Andy,
As far as I am aware, the Marxian dialectical materialism addresses
dynamics of producing human artifacts and is not concerned with
natural phenomena as an object of study.
You mentioned Model but did not figure this into your formulation.
The model seems necessary to distinguish the study of natural
phenomena (but we can, ofcourse model artificial phenomena too). The
model is such an artifact which is "created" in the process of
studying the natural phenomena.
A Marxian unit of analysis is required to be reducible to a single
basis (Marx, Davydov). But there is no such requirement for natural
phenomena to reduce to a single basis, although I believe attempts
have been made to formulate this (e.g. negentropy).
From the position of the natural scientists (with their models and
experiments) there is no such deep need to identify the unit of
analysis in Marxian terms. Rather, the natural scientist's "unit of
analysis" contributes toward the genetic understanding of the origins
of the natural phenomena studies, which is achieved through an
appreciation of the unfolding, interacting, systemic relations of
natural phenomena. The "unit" under these circumstances is the system
of interest (system to the un-initiated is not easily defined). But
it is also appreciated that a system is not isolated from all other
natural phenomena (which is in basic agreement with the materialist
conception of mind).
This leaves us in the interesting position of having two complementary
systems of thought applicable to two related phenomena.
1. The image-ideal elaborated upon by Ilyenkov, Davydov etc, which
traces the genesis of the (artificial) concept.
2. The psychological system elaborated by Vygotsky, Luria etc, which
traces the changing (genesis) functional relations of the system in
support of these artificial concepts.
The interaction of these two systems of thought yields further
considerations such as:
1. The tentative demarcation of a functional system of interest on the
basis of a dialectical-materialist unit of analysis (e.g. those
changing systems at play in "thought and speech") and the system of
activity that the subject participates in.
2. The genesis (of the concept?) of the model and its social influence
etc, which includes the history of the concept of system.
With respect to your comment "The unit of analysis suggests the
method", I would say, rather, that the awareness of the holistic
nature of the activity system and the conceived of sub-systems
necessary participation in this configuration affords the method. Or,
the problem of modelling this psychological behaviour is facillitated
by the appreciation of object-oriented activity as a holistic system.
I have not had much time to disconfirm the points I have inferred
(e.g. I have some Davydov & Ilyenkov, but not much Marx and less
Hegel), but have yet to find anything that contradicts this.
I look forward to your comments!
Huw
On 30 July 2013 04:42, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
So we have 4 distinct but interrelated concepts: system, model,
unit of analysis and method.
I will try to formulate a view on unit of analysis and method.
The idea of "artefact-mediated (collaborative) action" as a unit
of analysis (a generalisation of "word meaning") is the basis for
the "method of dual stimulation," as I see it.
Once you have a concept of that S - X - R triangle, as the unit of
action, then it suggests a method of investigation based on
offering the auxilliary stimulus, the artifact X, to the subject,
S, to assist them to complete the task, R. By varying teh artefact
X and the task R, investigation of S is possible.
Likewise, let us suppose that you see the mind as a psychological
system made up of functional subsystems each of which are
interconnected, irrespective of whether the subsystem in question
itself produces observable phenomena. This could be represented in
a diagram, too, something like S -> Ssys1 ---> Ssys2 -> R, meaning
that every subsystem (Ssys1) is connected with every other
(Ssys2), and disturbance of Ssys1 will cause a disturbance to
Ssys2, which may be manifeted in an observable response, R.
So the implication of this is that the "unit of analysis" of an
entire psychological system is two functional subsystems with an
interconnection. Ssys1 --- Ssys2.
This is not trivial, because much of Ssys1 will not be observable,
and this unit of analysis allows the investigator to study Ssys1
by means of the observable responses via Ssys2.
The unit of analysis suggests the method.
Andy