava<mailto:monada@netvox.ru
                        <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>>
                              *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re:
                        Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

                              Larry, when you say "Action
                        IS individual," did you
                              mention

                              to say that *actions* - the
                        individual units of
                              *action* are

                              individual? In which can it
                        is of course a tautology.

                              But *action* is irreducibly
                        *social*, and so is every

                              "individual" action. Or
                        better, so is every
                              "singular" action.

                              A lot of relevant
                        differences are coded in the English

                              language by the use of the
                        count-noun or mass noun
                              form, but

                              on the whole the set of
                        words (action, actions,
                              activity,

                              activities) and the set of
                        words (practice,
                              practices) have

                              no systematic difference
                        running across all
                              disciplines and

                              schools of thought. For us
                        CHATters, "activities" are
                              practices.

                              If you read Hegel and Marx,
                        there is an added issue: the

                              German words for action
                        (Handlung) and activity
                              (Tatigkeit)

                              are more or less inverted
                        for Hegel, and he doesn't use

                              Aktivitat at all.

                              Andy

------------------------------------------------------------

                              Andy Blunden

                        https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
                        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
                         <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
                        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=>
                        >

                        https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
                        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
                        <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
                        >


                              On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM,
                        Larry Purss wrote:

                              > Alexander, Mike,

                              > Thanks for the article.

                              > Moving to page 51 I
                        noticed that when referencing
                              Bernstein he contrasted
                        (action) with (practice) and
                              did not REPEAT (identity)
                        the thesis about the role
                              of practice in knowing).

                              > Two formulas:

                              > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’

                              > • Verification of knowing
                        THROUGH ‘practice’

                              >

                              > These two formulas closely
                        RESEMBLE each other but
                              do not co-incide

                              >

                              > Action IS individual

                              > Practice IS a social category.

                              >

                              > Sociohistorical (practice)
                        in the final analysis is
                              nothing other than the SUM
                        total of the actions of
                              individual who are separate.

                              >

                              > Individual action is LIKE
                        a single experiment.
                              They are alike in that both
                        individual action & a
                              single experiment are poorly
                        suited to the role of :

                              >

                              > A philosophical criterion
                        of (truth).

                              >

                              > I do not have the
                        background to intelligently
                              comment, but did register
                        this theme as provocative
                              FOR further thought and wording.

                              > And for generating
                        intelligent commentary

                              >

                              >

                              >

                              >

                              > Sent from Mail for Windows 10

                              >

                              > From: Ivan Uemlianin

                              > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM

                              > To: eXtended Mind,
                        Culture, Activity

                              > Cc: Alexander Surmava

                              > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:
                        Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

                              >

                              > Yes very interesting thank
                        you! (Ilyenkov fan)

                              >

                              > Ivan

                              >

                              > --

                              > festina lente

                              >

                              >

                              >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00,
                        mike cole
                              <mcole@ucsd.edu
                        <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
                        <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu
                        <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:

                              >>

                              >> This article might prove
                        of interest to those who
                              have been discussing

                              >> LSV's sources in

                              >> marx and spinoza.

                              >> mike

                              >>
                        <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>

                              >

                              >






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