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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal


I wasn’t *equating* individual psychological development with the development of intellect and cognition, but one sure wouldn’t want to leave those out, would one?  That indeed would be a costly price to pay! (And there’s no evidence that LSV wanted to leave them out, is there?)


> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:21 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
> Just a minute folks!
> Is everyone okay with the assumption that the
> individual=intellect/cognition?
> If so, then asking if non-dualism can have a theory of individual
> development is like asking if atheists pray to God. It's definitional.
> Seems like the question should be: can we imagine an individual without
> intellect/cognition?
> Some of you will immediately say, "of course not, that's a dumb question."
> But some others out there have been trying a different answer to this
> question. Paul Kockelman is one. Vincent Colapietro (whom Kockelman cites)
> is another. Martin is another. And maybe Vygotsky too?
> Speaking of which, Martin, can you re-send that Vygotsky piece? I didn't
> see it as an attachment.
> -greg ​
> On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Martin John Packer <
> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
>> You’re saying there has to be a god??
>> Martin
>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>> wrote:
>>> How do you posit activity as developing without a human mind that
>> manipulates activity, remaining a constant as the circumstances of activity
>> constantly change.  Think Intelligent Design.  I'm not saying development
>> is parallel to intelligent design, simply that they are based on the same
>> idea.
>>> Michael
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 10:42 AM
>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>> your activity
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden
>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>> On 29/06/2016 12:24 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote:
>>>> Cognitive or intellectual development.  Because it you are non-dualist
>> pray tell, what is developing?
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer
>>>> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:04 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>> Why (on earth) would non-dualism prevent a theory of individual
>> development, Michael?
>>>> Martin
>>>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 1:20 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>> In my view Pierce is not non-dualist because of his ideas on semiosis,
>> which are extremely interesting.  He is a non-dualist because he is a
>> Pragmatist.  That means their philosophy of human intelligence is based on
>> doing not on thinking.  Following James (or perhaps James followed him)
>> Pierce did not make any assumptions that posited a human mind inside of the
>> head.  The fact that semiosis is non-dualist is I would say an outgrowth of
>> this and not a cause.
>>>>> What I think Pragmatists understood is that you have to give up a
>> great deal when you avoid dualism at all costs.  I would suggest there is
>> no theory of individual development in Pragmatism (although there is
>> societal and community development).
>>>>> Years ago I struggled with whether Vygotsky was willing to make the
>> same type of sacrifice.  He did have a theory of individual development,
>> was is possible for him to be a non-dualist.  Not that I want to have that
>> argument.
>>>>> MIchael
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>>> Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 9:09 PM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>> Exactly! which is what is so marvellously non-dualistic about Peirce!
>> Semiosis is a natural process taking place in the objective world. It is an
>> alternative, more general approach than the usual concept of causality.
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>>> On 28/06/2016 5:19 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
>>>>>> Hi James,
>>>>>> You write that "To my mind, Interpretant (Thirdness) is very
>> important as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's words, "sign in the
>> mind"."
>>>>>> Do you know Paul Kockelman's work (ref below)? Kockelman emphasizes
>> that the interpretant is *not* necessary mental. For example, a plant can
>> respond to sunlight as an Object by turning in its direction
>> (Interpretant). It is hard to see how a 'mental concept' could be a sign
>> for a subsequent step of semiosis, whereas a plant turning, or an umbrella
>> opened, or . more obviously could be.
>>>>>> This video is in Spanish, but otherwise pretty clear!
>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXptyWLJT14>
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> Kockelman, P. (2005). The semiotic stance. Semiotica, 2005(157),
>> 233-304.
>>>>>>> On Jun 27, 2016, at 1:54 PM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <
>> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>> I like David's elaboration. Just to add a few comments to his and
>> others' points:
>>>>>>> For Peirce, any sign is a triad which constitutes three realms:
>> Representamen, Object & Interpretant, corresponding to Firstness,
>> Secondness & Thirdness as three aspects of the sign. Within the aspect of
>> Secondness, there are three forms: Icon, Index & Symbol, relating to the
>> three realms - hence, Icon (Firstness), Index (Secondness) & Symbol
>> (Thirdness). Through the realm of Interpretant, each of the three forms
>> contributes to an understanding of the sign (i.e. Object), although such
>> understanding is insusceptible of final proof. To my mind, Interpretant
>> (Thirdness) is very important as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's
>> words, "sign in the mind". What's more, Interpretant is in itself a new
>> sign for the next triad (i.e. semiosis).
>>>>>>> Peirce's semiosis is an interplay of these three realms - it is
>> concerned with sign action in terms of production and interpretation of a
>> sign through the representamen-interpretant relation that leads to "a
>> discovery of true meaning, the object" (see Mats Bergman's Peirce's
>> Philosophy of Communication, 2009, p.114). My take on Peirce's semiosis is
>> that any sign is an end in itself - here, "end" means "purpose" or "goal"
>> (rather than "closure").
