I want to add one further expansion to my commentary exploring the unity of cognition and affect. Working as a counselor in public schools I believe this month's article is opening a central theme which is currently *concealed*. A key Vygotskian concept that has wide currency in schools is *zone of proximal development. I am attaching an article on early preschool education, which develops 3 key concepts: social interaction; cultural tools; and zone of proximal development. [please delete the other attachment dated September 23 2013 - it was accidentally selected] On page 73 of the article Vygotsky is quoted: " We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal development; that is, learning awakes a variety of internal developmental processes that are able to operate ONLY when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with peers" Now the grammatical term *the* ZPD carries a possible confusion that conceals a tension. ZPD can be *read* to signal a *method* or a *tool* for *learning*. This concept can be captured and turned into a tool for taking knowledge which I the instructor *have* or are in *possession* of and depositing this possession in your *hands* through the method of picking up and using THE ZPD to give you the knowledge I *have*. Brostrom, challenges the metaphor of THE zone as a tool and a method by referencing Holzman's cautionary recommendation.. Bergstrom writes, "Though the idea of ZPD has resulted in many forms of creative education, there is also a risk of simplification and using the idea AS a mechanical INSTRUMENT. (Holman 1997, p.60) Holman warns us this is NOT AT ALL A ZONE BUT A LIFE SPACE, which human beings are INVOLVED IN, and THROUGH WHICH higher mental functions arise and develop." [page 73] We now have two radically distinct meanings of ZPD: 1] a *method* or an *instrument* which we can pick up and HAVE to use as a utensils in order to dish out knowledge which we also have and possess. This can remain within theory of learning as a transcendental/empirical doublet as a particular model/genre of learning which incorporates *THE* ZPD to its instrumental USE VALUES. 2] ZPD as a LIVING SPACE which is more INCLUSIVE than a concept of instruments and preconceived methods USED to dish out sediment2d, granular *knowledge* using conceptual utensils. Both meanings incorporate the metaphor of *zone* but within distinct genres of learning. One is a possessive image while *living SPACE* incarnated a radically different texture or tone within a space that becomes LIVED THROUGH. Bergstrom also ventriloquates Cole & Griffin, Engstrom, and Stetsenko to continue the caution to view ZPD as a simple method or cultural tool for learning EXISTING knowledge. I hope this expansion of the meaning and sense of ZPD fits within the texture of Jennifer and Rebecca's article and section 2 where the Vygotskian framework is developed. Turning to notions of *a living SPACE as not at all *an* instrumental possessive *zone* highlights the tensions within metaphors that conceal as they reveal. Human beings are always existing and LIVING THROUGH experiences WITHIN *living zones* and within these living spaces [metaphorical not geographical] higher mental functions arise and develop AS UNITIES of cognition and affect. A return through analepsis/prolepsis to exploring social emotional learning as existing in THE ZPD as possessive instrumental *methods* as a distinct approach [disposition]or exploring social emotional learning existing WITHIN LIVING ZONES of proximal development [as disposition] Also a return to being *stuck* trying to *figure out* ways to open these types of questioning within public schools as places of learning and development in ways that generate living response? Stuck Larry On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 6:43 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > I am going to attempt to re-situate *experience* as key to understanding > the unity cognitive and affective processes. > However, I will stay closer to the way these themes are presented in > Jennifer and Rebecca's article. I agree with Philip that this article has > the potential to anticipate future directions for exploring and > re-searching human nature. > I chose to put section 2 [Returning to Vygotsky's framework] to one side > to highlight section 1 which situated the article as asking "Where do we > locate or place social emotional learning in school environments. > I am now wondering if that opening may have shifted the conversation to a > concrete example [SEL] and if Vygotsky's framework should have been the > opening move? I believe the topic is central to understanding and > developing schooled environments that show or express *concern* that I will > try to engage others on the topic of section 2 - Vygotsky's framework. > > On page 205 Jennifer and Rebecca situation the framework