Re: Fw: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Haydi,
I don't think its your limits. I acknowledge my limits on this theme and
the way I'm grateful to listen in to Andy, martin, Brecht and possibly
Rauno .

Haydi, as mike mentioned the talk about *metaphysics* and Activity Theory
is a central theme which is engaging many scholars. I do not have the
background of either Andy or Martin. However martin is exploring thinking
and being as intimately connected themes (for example in his article on
Ifa  divination). Martin puts in question the metaphysical assumptions of
all theories and models including Activity Theory.
He is questioning our understanding of *reasoning* when he argues that from
within the Ifa cosmovision the thinking and the being is very reasoned
reflection. As I understand Martin he is questioning the assumption of
*mental states* as our current metaphysics (beyond physics). AS I
understand Martin he is asking questions about the metaphysics behind
Activity Theory.
He is not being dismissive with this question, as he assumes we cannot
*know* or *think* except from within a metaphysical way of life that is
shared in common (Hegel's objective spirit)*
Haydi, this supports the understanding within Activity Theory that our
shared objective understandings are prior to subjective understandings. My
reading of Martin's question is when Activity Theory posits
*internalization* AS mental states???

I may have misunderstood Martin's intent with his questions. I understand
Andy as positing *collaboration* as central to understanding. I'm reading
Andy as positing *realization* as the movement of understanding which is
both internally and externally realized simultaneously.
Haydi, I'm trying to understand the questions and the answers Andy and
martin are generating as they attempt to go deeper in their understanding.
I often feel disoriented as I listen in on their conversations but I sense
I'm developing a little ability to translate between their readings of the
same texts.
Activity as macro structures and institutional ways of life are
*translated* into actions.
I wonder about actions as planned intentional volitional acts and how they
relate to practices. Planned actions when actualizes within historical
contexts never manifest the exactly the way intended and the unintended
situations are practices.
Gadamer asks if there is a type of *knowing* which he calls phronesis
(practical knowing) which is NOT planned volitional actions.

Haydi, I want to acknowledge how much I appreciate your making the time to
invite me into further conversations. Your last posting was very helpful
and clarifying. I will continue to listen closely to both Andy and Martin.
The question of the relation between ideality (thought) and material Andy
argues are distinct essences. Martin answers they are both processes.
I'm interested in the conversation which opens up new understanding as I
listen into their disputes.
Not sure if this is helpful, but I wanted to let you know I appreciate how
you have kept. in touch as I continue to think out loud which I believe
leads to further understanding AS a question and answer philosophy.

In friendship

Larry



On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>wrote:

> Dear Larry
> We've had a lot of talks in the past mostly off the list . Now , there's
> the same problem ; because of my limits , I cannot come to terms with the
> many good thoughts you've offered in one rich message ; hope Andy , Martin
> , Brecht will continue their helpful debate . Thanks and apologies !
> Best
> Haydi
>
> ----- Forwarded Message -----
> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, 27 March 2013, 19:24:56
> Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
>
>
> Haydi,
> Hello, and thank you for this response to my questioning.
>
> As I read this commentary, (and Brecht's commentary on the transformations
> in Egypt I notice how similar are many the shared understandings.
>
> Haydi, I want to acknowledge that I am groping to understand these
> processes and am trying to get my bearings by reading multiple traditions
> and attempting to put them in conversation.
> In that *spirit* I will try to translate *imaginative* as that process
> emerging between the material and the ideal (internalized).
>
> I share an understanding that thinking/being is a developmental process
> which emerges through effective history (hermeneutical)
> That translates to the process of Marx *developing* through his encounters
> with Hegel.
> Haydi, I see THIS process as central to thinking/being.
> It IS a metaphysical understanding in the sense of beyond physics.
> Therefore forms of perceiving and conceiving and participation share a form
> of life.  Science as empirical as foundational to *truth* is also a
> metaphysical understanding with its own forms of understanding.
