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[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'



Not the first volume, Andy. And it's the first volume which has the
structure you are talking about.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 3:44 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Marx did die in the middle of writing Capital, David, and it was finished
> by Engels thirty years later.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> On 21/04/2017 3:38 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
>> I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too loose. A
>> statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind: we don't
>> usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
>> (indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements" because their
>> primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are facts, they
>> are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a question, or
>> an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs, e.g. "Look
>> out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.
>>
>> An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of language we
>> find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a single
>> utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give you a tape of
>> listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in Korean, you will
>> be
>> able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each dialogue,
>> and
>> even whether the speakers are men or women, without understanding any of
>> the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a unit is beside
>> the point. So "utterance" is too broad.
>>
>> And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and Vygotsky are
>> using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a fond, but
>> expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says "mama" really
>> means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's not the
>> case
>> that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine, thanks, and
>> you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that pre-exists
>> "me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am also using the
>> word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the child's
>> point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all. But teleology
>> is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech ontogenesis
>> is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after all, a
>> "complete
>> form" right there in the environment.
>>
>> The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital, the author
>> died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out with his old
>> articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do use wording
>> and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is really the
>> morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky probably
>> learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his classmate at
>> Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which our late,
>> beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.
>>
>> She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's brilliant. But it's
>> OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that Trubetskoy and
>> Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague Linguistic Circle
>> which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics). Chapter 5
>> is based on something from the German idealist psychologists Reimat and
>> Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we have this
>> weird
>> block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant and
>> de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the process of
>> relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means that a
>> concept
>> is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like quality.
>>
>> Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word meaning is a
>> RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are the kinds of
>> words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in fact that's
>> why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't figure out
>> what
>> he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because" meant in a
>> particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the sentence
>> meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a sentence
>> without the rest of the sentence is really a little like asking if there
>> are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and white
>> flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the kid the
>> following
>> utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
>>
>> a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in the USSR. (Why
>> is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of production
>> belong to the workers and peasants.
>> b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the means of
>> production belong to the workers and peasants.
>> c) All the means of production belong to the workers and peasants so
>> economic planning is possible in the USSR.
>> d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production means
>> socialist construction is possible.
>> e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
>> f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
>> g) socialist property forms
>> h) socialist property
>> i) socialism
>>
>> By the time the child is the age when children beget other children,
>> this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of production
>> belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group wording
>> "public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational, designed,
>> and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word "socialism". And
>> because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the psychological, while
>> the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and because wording is
>> inversely proportional to the internalization of inner speech, I think we
>> can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is an
>> internalization of e).
>>
>> But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this. We will need
>> a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between clause-level
>> wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order to describe
>> and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it. Otherwise, not
>> only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block, our model of
>> "internalization" will look like a "suture" or  an "ingrowing" (c.f. end
>> of
>> HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a grandchild's
>> mind covered with scars.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with "wording" to
>>> describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To help me
>>> clarify
>>> your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating about it,
>>> how
>>> does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings "statement" or
>>> "utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by others in the
>>> group
>>> on behalf of Bakhtin?
>>>
>>> is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us out here?
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance to me. But
>>> that
>>> might make a liar out of me too :-)
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word is often
>>>> unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always fairly clear.
>>>> This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard time
>>>> understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's true enough for
>>>> people who can read and write, but its really an accident of
>>>> orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable but two
>>>> morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally quite
>>>> overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words are
>>>> actually there.
>>>>
>>>> Other languages are not like English. So for example in Chinese (a
>>>> non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and morphemes is
>>>> always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is quite unclear
>>>>
>>> (when
>>>
>>>> you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between morpho-syllables
>>>> that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical Chinese, plays with
>>>> this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word, and the
>>>>
>>> overall
>>>
>>>> effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and morphemes and
>>>>
>>> meanings
>>>
>>>> but not words.
>>>>
>>>> So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of analysis is not in
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie slova).
>>>> Holbrook
>>>> Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal meaning", and
>>>> although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting how Russian
>>>> grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around the trap set
>>>> for
>>>> those who are only going by the English word meaning of "word meaning".
>>>>
>>>> I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In the first part
>>>> of
>>>> Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with Stern that the
>>>> child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word but a whole
>>>>
>>> wording.
>>>
>>>> He goes even further: he says it's a whole "wording-in-context", that
>>>>
>>> is, a
>>>
>>>> meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern about ANYTHING
>>>> unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of Thinking and
>>>>
>>> Speech,
>>>
>>>> Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram B is
>>>> arriving",
>>>> "Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have in common is
>>>> that they are not single words but they are single wordings.
>>>>
>>>> Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something that Andy
>>>>
>>> himself
>>>
>>>> points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should be "a
>>>> perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's observation is
>>>> essentially correct (although of course we undo part of his insight when
>>>>
>>> we
>>>
>>>> insist that all languages must "really" have an article of some kind).
