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[Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!



You believe the following, David?

Neither the biological nor the social endowment
of the child greatly changes in the acquisition of speech;
nevertheless,.....

mike

On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 3:24 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Andy:
>
> A good paradox! Word meaning is a unit, but the spoken word itself is just
> an element--a thing. We can see that this is, on the face of it,
> impossible: within a single holistic analysis, an element can be a part of
> a unit, but a unit can never be a part of an element. So what you are
> referring to when you say that the word is a thing is the "sonic" or
> "phasal" quality of the word: its "acoustic" properties, its "phonetics".
>
> But not its phonology. The word that Vygotsky uses for "phoneme" refers to
> the 1929 work of the Prague Circle, originally the Moscow Circle. He is a
> LITTLE coy about this, because the founders, Jakobson and Trubetskoy, were
> not very popular with the authorities and Vygotsky already had plenty of
> heterodox acquaintances to worry about. Nevertheless, whenever Vygotsky
> says "phoneme", we know he really means what Jakobson and Trubetskoy called
> "morphophonemes". We know this because the examples he actually
> gives--Russian case endings--are morpho-phonemes and not simply phonemes:
> so for example in English the sound /s/ is a simple phoneme when I say the
> word "self" but if I say "Andy's" the sound /s/ is a morpho-phoneme: a
> difference in sounding that makes a difference in meaning. The system (that
> is, the paradigmatic menu) of these differences in soundings are what the
> Moscow and Prague Circles called "phonology" (as OPPOSED to phonetics), and
> this is the kind of "phoneme" that Vygotsky is really talking about.
>
> Still, you can see that it is not what he is talking about when he says
> word meaning, because these units are still nowhere near big enough to
> describe the kinds of changes which must occur when verbal thinking
> develops. I feel the same way about a lot of the examples offered of
> "perezhivanie", including Marc's. If MacDuff's grief or Carla's epiphany
> about the misbehavior of her kids being due to "outside influences" really
> is the unit of personality and experience that Vygotsky wants us to use
> when we analyse the ontogenesis of personality, then it is no more
> appropriate than using the morpho-phoneme to analyse the whole of verbal
> thinking. Just as evolution (of species) requires very different units from
> history (of classes), development, whether we are talking about verbal
> thinking or the personality as a whole, is going to require very different
> units from learning, whether we are talking about MacDuff or Carla. The
> units must be able to develop; that is, the relationship of the elements
> within them must be susceptible to many changes over time.
>
> Let me give three examples of how this happens in different "perezhivanie".
> They are not mine; they are Vygotsky's, and they are all from the
> Pedological Lectures.
>
> First, the Crisis at One. Neither the biological nor the social endowment
> of the child greatly changes in the acquisition of speech; nevertheless,
> the relationship between the personality and the environment, of which
> both personality moments and environmental ones are constituent elements,
> is entirely transformed. Here we are not talking about phonemes, or even
> morpho-phonemes: we are talking about "wordings"--whole utterances. In
> Melbourne I presented some data that demonstrated this beautifully--a
> child's first word is actually an attempt to imitate a whole conversation.
>
> Second, the Crisis at Three. Vygotsky spends a lot of time discussing the
> "Seven Stars"--the symptoms of the "Terrible Twos" and "Threenagehood"
> noted by harried parents everywhere. But by the end of his analysis it's
> clear that what really happens is a new relationship between wish and
> will: in extreme cases, the child actually wishes for one thing (e.g.
> compromise) and wills the opposite (the everlasting "No!"). Again, neither
> the personality moments as such nor the environmental ones change, but
> there is a separation and a sorting which allows the subordination of wish
> to will that we see in play. This isn't the kind of "aha" moment that Marc
> is offering us at all: Vygotsky actually calls it the "antipode" of future
> will, because instead of enabling will it actually paralyzes it. But it is
> indubitably a key moment in the development of the relation of personality
> to environmental moments that we see in "perizhivanie".
>
> Thirdly, the Crisis at Seven. I think Gonzalez Rey makes a total hash of
> this, and I get very cross when I read his article. It is not true that the
> essence of perizhivanie remained a mystery to Vygotsky simply because he no
> longer subscribes to "the aesthetic reaction" and "catharsis" and other
> notions that he toyed with in Psych of Art (he's no longer doing
> experiments on changes in breathing rate when people read the works of
> Bunin either!). It might be true that he never offered a system of facts
> and methodological procedures for perezivanie, but that was only because
> one already existed, for example in the work of Wallon and Stern
> and others. It is demonstrably not true that when Vygotsky says that the
> speech environment of those around him does not change when the child
> learns to talk at one, he is not "profoundly contradictory with the concept
> of sense": when you read the quotation in context, it is very clear that
> what he is referring to are the kinds of absolute indicators used by
> Zalkind: how often the parents read the newspapers, the dialect they speak,
> and their educational background. These do not change, and if the child
> wants to make sense, these are the factors the child will have to relate
> to.
>
> Vygotsky gives the example of a child who is severely retarded. The child
> wants to play with other children and is rejected. The child walks down the
> street and the other children follow, laughing. The child is shrieked at,
> insulted, but as soon as the humiliation stops, the child is perfectly
> happy with himself. Vygotsky points out that the child is not able
> to "co-generalize" the "perizhivanie" of the humiliations: each is
> unpleasant, but they are entirely separate and cannot be connected with any
> internal sense of inferiority. A normal child, however, is able to
> "internalize" these humiliations and consequently develops a sense of
> inferiority. We can see that what has happened is the insertion of what
> Vygotsky calls an "intellectual" moment: an inner layer, which is what
> distinguishes later Chaplin movies from earlier ones (again, Vygotsky's
> example, not mine!) and what brings about the "loss of directness and
> naivete" that we see in pre-schoolers.
>
> I think that the reason people find "perizhivanie" so hard to work with is
> the same reason that they find "word meaning" hard to work with: it
> develops. The feeling of drinking milk as the infant drinks it is
> perizhivanie, and the thought of being humiliated when you are mulling it
> over and contemplating revenge is also perizhivanie, and only a profound
> analysis which includes ontogenetic development and not just learning will
> show the inner link between them. It's for that reason that I think that
> "activity" is not a useful unit of analysis and I am much more inclined to
> use your word "project", so long as it can include what Vygotsky calls
> "inner activeness".
>
> Vygotsky says:
>
>
> Когда я размышляю, припоминаю и т. д., я имею дело с внутренней
> активностью, эта внутренняя деятельность психологических процессов
> непосредственно не связана с внешней деятельностью. Вот эта новая форма
> внутренней активности в школьном возрасте заключается в том, что, в то
> время как в дошкольном возрасте эти внутренние деятельности обнаруживают
> непосредственную связь с действием, внешней активностью, в школьном
> возрасте мы имеем относительно самостоятельно возникающие, относительно
> независимые внутренние активности по отношению к внешней деятельности. Это
> уже ребенок, который может размышлять, в то время когда он делает или видит
> что-нибудь, тот, у которого возникает дифференциация внешней и внутренней
> деятельности.