>
> The central question around which we are exploring further understanding
> is the notion of the imaginable and how this relates to the dialogical and
> social understandings. I am struggling to see *thinking/being* as existing
> within metaphysical forms of life (as martin is so helpful in
> articulating). I am attempting to *see* as a way of perceiving
> (imaginable???) that thinking/being are always metaphysical forms of
> understanding and interpretation.  The age of science and modernity AS a
> conversation through the temporal realm.
>
> The term *dialogical* shares an understanding with CON-text.  Marx was
> participating in an historical conversation and his understanding emerged
> from within his engagement with German tradition.
> Activity theory emerged within engagement with Marx as a conversation.
> They share a metaphysics.
> As martin indicates we today are revisiting the way we dismissed the
> concept of metaphysics as something we have moved *beyond*.
>
> Haydi, I am interested in the conversation between Andy and martin and
> they way they *translate* each others understandings.
> In THAT encounter, I must use my *imagination* to
> read/interpret/understand the continuing *objective spirit* being expresses
> AS dialogical (context)*
>
> Haydi, your commentary today I *interpret* as a conversation within
> effective history. Gadamer would suggest that when we are moved through our
> reading of Marx for example we are participating in a *living* conversation
> with Marx.
> THAT way of understanding which imagines texts as *living* is what I mean
> by imaginal.
>
> Activity theory may be expressing this understanding of living text with
> different concepts which share the same meaning???
>
> Does this help our conversation. Andy and Brecht are also in a
> conversation when Andy develops the concept *realize* which operates on
> both the internal and external plane as a single unified process.
>
> THIS concept *realized* may require what I am calling * imaginal*
> understanding.
>
> Larry
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 3:13 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Dear Larry
> >You have the first response within the text itself :
> >[[And these are the very processes of the ac-tivity of the subject that
> always are external and practical first and then as-sume the form of
> internal activity, the activity of consciousness.]]
> >This means first that 'consciousness' is not there from birth (Ilyenko's
> reference to the experience of A.Meshcheryakov's innovations vis-a-vis the
> formation of consciousness) . Second , that when 'consciousness' was formed
> through the activities of the SOCIAL COLLABORATIVE DIALOGIC-ORIENTED (your
> loved one not repudiated by anyone) agent (subject) , it will not remain as
> something like a STAGE , as L declares , on which events take place and
> actors come and go , itself just fixed and recipient and away from all
> transformations , no , it , as is a moment of a whole non-stop process of
> LIFE ITSELF , aids MAN for a start of a INTERNAL activity towards the
> OUTSIDE (EXTERIORIZATION OR EXTERNALIZATION) . The ideal is volatile and
> this is the exegesis of 'reflection' . reflection is onto mind not to dwell
> , not to be registered , not to find secure place ; neither mind nor con.
> is a secure place to dwell in , to lie and rest ; reflection is dynamic and
>  dynamizes . Hence saying the ideal is within the process of the activity
> . All the time you think and act according to the schema of the ideal until
> it is , as you dub it , developed ; They say until it is REIFIED , FINISHED
> , MATERIALIZED , OBJECTIFIED . Ideal , reified , is no longer ideal . It's
> product . It's object . Now , again , Life takes you to the world of
> objects and orientates on one other object to promote it to the rank of a
> MOTIVE , according to the hiararchy of the motives depending of the
> personality of the SOCIAL ... agent . Another round of an activity and this
> activity is a close kin of the KNOWN MARXIAN LABOUR . And with Egypt , we
> are on the VALORIZATION PROCESS NOT the general universal work of man .
> >
> >
> >
> >Incidentally , the second response is also within the text :
> >[[The psychologist-metaphysician also drops the  mainlink -THE PROCESSES
> that mediate the ties of the subject with the real world, the only
> >
> >processes in which their psychic reflection of reality takes place, the
> transi-tion of the material into the ideal.]]
> >
> >How could these processes be imaginative ? Be reflection we don't mean
> 'imagination' . Meshcheryakov's kids were not able to imagine first . They
> were not able to satisfy their required instincts even .
> >I know lots of efforts are being made these days to reduce the
> psychological to the physiological  or to prove to know that we can find
> every aspect of the psychological within the physiological . But the
> Activity Theorists at least the Masters disagree .
