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[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'



Michael

Going back many, many posts now: almost 24 hours worth, I think.

When I wrote this:

'Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an utterance/dialogic
exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of its
relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class power
becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the argument is there in
Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the field of
opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of discourse that express
these power relationships and help to hold powerful positions in place in
the field. In this view it is not possible to identify the 'value' of an
utterance or a sign outside of this wider analysis… and an analysis of the
particular discursive/cultural field within its wider sociality.'

The sort of thing I had in mind was this 'word/utterance/statement' of
yours (I care not at the moment which of these is chosen - in this context
I am not clear it matters, though I recognise that every work was once an
utterance and a speech act… and that parsing into words is a relatively
recent cultural artifice):

'…. My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more authoritative
on the subject than any or most of us' (see below)

I think the 'value' (i.e. exchange value) of this statement of yours in my
frame has to be understood in the context of its function/workthe
academic field (or this section of it), how power is exerted here through
reference to 'authorities' like Ricoeur (NB not just 'authors' like the
rest of us? ), whether this is really useful in helping the community to
progress its understanding of the issue for practical purposes (e.g. How
many of the readers of this post have seriously read Ricoeur enough to get
the point?).

How our community of discourse comes to be structured so that power
'works' like this - that is a wider issue - and  here it does get hard for
us academics to see ourselves as we perhaps could or should be seen.

Michael: I hope you don't take this cheeky affront too personally: I could
do the same to most of the posts that one reads on xmca, and probably  my
own-  I don't mean to suggest that they have no use-value, and certainly
not that the collective dialogue has no use value. Yet still… we should
recognise that there is a power game in this field of discourse/opinion,
if we are to understand one another well. It may even be argued (with some
merit?) that a quote appealing to Marx - or even Ricoeur - has some use as
well as exchange value (or lets say merit) in linking ideas to a body of
previous revolutionary work.

Hugs!

