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[Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?



This is very much along the lines of what I was thinking Rod:

*I would say that for you, as an already accomplished participant in a
culture of concept systems, the sharing of your oriole experience might
well be with a whole host of internalised others. As adults we can share an
experience with our friends without needing them to be there ('X and Y
would love this').*

Except, i started to think, I can also share with myself, mediated by that
same system of concepts. I can stand there and, post facto, think, "Gee,
its sure rare to see an oriole" and think about last time I saw one there,
or remind myself to get some grape jelly to see if I can entice more to
come visit. And I can sure think about telling my wife when I go back into
the house and the pleasure she will get from knowing we had a distinguished
visitor.

The internal dialogue of consciousness available to an adult is sort of
like sharing with oneself over time. Dialogic imagination?

mike




On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 1:23 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:

> Mike,
>
> I would say that for you, as an already accomplished participant in a
> culture of concept systems, the sharing of your oriole experience might
> well be with a whole host of internalised others. As adults we can share an
> experience with our friends without needing them to be there ('X and Y
> would love this') - and of course social media allows us to share
> experiences with remote friends, though I am not sure that the pleasure of
> sharing is of quite the same order - maybe it is more so for digital
> natives.
>
> My interest in 'which comes first' is really ontological - I would have to
> argue that for any individual person context always comes first because we
> are born into a pre-existing (albeit fluid) culture. I am also inclined to
> go along with Steven Mithen's contention (e.g. in 'The Singing
> Neanderthals') that interactions and relations, first expressed through
> movements and vocalisations, must have preceded any form of language.
>
> An image which I particularly like is of a mountain rising out of lush,
> verdant valleys. Down in the valleys life is abundant, rich and complicated
> but as one ascends the mountain the vegetation gives way to ice and snow.
> The air becomes clear and cold and one can see for miles. Climbing is a
> very direct form of abstraction, lifting oneself out of the muddle of
> context to be able to see further and more clearly. But you can't live up
> there for long. Very young children live in the foothills but they don't
> have to find their own ways up to higher places because they are able to
> see their parents and siblings making the ascent.
>
> For me it is a particular challenge to try to imagine what it is like to
> be a two-year-old, not yet able to lift oneself out of one's immediate
> context to think 'about' things but instead able to think in and with the
> things and people and interactions that make up one's environment or
> context. I would argue that it is easy to forget this 'withness thinking'
> as John Shotter calls it, once thought is marshalled by more or less shared
> concept systems. Even the most abstract of thinkers still have to come down
> the mountain sometimes to engage with other people, to eat, wash and sleep
> and these contexts of lived practice are also internalised, like the
> opinions of our friends, and become part of our own relationships with our
> contexts.
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
> Sent: 22 March 2016 00:27
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?
>
> Dear Colleagues.
>
> Mike:
>
> I did not intend to offer the oriole example as an example of foreground
> and background, David. Rather, what I was after was the process of an event
> becoming a semantic event. I was under the influence of the discussion of
> fon/phonem and Rod's questions about which comes first.
>
>
>
> My example seems to fit Rod's specifies the process as I experienced it
> pretty well. An initial flash of unexpected light for which there is no
> name that becomes lexified as "the male oriole!"  But the issue of sharing
> is a little problematic. Standing in the backyard, not talking aloud, with
> whom was I sharing an event being woven into a semantic event? The semantic
> event happened, but the sharing?
>
>
>
> It seems important that Tomsello's monumental corpus of work should find
> its way into this discussion. And Nelson's too.
>
>
>
> Anyway, thanks to all for bringing round this topic. That it should occur
> mutually relevant to community psychology and to whatever this list
> represents, seems non-accidental.
>
>
>
> mike
>
>
>
> PS- On the question of context and figure/ground, I will send around three
> uses of the metaphor of context as rope. Their variety of
> origins/applications of the metaphor strike me as worth thinking about and
> speak to David's characterization of my views.