> >Second , the problem still goes : Ilyenko says ideal is not within the
> head . It's material . Dubrovsky as well as Lifshits oppose . Then if the
> word 'ideal' caused your thinking of 'imagination' , it's not appropriate
> here .
> >Purposely , I will not enter the sphere of 'creativity' , 'Piaget's idea
> of Permanence' , 'the chimpanzee's ability to act/create/innovate just
> within the visual field' , etc. etc.
> >Best
> >Haydi
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >________________________________
> > From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Tuesday, 26 March 2013, 18:22:08
> >
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
> >
> >
> >
> >Brecht,
> >Your commentary was very helpful and clarifying.
> >Your use of the word *inviting* and *invitation* also shifts the
> conversation towards dialogue and being addressed.
> >Entering the conversation from two directions/perspectives also helps
> clarify the relationships.
> >
> >Haydi,, you mentioned a direction from material to ideal.
> >Is this always an orientation from material to ideal, or is it possible
> to also orient from the ideal to the material once the ideal is developed??
> >
> >Also is it possible to consider the *spark* that mediates the transition
> of one to the other AS *imaginable* or *creative* sparks???
> >
> >Larry
> >
> >
> >On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 3:22 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >Dear Brecht
> >>Leontiev speaks in clear words :
> >>
> >>[[The old metaphysical psychology knew only abstract individuals being
> >>subjected to the action of an environment that resisted them, who on
> their
> >>part exhibited characteristic psychic capabilities: perception, thought,
> will,
> >>feelings. Indifferently the individual under these circumstances was
> thought
> >>of as some kind of reactive machine (if even a very complexly programmed
> >>machine), or he was ascribed innately developed spiritual strength. Like
> >>St. Sancho, who naively believed that with a blow of steel we will chop
> out fire
> >>that is hidden in rock and who was derided by  Marx,9 the
> psychologist-metaphysician thinks that the psyche can be extracted from the
> subject him-self, from his head. Like Sancho, he does not suspect that the
> fiery sparks
> >>are cast off not by the rock but by the steel, and what is most
> important, that
> >>the whole point is that in the white heat the sparks are the interaction
> of the
> >>rock and the steel. The psychologist-metaphysician also drops the
>  mainlink -the processes that mediate the ties of the subject with the real
> world, the only
> >>processes in which their psychic reflection of reality takes place, the
> transi-tion of the material into the ideal. And these are the very
> processes of the ac-tivity of the subject that always are external and
> practical first and then as-sume the form of internal activity, the
> activity of consciousness.]]
> >>Best
> >>Haydi
> >>
> >>
> >>________________________________
> >> From: Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
> >>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>Sent: Tuesday, 26 March 2013, 11:37:22
> >>
> >>Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Martin,
> >>
> >>
> >>Ironically, I think it is not only a question of methodology pertaining
> to a specific discipline, but a problem of "metaphysics" as well :)
> >>
> >>
> >>In the model of "individuals constituting a crowd", the "individual" is
> a genetic and logical given before the "crowd". But, again, individual
> bodies come to a demonstration already participating in numerous projects.
> These bodies cannot dress, talk, or move without explicitly and
> "empirically" acknowledging their participation in various "social forms",
> i.e. systems of activity, projects, etc. Returning to Marx, individuals are
> really ensembles - coherent wholes - of social relations. An individual
> actor is, on the one hand, a discrete agent participating in countless
> activities, and, on the other, a microcosm of the activities (s)he
> participates in. "Individuality" (cf. Voloshinov 1973) is just one of the
> many projects an individual participates in.
> >>
> >>
> >>It is important to realize that individuals do not assemble into a
> "crowd" independently from the activity. Their intentions are not an a
> priori as well. They are, in fact, formally and informally "invited" to
> participate. With regard to the 25 January demonstrations, people were
> formally invited through leaflets, facebook and twitter messages, and face
> to face conversations. But people were also informally "drawn into" the
> activity of protesting by the saliency of its actions. The organizers of
> the first protesters had decided to gather first in popular neighborhoods
> and move in mini-demonstrations from there to Tahrir, in order not to get
> arrested on an individual basis. This action had the unintended side-effect
> that people from the neighborhood began discussing with the protesters and
> began to physically join the demonstrations. Groups of a few hundred
> protesters swiftly swelled to a few thousands. The rest is history.