by weaving > together two subsections: > 1] unity and analysis by units > 2] consciousness AS a unity of intellect and affect. > > Vygotsky's framework embraces unity as grounding his central theoretical > concepts in a dialectical relationship. > Now, I want to draw out and highlight the concept of *experience* as also > central to the notion of unity. I will add this word *experience* to the > multiple phrases & sentences Jennifer and Rebecca wrote on p. 205 to make > my point. > " unified psychological functions in human relationships and experience" > " the unity of social experience and cognitive experience and emotional > experience" > "the unity of speech experience and thinking experience" > > The use of the grammatical conjunctive *and* to highlight the processes > linking experience AS unity. The central theme is that *experience* as > unity cannot be distorted by cutting the *elements* of this unity. For > example speech experience and thinking experience cannot be decomposed into > separate granular elements without destroying the unity [analogy to water > loosing its unity when researchers decompose and describe the elements > hydrogen and water through an analytical separation into granular > fragments] > > Jennifer and Rebecca are calling our attention to experience as dynamic > processes in contrast to analytic fossilized static frameworks which reify > experience. > > Therefore experiences must retain the properties that are characteristic > of the whole [including intellectual experience and affective > experience]rather than experience being reduced to elements within > dissected fragmentary *discrete* notions of experience as *intellectual > experience* OR *affective experience* > > In this amplification of the concept/word *experience* I want to keep > centrally in the foreground Dewey's questioning and regret at his using > this concept *experience* as biased towards idealism and encapsulated > subjectivity. Jennifer and Rebecca's article is operating within a > different and distinct *zone* of proximal development. Zone can also be > imagined as *horizon* or *space* or *place* as experiential *zones*. > *Experience* within THIS Vygotskian *zone* is unified and experience does > not exist within an interiorized *mind* ITSELF. > In addition to experience retaining unified properties of the whole > [gestalts?] the units can be analyzed [with caution to not reify elements > as static] to explore the tensions of the elements within the unity. This > tension which allow the units [notice the grammar of *the* units reifies] > to change and transform. > Jennifer and Rebecca write [p.206] > to BE "a LIVING part of the whole" [reference to Zinchenko.] > > THIS changing unity [both parts and wholes are changing] can be researched > by focusing on distinct *units of analysis" [which are not discrete units > of analysis] This analytical dynamic process also is developing WITHIN > *experience* which is always exceeding the horizon of any framework of > conceptualization. > Experience exists within temporality [analepsis & prolepsis] and > historical *consciousness* but that is for another conversation. > > I hope my shifting to section 2 [frameworks and concepts such as *word > meaning* and *perezhivanie*] will generate further commentary. Other > frameworks are also exploring experience AS LIVING PROLEPSIS and ANALEPSIS > [as gestalts] but they all share a common passion for unity and questioning > where we locate social emotional learning. > School environments is one *arena* or *stage* but the questions touch [as > social experience, cognitive experience, emotional experience] all levels > and realms of aesthesis as living experience. > Jennifer and Rebecca are opening wider zones of proximal development and > I'm enjoying the expansiveness of the *view* [privileging ocular perceiving] > Larry > > > On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 8:31 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > >> I have been waiting to hear further reflections on this months article. >> I have noticed that as I am reading other articles I hear Jennifer's >> voice calling me to listen for distinctions within unities and not reify >> these fluid distinctions into discrete dichotomies. >> I would like to offer further reflections on my musings. >> Dewey wrote a book titled "Experience AND Nature* as conductive concepts. >> I have read Vygotskian commentary suggesting *nature* does not capture >> the centrality of tools and artifacts. Would the title "Experience AND >> Artifacts" be a useful working title? >> Other titles that came to mind were "Experience AND Mediation" or >> "Experience AND Activity". >> I am proposing that *experience* and the conjunctive concepts as >> distinctions can be played with in our models of human nature. >> I am also aware that Dewey re-considered [analepsis] the choice