Julian



On 21/04/2017 16:53, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

>Ricœur (1985), in *Time and Narrative 2*, uses the following distinction
>for the purposes of theorizing the difference between narrated time and
>time of narration. Accordingly, "narrative posses" "the remarkable
>property" "of being split into utterance [*énociation*] and statement [
>*énoncé*]."
>To introduce this distinction, it suffices to recall that the
>configurating
>act presiding
>over emplotment is a judicative act, involving a "grasping together." More
>precisely, this act belongs to the family of reflective judgments.1 We
>have
>been
>led to say therefore that to narrate a story is already to "reflect upon"
>the event
>narrated. For this reason, narrative "grasping together" carries with it
>the capacity
>for distancing itself from its own production and in this way dividing
>itself in two. (p. 61)
>
>My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more authoritative on
>the subject than any or most of us.
>
>Michael
>
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
>------
>Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
>Applied Cognitive Science
>MacLaurin Building A567
>University of Victoria
>Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
>http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>
>New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
><https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-directions-in-mat
>hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>
>On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 10:38 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>wrote:
>
>> I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too loose. A
>> statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind: we don't
>> usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
>> (indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements" because
>>their
>> primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are facts, they
>> are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a question,
>>or
>> an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs, e.g. "Look
>> out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.
>>
>> An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of language
>>we
>> find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a single
>> utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give you a tape
>>of
>> listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in Korean, you
>>will be
>> able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each dialogue,
>>and
>> even whether the speakers are men or women, without understanding any of
>> the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a unit is
>>beside
>> the point. So "utterance" is too broad.
>>
>> And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and Vygotsky
>>are
>> using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a fond, but
>> expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says "mama" really
>> means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's not the
>>case
>> that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine, thanks, and
>> you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that
>>pre-exists
>> "me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am also using
>>the
>> word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the child's
>> point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all. But
>>teleology
>> is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech
>>ontogenesis
>> is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after all, a
>>"complete
>> form" right there in the environment.
>>
>> The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital, the author
>> died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out with his old
>> articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do use
>>wording
>> and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is really the
>> morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky probably
>> learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his classmate at
>> Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which our late,
>> beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.
>>
>> She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's brilliant. But
>>it's
>> OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that Trubetskoy and
>> Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague Linguistic Circle
>> which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics). Chapter 5
>> is based on something from the German idealist psychologists Reimat and
>> Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we have this
>>weird
>> block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant and
>> de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the process of
>> relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means that a
>>concept
>> is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like quality.
>>
>> Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word meaning is a
>> RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are the kinds
>>of
>> words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in fact
>>that's
>> why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't figure out
>>what
>> he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because" meant in
>>a
>> particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the sentence
>> meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a sentence
>> without the rest of the sentence is really a little like asking if there
>> are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and white
>> flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the kid the
>> following
>> utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
>>
>> a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in the USSR.
>>(Why
>> is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of production
>> belong to the workers and peasants.
>> b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the means of
>> production belong to the workers and peasants.
>> c) All the means of production belong to the workers and peasants so
>> economic planning is possible in the USSR.
>> d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production means
>> socialist construction is possible.
>> e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
>> f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
>> g) socialist property forms
>> h) socialist property
>> i) socialism
>>
>> By the time the child is the age when children beget other children,
>> this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of production
>> belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group wording
>> "public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational, designed,
>> and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word "socialism".
>>And
>> because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the psychological,
>>while
>> the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and because wording
>>is
>> inversely proportional to the internalization of inner speech, I think
>>we
>> can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is an
>> internalization of e).
>>
>> But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this. We will
>>need
>> a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between clause-level
>> wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order to
>>describe
>> and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it. Otherwise, not
>> only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block, our model
>>of
>> "internalization" will look like a "suture" or  an "ingrowing" (c.f.
>>end of
>> HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a grandchild's
>> mind covered with scars.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>
>> > Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with "wording" to
>> > describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To help me
>> clarify
>> > your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating about it,
>> how
>> > does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings "statement" or
>> > "utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by others in the
>> group
>> > on behalf of Bakhtin?
>> >
>> > is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us out here?
>> >
>> > Mike
>> >
>> > PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance to me. But
>> that
>> > might make a liar out of me too :-)
>> >
>> > On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > > In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word is often
>> > > unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always fairly
>> clear.
>> > > This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard time
>> > > understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's true enough
>> for
>> > > people who can read and write, but its really an accident of
>> > > orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable but two
>> > > morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally quite
>> > > overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words are
>> > > actually there.
>> > >
>> > > Other languages are not like English. So for example in Chinese (a
>> > > non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and morphemes is
>> > > always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is quite unclear
>> > (when
>> > > you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between
>> morpho-syllables
>> > > that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical Chinese, plays
>> with
>> > > this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word, and the
>> > overall
>> > > effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and morphemes and
>> > meanings
>> > > but not words.
>> > >
>> > > So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of analysis is not
>>in
>> > the
>> > > actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie slova).
>> Holbrook
>> > > Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal meaning",