>
> When I think, remember, etc. I am dealing with inner activeness; this
> psychological process of inner activity is not directly linked to any
> external activity. The new form of inner activeness in the School Age
> consists of this: that while during the preschool years these inner
> activities demonstrated an immediate link with action, with external
> activeness, in the school years we have a relative autonomy which emerges,
> inner activeness which is relatively independent of external activities.
> Here is already a child who can think, at the same time when he is doing or
> seeing something, one in whom has emerged a differentiation of inner and
> outer activities.
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 8, 2017 at 10:07 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > David: "Are words really units?"
> >
> > Well, firstly, "units" is a *relative* term. That is, the question is:
> are
> > words units of something, some complex process subject to analysis. And
> > which?
> >
> > Secondly, according to Vygotsky, "no." The concept Vygotsky proposes as a
> > unit is "word meaning" which he says is a unity of sound and meaning. The
> > sound is an artefact, which, detached from its meaningful utterance in a
> > transactional context is just a thing, viz., a word. Whereas "word
> meaning"
> > is an arrtefact-mediated action, a unit of human social activity.
> >
> > It is true that words can be countable or mass according to context, but
> I
> > wasn't talking about words was I? I was talking about word meaning.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden
> > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> > On 8/01/2017 7:59 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >
> >> Are words really units? When we look at their ideational meaning (that
> is,
> >> their logical and experiential content--their capacity for representing
> >> and
> >> linking together human experiences) they seem to fall into two very
> >> different categories: lexical words like "perezhivanie" or "sense" or
> >> "personality" of "individual" and grammatical words like "of", or
> "might",
> >> or "is". The lexical words seem to behave like units--they are bounded,
> >> discrete, and, as Andy would say, "countable" (the problem is that
> almost
> >> all nouns are both countable and uncountable depending on the context
> you
> >> put them in, so this distinction is really not as essential as Andy
> seems
> >> to assume). But the more grammatical words seem to be elements of some
> >> larger unit, which we can call wording.
> >>
> >> Veresov and Fleer come up against this problem with "edintsvo" and
> >> "edintsa". Of course, as they say, the two words are distinct. But this
> >> doesn't necessarily mean that the former always corresponds to "unity"
> in
> >> English and the latter is always "unit". If you look at the paragraph
> they
> >> translate on 330, you can see that Vygotsky starts with an idea that is
> >> quite "synoptic" and is well expressed by "unit". But in the last
> sentence
> >> there is a sense that "perezhivanie" is a meta-stable unit--one that
> >> remains self-similar only through a process of thorough change, like a
> >> bicycle whose every part is replaced--and in English is it is better to
> >> express this idea with "unity". The problem is that the differences
> >> between
> >> "edintsvo" and "edintsva" in Russian is a matter of gender (I think) and
> >> not simply abstractness, and as a result the English version, which
> cannot
> >> use the resource of gender,has to rely on abstractness, so the words
> >> "unity" and "unit" are somewhat more distinct and less linked than
> >> "edintsvo" and "edintsva".
> >>
> >> There are other problems that are similar. When Gonzalez Rey uses the
> word
> >> "final moment" to refer to the final period of Vygotsky's thinking, he
> >> leaves the anglophone reader the impression that he is referring to
> >> Vygotsky's deathbed thoughts. On the other hand, when Veresov and Fleer
> >> use
> >> "factor" to translate the same Russian word that Gonzalez Rey is using,
> >> they are giving us something more quantitative than Vygotsky intended,
> and
> >> their translation of "dalee nerazloshim'im chastyami etava edinstva"
> >> into  "vital and further indivisible part of the whole" is quite opaque
> in
> >> English (notice that here Veresov and Fleer use "whole" to translate
> >> "edinstva" rather than "unit"!) At some point you have to accept that
> you
> >> can change Russian words into English words as if you were exchanging
> >> rubles for dollars, but you still won't be able to buy a samovar at
> >> Walmart.
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Macquarie University
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, Jan 8, 2017 at 5:21 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no
> >
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Larry, all,
> >>>
> >>> our arguments in the 2014 address a science education literature in
> which
> >>> the constructivist perspective is the leading perspective; We note that
> >>> the
> >>> assertion that people learn from experience is everywhere taken for
> >>> granted
> >>> but nowhere accounted for. We resort to pragmatist and phenomenological
> >>> literature along with Vygotsky's insights to point out the need to
> >>> account
> >>> for learning as something that cannot be the result of an individual's
> >>> construction; in experience there is always something in excess of what
> >>> you
> >>> intended, and this is a basic feature of doing, of performing. I take
> >>> that
> >>> to be your "trans" in the trans/zhivanie word, Larry, which already is
> >>> denoted in the word PERezhivanie.
> >>>
> >>> But I do not wish to move our discussion too far away from Marc's paper
> >>> and the Perezhivanie special issue. We also risk disengaging many that
> >>> have
> >>> not have the privilege we've had to have the time to read so many
> >>> articles
> >>> in just few days into the new year. I think we are a point in the
> >>> discussion where a pretty clear point of agreement/disagreement, and
> >>> therefore of possibility for growth, has been reached with regard to
> the
> >>> view of perezhivanie as "an experience" and as the "working over it". I
> >>> think that to allow as many as possible to follow, and hopefully also
> >>> engage, I think it will be helpful to bring the diverse perspectives
> and
> >>> theoretical accounts to matter in accounting for some actual material.
> >>> And
> >>> there are a number of cases described in the articles, including Marc's
> >>> case of a teacher, as well as everyday facts, such as those brought by
> >>> Beth, and in Beth's article...
> >>>
> >>> I take the task for myself too, but Saturday morning need to attend to
> >>> other things!
> >>> A
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ________________________________________
> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> >>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> Sent: 07 January 2017 18:26
> >>> To: Andy Blunden; Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity;
> >>> Larry Purss
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>
> >>> Andy, Peter, i hope the intention to move beyond politeness to struggle
> >>> with this topic materializes.
> >>> In this vein i want to introduce exploration of the ‘excess’ of actual
> >>> over intended meaning as he sketched his introduction to ‘experience’.
> >>>
> >>> Citing Dewey, Alfredo says that this excess of actual learning over
> >>> intended learning INCLUDES what Dewey refers to as ‘attitudes’ and
> these
> >>> ‘attitudes’ are FUNDAMENTALLY what count in the future.
> >>> Alfredo and Roth  then add this summary statement :
> >>>
> >>> There is therefore, a need to theorize experience in terms that do not
> >>> assume control and rationality as the sine qua non of learning. It also
> >>> implies a need to develop analytical accounts that retain the
> >>> ‘uncertainty’
> >>> that is an ‘integral part’ of human experience.