>>>>
>>> But
>>>
>>>> it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever written that
>>>> the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because "a", as any
>>>> preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and certainly not a
>>>>
>>> Russian
>>>
>>>> word).
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
>>>> d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
>>>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Re the development of punctuation and the origin of 'words' see
>>>>> http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>>>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
>>>>> Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>>>>>
>>>>> "the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning tending toward the
>>>>> biblical from current common understandings of the term as a sort
>>>>>
>>>> "lexical
>>>>
>>>>> object."  The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when writing and neithr
>>>>>
>>>> did
>>>>
>>>>> the Greeks.
>>>>> I believe there are those who would include the utterance in its
>>>>>
>>>> meaning
>>>
>>>> as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation problems! But
>>>>>
>>>> discussion
>>>
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>>> them often reveals clarification of the various concepts involved as
>>>>>
>>>> they
>>>
>>>> appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has some of those
>>>>> properties.
>>>>>
>>>>> The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor translator to
>>>>> deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross language/cultural
>>>>> systems is what gives academics something to do.  :-)
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> and as a further note of caution, the unit in "Thinking and Speech"
>>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>
>>>> a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance which seems to be
>>>>>> analogous to "commodity."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>
>>>>> decision-making
>>>
>>>> On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael/all
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I  go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower than this
>>>>>>> list-serve demands - let me do this before the discussion moves to
>>>>>>> 'binocular
>>>>>>> vision') and challenge the metaphor of commodity/utterance: I can
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> see
>>>
>>>> it has merit but also I want to look at the limitations.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>
>>>> the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking for a
>>>>>>> characterisation of the larger totality involved - e.g. The
>>>>>>> 'economy/mode of production and its contradictions/collapse' and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> 'what
>>>
>>>> - dialogue?'
>>>>>
>>>>>> And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both take an
>>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit'… But
>>>>>>> suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to 'its language'
>>>>>>> (or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse'  or maybe
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> 'intercourse').
>>>
>>>> But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor 'labour = learning',
>>>>>>> this mapping only goes so far, and has certain dangers. The relation
>>>>>>> between commodity/economy (and the mode of production) and
>>>>>>> utterance/discourse (and the ideological super/infra-structure) is
>>>>>>> much more interesting in the concrete relations of history. I refer
>>>>>>> to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In reality the relation between commodity production and
>>>>>>> 'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls 'intercourse') is
>>>>>>> dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical development,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> and
>>>
>>>> even in collective production-and-dialogue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an utterance/dialogic
>>>>>>> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> its
>>>
>>>> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class
>>>>>>> power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the argument
>>>>>>> is there in
>>>>>>> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
>>>>>>> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the
>>>>>>> field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> discourse
>>>
>>>> that express these power relationships and help to hold powerful
>>>>>>> positions in place in the field. In this view it is not possible to
>>>>>>> identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign outside of this wider
>>>>>>> analysis… and an analysis of the particular discursive/cultural
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> field
>>>
>>>> within its wider sociality.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke tangential
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> responses:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more focussed post.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Best wishes
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might be another
>>>>>>> thread. I only want to note here that the mediation of the
>>>>>>> 'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material form of
>>>>>>> 'production' (I call the economy above) and vice versa does not
>>>>>>> involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely hegelian in
>>>>>>> seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a totality.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
>>>>>>> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind and Nature),
>>>>>>> and see
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to think of the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> two
>>>
>>>> parties to the interaction as two eyes , each giving a monocular
>>>>>>>> view of what goes on and , together , giving a binocular view in
>>>>>>>> depth. This double view is the relationship . (p.133)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What is gained by comparing the data collected by one eye with the
>>>>>>>> data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes are aimed at the
>>>>>>>> same region of the surrounding universe, and this might seem to be
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a
>>>
>>>> wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy indicates that
>>>>>>>> very considerable advantage must accrue from this usage. The
>>>>>>>> innervation of the two retinas and the creation at the optic
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> chiasma
>>>
>>>> of pathways for the redistribution of information is such an
>>>>>>>> extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely denote great
>>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage . (p.69)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive Science
>>>>>>>> MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5C2
>>>
>>>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> faculty/mroth/>
>>>
>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> different trajectories, Larry.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> decision-maki
>>>
>>>> ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy, Julian, Michael,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My learning curve at this moment is in the way of Michael
>>>>>>>>>> describing the back and forth double movement. That is both
>>>>>>>>>> giving/receiving, both
>>>>>>>>>> (expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our relationship. This
>>>>>>>>>> prior to or more primordial then taking the individual stance as
>>>>>>>>>> primary and the relation as derivative.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS as a
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> unit.