>> and
>> > > although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting how
>>Russian
>> > > grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around the trap
>>set
>> for
>> > > those who are only going by the English word meaning of "word
>>meaning".
>> > >
>> > > I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In the first
>>part
>> of
>> > > Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with Stern that
>>the
>> > > child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word but a whole
>> > wording.
>> > > He goes even further: he says it's a whole "wording-in-context",
>>that
>> > is, a
>> > > meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern about
>>ANYTHING
>> > > unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of Thinking and
>> > Speech,
>> > > Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram B is
>> arriving",
>> > > "Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have in
>>common is
>> > > that they are not single words but they are single wordings.
>> > >
>> > > Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something that Andy
>> > himself
>> > > points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should be "a
>> > > perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's observation is
>> > > essentially correct (although of course we undo part of his insight
>> when
>> > we
>> > > insist that all languages must "really" have an article of some
>>kind).
>> > But
>> > > it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever written
>>that
>> > > the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because "a", as any
>> > > preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and certainly not a
>> > Russian
>> > > word).
>> > >
>> > > David Kellogg
>> > > Macquarie University
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
>> > > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
>> > > > wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > Re the development of punctuation and the origin of 'words' see
>> > > > http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61
>> > > >
>> > > > -----Original Message-----
>> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>> > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
>> > > > Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
>> > > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>> > > >
>> > > > "the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning tending toward
>>the
>> > > > biblical from current common understandings of the term as a sort
>> > > "lexical
>> > > > object."  The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when writing and
>> neithr
>> > > did
>> > > > the Greeks.
>> > > > I believe there are those who would include the utterance in its
>> > meaning
>> > > > as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation problems! But
>> > discussion
>> > > of
>> > > > them often reveals clarification of the various concepts involved
>>as
>> > they
>> > > > appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has some of
>> those
>> > > > properties.
>> > > >
>> > > > The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor
>>translator
>> to
>> > > > deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross
>> language/cultural
>> > > > systems is what gives academics something to do.  :-)
>> > > >
>> > > > mike
>> > > >
>> > > > mike
>> > > >
>> > > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> > wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > > > and as a further note of caution, the unit in "Thinking and
>>Speech"
>> > is
>> > > > > a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance which seems
>>to be
>> > > > > analogous to "commodity."
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Andy
>> > > > >
>> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > > > Andy Blunden
>> > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy
>> > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> > decision-making
>> > > > > On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>> > > > >
>> > > > >> Michael/all
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> I  go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower than this
>> > > > >> list-serve demands - let me do this before the discussion
>>moves to
>> > > > >> 'binocular
>> > > > >> vision') and challenge the metaphor of commodity/utterance: I
>>can
>> > see
>> > > > >> it has merit but also I want to look at the limitations.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the
>>commodity is
>> > to
>> > > > >> the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking for a
>> > > > >> characterisation of the larger totality involved - e.g. The
>> > > > >> 'economy/mode of production and its contradictions/collapse'
>>and
>> > 'what
>> > > > - dialogue?'
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both take an
>> > > > >> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit'…
>>But
>> > > > >> suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to 'its
>>language'
>> > > > >> (or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse'  or maybe
>> > 'intercourse').
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor 'labour =
>>learning',
>> > > > >> this mapping only goes so far, and has certain dangers. The
>> relation
>> > > > >> between commodity/economy (and the mode of production) and
>> > > > >> utterance/discourse (and the ideological
>>super/infra-structure) is
>> > > > >> much more interesting in the concrete relations of history. I
>> refer
>> > > > >> to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> In reality the relation between commodity production and
>> > > > >> 'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls 'intercourse') is
>> > > > >> dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical
>>development,
>> > and
>> > > > >> even in collective production-and-dialogue.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an
>>utterance/dialogic
>> > > > >> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context
>>of
>> > its
>> > > > >> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where
>>class
>> > > > >> power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the
>> argument
>> > > > >> is there in
>> > > > >> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
>> > > > >> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including
>>the
>> > > > >> field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of
>> > discourse
>> > > > >> that express these power relationships and help to hold
>>powerful
>> > > > >> positions in place in the field. In this view it is not
>>possible
>> to
>> > > > >> identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign outside of this
>> wider
>> > > > >> analysis… and an analysis of the particular discursive/cultural
>> > field
>> > > > within its wider sociality.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke tangential
>> > > > responses:
>> > > > >> I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more focussed
>>post.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Best wishes
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Julian
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might be another
>> > > > >> thread. I only want to note here that the mediation of the
>> > > > >> 'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material form of
>> > > > >> 'production' (I call the economy above) and vice versa does not
>> > > > >> involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely hegelian in
>> > > > >> seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a totality.
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>> of
>> > > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>>of
>> > > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > > > >>
>> > > > >> Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind and
>>Nature),
>> > > > >> and see
>> > > > >>> Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to think of
>>the
>> > two
>> > > > >>> parties to the interaction as two eyes , each giving a
>>monocular
>> > > > >>> view of what goes on and , together , giving a binocular view
>>in
>> > > > >>> depth. This double view is the relationship . (p.133)
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> What is gained by comparing the data collected by one eye with
>> the
>> > > > >>> data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes are aimed
>>at
>> the
>> > > > >>> same region of the surrounding universe, and this might seem
>>to
>> be
>> > a
>> > > > >>> wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy indicates
>>that
>> > > > >>> very considerable advantage must accrue from this usage. The
>> > > > >>> innervation of the two retinas and the creation at the optic
>> > chiasma
>> > > > >>> of pathways for the redistribution of information is such an
>> > > > >>> extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely denote
>>great
>> > > > >>> evolutionary advantage . (p.69)
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> Michael
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > > >>> --------------
>> > > > >>> ------
>> > > > >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>>Science
>> > > > >>> MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC,
>>V8P
>> > 5C2
>> > > > >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
>> > faculty/mroth/>
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>> > > > >>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>> > > > >>> ections-in-mat
>> > > > >>> 
>>hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden
>><ablunden@mira.net
>> >
>> > > > wrote:
>> > > > >>>
>> > > > >>> different trajectories, Larry.
>> > > > >>>>
>> > > > >>>> a
>> > > > >>>>
>> > > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > > >>>> Andy Blunden
>> > > > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>> > > > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> > decision-maki
>> > > > >>>> ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote:
>> > > > >>>>
>> > > > >>>> Andy, Julian, Michael,
