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Re: [xmca] Double Stimulation?



Antti and Achilles,
Thanks for this. I have a pretty poor understanding of "double
stimulation", so your suggestions are very helpful.

I think I'm seeing the difference between the Strathern quote and double
stimulation. Let me see if I can push my point a bit further because what I
am trying to understand is close to Eric's question about unit of analysis.
Here I am thinking in terms of individual vs. group level mediation.

Achilles, as you describe it, it seems like double stimulation is primarily
concerned with individual agency. In the description you give (and perhaps
Engestrom as well?), mediation happens between a stimulus and a response
and puts distance (X) between the stimulus and the response such that the
individual can act in an agentic fashion. This is agency at the level of
the individual.

So what I'm wondering is if it makes any sense to think about double
stimulation (and agency) at the level of the group.

As an example, I recently came across work done by Aihwa Ong with factory
workers in Malaysia. She describes how when factory workers were faced with
a sort of dilemma of being over-worked or quitting their jobs, they would
become possessed by spirits and thus unable to work. Here is a mediator at
the level of culture that appears to be doing important work of solving a
dilemma (like Buridan's ass, only here the workers are faced with two bad
choices and they come up with a third and better choice which, in a sense,
chooses them). [And lets just assume that these factory workers aren't
"just pretending" but are really experiencing being possessed]. Does that
count as double stimulation? or is the concept more circumscribed (and
individualistic) than this?

My question is getting at where we locate "agency". In individuals alone?
Or as possibly being distributed among multiple people and perhaps in a
manner that isn't recognizable to the individual. But maybe there is a
concept for that that is different from "double stimulation."

Anyway, thanks again for these thoughtful and detailed responses. I do
appreciate you bearing with my limited understanding of these matters...

Very best,
greg








On Wed, Jun 5, 2013 at 6:03 AM, Achilles Delari Junior <
achilles_delari@hotmail.com> wrote:

> Sure, Greg,
> Well, seems to me that "draw analogies between different domains of their
> worlds" is closer to "meaning construction" than to choice a "stimulus
> medium" to help memory tasks, for instance. The "double stimulation" is
> fine because introduces a kind of mediation between a stimulus and our
> response to the stimulus. But, following Vygotsky's formulations at that
> time this new series of "stimulus" (a nude, a word, etc) act also as a
> stimulus, a conditioned one. If you change you paradigm to the proposition
> that all sign implies any kind of "generalization process" (meaning) that
> differs in their structure and has a genetic construction (see the studies
> about concepts, for instance), a sign could not be only a second series of
> stimuli ruled by the same laws that a conditional reflex... As in
> "Instrumental method": S-------X-------R. Where the relation S---------R is
> a direct stimulus response relationship, but when you introduce a second
> series of stimulus "X" (double stimulation) you have an indirect stimulus
> response relationship, but the relation between S and X, and X and R remain
> a conditioned reflex relationship... "Draw analogies between different
> domains of our worlds" seem to mean that we are in transit between
> different words of signification, and culture is a human production that
> involves the "generalization" from a world to another, broader, maybe not
> exactly more precise, but "broader", in my opinion. I don't know...
>
>
> "In natural memory a direct associative (conditional reflex) connection
> A→B is established between two stimuli A and B. In artificial, mnemotechnic
> memory of the same impression, by means of a psychological tool X (a knot
> in a handkerchief, a mnemonic scheme) instead of the direct connection A→B
> two new ones are established: A→X and X→B Just like the connection A→B each
> of them is a natural conditional reflex process, determined, by the
> properties of the brain tissue. What is new, artificial, and instrumental
> is the fact of the replacement of one connection A→B by two connections:
> A→X and X→B They lead to the same result, but by a different path. What is
> new is the artificial direction which the instrument gives to the natural
> process of establishing a conditional connection, i.e., the active
> utilization of the natural properties of brain tissue." Vygotsky "The
> Instumental Method" (this is 1930)
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/instrumental.htm
>
> But already in 1928:
>
> "Let us now compare the natural and cultural mnemonics of a child. The
> relation between the two forms can be graphically expressed by means of a
> triangle: in case of natural memorization a direct associative or
> conditional reflexive connection is set up between two points, A and B. In
> case of mnemotechnical memorization, utilizing some sign, instead of one
> associative connection AB, the others are set up AX and BX, which bring us
> to the same result, but in a roundabout way. Each of these connections AX
> and BX is the same kind of conditional-reflexive process of connection as
> AB." Vygotsky (1928)
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1929/cultural_development.htm
>
>
> See: "AX and BX is the same kind of conditional-reflexive process of
> connection as AB." --> The same kind... This paradigm will not be the same
> in 1933-34...
>
> "(Introduction: the importance of the sign; its social meaning). In older
> works we ignored that the sign has meaning. < But there is “a time to cast
> away stones, and a time to gather stones together” (Ecclesiastes). > We
> proceeded from the principle of the constancy of meaning, we discounted
> meaning. But the problem of meaning was already present in the older
> investigations. Whereas before our task was to demonstrate what “the knot”
> and logical memory have in common, now our task is to demonstrate the
> difference that exists between them.From our works it follows that the sign
> changes the interfunctional relationships." (Vygotsky, 1933-34)
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-consciousness.htm
>
>
> And now?
>
>
> Thank you.
>
> Achilles.
>
> > Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2013 18:31:23 -0600
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Double Stimulation?
> > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >
> > Achilles,
> >
> > Sounded interesting, but I'm not sure I followed you completely. You say
> > that Strathern's quote seems like it has a broader application that
> "double
> > stimulation", but I could use some help with the rest of your message.
> >
> > If you have a few minutes, maybe you could try rephrasing?
> >
> > -greg
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Achilles Delari Junior <
> > achilles_delari@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > In my undertanding, this is very broader and more powerful than double
> > > stimulation... Double stimulation could be overcoming with another way
> for
> > > think signs than "medium stimulus" - See "The problem of consciousness"
> > > (1933-34), for instance. The more important will be not the similarity
> > > between a nude and a word, but their difference, "before was forgotten
> that
> > > sign had a meaning" and "now" the meaning must be take in account.
> Double
> > > stimulation, in my understanding, do not resists to this new point of
> view.
> > >
> > > Achilles.
> > >
> > > > Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:19:04 -0600
> > > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu; lchcmike@gmail.com;
> antti.rajala@helsinki.fi
> > > > CC:
> > > > Subject: [xmca] Double Stimulation?
> > > >
> > > > I wonder if this quote by Marilyn Strathern can be productively
> connected
> > > > (not necessarily geneaologically, but ideologically) to the notion of
> > > > "double stimulation" (which I am just now trying to figure out):
> > > > "Culture consists in the way people draw analogies between different
> > > > domains of their worlds" (1992: 47).
> > > >
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
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>
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-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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