>>>>>>> The term "sign" was used loosely both Saussure and Peirce. For
>> Saussure, sign means signifier, whereas for Peirce it means the form the
>> sign takes. The "object" is normally hidden; it would have been otherwise
>> pointless to make a sign if the object is already present. Object is absent
>> in Saussure's dyad (which is self-contained: signifié-signifiant, i.e.
>> signified-signifier). Saussure's "signified" is not quite the same as
>> Peirce's "interpretant". In the former, the system of signification which
>> bridges the signified and the signifier is fixated, e.g. the sound MIAO as
>> signifier resulting in a linguistic concept CAT as signified is determined
>> by the system of signification, English language. If the system is French
>> language, then the linguistic concept will be LE CHAT. More importantly,
>> the idea behind Peirce's interpretant is "dialogical thought" which is also
>> absent in Saussure's dyad.
>>>>>>> Regarding word-image relations, what's interesting is that both
>> modes of meaning are slippery and elusive - which opens up a huge scope for
>> semiotic thinking. The approach to written texts is in the form of linear
>> itinerary, but the approach to visual images is in the form of
>> circumnavigation, which spirals outwards from the centre to the periphery
>> and at the same time inwards from the periphery to the centre. In terms of
>> meaning potential, I don't think the centre necessarily implies a deep
>> structure whereas the periphery a surface structure - both can be either,
>> depending on the phenomenon and the person who finds himself in that
>> phenomenon.
>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg
>>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: 26 June 2016 22:19
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>>>> Martin:
>>>>>>> Actually, it's the icon that is "first" for Peirce, but it's
>>>>>>> sometimes pretty hard to tell what "firstness" means, because it's
>>>>>>> not really equivalent to mediacy, which is the way most Vygotskyans
>>>>>>> are trained to think. Instead, Peirce uses a set of thought
>>>>>>> experiments to distinguish what comes first: "An icon is a
>>>>>>> represntamen whose representative quality is a firstness of it as a
>>>>>>> first. That is a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be
>>>>>>> a representament.". (Philosophical writings of Peirce, J. Buchler
>> ed., New York: Dover, p. 104).
>>>>>>> Here's the passage of Peirce I find most useful:
>>>>>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>>>>>> that would possess the character which renders it significant even
>>>>>>> though its object had no existence: such as a lead pencil streak
>>>>>>> representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,at
>>>>>>> once,lose the character which makes it a sign if its object where
>>>>>>> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
>>>>>>> interpretant. Such,for instance, is a piece of mould (i.e. particle
>>>>>>> board--DK) with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; for
>>>>>>> without the shot there would have been no hole,but there is a hole
>> there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
>>>>>>> A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it
>>>>>>> a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
>>>>>>> speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
>>>>>>> understood to have that signification." (104).
>>>>>>> So icons are "first" because they don't need an object to mean;
>>>>>>> indexes are "second" because although they need an object, they
>>>>>>> don't need an interpretant, and symbols are "third" because in
>>>>>>> order to mean they need an object, and an interpretant. What is
>>>>>>> confusing to people is that this doesn't create three distinct
>>>>>>> categories: a symbol has to also be some kind of index and some
>>>>>>> kind of icon, and an index has to be an icon. So a foot is a foot
>>>>>>> and it doesn't need any aim or goal or object to mean a foot. In
>>>>>>> the same way, a foot print is a footprint, but it it's not just a
>>>>>>> footprint: it also means that there was a foot there at one
>>>>>>> time,and that's what makes it an index as well as an icon. Finally,
>>>>>>> the word "foot" or "pied" or "jiao" is a sound, but it's not just a
>>>>>>> sound; it also means that there was a speaking mouth, tongue, vocal
>>>>>>> cords, lungs and brain there at one time, and these are what makes
>>>>>>> each spoken word an icon and an index as well as a symbol.
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Martin John Packer
>>>>>>> <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>>>>>>>> I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the
>>>>>>>> Ur-sign for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I
>>>>>>>> took this to be a reference to LSV's frequent mention of the
>>>>>>>> infant's pointing - an indexical sign if ever that was one, since
>>>>>>>> the gesture is literally done  with the index finger.
>>>>>>>> As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more
>>>>>>>> complex, and the symbol the most complex kind of sign.
>>>>>>>> And for what it's worth, I read Hegel (and many other
>>>>>>>> phenomenologists) as aiming to describe the movement in
>>>>>>>> consciousness from appearance to reality. Or perhaps better put,
>>>>>>>> the movement from what seems real to what turns out to be the mere
>>>>>>>> appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for Marx, for LSV?),
>>>>>>>> this movement never ends. (Well, there's some debate over that
>>>>>>>> claim, but let it stand for now!)
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
>>>>>>>>> Greg's question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur*
>>>>>>>>> phenomenon for
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce's triadic model
>>>>>>>> where the objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
>>>>>>>>> I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this
>> topic:
>>>>>>>>> "Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a
>>>>>>>>> cognition
>>>>>>>> of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this
>>>>>>>> cognition, to
>>>>>>>> *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere
>> happening."
>>>>>>>>> Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending*
>>>>>>>>> noumenal or
>>>>>>>> phenomenal?
>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>> From: Lplarry
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson