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[Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
I am approaching this topic as exploratory in the spirit of the ‘array’ of options you have outlined in your summary.
My focusing and questioning the term (intentional) questions this terms centrality by pivoting to explore the phrase (is TAKEN to be) - intentional which signals a shift in accent. More focused on what is occurring relationally (relationality being the quality OF this taking to be relation) implying that what is posited as occurring intentionally through his agency or her agency may alternatively be considered as occurring within a mutual single relation focusing upon being TAKEN as intentional. (back and forth moving across …
This shifts the focus to the way that our movements are (taken) and suggests the relational aspect as more central than the intentional aspect.
In what (personal sense) am I drawn to this alternative. I suppose it speaks to where I locate (what matters?) I have mentioned the Japanese motion of ‘ma’ (interval) and I was surprised that Wolff-Michael had explored this Japanese sense ability. If we imagine A/B as two ‘sides’ that become ‘joined’ then A and B are prioritized.
The alternative may be to consider A/B within a SINGLE relation that embodies movement occurring through this gap or interval.
I hear Wolff-Michael engaging with this theme.
I emphasize this is exploratory and radically ‘open’ to revision.
How I move within my personal relations I imagine hanging in the balance. More a focused sense of disposition than intentional positionality.
I am hesitant in my answer, but move through and within this spirit of inquiry. My take on this matter.
Sent from my Windows 10 phone
From: Haydi Zulfei
Sent: May 2, 2017 12:21 PM
To: firstname.lastname@example.org; Andy Blunden; email@example.com
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
I wonder If I understand you well.
We are all revolving around the pivot of quality. No one of us said : 4 to 2 is as 8 to 4 to implicate incremental quantity.
With the 'quality of the intentional' I could not find the other leg of the dichotomy : the quantity of the intentional.
I have to take it as being conscious towards what you're going to do , what need in the hierarchy of needs has taken you to this point of taking over the responsibility and in what 'personal sense' have you risked being accountable to social commitments.
Goal , as it is the actual practical moment of realizing activities (maybe not fully known or altogether unknown to the doer or performer) should necessarily be known to the actor. I fancy myself belonging to a group who scandalize 'The practical essence of Man'! To live is to act!
People here suggested that they understand better if examples are given.
Yes :I had
your relation of 'carry across...' as one relation two moments.
Michael and Alfredo's construal of 'field of speech' in place of a third as mediation.
the primordial relation of (general mediation,tool,activity,sign,stimulus means,general artifacts,etc.)
Julian's relation of considering sign/word within the wider context of ideological tenets as related to the wider sphere of economic activities (use and exchange value)
Wolf-Michael’s relation of concretizing materializing word’s use and exchange value as completely and confidently reframed into Marx’s framework of analyzing ‘Capital’ in detailed explication.
Roy Harriss and Herbert Clark’s relation of co-ordination and integration the former dealing with the strong version of fixed-language code as being defective and inefficient in comparison to a live talk and novel speech fusing linguistic and non-linguistic factors within an spontaneously-created context of activity-based communication. The latter leaning towards a weaker version of non-compatibility of language-s with a communication proper.
I talked about my option and I’m ready to be led to the right track.
And I think I began with both goal-oriented persons and where such persons should take over their responsibility and to what cause they should devote their sleves.
This is what is in my capacity!
I had a review overall. Word by word proverbial cognate was impossible to find. I might have been mistaken in putting it in quoted form . As to its commensurability to the soul of what Ilyenko taught us , though you're a giant here yourselves , yet I wrote to two well-known Ilyenkovians. I’ll contact you for this. Thanks!
Very best wishes
From: "firstname.lastname@example.org" <email@example.com>
To: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org>; Haydi Zulfei <email@example.com>; "firstname.lastname@example.org" <email@example.com>
Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 19:33:32
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
Thanks for focusing our attention upon the relativITY (quality of the relative) exploring ideal and material emerging within goal-oriented joint practical activity.
I want to abstract and focus on the term (goal)
Does goal imply (intentionalITY – having the quality of the intentional)?
This then returns us to Wolff-Michael and Alfredo who suggest differing qualities of relationalITY (qualities of the relational).
The suggestion is not to begin with he or she being intentional, but rather to begin with the relation/place from which he and she ARE TAKEN TO BE …
This may be crytic and may misrepresent this alternative lense of discernment?
If so I will continue to listen
Sent from my Windows 10 phone
From: Andy Blunden
Sent: May 2, 2017 2:03 AM
To: Haydi Zulfei ; firstname.lastname@example.org
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is
no longer ideal"?
I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal"
I'd like to see it in context.
On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a
> definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is
> nothing more than the reflection of the material onto
> mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related .
> The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or
> salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into
> steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into
> material and inversely material into ideal is the very
> process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity.
> For the second part of your remark , I think you've
> forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The
> REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess
> the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the
> properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said
> hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use
> . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very
> history of idealization of a need which , in the process
> of material practical activity , turns into an object as
> product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko
> himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a
> phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the
> genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for
> the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to
> use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions ,
> practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as
> the carrier of ideas.
> *From:* Andy Blunden <email@example.com>
> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <firstname.lastname@example.org>;
> "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55
> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
> So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still
> have ideal properties as well as material properties.
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is
>> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires
>> objectification and deobjectification of objects in
>> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never
>> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in
>> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their
>> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal
>> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is
>> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A
>> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are
>> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the
>> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the
>> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a
>> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are
>> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious
>> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their
>> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal
>> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the
>> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and
>> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical
>> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into
>> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have
>> different definitions.
>> *From:* Andy Blunden <email@example.com>
>> *To:* firstname.lastname@example.org
>> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words
>> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table"
>> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the
>> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of
>> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables
>> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive
>> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay.
>> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this
>> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism.
>> Andy Blunden
>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in
>> a Festschrift for
>> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts:
>> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the
>> interactions of
>> > which they
>> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the
>> present (e.g., the
>> > structure of
>> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms
>> of writing). They
>> > are material
>> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This
>> principle applies
>> > with equal
>> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the
>> more usually noted
>> > forms
>> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute
>> material culture.
>> > What
>> > differentiates a word, such as “language” from, say, a
>> table. is the
>> > relative prominence
>> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists
>> apart from its material
>> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or
>> hand movements, or as
>> > writing,
>> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies
>> an order imposed by
>> > thinking
>> > human beings."
>> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown
>> out of journals by
>> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word
>> and a table is the
>> > relative salience of the ideal and the material.
>> Sure--words are full of
>> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right?
>> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well,
>> because a word
>> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't
>> a word. In a
>> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding:
>> change one, and you
>> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with
>> is the idea of the
>> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a
>> table. You could
>> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a
>> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does
>> ignore the delightful
>> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out
>> of the quote is
>> > just that words are really just like tools. When in
>> fact Mike is saying
>> > just the opposite.
>> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the
>> structure of a pencil
>> > carries within it the history of certain forms of
>> writing. Does he mean
>> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's
>> been used? Or is he
>> > making a more archaeological point about graphite,
>> wood, rubber and their
>> > relationship to a certain point in the history of
>> writing and erasing?
>> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like
>> words--the idea has to
>> > come first.)
>> > David Kellogg
>> > Macquarie University