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> My learning curve at this moment is in the way of Michael
>> > > > >>>>> describing the back and forth double movement. That is both
>> > > > >>>>> giving/receiving, both
>> > > > >>>>> (expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our relationship.
>>This
>> > > > >>>>> prior to or more primordial then taking the individual
>>stance
>> as
>> > > > >>>>> primary and the relation as derivative.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
>>as a
>> > > unit.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth movement that
>>is
>> > > > >>>>> NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the back-and-forth
>> > > > >>>>> ‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge from
>>WITHIN
>> > > > >>>>> this primordial double relation.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory, shifting the
>> accent,
>> > > > >>>>> or are imdividuals situated differently in the comtrasting
>> > notions
>> > > > >>>>> of units.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas Michael
>> > ‘figures’
>> > > > >>>>> gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> > > > >>>>> *Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
>> > > > >>>>> *To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>><mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> > > > >>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Julian/Michael,
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> I remember getting very excited back in the early '80s when
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters of Capital
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The symmetry between
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis of
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> production is a strong one because both take an
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit as well,
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> which, so far as I know has been neglected. But this
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too far. The
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> "point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and the
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> productive activity of a community is not the same as its
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are bound to
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> make into an independent realm." Concretely, speaking is not
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> producing. But like all human activities, both are subject
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Andy
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Andy Blunden
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>> > decision-mak
>> > > > >>>>> ing
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Michael
>> > > > >>>>>> In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit that
>>contains
>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> essential
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> contradictions… but of what?
>> > > > >>>>>> For Marx the whole point of commodity exchange/value is
>>that
>> it
>> > > > >>>>>> is
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> beginning of an explanation of the 'economy', capitalism,
>>and
>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> labour
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> theory of value is the key to its collapse …
>> > > > >>>>>> What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange in
>>dialogue?
>> And
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> where
>> > > > >>>>> is
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> sensuous/supersensuous
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> is a distraction from the 'point'.
>> > > > >>>>>> That’s my puzzle.
>> > > > >>>>>> Julian
>> > > > >>>>>> On 17/04/2017 21:49, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>> behalf
>> > > > >>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>> > behalf
>> > > > >>>>>> of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > > > >>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> Hi Julian,
>> > > > >>>>>>> the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is
>>to
>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>> commodity
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous parts are
>>there
>> > that
>> > > > >>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>> Marx
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
>> > > > >>>>>>> Michael
>> > > > >>>>>>> 
>>------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > > >>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>> --------------
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> ------
>> > > > >>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>> > > > >>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>> > Victoria,
>> > > > >>>>>>> BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>> > > > >>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>> > > > >>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>> > > > >>>>>>> 
>><https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>> > > > >>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>> ections-in-mat
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>> mathematics/>*
>> > > > >>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian Williams <
>> > > > >>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>> > > > >>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Michael and all
>> > > > >>>>>>>> I am coming late to this discussion and maybe have been
>> > missing
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> some
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues addressed
>>by
>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Functor:
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to some extent
>>the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> critique I
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you are
>>familiar
>> > with:
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> but
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> in
>> > > > >>>>>>>> some ways I am even more skeptical of this metaphor. So:
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as in
>>'economy'
>> to
>> > ..
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> 'Š?
>> > > > >>>>> Š '
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
>> > > > >>>>>>>> What is the 'value' that is exchanged in discourse, and
>>how
>> > > > >>>>>>>> does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in some sort
>>of
>> > > > >>>>>>>> dialogic 'consumption'
>> > > > >>>>>>>> of useful understanding?
>> > > > >>>>>>>> How does the producer of value 'labour' to produce it,
>>and
>> how
>> > > > >>>>>>>> is
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> 'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of the sign
>>that
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> results?
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> [Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value is Marx's
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> essential
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> contribution.]
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Then how does this work relate to devious studies: we
>> already
>> > > > >>>>>>>> have
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural capital/value to
>>symbolic
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> power
>> > > > >>>>> in
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Best regards as ever
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Julian
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am far from
>> happy
>> > > > >>>>>>>> with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward negation of
>> the
>> > > > 'Real'
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> implicit
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a bit more
>>-
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> maybe in
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> 2018Š we should pick up!   :-)
>> > > > >>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 18:22, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>> > behalf
>> > > > >>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>on
>> > > > >>>>>>>> behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> things become easier to think through if you do not
>>take an
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> individualist
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> starting point but a relational one---not "she has to
>> produce
>> > > . .
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> ."
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> but
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> look at what is happening in the exchange, where each
>> giving
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> also
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> is
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you have double
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> giving-taking;
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in a verbal exchange, each speaking also involves
>>listening
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> receiving,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> and the receiving is for the purpose of giving 
>>(speaking,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> replying).
>> > > > >>>>> As
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> soon as you do this, you remain with back-and-forth 
>>movement,
>> no
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> longer
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> action but transaction.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> The other interesting thing is that the Russian word
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> znachenie,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> translated
