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[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)



Hi huw ! I don't know about David's opinion but as for myself I agree to what you define so succinctly especially when we read Davydov's 'dissolving particularities' to reach 'concrete universals' in one of the quotes I delivered . Thanks a lot !
Best
Haydi
 

      From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
 To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
 Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:05:13
 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
   
Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.

Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
progression in its transformation?

Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
teeth/molars at present...

Best,
Huw





On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
> between "moment" and music.
>
> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>
> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
> angular momentum.
>
> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>
> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > Dear all ,
> >
> > Look at this please !
> >
> > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
> > experiment: 1) The
> > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
> > essence can be revealed
> > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
> > transformations; 3) this same
> > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
> the
> > object is
> > “embedded.” If the construction of this object can still be represented
> as
> > a process of
> > abstraction of the real object’s properties, then this third moment
> > essentially becomes a
> > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
> > within this special
> > system of links that the object’s content gets revealed.]]
> >
> > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
> > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
> even
> > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
> > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
> > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
> > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
> > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
> motionality ,
> > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
> > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
> converted
> > in the other as we all have seen .
> >
> > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
> > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
> > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
> > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
> > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
> or
> > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
> of
> > how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
> > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
> > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
> which
> > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
> .
> > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
> > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
> > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
> > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
> for
> > such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
> >
> >
> >
> > Best
> >
> > Haydi
> >
> >
> >
>