> >>>
> >>> Where are Alfredo and Roth leading us with this sketch of experience?
> To
> >>> highlight ‘attitudes’ that occur in the excess of actual over intended
> >>> learning? The word ‘attitudes’ generates images of (atmosphere) and
> >>> (moods)
> >>> that ‘flow’ like cascading waterfalls that can be imaged as (force) or
> as
> >>> (receptive). Attitudes that flow to places where they are received
> >>> within a
> >>> certain attitude of care and concern. Not as forceful an image as
> moving
> >>> only  with control and rationality.  Describing ‘weaker’ thought that
> >>> remains uncertain but that also opens us to the other’s peril and
> plight.
> >>> Possibly a post-analytic motion that exceeds the intended by
> >>> living-through
> >>> the actual that develops ‘attitudes’ that are fundamentally what count
> >>> for
> >>> the future.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >>>
> >>> From: Andy Blunden
> >>> Sent: January 7, 2017 5:00 AM
> >>> To: Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>
> >>> OK Peter, what you say is all very true I am sure, but it
> >>> entails conflating activity and action (as mass nouns) and
> >>> context and mediation, and makes the required distinction
> >>> much like one could find multiple meanings for the word
> >>> "and" by listing the different phrases and clauses which can
> >>> be linked by "and."
> >>>
> >>> Andy
> >>>
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> Andy Blunden
> >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> >>>
> >>> On 7/01/2017 11:42 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Let me try to illustrate.
> >>>>
> >>>> Reading as mediated action: The cultural-historical
> >>>> context of reading mediates how one’s attention and
> >>>> response are channeled in socially constructed ways. So,
> >>>> in one setting, say at home or reading in the company of
> >>>> friends, a novel might bring a reader to tears, or invite
> >>>> readers to share personal stories that parallel those of
> >>>> the plot lines, or laugh out loud. But another setting, a
> >>>> formal school or university class, would have historical
> >>>> values and practices that mute emotional and personal
> >>>> responses, and promote a more sober, analytic way of
> >>>> reading and talking that fits with specific historical
> >>>>   critical conventions and genres, and discourages others.
> >>>>
> >>>> Reading as mediating action: The act of reading can be
> >>>> transformational. In reading about an talking about a
> >>>> character’s actions, a reader might reconsider a value
> >>>> system, become more sympathetic to real people who
> >>>> resemble oppressed characters, etc. In other words,
> >>>> reading a text may serve a mediational process in which
> >>>> textual ideas and exemplars enable a reader to think
> >>>> differently.
> >>>>
> >>>> *From:*Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >>>> *Sent:* Saturday, January 7, 2017 6:28 AM
> >>>> *To:* Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>; eXtended Mind,
> >>>> Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>>
> >>>> Can you explain in a paragraph or two,. Peter, rather than
> >>>> asking us all to read 10,000 words to extract an answer?
> >>>>
> >>>> Andy
> >>>>
> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>
> >>>> Andy Blunden
> >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On 7/01/2017 11:23 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>      Andy and others, I tried to work out the mediated/mediating
> >>>> question
> >>>>
> >>> in the area of reading....see if this helps.
> >>>
> >>>>      Smagorinsky, P., & O'Donnell-Allen, C. (1998). Reading as
> mediated
> >>>>
> >>> and mediating action: Composing meaning for literature through
> multimedia
> >>> interpretive texts. Reading Research Quarterly, 33, 198-226. Available
> >>> athttp://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/RRQ/RRQ1998.pdf
> >>>
> >>>>      -----Original Message-----
> >>>>
> >>>>      From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>      <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>  [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@
> >>>>
> >>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >>>
> >>>>      Sent: Friday, January 6, 2017 7:12 PM
> >>>>
> >>>>      To:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>
> >>>>      Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>>
> >>>>      I have never understood this supposed distinction, Alfredo,
> between
> >>>>
> >>> "mediated activity" and "mediating activity" given that all activity is
> >>> mediated and all activity mediates.
> >>>
> >>>>      Also, could you spell out what you mean by the "tension"
> >>>>
> >>>>      between perezhivanie as meaning and perezhivanie as struggle.
> >>>>
> >>>>      Andy
> >>>>
> >>>>      ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>
> >>>>      Andy Blunden
> >>>>
> >>>>      http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> >>>>
> >>>>      http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> >>>>
> >>> decision-making
> >>>
> >>>>      On 5/01/2017 6:26 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>          Thanks Marc for your careful response.
> >>>>
> >>>>          I am familiar to Vygotsky's notion of cultural mediation and
> I
> >>>>
> >>> am aware and acknowledge that it was elaborated as a means to overcome
> >>> dualism, and that it is not analog to a computational approach.
> >>>
> >>>>          When I brought the computing analogy, I did so with regard
> not
> >>>>
> >>> to the concept of cultural mediation in general, but to the way it can
> be
> >>> (and is) deployed analytically. I react to what it seems to me a
> >>> dichotomy
> >>> between a "meaning" as something that is static (thereby a form of
> >>> "representation" or reflection of the relation with the environment
> >>> instead
> >>> of​refraction)​​  and the experiencing-as-struggling, which is
> described
> >>> as​transformation or change. If so, mediation here would seem to be
> part
> >>> of
> >>> a methodological device that first dissects "a type of meaning" from "a
> >>> type of activity" (or a given state from the process that changes that
> >>> state), and then unites it by adding the term "mediation." And this may
> >>> be
> >>> my misreading, but in that (mis)reading (which perhaps is mostly due to
> >>> the
> >>> fact that in your empirical illustration only the initial and end
> >>> product,
> >>> i.e., perezhivanie, are described, but not the
> experiencing-as-struggle,
> >>> that is, the moving between the two), mediation here seems to do as
> >>> analytical concept precisely what you were afraid our monism was doing:
> >>> explaining nothing. Only the end products but not the process of
> >>> producing
> >>> perezhivanie are revealed. This may be problematic if one attends to
> what
> >>> Veresov argues in the paper I shared yesterday, where he defends the
> >>> notion
> >>> of mediation but also specifies that Vygotsky speaks of *mediating
> >>> activity* (as opposed to *mediated* activity). That is, not mediation
> by
> >>> signs as products, but mediating activity as the activity of producing
> >>> signs (which again is an activity of producing social relations,
> perhaps
> >>> what you refer as "holistic meanings"?). What do you think?
> >>>
> >>>>          I did not think you were trying to deny the influence of
> >>>>
> >>> Spinoza, and I do not think we ever said that Perezhivanie was
> primarily
> >>> a
> >>> move from Cartesian Dualism to Monism, as you suggest in your post. I
> >>> copy
> >>> and paste from my prior post:  "The fact is that Vygotsky was building
> a
> >>> theory on the unity of the affect and the intellect that was to be
> >>> grounded
> >>> on Spinoza, and what we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a
> >>> concept being developed during the same period (but not finalised or
> >>> totally settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the Spinozist
> >>> Vygotsky."