>
> On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > This is helpful, David but I am not sure that your cline, as I understand
> > it, fully recognises the asymmetries of texts framed in systems of
> concepts
> > and texts framed in 'real' things and interactions. For the infant there
> is
> > no significant distinction between the attention and activity and the
> > knowledge which subtends them. Concepts, categories and words allow
> > multiple instances to be woven into nameable ideas which can exist
> outside
> > any particular 'real' context and can therefore be shared but whether we
> > think lived experience is reduced or elevated to shareable knowledge,
> that
> > knowledge can only be understood if it is given colour and vitality by
> > 'spontaneous concepts'. So the wordy, abstractable text depends on every
> > hearer/reader/participant's ability to connect shared branches with
> private
> > roots - breathing meaning into it but when meaning is shared directly, in
> > shared attention, for example, it does not depend on participants'
> ability
> > to make connections with the branches of a system of concepts. It may be
> > possible to put this sort of 'face to face' meaning sharing into words
> > (though inevitably this will involve some reduction or elevation) but
> this
> > translation is not a necessary part of the experience of the text.
> >
> > I have a feeling that weather is already half way reduced/elevated, a
> > generalisation which can describe an experience shared by many, even if
> it
> > has not attained the level of generalisation required for thinking about
> > climate. Shared attention may be something more contained - a flash of
> > lightning, a gust of wind or a flurry of snow on the face of that beast!
> >
> > It seems to me that what is required for an event to be woven into a
> > semantic event is just that its noticing is shared. When infants
> 'discover'
> > that a previously undifferentiated 'Great We' can be differentiated into
> > 'my attention' AND 'your attention' they can delight in the experience of
> > 'locking on' which is felt when attention is shared. I am still very
> > uncertain about the boundary beyond which an event can be thought of as
> > semantic. I suspect that the felt familiarity of a situation which has
> been
> > shared before (like Andy's book sharing but not necessarily with anything
> > as texty as a book) may be enough to produce a sense of 'Ah, I know what
> to
> > expect here' which might convert an experience into a kind of experience,
> > elevating it (or reducing it) out of the weather of context.
> >
> > It is difficult to form uncertain ideas into texts which stand a chance
> of
> > sharing meaning with people I have never even met but grappling with
> these
> > posts does sometimes bring me up with a flash of connection (or what
> feels
> > to me like connection!). I did like the footprints in the snow.
> >
> > All the best,
> >
> > Rod
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: 21 March 2016 20:57
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?
> >
> > Rod:
> >
> > I think the word "context" will work just fine. We just have to see a
> > cline of instantiation, from the context of culture (the speech community
> > as a whole, seen as the sum total of all the persons who speak a
> language)
> > and the context of situation (the elements of the context of culture and
> > the elements of a material situational setting which are selected to be
> > semanticized in a given exchange). This cline of instantiation between
> > context of culture and context of situation is exactly what Malinowski
> > describes in the long addendum he appended to "The Meaning of Meaning"
> > in Ogden and Richards, except that Malinowski is not so clear about
> > distinguishing between a material situational setting and a context of
> > situation.
> >
> > Halliday (who was a big influence on Stephen P. Witte) describes the
> > relationship between context of culture and context of situation as being
> > like weather and climate: two different perspectives brought about by two
> > different timescales on one and the same phenomenon. The difference in
> > timescale does mean that in a context of culture certain phenomena which
> I
> > will call cultural and social are foregrounded and other phenomena which
> I
> > will call interpersonal and psychological are backgrounded, while in a
> > context of situation, we find things the other way around: the
> > interpersonal and psychological is made explicit and thus tends to get
> > foregrounded while the cultural and social are left implicit and
> therefore
> > backgrounded. This is not that different from climate and
> > weather: with climate, what is decisive is the angle of the sun and the
> > extent to which the earth retains solar radiation and what is accidental
> is
> > the patterns of air movement, while with weather what is decisive is the
> > pattern of air movement and the incidence of solar radiation is...well,
> > incidental.
> >
> > Mike likes to say that foreground and background "create each other" I
> > think that's one reason he is so taken with his orioles and with
> > McDermott's spirals/concentric circles. I am less taken with these: taken
> > too far, they set my dialectics against my materialism. To me the reason
> > why the infant must give up proto-speech and learn mother tongue as a
> > SECOND language is because in the long run climate determines weather
> > rather than the other way around; in a language, the context of culture
> is
> > ultimately mightier than the context of situation even though (and even
> > precisely because) the context of culture is really nothing more than the
> > sum total of contexts of situations.
> >
> > But let us apply Mike's principle here. If context and text really do
> > create each other (and if they evolve, as you and Katherine Nelson and
> also
> > Vygotsky describe, out of an undifferentiated joint attention) then we
> > should be able to find a counterpart to text at one end of the cline of
> > instantiation as easily as we do at the other.