> >>
> >>
> >>At the moment of the "invitation" people were already drawn into the
> activity of protesting. What was left for them was to *recognize* the
> project as their own and participate in its leading action: the
> demonstration. Conversely, the project had to prove its rationality and
> necessity to potential participants. The basis on which each discrete
> individual decided to agree and participate was quite varied. Often the
> decision to participate was not taken on an individual basis, but already
> as a collaborative activity, "in group", for example the Ultras (hardcore
> football supporters), families living in the same street, or workers
> belonging to a strike committee. But the fact that, in the end, millions
> did, indicated that the activity of resistance (expressed in vague concepts
> such as "the regime is a bunch of thieves" and survivalist or basic forms
> of resistance such as evading taxes, not going to vote, etc.) already
> existed and was taken to the next
>  level
> >> of open and explicit mobilization.
> >>
> >>Likewise, a strike is not the first moment of resistance, it is the
> moment where already existing forms of resistance (often individual or by
> small groups) becomes organized, salient, collaborative, intentional, etc.
> Even when an individual engages in a singular activity he employs the tools
> and signs that are developed through his participation in projects. Even
> indirectly, his/her activity is still socially mediated. When participating
> in a collaborative activity this mediation becomes "direct" (dialogical?),
> and takes on a wholly different developmental logic.
> >>
> >>
> >>People who were "passively resisting" were suddenly thrown into the
> collaboration of "active protest". They came into confrontation with the
> police, and more importantly, in a few street battles, they "won". They
> came into confrontation with each other and realized they were "legion"
> because they were already practical-materially a massive force. They were
> already making a revolution in their deeds and demands before they fully
> realized they were making a revolution and conceptualized their own
> activity as a revolution. If anything, revolutionary intentions came
> *after* practically being a revolutionary - emerging from the activity.
> Their individual consciousness of the newly emerging goals of their
> activity was semiotically mediated by slogans such as "down with the
> regime", "bread, freedom, and social justice", revolutionary songs,
> graffiti and cartoons that expressed power relations and the necessity to
> overthrow them, ..., and practically by their
> >> organization and crafting of tools (from molotov cocktails to stages
> for speeches).
> >>
> >>
> >>From *this* perspective, there are no two levels (1) "one perspective,
> actions in collaborations are drawn into a new activity, which then defines
> new actions"; and (2) the other perspective, individuals act intentionally
> (and reason and feel) towards and with others with whom they share a
> network, and this inspires and motivates others who have previously not
> participated." It is a story of mediation and of development, where
> individual intentions and actions are entwined with collaborative efforts.
> >>
> >>
> >>When I speak of revolutionary institutions I mean this in a broad sense
> of stable and systemic objectifications of struggle. An ad hoc meeting to
> organize a demonstration or a strike is not yet an institution, but it can
> become one. The occupation of Tahrir at one point had the potentiality of
> becoming an institution (it was even called the "Republic of Tahrir"). Why
> did this institution not crystallize? Because the military was successful
> in drawing a majority of protesters into its own project of "transition".
> It demobilized the participants of the occupation action which then played
> a leading role in the revolutionary process. How was this possible?  It was
> the outcome of a specific hegemonic struggle, which the military won,
> because of reasons I won't detail here now. To put it in abstract terms:
> the military formally agreed with the goal of the popular project, but
> substituted its own top-down actions for the grassroots action of the
>  protesters.
> >> This created confusion, and the rest is, unfortunately, also history.
> >>
> >>On the other hand, many strike committees that popped up during the
> revolution DID crystallize into more or less stable independent
> trade-unions. Why? Because these strike committees often had a longer
> history of organized struggle and collaboration, because they were better
> organized, and because the fall of Mubarak, which demobilized broad layers
> of "political" protesters, was appropriated as a call for *increased*
> mobilization from "social" protesters. But that's also a different story
> which would lead us too far.
