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[Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
In Bruner's prolog to the Collected Works (1987), he states:
For Vygotsky, becoming human implies the "centralizing" or cerebralization of mental processes -- whether in development, in cultural history, or in phylogenesis. ... Processes go inward, and they are thereby made amenable to interaction with other processes. ... The existence of autonomous processes is a sign of immaturity, of pathology, or phylogenetic primitiveness. Perception operating on its own, for example, yields the symptomatology of mental subnormality. Through interaction, human mental processes become ordered, systemic, logical, and goal oriented. By the achievement of generative order we become free of the immediacy of sensation, free of the chaining of associations, capable of applying logic to practical application. (p. 15)
If this is the Vygotskyan interpretation of chaining you're referring to, then yes, this would be the same concept of associative reasoning used by cognitive psychologists. But if Bruner has this right, Vygotsky, in keeping with Annalisa's interpretation, understood logic as not quite natural, but as normative for humans. Cognitive psychologists see associative reasoning as normative, with logic an esoteric accomplishment.
I should add that even though actual logical reasoning is an esoteric accomplishment, (incorrect) logic-like forms imbue reasoning in literate societies. Logical inference is governed by two principles:
Modus ponens asserts that given the conditional, if p then q, and the antecedent, p, one may deduce the truth of the consequent, q. (i.e., p --> q, and p, deduce q) and
Modus tolens asserts that given the conditional, if p then q, and denial of the consequent, not q, one may deduce denial of the antecedent, not q. (i.e., p --> q, and ~q, deduce ~p)
But logical misapplications are widespread in literate cultures:
Asserting the conditional, if p then q, and the consequent, q, people incorrectly deduce the antecedent, p. (i.e., p --> q, and q, deduce p) and
Asserting the conditional, if p then q, and denial of the antecedent, not p, people incorrectly deduce denial of the consequent, not q. (i.e., p --> q, and ~p, deduce ~q) (See Evans, 1982.)
Evans, J. St. B. T. (1982). The psychology of deductive reasoning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:email@example.com] On Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 10:44 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
Is this equivalent to what Vygotsky referred to as chaining?
But one of the results that cognitive scientists have clearly established is that human reasoning, in general, is associative, not logical. Our conceptual structures are associatively linked, meaning that concepts conjure up other, related concepts. Our reasoning is a kind of juggling of these linked concepts.
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:29 AM, David H Kirshner <email@example.com> wrote:
> Recognizing that Jacob and others may see it differently, I agree with
> you that logic is not gendered.
> I do disagree, though, with your final statement that "Logic isn't a
> Western invention, by the way. It's very much part of human cognition."
> What I think is sustainable is the position that reasoning is very
> much a part of human cognition. But one of the results that cognitive
> scientists have clearly established is that human reasoning, in
> general, is associative, not logical. Our conceptual structures are
> associatively linked, meaning that concepts conjure up other, related
> concepts. Our reasoning is a kind of juggling of these linked concepts.
> One of the classical studies that established this perspective
> concerns Margie the bank teller:
> Margie is bright, single, 31 year old, outspoken, and concerned with
> issues of social justice.
> What is more likely
> A) Margie is a bank teller, or
> B) Margie is a bank teller and Margie is a feminist.
> (If you're not familiar with this problem, take a moment to answer
> it.) ...
> The logical analysis holds that Margie is more likely to be a bank
> teller than both a bank teller and a feminist because choice A
> includes the possibility that Margie is a bank teller and a feminist
> as well as the possibility that Margie is a bank teller and not a
> feminist, but choice B includes only one of those possibilities.
> But the vast majority of subjects tested select choice B, which the
> cognitive psychologists take as indicating that we are guided by our
> associations to people like Margie rather than by the logical
> conditions of the problem.
> In my view, logic as a discursive form--a technology of thought--is a
> Western invention. Whether it is identified as "male" because of
> historical association or biological predisposition, I don't know, and
> I should add, I don't care. (Jacob, the science of biologically based
> sex differences in cognition has not been "debunked." Rather, feminist
> scholars have rightly pointed out that the data are inconclusive, and
> that prior assertions of biologically based sex differences in
> cognition over-interpret the scientific results.) Neither history nor
> biology is determinative, and logic is too important a part of our
> cultural legacy to deny any individual or group the opportunity to master it.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar
> Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 12:28 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <email@example.com>; Vera
> John-Steiner <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
> About logic: to Greg M., Actually, I thought it was Jacob who
> discussed logic in gendered discourse. Unless you brought it up a long
> time ago in the group he references. I was under the impression that
> he had attempted to bring it up a few times in the past. Or am I mistaken?
> In his reply on timestamped Nov 03, 08:30:41 he stated:
> "Not to beat the proverbial dead horse, but several listserv
> members--including me--have tried to introduce this position re: logic
> in prior xmca threads. The position has mostly either been ignored or
> loudly rejected out of hand by more vocal participants on this listserv."
> So I was responding to that paragraph.
> I am not clear about Jacob's position but my position is that logic is
> an intellectual tool, just like intuition can be an emotional tool.
> Insight might be a combination of both logic and intuition. But
> nothing about logic makes it male, as I see it, no matter how much men
> might assert that to be the case.
> Logic is reasoning in a particular way with the mind, and any human
> can partake in it if one wants. You can't perform logic with your
> elbows and knees. Counting has a logic. So does self-preservation.
> What one does with logic has to do with one's values. If your values
> are for a pure race, for example, you can certainly use logic to
> rationalize activities that purify race however you might want to
> define it. Does that make logic a tool to create meaning that is
> essentially determined by power? Or is it just abuse of logic to
> assert one's power (over others, which is actually being powerless,
> since one who is truly powerful does not require power over others), which at its basis, is meaningless?
> Also, I don't think that Rein was saying gender is fluid. He said it
> "... in other words, what cultures have "naturalized" as divisions
> into genders are more often than not constructions erected by a gender
> group in order to dominate others. Such construction, I would argue,
> can only be taken down with arguments that follow a logic which itself
> is not gendered, because if it were, it would be a contestant in the field, not the referee."
> I believe if I read him as he wanted to be read, I think he's saying
> that logic is not gendered, which I agree with. The fact that we can
> say "a logic" means the application of that logic has a boundary, but
> it doesn't mean that this logic is different than that logic. It means
> if I use a hammer on a house, I can also use it to bash in skulls. The
> tool is the same, the application is different, as are the values motivating its use.
> The boundaries are the objectives for using the logic, not the logic
> itself. Of course we can bicker over the forms of mallets, claw
> hammers, or rocks for hitting things and their differences, but the
> activity of hammering is the same. The values, motivations, and
> objectives are different, which offer the boundary, however the
> activity remains the same despite those boundaries.
> Logic isn't a Western invention, by the way. It's very much part of
> human cognition. Rationalism I suppose could be Western, but I reserve
> the right to be wrong about that.
> Kind regards,