> >>>
> >>>>          I totally believe that bringing the distinction between
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie as meaning, and perezhivanie as struggle, is totally
> >>> relevant,
> >>> and Beth Ferholt's vignettes of Where the Wild Things Are do indeed
> >>> illustrate this. We really need to address this tension, which as
> Beth's
> >>> examples and as our own everyday experience shows, is a tension that
> >>> matters not just to books and to theories but to living persons
> >>> (children,
> >>> teachers), a tension that moreover is present and mentioned in all the
> >>> articles of the symposium. The papers offer different proposals, and I
> >>> think is so great we have the chance to discuss them! I too, as you, am
> >>> very interesting in hearing others about the questions you had
> concerning
> >>> sense and meaning.
> >>>
> >>>>          Alfredo
> >>>>
> >>>>          From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>          <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>
> >>>>          <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>          <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>  on behalf of Marc
> >>>>
> >>> Clarà
> >>>
> >>>>          <marc.clara@gmail.com> <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
> >>>>
> >>>>          Sent: 04 January 2017 22:31
> >>>>
> >>>>          To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>
> >>>>          Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>>
> >>>>          Thank you very much, Alfredo, for sharing this excellent
> paper
> >>>> by
> >>>>
> >>>>          Veresov, and thanks also for your responses, which really
> >>>> helped
> >>>>
> >>> me to
> >>>
> >>>>          better understand your points. My main doubt about your
> >>>> proposal
> >>>>
> >>>>          was/is caused by the statement that the idea of cultural
> >>>>
> >>>>          mediation/mediator implies a cartesian dualism. This shocks
> me
> >>>>
> >>>>          because, to me, the idea of cultural mediation is absolutely
> >>>>
> >>> crucial
> >>>
> >>>>          (in fact, the keystone) for the construction of a monist (and
> >>>>
> >>>>          scientific) psychology that does not forget mind –that is, a
> >>>>
> >>> cultural
> >>>
> >>>>          psychology. From your response, however, I realized that we
> may
> >>>>
> >>> be
> >>>
> >>>>          approaching the idea of mediation in different ways. I talk
> of
> >>>>
> >>>>          mediation and mediators in a quite restricted way. The
> starting
> >>>>
> >>> point
> >>>
> >>>>          of my understanding of mediation is a dialectical
> relationship
> >>>>
> >>>>          (organic, transactional) between the subject and the world
> >>>>
> >>> (Vygotsky departs from the scheme stimulus-response, from reflexology).
> >>>
> >>>>          This relationship, that Vygotsky calls primitive
> psychological
> >>>>
> >>>>          functions, would be basically biological. However, in human
> >>>>
> >>> beings
> >>>
> >>>>          this relationship is mediated by cultural means: signs and
> >>>>
> >>> tools; or
> >>>
> >>>>          primary, secondary and terciary artifacts. These cultural
> means
> >>>>
> >>>>          reorganize the primitive functions (dialectic S-O
> >>>> relationship),
> >>>>
> >>> which
> >>>
> >>>>          become then higher psychological functions (S-M-O) (see for
> >>>>
> >>> example,
> >>>
> >>>>          The problem of the cultural development of the child, in The
> >>>>
> >>> Vygotsky
> >>>
> >>>>          Reader). Now, the subject, the cultural mediators, and the
> >>>>
> >>> object form
> >>>
> >>>>          an inseparable dialectical unit, so that the subject acts on
> >>>>
> >>>>          (transforms) the object through the prism of the cultural
> >>>>
> >>> mediators,
> >>>
> >>>>          the object acts on (transforms) the subject also through the
> >>>>
> >>> prism of
> >>>
> >>>>          the cultural mediators, and the cultural means are themselves
> >>>>
> >>> also
> >>>
> >>>>          transformed as a consequence of their mediation in this
> >>>>
> >>> continuous
> >>>
> >>>>          dynamic dialectical tension. Here, for me, it is important
> the
> >>>>
> >>> idea
> >>>
> >>>>          that the cultural means are as material (if we assume a
> >>>>
> >>> materialist
> >>>
> >>>>          monism) as all the rest of the world; in fact, are parts of
> the
> >>>>
> >>>>          material world which become signs or tools (and can be
> >>>> therefore
> >>>>
> >>>>          socially distributed). This permits the introduction of the
> >>>>
> >>> scientific
> >>>
> >>>>          study of mind-consciousness (as mediating systems of signs),
> >>>>
> >>> because
> >>>
> >>>>          mind is not anymore something immaterial and unobservable,
> but
> >>>>
> >>> it is
> >>>
> >>>>          as material and observable as the rest of the natural world.
> It
> >>>>
> >>> is
> >>>
> >>>>          from this view that, for me, the idea of cultural mediation
> is
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>          keystone of a monist psychology that includes mind. Thus,
> when
> >>>> I
> >>>>
> >>> speak
> >>>
> >>>>          of mediators, I refer to the cultural means which mediate in
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>> S-O
> >>>
> >>>>          dialectics; I am especially interested in signs/secondary
> >>>>
> >>> artifacts.
> >>>
> >>>>          Here, it is perhaps necessary to insist that when I talk of
> >>>>
> >>> studying
> >>>
> >>>>          mediators (and their semantic structure), this doesn't mean
> >>>> that
> >>>>
> >>> they
> >>>
> >>>>          are taken out from the activity (the flux of live) in which
> >>>> they
> >>>>
> >>>>          mediate (since out of activity they are not signs anymore);
> >>>>
> >>> here, I
> >>>
> >>>>          think Vygotsky tries again to overcome another old dichotomy,
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>>>          functionalism-structuralism one. I hope that all this makes
> >>>> also
> >>>>
> >>> clear the difference between this view and that of computational
> >>> psychologies (which in general are profoundly and explicitly dualist
> and
> >>> not dialectic).
> >>>
> >>>>          Back to perezhivanie, I'm not obviously trying to deny the
> >>>>
> >>> influence
> >>>
> >>>>          of Spinoza on Vygotsky's thinking (this is explicit in
> >>>> Vygotsky's
> >>>>
> >>>>          writings, especially in “The teaching about emotions”, in the
> >>>>
> >>> Vol.6 of
> >>>
> >>>>          the Collected Works). But I have doubts that Vygotsky's
> >>>>
> >>> introduction
> >>>
> >>>>          of the concept of perezhivanie is to be regarded primarily
> as a
> >>>>
> >>>>          movement towards monism (from a previous cartesian dualism),
> >>>> and
> >>>>
> >>> that
> >>>
> >>>>          this movement questions the concept of cultural mediation.