> >
> > So we do. The counterpart to a context of situation is, of course, a
> text,
> > so long as we see text as a semantic event and not simply the recording
> > thereof in paper and ink. Text is what people like to call discourse, but
> > such is the conservatism of academics we tend to associate text with
> > writing rather than with thinking and with speech. If that were text,
> > though, infants would have to wait for half a decade for it, and they
> > don't. Text is semantic; we have text wherever we have the analysis of a
> > setting into a context and the sharing of that analysis through
> > communication. Text is the beast itself and not simply its footprints in
> > the snow.
> >
> > And the counterpart to a context of culture? It's just the sum total of
> > everything that a speech community writes, reads, speaks and understands:
> > it's the sum total of text produced in a language. But my point was that
> > it's text, or anyway the socio/cultural equivalent of text (and in some
> > cases, e.g. the Torah or the Confucian Classics, it's literally reducible
> > to a handful of written texts). It's not just "behaviour", or "activity",
> > or "production".
> >
> > It's not behaviour because it's more about knowing than doing. It's not
> > activity because it's not defined by single goals. And it's not
> production
> > because there is no exchanging of labor and capital, no production of
> > commodities, no use or exchange value, just "value" tout court. But it's
> > value to which every infant is invited to partake, and in at least one
> way
> > the infant's understanding of what is going on with the context of
> culture
> > is more accurate than ours. Infants, unlike adults, appear to assume that
> > since attention and even activity is shared, the knowledge which subtends
> > them must be shared as well.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > I have opened a new strand to avoid distracting from the discussion of
> > > the Tharp and O'Donnell article.
> > >
> > > If we go back to the roots of text in weaving it makes sense that, in
> > > the wider sense to which you allude, text is always between people. It
> > > is when people connect their interests in some way and share meanings
> > > that stuff and events get woven into text. Even if you hadn't said
> > > anything when you presented the book to the 9 month old baby, the
> > > second presentation would be recognised as a social event - 'Oh yes,
> > > this thing that we do' and this feeling of shared experience does seem
> > > to play an important part in infants' assisted ability to weave
> > > public, cultural meanings into their private, personal experiences.
> > >
> > > As Vygotsky noted, infants develop within an already woven context of
> > > culture so what happens to and around them is pre-patterned and
> > > because humans are oddly interested in what their infants are
> > > interested in, interactions serve to model particular weaving patterns
> > > and styles. Studies by Tomasello, Moll and colleagues (discussed in
> > Moll, H. and Meltzoff, A.
> > > (2011) Joint Attention as the fundamental basis of understanding
> > > perspectives. In A. Seemann (ed.) Joint Attention: new developments in
> > > psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge,
> > > MA: MIT Press, 393-413) show that 12 month old infants appear to
> > > 'remember' their interactions with a researcher and selected toys but
> > > only if they have played with the toys together - watching the
> > > researcher play with the toys, or playing with them while the
> > > researcher watches, does not provide enough embodied, enactive,
> > > interactive experience to shape future interactions (and the infant's
> > > knowledge is 'context specific' - not extended to other researchers or
> > other toys).
> > >
> > > So there is a naming problem here. Is there, as you say, no context
> > > without specific, personally experienced and woven text? Or is there a
> > > pre-existing context which, as yet unbeknown to the weaver, influences
> > > and guides the texts which come to be formed? Infants are surrounded
> > > by a cultural context which is richly and densely shaped by the
> > > concept systems which have evolved out of the patterns in people's
> > > behaviour. What their caregivers do with, to and around them is shaped
> > > both by what those caregivers have seen other people do and by a long
> > > history of people hearing and reading about what other people do and
> > > have done. I would like to be able to use context to refer to the
> > > culturally patterned environment in which infants are helped to notice
> > > particular kinds of patterns but you want the word (if I have
> > > understood correctly - and what are the chances?) to refer to a
> > > personal frame of reference. This is helpful for me, highlighting the
> > > way the 'same' cultural environment can be woven into different
> > > contexts by different weavers, but that leaves me needing another word
> > > for the co-woven, negotiated environment which enables infants to join
> > > in before they have sorted out or internalised the concept systems
> > > which shape it. And which allows someone entering a new job or a new
> > > role to sidle in from peripheral participation to feeling they belong
> at
> > the core of the group.
