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Re: [xmca] Abstract to Concrete



Larry, firstly on "ideal typical lines of development." - typical of what?

Vygotsky gives us two ideal typical lines of development. The first is the development of everyday or spontaneous concepts, itself a bundle of several ideal typical lines of development interacting with each other, as per Chapter 5 of T&S. Secondly, the line of development typical of a social science concept acquired in a Soviet school. There are of course very many other lines of development (eg learning grammar, learning elementary physics, releigous training), but these two ideal types cover most of the main issues he studied.

Now, Yrjo gives us another line of development, which is ideal-typical of concepts constructed through the intervention of professional consultants in an organisation.

This does not exhaust all possibilities. When a new concept arises literally in the wild, rather than in the "guided democracy" of a management-arranged consultancy, the path is slightly different. I don't accept that models, in the sense of a germ-cell, are constructed according to a plan. That begs the question, and leads to an infinite regress. When we developed the concept of collaborative learning space at Melbourne Uni in 1999, the germ cell was an oval table. It was a year after we first built the spaces with oval tables before we realised that an oval table "models" collaboration around texts, and is found in student flats where students meet to study together as well as in corporate board rooms. So we didn't "model" collaboration and then build the oval table from a plan, self-consciously like that. We realised only afterwards the significance of the oval table, and that everything else was contingent and secondary. That was a process of concept formation in the wild. Slightly different path of development.

Andy

Larry Purss wrote:
Andy, Christine,
I am struggling to follow along with your evolving thoughts and reflections but one fragment of the conversation left me wanting to add my 2 cents worth. If it is going off topic, or is tangenital to the body of this work just ignore my comments. Both of you have been questioning if Yrjo's work is focused mainly on particular ideal-typical sequences [grades, stages,] of cognitive acts FOR interventions. The question this invites is to ask if concept formation in the wild extends beyond activity as interventions? *Interventions* as a concept implies the use of metaphors such as *construction* or *building* models to solve problems. Models built are according to plans. This fragment from your conversation is what I'm addressing: "The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In general, I find the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled." This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In general I would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a moment of discovery than a "construction." As I read this fragment I was asking myself if your conversation is shifting the focus of developing *concepts in the wild* FROM *modelling* and *intervening* as functional reasons for solving problems TO a more general concept of concepts that is focusing on *discovering* the way concepts originate as *germ cells* in the wild. Andy, Christine, in playing with the concept of *discovery* as preferable to using the metaphor of construction or building models, does the concept *discovery* referring to dicovering the germ cell as an *aha* moment LEAP beyond the boundaries of explaining the concept of concepts as focusing on*interventions* & *constructing* and *building* from blueprints or plans? In other words does *discovery* as central to the notion of the process or *rhythm* [Dewey's term] of forming concepts mean *unveiling* [what is overflowing the boundaries] or is it more accurate to perceive *discovery* as *unearthing* what already exists but must be re-discovered? [an archeological metaphor]. The notion of rhythm implies REcurrence of an occurence but is this recurrence a repeating cycle of relationships that is *mechanical* [can be measured and quantified and be predicted because repeatable] and therefore the rhythm is predictable or does the rhythm of recurrence transform the *relationships* with EACH recurrence as a new occurence? In other words NO repetition as identity but a continuing rhythm with changing relational occurrence with EACH recurrence. Andy, Christine, I am merely *thinking out loud* trying to grok the recurring theme of this thread. Hope it is not too private a reverie. Larry On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 6:30 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    Christine! Thank you very much indeed for those annotations and
    thoughts on the "ascent from abstract to concrete."
    I said I was "not sure" about the place of dual stimulation in
    Action 2, and you have convinced me. What I didn't see is that
    dual stimulation is precisely what characterises the use of the
    germ cell /after /Action 2, so my doubts must be dispelled. Thank
    you for that.