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> as "meaning" (really, signification) also translates as
>> > "value"
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> "magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically adds
>> "function"
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> "rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and not Kant or
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of Œideality¹ 
>>(i.e.,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> activity)
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> while
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> remaining Œinside
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> consciousness¹, without venturing into the external
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> sensuously-perceptible
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> corporeal
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> world, the world of the palpable-corporeal forms and
>> > relations
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> things.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>       This Hegelian definition of the term Œideality¹ 
>>takes
>> > in
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> whole
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> range of phenomena
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> within which the Œideal¹, understood as the corporeally
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> embodied
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> form
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> of
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the activity of
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> social man, really exists ­ as activity in the form of 
>>the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> thing,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> or
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> conversely, as the thing
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this 
>>activity, as
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> its
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> fleeting
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> metamorphoses.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>       Without an understanding of this state of affairs 
>>it
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> would be
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> totally
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> impossible to fathom
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the miracles performed by the commodity before people¹s
>> eyes,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the commodity-form of the product, particularly in its
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> dazzling money-form, in the form
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> of
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> notorious Œreal
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹, things 
>>which,
>> as
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> soon
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> as
>> > > > >>>>> we
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> have the slightest
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> theoretical understanding of them, immediately turn out 
>>to
>> be
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> not
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> Œreal¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> at
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> all, but Œideal¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> through and through, things whose category quite
>> > unambiguously
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> includes
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> words, the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> units of language, and many other Œthings¹. Things that,
>> > while
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> being
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> wholly
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œmaterial¹,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all their 
>>Œmeaning¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> (function
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> rôle) from Œspirit¹,
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> >from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their specific 
>>corporeal
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>> existence.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Outside spirit and
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> without it there cannot even be words; there is merely a
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> vibration of
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> air.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Michael
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>> -----------------------------
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> ---------------
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> ------
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied 
>>Cognitive
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> 
>><https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>> > mathematics/
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> >* On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM, 
>><lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> wrote:
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s trajectory as
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> presented in
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> his
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of the 
>>Sign). On
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> page
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> 149
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> he
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attempts to clarify the difference between sign complex
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
>> > > > >>>>> &
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> sign
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> complex Œvalue¹.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> His methodology is to read Marx Œsubstituting¹ the word
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> ŒSIGN¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> (implying
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites this method 
>>will
>> > be
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> generative.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Here is his realization through the method of 
>>re-reading
>> as
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> (trading,
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal footprints
>> are
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> useful/functional to the hunter inherently; they do NOT
>> have
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> (exchangeble value) though they do have use-value for the
>> hunter
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> or
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> hunting
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> party in finding game.  Similarly a sign complex can be
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> useful
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> and
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> product of human labour without being Œvalue¹
>> (exchangeable).
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Someone
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> who
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> satisfies HER needs through her product produces
>> Œuse-value¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> but
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> NOT
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> Œvalue¹.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS (complexes),
>> she
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> has
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> to
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> produce
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR others. She has 
>>to
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come
>> (exchangeable)
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> SIGN, the
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> product
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> HAS
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the SIGN complex
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œconstitutes¹
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> use-value.
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> The production of signs that produce no Œvalue¹ that is
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> exchangeable
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> FOR
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> others leads to personal notes often having NO 
>>use-value to
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> others.
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> To
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹ requires
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> exchangeability
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> under
>> > > > >>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his re-reading
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>> methodology
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >>>>> garrbled the trans/mission?
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I offer this because it helps clarify my reading of
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> My morning musement
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>>>>>
>> > > > >>>>>
>> > > > >
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > >
>> >
>>