> > >
> > > If you haven't already read Katherine Nelson's 'Young Minds in Social
> > > Worlds: experience, meaning and memory' (Harvard 2007) I would
> > > strongly recommend this - she develops a strongly Vygotskyan argument
> > > that infant development has to be understood in terms of interwoven
> > > processes of making sense and making relationships - drawing together
> > > a huge amount of research on early communication and meaning sharing.
> > >
> > > All the best,
> > >
> > > Rod
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > > Sent: 20 March 2016 20:31
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
> > >
> > > Rod:
> > >
> > > Actually, that's just the kind of text I'm working with right now.
> > > Here's the plan. Every week, we give a nine month old baby a book. We
> > > ask four questions in two languages (because the baby has one Korean
> > > speaking parent and one English speaking one):
> > >
> > > a) English: What's this?
> > > b) English: Is it a ...?
> > > c) Yigot mueo ya? (What's this?)
> > > d) ... yi ya?   (Is it a ...?)
> > >
> > > Sometimes we mix up the order. This goes on every week for the next
> > > three years, as the child first figures out that a book is not edible.
> > > That it contains pictures. That that the pictures are not just colors
> > > but meant to be signs. That beneath the pictures there are letters.
> > > That the letters are not just drawings but are meant to be symbols.
> > > That the symbols encode settings, characters, and problems. That the
> > > problems can only be solved by means of dialogue, etc.
> > >
> > > Now, the first time I tried this, the child simply could not
> > > concentrate on the object for any length of time. But the SECOND time
> > > I did it, the child literally could not look away from it! You could
> > > see that although the child had no idea what was being said, the child
> > > was might just be starting to think some proto-language equivalent of
> > > "What's this?" "Is it a...?" "Yi got mu eo ya?" "Chaek yi ya?" And
> > > after a minute or so, the child looked up, as if to see whether the
> > > large person making so much noise might be thinking something along
> > those lines too.
> > >
> > > So maybe THAT's text! And as you can see it doesn't matter at all
> > > whether the text realizes concepts or feelings or just perceptions,
> > > the underlying semiotic mechanism is pretty much the same. But it
> > > seems that there's only text when something has been selected from the
> > > material setting by some human consciousness or consciousnesses for
> > > semiotic transformation; there's only text when there some kind of
> > > "metaphor" (gestural, phonological,
> > > lexicogrammatical) for context. It seems that it's precisely THIS act
> > > of selection which transforms a material setting into a context, and
> > > it's premature to speak of context before that happens. So for example
> > > I wouldn't use the term context for the first week of work, only for
> > > the second.
> > >
> > > I think it's legitimate to talk about "social context" and "cultural
> > > context", because I believe that context, like text, exists on a cline
> > > of instantiation. At one end, we have the relationship between a
> > > context of situation (Malinowski) and a text (Halliday). That's the
> > > end I'm at right now. At the other, we have the relationship between a
> > > context of culture (again, Malinowski) and...and a whole language
> > > system (again, Halliday). I gather that's the end at which the KEEP
> > > and the Community Development projects in Micronesia and the
> > > Delinquency Research plans are working. But I don't see how "activity"
> > > or "behaviour" can ever realize context, unless it is semiotic
> > > activity and semiotic behaviour, in which case we might as well start
> > looking around for text. That's where the garlic and ginger is.
> > >
> > > (Rod--I'm new at this stuff: watching infants crack the whole problem
> > > of anthropogenesis single-handed, I mean. That's how exciting it is,
> > > and that's about how baffling it is too. I know you are an old hand.
> > > Can you give me any tips on what to read and advice about what to do
> > > next?)
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > > > I was driven to respond to David's earlier comments about context
> > > > since my own understanding of this term is in the context of trying
> > > > to understand how preverbal children make sense (meanings framed by
> > > > social and physical contexts more than by systems of concepts). Here
> > > > it is difficult to separate a text out of the context, an
> 'individual'
> > > > thought process apart from the interactions in which it can occur.