> >>
> >>
> >>In conclusion there is a no strict separation between "social movements"
> and "institutions". Organizing a demonstration (movement) already
> presupposes degrees of organization (institutions), and from the activity
> of a collective action organizations may develop. However, in the
> development of an activity, there are phases where "movement" or
> "institution" is leading or dominant. After the fall of Mubarak, it was
> obvious that mobilizations were still important, but that the point of
> gravity shifted to building revolutionary institutions. And the fact that
> this formation process was fragmented, diverted, and retarded because of
> the so-called "democratic transition" from above (= counter-revolution) is
> the reason Egypt is still a mess today.
> >>
> >>
> >>Best,
> >>
> >>
> >>Brecht
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Brecht,
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> I can see the logic of exploring the mutual constitution of actions
> and activities, rather than of individuals and crowds. Especially since
> you're in a Department of Conflict and Development Studies. But speaking as
> a psychologist, what would happen if one looked this phenomenon in Egypt in
> *both* ways - rather like MCM and CMC in Capital?
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>>> From one perspective, actions in collaborations are drawn into a new
> activity, which then defines new actions. From the other perspective,
> individuals act intentionally (and reason and feel) towards and with others
> with whom they share a network, and this inspires and motivates others who
> have previously not participated.
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> It may even be that what seems organic and spontaneous from the one
> perspective seems logical and inevitable from the other. And vice versa.
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> Finally, you write that...
> >>
> >>>>>  by instances of "institutionalization"...  Only a few of the
> spontaneous movements of the insurrection have been crystallized and
> developed as stable and coherent "systems of activity".
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> I'm trying to make sense of institutions these days. Do you have ideas
> as to why this has not occurred? What does it take to constitute an
> institution? The power to declare it? I mean, in a non-revolutionary
> society this is precisely what happens: one institution designates people
> (role inhabitants) who define a new institution. In a situation where all
> institutions, I suppose, are questionable, what alternative basis might
> there be?
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> Martin
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 1:58 PM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>>> I think a "crowd" is too loose a concept to investigate such a
> process.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Firstly, the category of "crowd" lumps together fundamentally
> different actions and activities. A lynch mob or a mass concert obviously
> has a different developmental logic than a political demonstration or a
> strike.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Secondly, I rather study the relation between collaborative actions
> and collaborative activities than between "individuals" and "groups".
> Individual bodies are not entering actions as individuals, but because they
> are already a part of existing collaborations which are drawn into a new
> activity/project. So the "seeds" of any "crowd" already exist before its
> formation as a "crowd". For example, the first demonstrations on 25 January
> 2011 in Cairo mobilized (1) existing "networks" of activists that had been
> built slowly since the last decade, both "real" (organizations) and
> "virtual" (internet-based); (2) non-organized people from popular
> neighborhoods who "spontaneously" joined the smaller protest marches
> towards Tahrir. But even these people joined the action (concrete
> demonstration) as part of an already existing project (neighborhood,
> workplace, community, etc.).
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Thirdly, instead of "individuals" constituting a "crowd", the mass
> mobilizations rather represented a coming together of different projects
> into a joint action, which then "organically" gave rise to a new project of
> "revolution". I say organically and spontaneously, because the goal of
> revolution emerged from the coming together of these various projects and
> the development of their joint action - no organized political force had
> dreamed of moving forward the call for an end to the regime. There was a
> dual developmental process: A. the goals of the activity developed from a
> vague and soft critique of the regime to the radical demand of overthrowing
> the current order; B. the actions that comprised the activity changed from
> mass demonstrations, over small-scale "guerrilla warfare" in the streets
> against the police at night, to occupation of public spaces.