>>>>
>>>>> Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth movement that is
>>>>>>>>>> NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the back-and-forth
>>>>>>>>>> ‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge from WITHIN
>>>>>>>>>> this primordial double relation.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory, shifting the accent,
>>>>>>>>>> or are imdividuals situated differently in the comtrasting
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> notions
>>>
>>>> of units.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas Michael
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ‘figures’
>>>
>>>> gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>> *Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
>>>>>>>>>> *To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Julian/Michael,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I remember getting very excited back in the early '80s when
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters of Capital
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The symmetry between
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> production is a strong one because both take an
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit as well,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> which, so far as I know has been neglected. But this
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too far. The
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> productive activity of a community is not the same as its
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are bound to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> make into an independent realm." Concretely, speaking is not
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> producing. But like all human activities, both are subject
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> decision-mak
>>>
>>>> ing
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit that contains the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> contradictions… but of what?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For Marx the whole point of commodity exchange/value is that it
>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> beginning of an explanation of the 'economy', capitalism, and the
>>>>>>>>>> labour
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> theory of value is the key to its collapse …
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange in dialogue? And
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
>>>>>>>>>> sensuous/supersensuous
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> is a distraction from the 'point'.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That’s my puzzle.
>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 21:49, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
>>>>>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>
>>>> of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Julian,
>>>>>>>>>>>> the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> commodity
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous parts are there
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>
>>>> Marx
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria,
>>>
>>>> BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ections-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian Williams <
>>>>>>>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am coming late to this discussion and maybe have been
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> missing
>>>
>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues addressed by the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Functor:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to some extent the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> critique I
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you are familiar
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> with:
>>>
>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> some ways I am even more skeptical of this metaphor. So:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as in 'economy' to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ..
>>>
>>>> 'Š?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Š '
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What is the 'value' that is exchanged in discourse, and how
>>>>>>>>>>>>> does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in some sort of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogic 'consumption'
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of useful understanding?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> How does the producer of value 'labour' to produce it, and how
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of the sign that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> results?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> [Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value is Marx's
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> essential
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> contribution.]
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then how does this work relate to devious studies: we already
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural capital/value to symbolic
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> power
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Best regards as ever
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Julian
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am far from happy
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward negation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 'Real'
>>>>>
>>>>>> implicit
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a bit more -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> maybe in
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 2018Š we should pick up!   :-)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 18:22, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>
>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things become easier to think through if you do not take an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> individualist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> starting point but a relational one---not "she has to produce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> . .
>>>>
>>>>> ."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> look at what is happening in the exchange, where each giving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you have double
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> giving-taking;
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a verbal exchange, each speaking also involves listening
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> receiving,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the receiving is for the purpose of giving (speaking,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> replying).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> soon as you do this, you remain with back-and-forth movement, no
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> action but transaction.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The other interesting thing is that the Russian word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> znachenie,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> translated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "meaning" (really, signification) also translates as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "value"
>>>
>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically adds "function"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and not Kant or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of Œideality¹ (i.e.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> remaining Œinside
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness¹, without venturing into the external
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensuously-perceptible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world, the world of the palpable-corporeal forms and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>        This Hegelian definition of the term Œideality¹ takes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whole
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> range of phenomena
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> within which the Œideal¹, understood as the corporeally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> embodied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> the activity of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social man, really exists ­ as activity in the form of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> conversely, as the thing
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this activity, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fleeting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> metamorphoses.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        Without an understanding of this state of affairs it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to fathom
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the miracles performed by the commodity before people¹s eyes,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the commodity-form of the product, particularly in its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dazzling money-form, in the form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> notorious Œreal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹, things which, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> soon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> have the slightest
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical understanding of them, immediately turn out to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œreal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all, but Œideal¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through and through, things whose category quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unambiguously
>>>
>>>> includes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> words, the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> units of language, and many other Œthings¹. Things that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>
>>>> being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wholly
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Œmaterial¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all their Œmeaning¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (function
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> rôle) from Œspirit¹,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their specific corporeal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Outside spirit and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> without it there cannot even be words; there is merely a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vibration of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> air.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics/
>>>
>>>> * On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s trajectory as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> presented in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of the Sign). On
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> page
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 149
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> attempts to clarify the difference between sign complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> &
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> sign
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> complex Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> His methodology is to read Marx Œsubstituting¹ the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ŒSIGN¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (implying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites this method will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>
>>>> generative.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is his realization through the method of re-reading as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (trading,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal footprints are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful/functional to the hunter inherently; they do NOT have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeble value) though they do have use-value for the
>>>>>>>>>> hunter
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hunting
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> party in finding game.  Similarly a sign complex can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> product of human labour without being Œvalue¹ (exchangeable).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> satisfies HER needs through her product produces Œuse-value¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS (complexes), she
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR others. She has to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SIGN, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> product
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> HAS
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the SIGN complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œconstitutes¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> use-value.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The production of signs that produce no Œvalue¹ that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> FOR
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> others leads to personal notes often having NO use-value to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹ requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exchangeability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his re-reading
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methodology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> garrbled the trans/mission?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I offer this because it helps clarify my reading of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My morning musement
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>
>