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[Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness
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- Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness
- From: Andy Blunden <email@example.com>
- Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 11:28:55 +1100
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Thanks Paul, Huw and (off-line) Francine.
Points all taken. :)
On 1/02/2016 3:01 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
Yes, operations needn't be physical actions (overt
However, you may not need to refer to Leontyev if you're
happier with Vygotksy. The distinction between
involuntary attention and voluntary attention may be
sufficient for you (vol. 4).
Regarding giving explanations for involuntary activities,
a secondary problem is that you may then find that these
explanations are 'excuses' for involuntary activity and
not necessary the conditions that brought these activities
about for the subject.
Hope that helps,
On 31 January 2016 at 11:19, Andy Blunden
<firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:email@example.com>> wrote:
Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers?
Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian
structure of the personality: "basic security system",
"practical consciousness" and "discursive
consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego.
I am involved in criticising this concept of
"practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three
levels of activity.
For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the
practical intelligence which an infant acquires by
handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks,
but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people
to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks
for example, whether social, practical or intellectual
in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have
been acquired without ever passing through conscious
awareness (although this is not a category he uses).
In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably
be the correct name for what he calls "practical".
SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the
Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness"
is part of the Unconscious.
My question is this? - Am I right that operations are
not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a
curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing
or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things
like estimating a person's intentions from their
expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling
out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the
physical operations* we usually use as examples?
According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did
something (practical consciousness) then the subject
will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation
through discursive consciousness. But he says
(correctly I think) that this discursive explanation
could only be an *interpretation* of what they did
under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously,"
and do not normally formulate theories about. He says
that there is no "barrier" between practical and
discursive consciousness, but the movement between the
two seems not to be theorised.