> >>>>
> >>> Instead,
> >>>
> >>>>          and I think that this is in line with some of González-Rey
> >>>>
> >>>>          observations in his paper, my impression is that the
> >>>>
> >>> introduction of
> >>>
> >>>>          the concept of perezhivanie responds more to a movement (a
> >>>>
> >>> further
> >>>
> >>>>          step) towards holism (something that, in my understanding,
> can
> >>>>
> >>> also be
> >>>
> >>>>          found in Spinoza). Thus, I think that the word meaning is
> still
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>          unit of analysis in the last Vygotsky -and therefore, the
> idea
> >>>> of
> >>>>
> >>>>          cultural mediation is still crucial (in fact, in The problem
> of
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>          environment, he connects the concept of perezhivanie, which
> has
> >>>>
> >>> just
> >>>
> >>>>          introduced, to the development of word meaning [p.345-346,
> also
> >>>>
> >>> cited
> >>>
> >>>>          in my paper]). However, in my view, in the last Vygotsky the
> >>>>
> >>> focus is
> >>>
> >>>>          not anymore primarily on the word-meaning as formed for
> things
> >>>>
> >>> (or
> >>>
> >>>>          collections of things, as in the ontogenetic research with
> >>>>
> >>> Sakharov), but the focus is now in the formation of meaning for
> holistic
> >>> situations.
> >>>
> >>>>          Best regards,
> >>>>
> >>>>          Marc.
> >>>>
> >>>>          2017-01-03 19:16 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
> >>>>
> >>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
> >>>
> >>>>              Hi Marc, all,
> >>>>
> >>>>              thanks for joining and for your interesting work, which I
> >>>>
> >>> follow
> >>>
> >>>>              since I became aware of it. I appreciate the way in your
> >>>>
> >>> paper you
> >>>
> >>>>              show careful and honest attention to the texts of the
> >>>> authors
> >>>>
> >>>>              involved, but perhaps most of all I appreciate that the
> >>>>
> >>> paper makes
> >>>
> >>>>              the transformational dimension related to struggle and
> >>>> change
> >>>>
> >>>>              salient, a dimension all papers deemed central to
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie. And I
> >>>
> >>>>              have learned more about Vasilyuk by reading your paper.
> But
> >>>>
> >>> I also
> >>>
> >>>>              see that we have approached the question of perezhivanie
> >>>>
> >>> differently
> >>>
> >>>>              and I think that addressing the questions that you raise
> >>>>
> >>> concerning
> >>>
> >>>>              our article may be a good way to both respond and discuss
> >>>>
> >>> your paper.
> >>>
> >>>>              I am aware that our use of the term monism may be
> >>>>
> >>> problematic to
> >>>
> >>>>              some, and N. Veresov, who has recently written about this
> >>>>
> >>> (see
> >>>
> >>>>              attached article), warns against the dangers of simply
> >>>>
> >>> moving from
> >>>
> >>>>              dualism into an undifferentiating monism that relativizes
> >>>>
> >>> everything,
> >>>
> >>>>              making development un-studiable. This seems to be the way
> >>>> in
> >>>>
> >>> which
> >>>
> >>>>              you have understood our argument, and of course this is
> not
> >>>>
> >>> what we are or want to be doing.
> >>>
> >>>>              Probably many will think that *dialectical materialism*
> >>>>
> >>> rather than
> >>>
> >>>>              monism is the proper term, and I could agree with them;
> we
> >>>>
> >>> do in fact
> >>>
> >>>>              use dialectical materialism there and elsewhere. Yet, we
> >>>>
> >>> wanted to
> >>>
> >>>>              emphasise the Spinozist influence (an influence that also
> >>>>
> >>> runs
> >>>
> >>>>              through Marx) and so we found it appropriate to use the
> >>>> term
> >>>>
> >>> monism,
> >>>
> >>>>              a term that Vygotsky uses before arguing that Spinoza
> >>>>
> >>> "develops an essentially materialistic view"
> >>>
> >>>>              (Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 124). For us, the aim is
> >>>>
> >>> working out
> >>>
> >>>>              ways to empirically examine and formulate problems in
> ways
> >>>>
> >>> that do
> >>>
> >>>>              not reify a mind-body dualism.
> >>>>
> >>>>              Although overcoming dualism is foundational to the CHAT
> >>>>
> >>> paradigm, I
> >>>
> >>>>              would however not say that Vygotsky did get to solve all
> of
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>              problems that Cartesian dualism had created for
> psychology,
> >>>>
> >>> even
> >>>
> >>>>              though he recognised those problems brilliantly as early
> as
> >>>>
> >>> in the
> >>>
> >>>>              "Crisis". It should suffice to cite Vygotsky's own
> remarks,
> >>>>
> >>> which we quote in the paper (and which A.N.
> >>>
> >>>>              Leont'ev mentions in the introduction to the collected
> >>>>
> >>> works), where
> >>>
> >>>>              Vygotsky explicitly critiques some of his own prior ideas
> >>>>
> >>> for failing
> >>>
> >>>>              to overcome dualism. We agree with those who, like F. G.
> >>>>
> >>> Rey, see
> >>>
> >>>>              Vygotsky's project as a developing rather than as a
> >>>>
> >>> finalised one.
> >>>
> >>>>              The fact is that Vygotsky was building a theory on the
> >>>> unity
> >>>>
> >>> of the
> >>>
> >>>>              affect and the intellect that was to be grounded on
> >>>> Spinoza,
> >>>>
> >>> and what
> >>>
> >>>>              we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a concept
> >>>>
> >>> being
> >>>
> >>>>              developed during the same period (but not finalised or
> >>>>
> >>> totally
> >>>
> >>>>              settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the
> >>>>
> >>> Spinozist Vygotsky.
> >>>
> >>>>              As you note, in our article we argue that, if one takes
> the
> >>>>
> >>> Spinozist
> >>>
> >>>>              one-substance approach, classical concepts used in
> >>>>
> >>> non-classical
> >>>
> >>>>              psychology, at least in the way they are commonly used in
> >>>>
> >>> the current
> >>>
> >>>>              literature, should be revised. One such concept is
> >>>>
> >>> mediation. And I
> >>>
> >>>>              personally do not have much of a problem when mediation
> is
> >>>>
> >>> used to
> >>>
> >>>>              denote the fundamental fact that every thing exists
> always
> >>>>
> >>> through
> >>>
> >>>>              *another*, never in and of itself. But I do think that it
> >>>> is
> >>>>
> >>>>              problematic to identify MEDIATORS, such as "a meaning",
> as
> >>>> a
> >>>>
> >>> means to
> >>>
> >>>>              account for or explain developmental processes and
> learning
> >>>>
> >>> events,
> >>>
> >>>>              precisely because it is there, at least in my view, that
> >>>>
> >>> dualism creeps in.