> >>
> >>>> This dual developmental process was determined by, on the one hand
> the internal relation between actions and activity, and, on the other, the
> external encounter between the actions and organized state power. For
> example, internally, from the occupation of Tahrir emerged the need for
> grassroots forms of governance (tents, food, doctors, art and songs,
> prisoners, etc.), which, in turn, strongly encouraged the feeling that a
> societal revolution was taking place. Externally, the withdrawal of the
> police from the streets stimulated the formation of popular committees to
> protect neighborhoods from thugs and criminals (who were often set loose by
> the regime...), which, in popular and working class neighborhoods, became
> pillars of revolutionary self-organization.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Fourthly, this touches upon activity as a developmental process where
> moments of "movement" that bring together individual bodies in new forms of
> collaboration has to be grounded by instances of "institutionalization" (or
> systematization) if it is to become a stable social form. And this is where
> the Egyptian revolution has largely failed, up until now. Only a few of the
> spontaneous movements of the insurrection have been crystallized and
> developed as stable and coherent "systems of activity". But that's another
> discussion.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Best,
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Brecht
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> Quoting Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>>> What an interesting investigation, Brecht!
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>> You write of a relationship of 'constitution' that runs both ways
> between individual actions and group activity. Years ago I read Elias
> Canetti's book Crowds and Power, and the memory I have of that book
> (probably distorted by the passage of time) is that Canetti was exploring
> the way a crowd has an existence that is more than the sum of its parts:
> when individuals 'constitute' a crowd this really gives rise to something
> emergent, new. Do you see that in Egypt?
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>> Martin
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 11:01 AM, Brecht De Smet
> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> Unfortunately, I don't know enough about Activity Theory to engage
> in a detailed criticism; during my brief encounter with CHAT I immediately
> "jumped" to Andy's concept of project collaboration (PC) (which is of
> course partially rooted in AT). Likewise, because my research focus is more
> on the "meso"-level of groups, movements, and organizations, I can't really
> say much about ethnographic descriptions of micro-activities such as
> opening windows on election days.
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> The advantage of PC for my research is that the object of an
> activity is conceived of as emerging within the developmental process of
> the activity itself. As I'm studying the revolutionary process in Egypt,
> such a perspective allows for an understanding of the real transformations
> of actions and activities involved. A concrete activity obviously
> constitutes concrete actions (e.g. the broad activity of protesting on 25
> January constituted the actions of meetings, demonstrations, etc.), but the
> development of actions has the potential to reconstitute the activity (the
> demonstration on Tahrir turned into an occupation, which, in turn, created
> a space for alternative politics; the mass character of the demonstrations
> reconstituted the object of the protest towards "an end to the regime",
> i.e. revolution; etc.). In abstract terms: the relation between individual
> protesters and the activity of protesting (the project) is mediated by
> particular
>  actions
> >> (their collaboration), and, vice versa, the relation between individual
> protesters and their particular actions is mediated by the "overarching"
> activity of protest.
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> This neat scheme becomes much more complex when you take into
> account the relations between various projects, both "horizontally" and
> "vertically". Horizontally, the spontaneous revolutionary project arises in
> contradiction /solidarity to a bunch of other projects (e.g. Islamism, the
> state, etc.). Vertically, and "from the bottom-up" this project is part of
> such historical systems as the Egyptian social formation and global
> capitalism; and "top-down" it is constituted by and reconstitutes a series
> of smaller projects (students' movements for better education; workers'
> movements for better wages; villages demanding water and electricity, etc.).
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> Added to this - and against the notion of the "omniscient"
> scientist-observer - the social researcher him/herself is a
> constitutive/constituted actor vis-à-vis the project, in the sense that
> his/her actions (publishing papers, doing fieldwork, writing books,
> attending conferences, conducting interviews, etc.) plays a potential
> mediating role, for example in the understanding of the project of itself,
> in crafting intellectual tools to achieve (or undermine) the goals of the
> project, etc.
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> I do not know if this amounts to a critique of AT, but this is the
> way "actions" and "activity" have been productive concepts for my research.