of the >> concept *experience* in his model. However, with the exploration of the >> unity of cognition AND feeling I wonder if *experience* can still be a >> concept which we can *live through* as a meaningfully shared concept to >> explore analytical distinctions WITHIN unities? >> >> The concept *word meaning* was proposed as a central concept used by >> Vygotsky which as an aspect of experience unifies cognition and affect >> WITHIN experience as situated. >> This insight is exploring the place of *concepts* within experience [as >> situated]. >> Calvin Schrag has explored Merleau-Ponty's theme of the centrality of >> the *visual FIELD* and proposes that M-P's insights exploring the visual >> field within experience can be extended to other *fields* such as the other >> perceptual fields [touch hearing, taste] AND conceptual fields, and >> valuational fields. >> The key insight M-P offers is that these multiple fields [perceptual, >> conceptual, valuational] WITHIN experience are neither "outer worlds* of >> re-presented or re-constituted objective properties and relations on the >> one hand, nor are these multiple fields [perceptual, conceptual, >> valuational] an "abstracted inner world" as transcendentally accessed. >> The experiential world [as situated] M-P describes as a *lived-through >> world*. >> Consciousness, [the theme Vygotsky was turning towards before his early >> death], is NEVER ENCLOSED WITHIN ITSELF. It is from the beginning lodged >> within the world as an intentional unity with figures [and con-figurations] >> positioned or located against backgrounds [Gestalts]. Gestalt has also been >> proposed on this xmca site as where Vygotsky was turning. >> Schrag suggests M-P privileged the *visual field* but his key insight can >> be expanded beyond the visual to multiple fields. Schrag suggests the >> visual field is not *truer* or displays a *richer* structure than do the >> other multiple fields. The visual field of sight does have the advantage of >> providing more direct conditions for objectification. I would add that the >> conceptual field also has this distinct benefit of distanciation of figure >> and ground. Schrag points out that this benefit however, by virtue of the >> distant and disembodied potential of the visual sense [I would add >> conceptual field as sense] is prone to become separated from the concrete >> *experiencer* and the dynamic fields [as Gestalts] >> >> Schrag highlights a word [aisthesis] which points to the phenomena which >> MEDIATES all the senses. THIS full bodied is most overtly displayed and >> manifested particularly WITHIN the perceptual field of touch AS tactile >> sensation. >> >> This is Schrag's key point [and may also be put in conjunction with the >> unity of cognition and affect]. >> Full-bodied aisthesis CONTINUES TO BE OPERATIVE in the visual [and >> conceptual] fields, and by virtue of aisthesis retains a unity WITHIN >> experience. >> This insight not does mean an inversion of visual and conceptual fields >> to the nonvisual tactile or auditory fields. Touch and hearing are neither >> truer or richer in structure than sight or concepts. No sense should be >> elevated above the others. Sight and concepts without the full bodied >> aisthesis of the other senses divests *experience* of its vibrancy, as the >> other senses without the visual and conceptual which provide distance tend >> to enslave experience within immediacy. >> >> Schrag and the current article are emphasizing unity and the >> multidimensional texture of experience as cognition AND affect. As Schrag >> writes, >> "The multidimensional texture of experience is displayed not only in the >> plurality of perceptual fields, but also in the variegated deployment of >> conceptual and valuational fields. Conceiving and valuing, as assuredly as >> perceiving, occur WITHIN a figure-ground context. Experience is always >> broader in its reach than perceptual fields." >> >> M-P's privileging the visual sense is not his central insight. His >> central insight is that the multiple fields of sense DISPLAYS a >> figure-ground relation AND an intentional structure REVEALING its intended >> figures at EVERY level of experience. >> >> Jennifer, I enjoyed crisscrossing your insights and extensions of the >> unity of cognition AND affect with Schrag's descriptions within a >> phenomenology of experience. >> >> I apologize if this is going off topic but your article is *in my mind* >> as I am reading Schrag's theme of unity of the senses. >> Larry >> >> > >
Attachment:
SEPTEMBER 23 2013 STRAUS ERWIN PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HUMAN WORLD.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document
Attachment:
SEPTEMBER 25 2013 BROSTROM STIG Reading of Literature and Reflection by Means of Aesthetical Activities.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document