> >>>
> >>>>              For example, I find it paradoxical that you are concerned
> >>>>
> >>> that our
> >>>
> >>>>              monist approach risks turning perezhivanie into a useless
> >>>>
> >>> category
> >>>
> >>>>              because it may be used to explain everything and nothing,
> >>>>
> >>> and yet you
> >>>
> >>>>              do not seem to have a problem using the term mediation to
> >>>>
> >>> account for
> >>>
> >>>>              the transformation of perezhivanie without clearly
> >>>>
> >>> elaborating on how
> >>>
> >>>>              mediation does change anything or what it looks like as a
> >>>>
> >>> real
> >>>
> >>>>              process. How is it different saying that a perezhivanie
> >>>>
> >>> mediates the
> >>>
> >>>>              experiencing-as-struggle from simply saying that it
> >>>>
> >>> "affects" or
> >>>
> >>>>              "determines" it? Indeed, if perezhivanie mediates
> >>>>
> >>>>              experiencing-as-struggle, does not
> >>>> experiencing-as-struglgle
> >>>>
> >>> too
> >>>
> >>>>              mediate perezhivanie? And do not both may be said to
> >>>> mediate
> >>>>
> >>> development, or development mediate them? Is not this explaining
> >>> everything
> >>> and nothing?
> >>>
> >>>>              I do believe you can argue that there is a difference
> >>>> between
> >>>>
> >>>>              mediation and classical psychology's cause-effect
> >>>> relations,
> >>>>
> >>> but to
> >>>
> >>>>              show this you need to dig into the dialectical
> >>>> underpinnings
> >>>>
> >>> of the
> >>>
> >>>>              theory. In your paper, you offer a nice analysis of a
> >>>> lovely
> >>>>
> >>> case of
> >>>
> >>>>              a teacher who, in dealing with a challenge with one of
> her
> >>>>
> >>> students,
> >>>
> >>>>              changes her perezhivanie. I think you can rightly argue
> >>>> that
> >>>>
> >>> there is
> >>>
> >>>>              a semiotic transformation, and I fully support your
> >>>>
> >>> statement that by
> >>>
> >>>>              studying discourse we can empirically approach questions
> of
> >>>>
> >>>>              psychological development. The contradictions you show as
> >>>>
> >>> being
> >>>
> >>>>              involved and resolved resonate really well with what I
> >>>>
> >>> experience as
> >>>
> >>>>              a parent or as a teacher in the classroom. Yet, without
> >>>>
> >>> unpacking
> >>>
> >>>>              what this "mediation" taking place between one
> perezhivanie
> >>>>
> >>> and the
> >>>
> >>>>              next one means as a concrete and real, the same analysis
> >>>>
> >>> could be done taking an information processing approach:
> >>>
> >>>>              there is an situation that is processed (represented?) in
> >>>>
> >>> one way,
> >>>
> >>>>              which then leads to a (cognitive) dissonance, and then
> >>>> there
> >>>>
> >>> is a
> >>>
> >>>>              cognitive resolution by means of which the situation is
> >>>>
> >>> presented
> >>>
> >>>>              differently in consciousness (indeed, when seen in this
> >>>> way,
> >>>>
> >>> the term
> >>>
> >>>>              perezhivanie and the term "representation" become almost
> >>>>
> >>>>              indistinguishable). How is mediation, as an analytical
> >>>>
> >>> concept,
> >>>
> >>>>              helping here? And most importantly to the question of
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie,
> >>>
> >>>>              how is this analysis going to show the internal
> connection
> >>>>
> >>> between
> >>>
> >>>>              intellect and affect that Vygotsky formulates as
> >>>>
> >>> constitutive of the notion of perezhivanie?
> >>>
> >>>>              I believe that the key lies in understanding what
> Vygotsky
> >>>>
> >>> means when
> >>>
> >>>>              he says that perezhivanie is a unit of analysis. I will
> not
> >>>>
> >>> repeat
> >>>
> >>>>              here what already is written in at least a couple of the
> >>>>
> >>> articles in
> >>>
> >>>>              the special issue (Blunden, ours), that is the difference
> >>>>
> >>> between
> >>>
> >>>>              analysis by elements and unit analysis (Vygotsky 1987). A
> >>>>
> >>> unit
> >>>
> >>>>              analysis approach is consistent with Spinoza, for whom
> >>>>
> >>> cause-effect
> >>>
> >>>>              explanations were not adequate, requiring instead an
> >>>>
> >>> understanding of
> >>>
> >>>>              self-development, perezhivanie as a kernel cell for the
> >>>>
> >>> development
> >>>
> >>>>              of personality. And I think you may be after this in your
> >>>>
> >>> article in
> >>>
> >>>>              suggesting a form of continuous movement from
> perezhivanie
> >>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>>              experiencing-as-struggle. But perhaps the major
> difficulty
> >>>> I
> >>>>
> >>> find is that, in positing Vygotsky's perezhivanie as "a type of
> meaning"
> >>>
> >>>>              and Vasilyuk's perezhivanie (or experiencing-as-struggle)
> >>>> as
> >>>>
> >>> a "type
> >>>
> >>>>              of activity," it is difficult not to see here a division
> >>>>
> >>> between
> >>>
> >>>>              product and process, a division that then is analytically
> >>>>
> >>> bridged by
> >>>
> >>>>              the addition of a third term, mediation, that should
> bring
> >>>>
> >>> back the
> >>>
> >>>>              real movement between the product and the process.
> >>>>
> >>>>              A different approach involves considering the concrete
> >>>>
> >>> extension of
> >>>
> >>>>              actual living and lived social relations, and look at
> them
> >>>> as
> >>>>
> >>>>              generative phenomena. What is there in the encounter
> >>>> between
> >>>>
> >>> Carla
> >>>
> >>>>              and the child that leads to change? For it is not inside
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>> mind,
> >>>
> >>>>              but in real life, in consciousness as the real relation
> >>>>
> >>> between people, that Carla is changed.
> >>>
> >>>>              How is the semantic structure that you nicely present and
> >>>>
> >>> attribute
> >>>
> >>>>              to Carla a product of the social relation between her and
> >>>>
> >>> the child?
> >>>
> >>>>              I think that to rightfully situate perezhivanie as a
> >>>> concept
> >>>>
> >>> in a
> >>>
> >>>>              Vygotskian framework, we ought to address its relation to
> >>>>
> >>> the genetic
> >>>
> >>>>              law of development.
> >>>>
> >>>>              There is much more to disentangle, but this is long
> enough.
> >>>>
> >>> I hope I
> >>>
> >>>>              have succeeded in making clear these ideas. Thanks so
> much
> >>>>
> >>> for
> >>>
> >>>>              engaging in the discussion!