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> Best,
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> Brecht
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> Quoting Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>> Hi Brecht,
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>> Yes, a rational critique of ontology is possible, and indeed
> necessary. I was trying to engage in such a critique of activity theory,
> which it seems to me departs considerably rather the admirable (though not
> unquestionable) ontology that Marx proposed. (And yes, as you suggest, the
> claim to be "purely empirical" seems to me a return to the outdated and
> simplistic notion that there is on the one hand 'metaphysics' and on the
> other hand 'genuine science.' But let that pass.) Activity theory, in my
> view, essentializes a particular organization of human activity and in
> doing so obscures the historical character of that organization. Would you
> agree?
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>> Martin
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 4:00 AM, Brecht De Smet
> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> Martin, I obviously agree with your presentation of the
> historical lineages of the "word" metaphysics. However, with regard to the
> current discussion on the "terms of the debate", it is quite obvious that
> Andy's original remark: "So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical
> "states of mind", or intelligent infants, etc" clearly deployed metaphysics
> in the critical (derogatory?) sense of a "false ontology", i.e. the domain
> of fantastic "a priori" speculation. Retorting that everyone uses
> metaphysics, a.k.a. an ontology-epistemology, paradigm, Weltanschauung,
> etc. obscures the fact that a rational critique of particular ontologies is
> possible and even a necessary part of the scientific project.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> With regard to the "concept" of metaphysics, the Marxian critique
> is important because at the time it did not only posited its "own"
> metaphysics against the dominant paradigms, but, instead of analyzing the
> social relations and politics that emerged from a certain philosophy, it
> studied the concrete historical social relations and politics that gave
> rise to shapes of metaphysics. In this sense it constituted a "Copernican
> revolution". Superficially, yes, "the materialist method" as Marx calls it
> in the German Ideology has an "ontology", in the sense that it is based on
> a number of premises, but, in contradistinction to the theories that came
> before: "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
> imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
> conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
>  existing and those
> >> produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a
> purely empirical way." (
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> Of course we can make a lot of fuss about the supposed empiricism
> of this passage, but its essence amounts to a call for an emancipatory
> project with at its core real, historical humanity. Within the history of
> this project, the "insult of metaphysics" has taken on many forms, from a
> rational critique of a-historical, idealist, or anti-humanist ontologies to
> the sectarian attacks by the ideologists of (ironically the extremely
> "metaphysical" ossified doctrine of) "Marxism-Leninism". We may deem such
> insults as unfortunate, but they are perhaps unavoidable when the domain of
> ontology is as much penetrated by politics as politics is by metaphysics.
> To conclude: if anything, Marx subverted the "neutrality" of the
> philosophical "category" of ontology/epistemology and its "constitutive"
> position within society.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> Best,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> Brecht
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Hi Brecht,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a
> Marxist point of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's
> materialism is still an ontology, still a metaphysics.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses
> of the word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having
> no basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The
> logical positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this
> sense from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not
> verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable
> concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated
> metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation
> and measurement.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the
> positivist view of science turned out to be. The second use of the word
> 'metaphysics' helps us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of
> what truly exists, and to accounts of relationships between 'existences'
> (e.g. reduction relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or
> priority)" (Kreines, 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy
> that deals with ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well
> as the assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it
> studies.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is,
> when someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy
> insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came
> from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt with
> what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the
> traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called
> 'Meta-physica.'
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example,
> as you point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the
> ensemble of social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core
> ontological assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological
> assumptions of Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself
> confuses things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory
> sense. Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged
> them merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often
> referred to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use
> of the term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of
> ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk
> about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and
> community in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.
> Philosophy Compass, 1(5), 466-480.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet
> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a
> new one:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one
> wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a
> whole metaphysics here.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various
> writings I think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On
> the contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a
> materialist and non-metaphysical way.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's
> Theses on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he
> summarizes the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism
> and objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of
> course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After the
> theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing his
> "materialist method".
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical
> materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human practice
> (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world
> consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was
> constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was
> absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were
> forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity that
> did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether
> objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of
> theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
> reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in
> practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
> isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to
> epistemology. True knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or
> dialectical logic, but from the encounter between human thought and human
> practice. The reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely
> scholastic question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark
> matter, etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is
> essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find
> their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
> practice." Real human practice or activity is the only base for gaining
> true knowledge about humanity.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical)
> materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their environments.
> Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who
> changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of
> circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or
> emancipatory science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive
> ideological concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still
> remains to be done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how
> real social relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course,
> this means that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to
> be overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11:
> "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the
> point is to change it."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real
> contradictions in the realm of thought.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the
> essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In
> reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the
> individual" as the unit of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical
> and atomizing abstraction which "belongs in reality to a particular social
> form" (Thesis 7). A social science basing itself on the actions,
> intentions, emotions, etc. of discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and
> abstract view of humanity as its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> --
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Brecht De Smet
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development
> Studies
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research
> Group)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Department of Political and Sciences
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Ghent University
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> www.psw.ugent.be/menarg
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the
> person to turn to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal,
> Particular - there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the Stanford
> Enc of Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate
> over this. There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of
> Hegel as a ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense. This
> was followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the
> Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy,
> especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as
> standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system
> sketched above."  (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are
> people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as
> exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into fundamental
>  ?features? or ?structures? of the world
> >> itself."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think
> we want to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't
> think that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics.
> We can debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a
> position, in philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No
> metaphysics here!" is a tad naive.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <
> carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your
> exclamation Martin
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Carol
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy!
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for
> correcting my
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> typing mistake! :(
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development
> of Activity
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned
> meaning and the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in
> which the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular.
> This is a relation
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It
> allows the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is
> *realised*. This word
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double
> barrelled
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the
> objective sense of
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the
> judge delivered
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to",
> as in "I
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were
> doomed to failure."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in
> Actvity
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as
> outlined in your
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> excellent paper.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my
> article. There
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some
> difficulties to
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like
> to answer to the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> following:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the
> macrostructure of
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN
> Leont'ev and I
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of
> activity and its
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that
> are related to
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions
> under which an
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it
> when he stated
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to
> motivation and how the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and
> goals of an
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different
> actions, and one
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> action can realize different activities.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception;
> they have to
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience
> signal the success,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives
> for both
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself,
> emotion is tied
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure
> of an activity.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions
> activities (!)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and
> externally) the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an
> activity, and it
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection
> between action and
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the
> individual subject.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
> of mind", or
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's
> the behavior.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What's the goal?
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in
> order to
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal.
> What is the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity?
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that
> the speech is a
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the
> election victory.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the
> victory there
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and
> the personally
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be
> possible that he
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally
> feels to be
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
> societal
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
> personal sense
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
> framed this
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is
> able to fulfill
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the leadership.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we
> speak about
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults,
> but not in
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental
> image of a
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> future state of affairs.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and
> advanced
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> level in older children:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven
> level of
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition
> of first
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But
> these
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about
> the desired
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a
> sign system
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state
> in the here
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting
> point, not
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select
> one of them and
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into
> play that color
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
> striving for and
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to
> transform
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> them into actions is not something that occurs
> automatically. It emerges in
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the
> attainment of goals
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly
> optimized. Older
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> children are
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the
> macrostructure of an
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a
> specific
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an
> activity.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Best
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manfred
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article
> is choice
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev,
> rather than
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and
> motives. So
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to
> motivation and how the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
> Because motives
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
> inferred/learnt.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success,
> failure,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself,
> emotion is tied
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure
> of an activity.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions.
> It is the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
> success, etc., etc.,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is
> this which makes
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and
> activity, for both
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
> of mind", or
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's all in there.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why
> operation/action/activity were
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out
> the views in
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
> important
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in
> opening the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader.
> I.e., the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is
> a part,
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer
> this to
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that
> the
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation
> to an
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
> activity -
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal
> state and
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity,
> not
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental.
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>
> >>>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>>> _____
> >>
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>>> _____
> >>
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>>>
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >>> __________________________________________
> >>
> >>> _____
> >>
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>__________________________________________
> >>
> >>_____
> >>
> >>xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>__________________________________________
> >>_____
> >>xmca mailing list
> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
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