> > > >
> > > > It strikes me that Andy's point about the contexts in which concepts
> > > > have their meanings is particularly relevant here. The
> > > > intersubjectivity available to a caregiver-child dyad or within a
> > > > family is of a different order to that available between otherwise
> > > > unconnected speakers of the 'same' language. Where one is rooted in
> > > > a history of shared experiences in common contexts  the other is
> > > > rooted in a history of more or less abstracted ideas (concepts)
> > > > which refer to
> > > experiences but 'from above'
> > > > rather than 'from within'. Knowing what someone else means is never
> > > > completely achievable and I think the positive consequence of this
> > > > is that intersubjectivity has to be understood as a process, a
> > > > conversation rather than an answer. 'Feeling' with other people is
> > > > not an achieved end but a means towards sharing understanding (I
> > > > like the idea that the word understanding is misunderstood - 'under'
> > > > deriving from the same root as 'inter' and meaning 'among' rather
> than
> > 'below'
> > > > - to understand something is to stand IN it).
> > > >
> > > > We can know ABOUT other cultures through reading about them or
> > > > watching films but how we know cultures in which we have stood is
> > > > importantly different - I think. Meeting other people, or meeting
> > > > with them, can enrich our personal understanding by exposing us to
> > > > different ways of thinking but I think we have to recognise that
> > > > thinking ABOUT ways of interacting has to be understood as a
> > > > multi-layered thing, ranging from the thickest knowing of our lived
> > > > and co-lived experiences to the ethereal abstractions of
> > > > philosophical
> > > thought-play.
> > > >
> > > > So sharing concepts out of context is doable but not achievable.
> > > >
> > > > All the best,
> > > >
> > > > Rod
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > > Sent: 20 March 2016 10:34
> > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
> > > >
> > > > I don't know if the issue is having common interests, Cliff.
> > > > I think it's very productive, even necessary, that each little bunch
> > > > of us has different concerns and shines light on different aspects
> > > > of
> > > human life.
> > > > But what we really need is shared concepts, through which we can
> > > > understand each other and collaborate. So it is good news that CC
> > > > has appropriated zone of proximal development, activity setting,
> > > > shared activity and the law of genetic development.
> > > > I think we need to be very conscious of the dangers inherent in
> > > > appropriating expressions like these though. You pointed out that in
> > > > the early days of CC, "'cultural psychology' was generally practiced
> > > > as 'cross-cultural', largely as comparison studies", but everything
> > > > I read in your paper tends to suggest "culture" is still understood
> > > > and used in just this sense. Consequently it is very easy to miss
> > > > the meaning attached to "culture" in CHAT, which, after all,
> > > > originated in pretty much a mono-cultural situation. One word can
> > > > index different concepts. Achieving interdisciplinarity is only
> > > > achieved by means of shared concepts. But on the other hand, since
> > > > the content of a concept is ultimately the larger system of
> > > > practices to which it is indigenous, it seems almost as if a concept
> > > > can only be shared when the broader context of its use is already
> > assimilated.
> > > > Along these lines, it was a little while before I realised that you
> > > > were using the word "intersubjectivity" with quite a different
> > > > meaning than I would. It seems to denote empathy. "Intersubjectivity
> > > > involves co-actors feeling the same emotions and values in the same
> > > > situations," and I don't even know it means to "feel values."
> > > > Connected with this the description of joint action, turned out to
> > > > be in sharp contrast to my conception of it. As I see it,
> > > > collaboration (my preferred term, rather than "joint
> > > > action") necessarily entails both moments of conflict as well as
> > > > cooperation. Harmony and bliss are great things, but I think they
> > > > are rather cheaply purchased simply by everyone marching in step.
> > > > I suspect that these two examples of shared words indicating
> > > > different concepts are connected to the hope of mutual appropriation
> > > > by means of having a "center of commonality."
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > > On 20/03/2016 12:28 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
> > > > > Thanks for your thoughtful comments, Alfredo. Roland and I thought
> > > > > that although CC and CHAT have many common interests, most folks
> > > > > in each appeared to be unaware of the other (judging by the
> > > > > infrequency of common citations). As described in our article, we
> > > > > and several of our colleagues have been influenced by CHAT and
> > > > > have used CHAT concepts in our research and intervention programs.
> > > > > As for influence in the opposite direction, perhaps the KEEP
> > > > > project, Seymour Sarason's work, and some of Maynard's work with
> > > Greenfield.
> > > > > Also Kurt Lewin is a source common to both CC and CHAT. I too
> > > > > would be interested to hear of additional influence in the
> > > > > opposite
> > > direction.
