[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Greg,
John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities*
He suggests three realms of knowing.
1] knowing that
2] knowing how
3] knowing from or knowing within.

Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*.
"Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how
students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."

Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing
addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
John would say this explanation is composed in a
*referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second kind.

On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind:
Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. Knowing
how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of
institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted
forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]

John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice*
which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a
*voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in
Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]

This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be
reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This
third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution or
society.
Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving this
knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the
*language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and
sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already
FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by the
disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated
as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical
knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from the
realm of *framing*.
John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the FELT
MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action.

Greg, I hope this was clear?
His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis sensus*
A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
And a section on Vygotsky.

All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action.

Larry







On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
<greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:

> Larry,
> Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a cite?
> or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a third
> realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first and
> second realms were?
> And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is?
> Thanks,
> -greg
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Anti,
> > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves
> together
> > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > Two quick comments.
> > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are alternatives
> > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* but a
> > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating within
> > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit
> *agency*
> > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > 2nd
> > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors may
> > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds].
> > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of *seeing*
> > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our
> > anticipations going forward.
> >
> > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as
> > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing]
> > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm]
> that
> > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is
> entered
> > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of
> *framing*.
> > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within micro
> > processes.  Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales.
> > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view.
> When
> > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 types].
> I
> > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in the
> > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's  metaphor of framing [as
> > previously FORMED frames]
> >
> > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference then
> a
> > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection.
> > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <ajrajala@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of
> > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of
> > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are
> many
> > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say
> that
> > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with
> symbolic
> > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where
> > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > >
> > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems
> > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within
> > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > >
> > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within
> > an
> > > historically
> > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian
> > perspectives
> > > and
> > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and
> > > workplace practice
> > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the
> details
> > > of language
> > > use and conversational organization."
> > >
> > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use
> > and
> > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in
> particular,
> > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we
> > mainly
> > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on
> > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships
> > between
> > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a
> > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction
> is
> > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part
> > of
> > > the bird expert.
> > >
> > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible
> > with
> > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being
> > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional
> issues
> > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry
> > has
> > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether
> > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such
> > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding
> > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > >
> > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > ethnomethodological
> > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of
> sociocultural
> > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson:
> > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > >
> > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain
> > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether
> 'cognitive',
> > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge
> > Greeno's
> > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on
> > emotional
> > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames
> > > (which he relates to Goffman).  "This refers to ways in which an
> > individual
> > > is
> > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions
> > of
> > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session
> > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on
> > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and
> > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > >
> > > Greg wrote:
> > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which
> motivations
> > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain
> extent"
> > -
> > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with
> > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > >
> > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals
> can
> > be
> > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed
> in
> > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a
> > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense.
> > >
> > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of
> stability
> > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague
> of
> > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become
> > legitimately
> > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > >
> > > Antti
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along
> > > with
> > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and
> > > thought,
> > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > >
> > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability
> of
> > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes
> of
> > > > sense making capturable with
> > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even
> > > dictionary
> > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the
> history
> > > of
> > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
> > > > ontogeny.
> > > >
> > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in
> > > these
> > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>