> >>>>
> >>>>              Alfredo
> >>>>
> >>>>              ________________________________________
> >>>>
> >>>>              From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>              <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>
> >>>>              <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>>              <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>  on behalf of
> >>>> Marc
> >>>>
> >>> Clarà
> >>>
> >>>>              <marc.clara@gmail.com>
> >>>>              <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
> >>>>
> >>>>              Sent: 02 January 2017 22:14
> >>>>
> >>>>              To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>
> >>>>              Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
> >>>>
> >>>>              Hi, all, and thank you so much, Alfredo, for your kind
> >>>>
> >>> invitation to
> >>>
> >>>>              participate in this discussion. My paper in the MCA
> special
> >>>>
> >>> issue
> >>>
> >>>>              focuses on a distinction between a type of activity,
> which
> >>>> I
> >>>>
> >>> argue
> >>>
> >>>>              that is what Vasilyuk called *perezhivanie*
> (experiencing)
> >>>>
> >>> and a type
> >>>
> >>>>              of semiotic mediator, which I argue that is what
> Vygotsky,
> >>>>
> >>> in The
> >>>
> >>>>              Problem of the Environment, called *perezhivanie.* I
> argue,
> >>>>
> >>> following
> >>>
> >>>>              Vasilyuk, that in experiencing activities (Vasilyuk's
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie),
> >>>
> >>>>              this type of mediator is profoundly transformed – in
> fact,
> >>>>
> >>> that
> >>>
> >>>>              experiencing activities consist of the semiotic
> >>>>
> >>> transformation of this type of mediator.
> >>>
> >>>>              As Veresov and Fleer argue in their commentary,
> >>>> perezhivanie
> >>>>
> >>> (as a
> >>>
> >>>>              type of
> >>>>
> >>>>              mediator) is for me a psychological phenomenon, one which
> >>>> is
> >>>>
> >>> of
> >>>
> >>>>              course conceptualized from a specific theoretical
> >>>> framework.
> >>>>
> >>> But the
> >>>
> >>>>              phenomenon is also visible from other theoretical
> >>>> frameworks
> >>>>
> >>> as well,
> >>>
> >>>>              as I mention in the paper. This phenomenon is my main
> >>>>
> >>> interest, and
> >>>
> >>>>              it is from this interest that I arrived at the concept of
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie (not the other way around).
> >>>
> >>>>              Now, the phenomenon is that at least emotion, reasoning,
> >>>> and
> >>>>
> >>> volition
> >>>
> >>>>              (formation of conscious purposes) seem to be decisively
> >>>>
> >>> mediated by
> >>>
> >>>>              holistic situational meaning. My current research concern
> >>>> is
> >>>>
> >>> trying
> >>>
> >>>>              to find ways to study and understand how this mediation
> >>>>
> >>> occurs and
> >>>
> >>>>              how these semiotic mediators are transformed and
> >>>>
> >>> distributed. From
> >>>
> >>>>              this view, I think that experiencing activities
> (Vasilyuk's
> >>>>
> >>>>              perezhivanie) may provide a good terrain to study these
> >>>>
> >>> issues
> >>>
> >>>>              (especially regarding the mediation of emotion), as I
> tried
> >>>>
> >>> to exemplify in the paper.
> >>>
> >>>>              Studying semiotic mediation, however, is of course not
> >>>> easy.
> >>>>
> >>>>              Following Vygotsky, I assume that extended discourse is
> the
> >>>>
> >>>>              manifestation of thinking within certain psychological
> >>>>
> >>> conditions
> >>>
> >>>>              (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 7), and I also
> >>>>
> >>> assume the
> >>>
> >>>>              Vygotsky's law of the unity of the structure and function
> >>>> of
> >>>>
> >>> thinking
> >>>
> >>>>              (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 6). From these
> two
> >>>>
> >>>>              assumptions, I propose that meaning (and its functions in
> >>>>
> >>> human
> >>>
> >>>>              activity) can be scientifically studied by structurally
> >>>>
> >>> analyzing the
> >>>
> >>>>              narratives generated by subjects, considering that the
> >>>>
> >>> discourse
> >>>
> >>>>              produced in the narrative is the point of departure of
> this
> >>>>
> >>> study,
> >>>
> >>>>              but that considerable analytical work must be done to
> move
> >>>>
> >>> from this
> >>>
> >>>>              discourse to the full characterization of meaning. It is
> in
> >>>>
> >>> that
> >>>
> >>>>              point where I find useful the work developed by Greimas,
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>> usefulness of which I only suggest in the paper.
> >>>
> >>>>              >From this background, I found many interesting ideas and
> >>>>
> >>> questions
> >>>
> >>>>                  in the
> >>>>
> >>>>              other papers of the special issue. In this first post I
> >>>> will
> >>>>
> >>> propose
> >>>
> >>>>              two of them for possible discussion. The first one was
> >>>>
> >>> raised by
> >>>
> >>>>              González-Rey, when he introduces, in connection with
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie,
> >>>
> >>>>              the concepts of personality, and especially, of sense.
> So,
> >>>>
> >>> which is
> >>>
> >>>>              the conceptual (and-or
> >>>>
> >>>>              phenomenal) relation between perezhivanie and sense?
> >>>>
> >>> González-Rey
> >>>
> >>>>              suggests that both concepts are somewhat similar (and
> >>>>
> >>> overcome by the
> >>>
> >>>>              concept of “subjective sense”); my opinion, partly
> >>>> expressed
> >>>>
> >>> in my
> >>>
> >>>>              commentary, is that perezhivanie is a type of meaning,
> >>>> which
> >>>>
> >>> includes
> >>>
> >>>>              different levels of depth, and that sense corresponds to
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>> deepest
> >>>
> >>>>              level of meaning (which can be characterized as a system
> of
> >>>>
> >>> semic
> >>>
> >>>>              oppositions). Therefore, sense wouldn't be in opposition
> to
> >>>>
> >>> meaning
> >>>
> >>>>              (as “a microcosm of human consciousness”, as Kozulin
> >>>>
> >>> remembers in his
> >>>
> >>>>              commentary), although it would be in opposition to
> >>>>
> >>> manifested meaning (the surface level of meaning).
> >>>
> >>>>              The second issue was raised by Roth and Jornet, and I
> think
> >>>>
> >>> it goes
> >>>
> >>>>              beyond the issue of perezhivanie itself. If I understand
> >>>>
> >>> them well,
> >>>
> >>>>              they argue that Vygotsky's core proposal of cultural
> >>>>
> >>> mediation is
> >>>
> >>>>              influenced by the Cartesian dualism (mind-matter), and
> >>>> that a
> >>>>
> >>>>              promising approach to Cultural Psychology would be a
> >>>>
> >>> Spinozist
> >>>
> >>>>              monism. I am actually very interested on the issue of
> which
> >>>>
> >>>>              epistemological position can best substantiate the
> >>>>
> >>> construction of a
> >>>
> >>>>              cultural psychology, and that's why I feel inclined to
> take
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>              opportunity to ask for your opinions about that. About
> the
> >>>>
> >>> proposal
> >>>
> >>>>              of Roth and Jornet, I have some doubts. First, I don't
> see
> >>>>
> >>> why
> >>>
> >>>>              Vygotsky's proposals can be seen as dualist (in the
> >>>>
> >>> Cartesian sense)
> >>>
> >>>>              -I suspect that it is because of the analytical
> >>>>
> >>> distinctions?.