> > > > >
> > > > > You are correct that Delta Theory builds on psychosocial systems
> > > > > with Vygotsky as an important source. Delta Theory boldly attempts
> > > > > to be a universal theory of how change occurs using Delta as the
> > > > > symbol for change.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm pleased that you found the discussion of cognitive science,
> > > > > psycho-neurology, and a potential center of commonality in
> > > > > psychology of interest! That is the goal of the article, i.e., to
> > > > > show how the commonality of CC and CHAT have the potential to form
> > > > > that commonality with developmental, educational, cognitive, and
> > > neuro-psychology.
> > > > > Hopefully this discussion format will facilitate interest in the
> > > > > process.
> > > > >
> > > > > Cliff
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mar 19, 2016, at 6:17 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >> Thanks Cliff and Mike for sharing this interesting article. I was
> > > > >> not familiar to cultural community psychology and this and the
> > > > >> other papers in the symposium do a great job introducing and
> > > > >> concisely describing the field, and how it evolved from community
> > > > >> to cultural community psychology.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> As I was reading, I wondered how much the influence of CHAT
> > > > >> literature had influenced the development of community psychology
> > > > >> itself from the start. As I progressed in my reading, I then
> > > > >> found clear references to these influences, which even meant the
> > > > >> delay of the publishing of Roland's work, I assume, due to the
> > > > >> important input that Vygotsky's publications meant for the
> > > > >> project. But then I wondered on what had been other sources. What
> > > > >> were other foundational influences to the field? I'd be
> > > > >> interested to know about them in part because, while the paper
> > > > >> discusses many examples in which CHAT gives input to CC, I would
> > > > >> like to know more about the (possible) inputs in the other
> > direction.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Also, I found interesting the mention of a new center of
> > > > >> commonality in psychology in general. I was glad to see, however
> > > > >> brief, mentions to research in cognitive science and
> > > > >> psycho-neurology. In your paper, Delta theory is mentioned as a
> > > > >> move forward towards integration. In the case of CHAT, this was
> > > > >> pursued by means of developing a scientific discipline based on
> > > > >> dialectical materialism and the sociogenetic method. Delta theory
> > > > >> (I just had a very brief first
> > > > >> contact) seems to build upon the notion of psychosocial systems.
> > > > >> This sounds very much in line with Vygotsky, who surely is a
> > > > >> central source. Again, here I would love to hear what other
> > > > >> insights/sources are involved that may provide new insights to
> > > > >> those more familiar to CHAT but not so much with CC and Delta
> > theory.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Thanks,
> > > > >> Alfredo
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> ________________________________________
> > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > >> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of mike cole
> > > > >> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > > >> Sent: 18 March 2016 02:39
> > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Article for Discussion
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Dear XCMA-er-o-philes-
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> We thought it appropriate to put up for discussion the paper by
> > > > >> Roland Tharp and Cliff  O'Donnell from the most recent issue of
> MCA.
> > > > >> Roland wanted to stimulate discussion among what he and Cliff saw
> > > > >> as people with a strong family resemblance. He passed away before
> > > > >> this part of the discussion could take place.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Roland and Cliff argue for the mutual relevance of Cultural
> > > > >> Community Psychology and Vygotskian inspired research in the
> > > > >> approach referred to often in these pages as CHAT, not only
> > > > >> because it is an acronym for cultural-historical activity theory,
> > > > >> but because we have a tradition of chatting here about the ideas
> > > > >> in papers that sample our different interests.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> In this case, Cliff is intending to send this message and an
> > > > >> invitation to people from Community Psychology to join in. May it
> > > > >> be celebratory of Roland's long life seeking to promote growth
> > > > >> enhancing communication.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> get your copy at
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Enjoy, and of course, send along to others you think might be
> > > > >> interested.
> > > > >> Its legal, free, above board, and, hopefully, interesting!
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> mike
> > > > >>
> > > > >> --
> > > > >>
> > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
> > > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> > > > >
> > > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
> > > > > Professor Emeritus
> > > > > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
> > > > > Division 27)
> > > > >
> > > > > University of Hawai'i
> > > > > Department of Psychology
> > > > > 2530 Dole Street
> > > > > Honolulu, HI 96822
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
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> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
> that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> ________________________________
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-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
that creates history. Ernst Boesch