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[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from axis. The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia.

YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above.

yada yada yada,

*Andy Blunden*
On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect appearing as torque in another.


On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense
    9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant
    aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a
    translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
    But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as
    "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word
    play going on there, yes?
    *Andy Blunden*
    On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:

        I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still
        working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think
        the form of part-whole relation is what is at
        issue and "moments" in this sense are
        qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events
        whose conventional meaning is torqued by the

        still learning!

        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden
        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

            I am not at all clear about the context here,
            Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
            thought should have been "instants" and then David
            introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
            which was the subject of my comment.

            I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and
        found that
            all bar one instance of the use of the word
            were in the sense of "at this moment in the
        story ..."
            The one odd reference is this one:

               "We have consistently taken a genetic
        approach to the
               analysis of our problem. We have, however,
        attempted to
               represent the *moments* of this genetic
        process in
               mature, classic forms. The inevitable
        result is that we
               have diverged from the complex and twisting
        path that
               characterizes the actual development of the

            It is possible that Vygotsky refers with
        "moment" here
            to the distinct modes of conception which were
            manifested in the child's activity, at different
            stages, but which are combined in the most
            pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
            complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
            diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
            possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
            Perhaps their *first appearance* in
        ontogenesis could
            form some kind of regular sequence, possibly,
        but it
            is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
            association as "moments" of concept formation
        in the
            other sense of the word "moment" which is not
            interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't
        say for


            *Andy Blunden*
            On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:

                The theoretical point seems interesting
        and worth
                clarifying. The differing interpretations have
                quite different implications.

                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>

        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:

                    Actually, Hegel does not use "moment"
        as meaning a
                    stage, phase or step, David. He tends
        to use
                    category, stage or division for those

                    Individual, Particular and Universal
        are typical
                    examples of "moments" but these are
        not steps,
                    or stages of the concepts, even though
                are also
                    exhibited in this way. Every concrete
                has all
                    three moments. In a trade union, the
        members, the
                    branches/divisions and the general
        secretary are
                    individual, universal and particular
        moments. We
                    cannot conceive of a union developing
        from an
                    individual to a branch to a general
                can we?

                    I will look into the origins of this
        expression. I
                    have always just presumed it came from
                mathematics, as
                    in the first, second, third, ...
        moments of a
                    function, and I know Hegel did study this
                branch of
                    mathematics, because he gives a lot of
                to it in
                    the Science of Logic in his critique of
                calculus. But
                    I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.

                    *Andy Blunden*

                    On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg


                        Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
                more often
                        "moments", and the word
                        "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
                phase, or a
                        step (as in the three
                        "moments" of the formation of the
        concept in
                        Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
                        others", "for myself".

                        One of the most difficult problems
        we had
                to solve
                        in translating the
                        Lectures on Pedology was that
        Vygotsky very
                        clearly distinguishes three
                        moments of speech development:
                        nominative, and signifying.
                        "Indicative" is often non-verbal,
        e.g. a
                        gesture. "Nominating" is
                        ipso facto verbal, because it is
        the naming
                        function: "every thing has a
                        name". But "signifying" is much
        harder to pin
                        down, and in one place
                        Vygotsky actually says that it is
                synonymous with
                        the adult understanding
                        that anything can be named. So
        what is the
                        difference between knowing that
                        everything has a name and the
                that any
                        thing can be named?

                        I think that the distinction is
        just as
                subtle and
                        just as significant
                        as the distinction between pointing to
                        with a gesture, pointing
                        to something with a word like
        "this" or
                        and pointing to something
                        with a word like "apple" or
        "pear". If I
                say that
                        "everything has a name",
                        the name could be extremely general
                        or "thing") or it could
                        be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
                computer"). But
                        I don't yet have the
                        idea that names are invented, and that
                        it is possible to name
                        objects which do not exist, and
                to bring
                        into existence modes of
                        pure abstract thinking through
                        signifying, and it is
                        indeed a new moment, or a new
        instant, in the
                        lifelong process of speech

                        David Kellogg
                        Macquarie University

                        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM,
        Huw Lloyd

                            Thank you, David. That helps
        to explain a
                            particular aspect that I thought
                            Vygotsky was overlooking in
        the narrative,
                            which is that stimuli can not
                            only signify but also
        symbolise, i.e. they
                            afford the kind of dynamics you
                            have elucidated from Volkelt's

                            I have also noted that the
        translation of
                            phrases like "instances of a
                            process" is probably off the mark
                too.  What
                            is really meant, I believe, is
"instants of a process". These have two
                            rather different meanings from the
                            perspective of thinking about


                            On 10 January 2016 at 06:02,
        David Kellogg

        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>>> wrote:


                                Here's what Vygotsky
        really says:

                                Если задача не превышает
                естественных сил
                                ребенка, он справляется с ней
                                непосредственным или
                                В этих случаях структура его
                                поведения совершенно
        напоминает схему,
                                нарисованную Фолькельтом.


                                Collected Works, p. 117).

                                This means (as nearly as I can
                make out):
                                "If the task did not go beyond
                                the natural capability of the
                child, he
                                could deal with it in an


                                or primitive method. In this
                cases, the
                                structure of his behavior


                                completely similar to the
        scheme as
                                presented by Volkelt".

                                I think there is no
        diagramme, at
                                not in the sense of a two
                                dimensional graphic one
        can have a
                                of. What Vygotsky is
        referring to
                                is Volkelt's attempt to
                all child
                                behavior as the result of an
                                affectively tinged FUSION of
                                and behavior, an affectively
                                colored, unanalyzable,
        whole in which
                                perception and behavior were
                                absolutely inseparable.
        This was
                what Hans
                                Volkelt concluded from a


                                of experiments that
        Vygotsky refers to
                                repeatedly, both in HDHMF
        and in


                                Lectures on Pedology and

                                What Volkelt did was this:
        he had four
                                baby bottles: one shaped
        like a
                                triangle, one like a
        violin, one
                like a
                                square, etc. They were all
                                different colors as well.
        But three of
                                them didn't have holes in the


                                you could see and smell
        the milk
                but you
                                couldn't drink it. One did. He
                                taught the infants to
        associate the
                                drinking of milk and the
        feeling of
                                satiation with one particular
                bottle, so
                                that they would actually
                                the bottle unless it had
        all the


                                etc. So Volkelt argued
        that from the
                                child's point of view, he
        was not
                                drinking milk but
        triangular blue
                                This kind of "affectively
                                whole" is what Vygotsky
        refers to as
                                "Volkelt's scheme", or

                                Volkelt's scheme came to a
        bad end. He
                                eventually decided that we
                                grow out of unanalyzable
        perception-behavior wholes,
                                and this would explain the
                indivisible and
                                inseparable devotion of the
                                German volk to their
        Fuhrer. So in
                                work Vygotsky is very
        careful to
                                distance himself from
        Volkelt even
                in his
                                explanations of infant


                                in the Lectures on Pedology he
                argues that
                                ALL THREE layers of behavior
                                (that is, instinct, habit, and
                                intelligence) are present
        in infancy.

                                David Kellogg
                                Macquarie University

                                On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at
        10:50 PM,
                Huw Lloyd

                                    Does anyone have a copy of
                                    diagram" to hand that
        is referred


                                    in The History of the
                Development of
                                    Higher Mental
        Functions (1997,


                                    and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
                don't think
                                    a reference is given.


                It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
                natural science with an
                object that creates history. Ernst Boesch

        It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
        natural science with an
        object that creates history. Ernst Boesch