> >>>
> >>>>              Anyway, in my understanding, Vygotsky explicitly assumes
> a
> >>>>
> >>>>              materialist monism (for example in The Crisis), and in
> fact
> >>>>
> >>> he constructs his proposal on mediation upon reflexology, which also
> >>> explicitly assumed a materialist monism (e.g.
> >>>
> >>>>              Sechenov). Would a Spinozist monism be a better point of
> >>>>
> >>> departure? I
> >>>
> >>>>              don't know, in my understanding it is a more idealist
> >>>>
> >>> monism, and I
> >>>
> >>>>              don't clearly see what could be gained. In my opinion, a
> >>>>
> >>> scientific
> >>>
> >>>>              psychology which includes the study of mind is only
> >>>> possible
> >>>>
> >>> if any
> >>>
> >>>>              type of monism is assumed. However, in my view, for a
> >>>>
> >>> scientific
> >>>
> >>>>              psychology, the ontological nature of the world is
> perhaps
> >>>>
> >>> less
> >>>
> >>>>              important (it is an issue for metaphysics?), and I am
> >>>>
> >>> inclined to assume a neutral monism (e.g. Russell).
> >>>
> >>>>              So from this view, a materialist monism and a Spinozist
> >>>>
> >>> monism
> >>>
> >>>>              wouldn't be so different, so from both views it could be
> >>>>
> >>> assumed that
> >>>
> >>>>              all is of the same nature and all is similarly knowable
> >>>>
> >>> (including
> >>>
> >>>>              mind) [which is the ontological nature of the world and
> to
> >>>>
> >>> what
> >>>
> >>>>              degree it is knowable are issues that can be left to
> >>>>
> >>> philosophy].
> >>>
> >>>>              However, in my opinion, this does not mean that, while
> >>>>
> >>> assuming a
> >>>
> >>>>              monism, analytical distinctions cannot be done when
> >>>> studying
> >>>>
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>              world. In that sense, I had the impression that Roth and
> >>>>
> >>> Jornet
> >>>
> >>>>              tended to dilute analytical distinctions in the name of
> >>>>
> >>> monism; I
> >>>
> >>>>              repeat that I don't know if I understood them well, but
> if
> >>>>
> >>> this was
> >>>
> >>>>              the case, in my opinion, analysis would be impossible
> >>>> within
> >>>>
> >>> the new
> >>>
> >>>>              psychology suggested by Roth and Jornet, and, regarding
> >>>>
> >>> perezhivanie,
> >>>
> >>>>              there would be the danger, noted by Vygotsky in The
> Crisis
> >>>>
> >>> and
> >>>
> >>>>              cautioned by Kozulin in his commentary, that by meaning
> >>>>
> >>> everything, perezhivanie ends by meaning nothing.
> >>>
> >>>>              Best regards and happy new year,
> >>>>
> >>>>              Marc.
> >>>>
> >>>>              2017-01-02 9:12 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
> >>>>
> >>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
> >>>
> >>>>                  Dear all,
> >>>>
> >>>>                  I would like to join David, Luisa, Ana, Henry and the
> >>>>
> >>> others to wish
> >>>
> >>>>                  you all a Happy New Year! May it be full of joy,
> peace,
> >>>>
> >>> and opportunity.
> >>>
> >>>>                  I also would like to begin the year announcing our
> >>>> first
> >>>>
> >>> ?MCA
> >>>
> >>>>                  article discussion, ?although in fact corresponds to
> >>>> the
> >>>>
> >>> last issue
> >>>
> >>>>                  of the year
> >>>>
> >>>>              we
> >>>>
> >>>>                  just passed, Issue 4 on Perezhivanie. This is a very
> >>>>
> >>> special
> >>>
> >>>>                  *special* issue, not only because its topic has
> raised
> >>>>
> >>> lots of
> >>>
> >>>>                  interest lately in
> >>>>
> >>>>              the
> >>>>
> >>>>                  CHAT community but also because, greatly coordinated
> by
> >>>>
> >>> Andy Blunden
> >>>
> >>>>                  and the rest of the editorial team, the issue takes
> the
> >>>>
> >>> form of a
> >>>
> >>>>                  symposium where authors get the chance to present and
> >>>>
> >>> respond to
> >>>
> >>>>                  each others' ideas on the subject. In my view, this
> >>>>
> >>> allows having a
> >>>
> >>>>                  rich and
> >>>>
> >>>>              multidimensional
> >>>>
> >>>>                  approach to a subject as important as perezhivanie.
> >>>>
> >>>>                  Following with the dialogical spirit in which the
> >>>>
> >>> special issue was
> >>>
> >>>>                  assembled, we will focus on one lead article, but
> >>>> hoping
> >>>>
> >>> to also
> >>>
> >>>>                  engage ideas and insights present in or relevant to
> >>>> other
> >>>>
> >>>>                  contributions in the issue. ?Marc Clarà's "Vygotsky
> and
> >>>>
> >>> Vasilyuk on
> >>>
> >>>>                  Perezhivanie: Two Notions and One Word" will be our
> >>>>
> >>> focus. The
> >>>
> >>>>                  article very nicely engages the lead work of
> Vygotsky,
> >>>>
> >>> but also the
> >>>
> >>>>                  less known ??(?in educational literature) but totally
> >>>>
> >>> relevant works
> >>>
> >>>>                  of psychologist ?F. Vasilyuk and semiotician
> >>>>
> >>>>              A.
> >>>>
> >>>>                  J. Greimas, mobilising a number of key concepts
> >>>>
> >>> including those of
> >>>
> >>>>              semiotic
> >>>>
> >>>>                  mediation and transformation.
> >>>>
> >>>>                  ?In addition to Marc, who will soon join us, I have
> >>>>
> >>> encouraged some
> >>>
> >>>>                  of
> >>>>
> >>>>              the
> >>>>
> >>>>                  other authors in the special issue to also join as
> >>>>
> >>> "relevant
> >>>
> >>>>                  others," if time and circumstances allow them. Let's
> >>>>
> >>> hope that this
> >>>
> >>>>                  will help keeping the symposium spirit up.
> >>>>
> >>>>                  Marc's article is attached to this e-mail and will be
> >>>>
> >>> made open
> >>>
> >>>>                  access at the T&F pages as soon as people is back
> from
> >>>>
> >>> the holidays.
> >>>
> >>>>                  The T&F link
> >>>>
> >>>>              is
> >>>>
> >>>>                  this:
> >>>>
> >>>>                  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749039
> .
> >>>>
> >>> 2016.1186194
> >>>
> >>>>                  The link to the MCA Forum pages, where we announce
> our
> >>>>
> >>> discussions
> >>>
> >>>>                  and other xmca things, is here:
> >>>> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/
> >>>>
> >>>>                  I wish us all a very productive and interesting
> >>>>
> >>> discussion.
> >>>
> >>>>                  Alfredo
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>