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[Xmca-l] Brandom Extended

Your metaphor of downtown city and architecture not being picture frames I found intriguing but I will require more con/text to follow in more than  an impressionistic way.

I happen to be reading an article by Robert Pippin that is exploring similar themes. Pippin says that he is making a case for a Hegelian shareable *I-We* relation extending beyond Bransom’s *I-Thou* relation of idiodects. Is this the contrast between dwelling within architectural places rather than within picture frames?

Now for the con/text in which this claim is embedded is this quote:
“ Arguments for relativism and sometimes transcendental idealism often make the mistake, the mistake of thinking of thought or horizons of sense or modes of sense-making or conceptual schemes in this third person way *as if* something one can get trapped inside of unless something exogenous can *break* through it.  As it has been put in many contemporary contexts, one source of the confusion is the temptation to think in terms of conceptual schemes and a separable, otherwise neutral, non-conceptual content that is conceptualized by such a scheme. The temptation is to think of an in  principal neutral or indeterminate content or world in itself the accessibility of which is a matter of applying a scheme to such a content and so ending up with something *less* than the world in itself, but rather the world only as so finitely appropriated.  Hegel is among the parties denying such a scheme-content distinction, although he is certainly not denying that there can be different, sometimes quite different, aspectual takes on the world. The point of this self-negating language is to distinguish this possible partiality of a *shape of spirit* from the idea of some putatively radical, alternative conceptual scheme, and this view about the *inherently* possible self-negating aspect of such a *shape* is meant to stress what Gadamer calls the *openness* of linguistic horizons to each other.”

Pippin at this point adds a footnote # 7 
“Besides being right (in my view anyway) about the set of Friedman, Gadamer, and Davidson issues, McDowell also broaches the question of what we need to say is *shareable* by a linguistic community in order for this mutual intelligibility and integration to succeed and suggests the beginning of what I would regard as a Hegelian case for the indispensability of an *I-We* relation beyond the *I-Thou* priority argued for by Bransom and, in effect, by Davidson on the priority of idiolects.”

If asked I can send the article.

Sent from my Windows 10 phone