    I also have long thought that the germ cell of Hegelian
    concept-formation and Vygotskyan theory is the same thing as the
    "transitional object" which is central to Donald Winnicott's child
    psychoanalysis. This connection does shed a lot of light on
    concept formation when it is introduced, as you have done, into
    the "ascent from abstract to concrete." Most particularly it does
    away, once for all, any
    rendering of this process as a "purely congnitive/rational"
    process, from which all need-and-desire have been expunged. Of
    course, the object appears in Hegel's Psychology, as something
    with a unity of its own outside the domain of the subject itself,
    precisely via becoming the object of desire. So as you point out,
    this notion really ties together a lot of apparently disparate
    theory. Thank you for that!

    I have collected my observations so far, begun in my conversation
    with you, Christine, here:
    http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/engestrom.htm
    <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/works/engestrom.htm>

    Thanks for that Christine!
    Andy

    Christine Schweighart wrote:

        Thank you Andy, there are typos.  My doubt about  dual
        stimulation does arise from its role in intervention. When you
        say 'just here' I'm taking you to mean just between notions
        and grasping abstract concept 'germ cell', though as
        transitory objects in action research are just those kind of
        concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating  phenomena and
        also enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which
        isn't a 'wild' transition' but is intervention based on the
        value of achieving evaluation using theoretical analysis.
         There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional'
        with what is already abstract ( but brought in by a
        researcher/teacher/some other), this does happen , though the
        resources to enable conditions favourable for exploration in
        intervention settings are often far different to  'Ok what's
        the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it
        a go'.
        When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called
        them "grades" rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and
        sublates others in a kind of cascade. It is not a neat
        sequence of events, culminating in a "new stable form of
        practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a
        form of theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them
        differently, ( my   influences/background's different.:)
        •         The first action is that of..
         expressing disquiet with some situation or practice

            •         The second action is that of ..
        identifying relationships that are significant to those
        attending to the expressions or feeling of disquiet
         ( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on
        theoretical thinking already - so either this is present in
         practice , from varius discipines but not necessarily
        affording analytical insight across groups etc. So  what is
        set out below as  'second'  is problematic
            /Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
        transformation
            of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
            mechanisms./


            •         The third action is that of ...
        identifying abstract concepts , and " /modeling a new explanatory
            relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable
        medium.
            This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of
        the new
            idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
            offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it./"
        ( as there are various potentialities)


            •         /The fourth action is that of ....
        examining the  ( relevant aspects through) model/ *S*,

            /..... experimenting on it in order to fully
            grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations../

         in relation to actual living practice.

            •         The fifth action is that of ...

           / concretizing / developing thinking and taking action to
        evaluate and refine /by means of practical applications,
        enrichments,
            and conceptual extensions./


            •        / The sixth and seventh actions are those of
        reflecting on
            and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes
        into a
            new stable form of practice./


        Though  still focussing on moving from notions and dual
        stimulation there are conditions conducive and if the germ
        cell isn't already there , then such rational thinking isn't
        what is affording (the aha moment),  'the conditions' are
        other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was deepening
        my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading
        VV Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice ,
        ' Activity Structure and Content - and his view that nothing
        can be said about activity without understanding how
        'spititual or organic desire' and how it's tranformed into a
        need.  Needs and desires make the basis on which emotions
        function.  He says later the general functions emotions
        perform is that they enable a person to set a certain vital
        task; but they enable a person to decide from the very
        beginning whether physical , spiritual and moral  means to
        fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken up.
         Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions'
         for whatever 'actions'  of whole process.

        In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to
        Winnicott's. Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts'
        what happens?

        Christine.


        On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden
        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

            Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos,
            please send them to me.

            Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" -
            getting to the abstract heart of the problem - and is
        therefore
            exactly what Ilyenkov is talking about in the passage you
        cite.
            But whether the concept of double stimulation helps just
        here I
            don't know. And also, I personally think it is worth
        devoting some
            time to grasping the *whole process* of concept formation
        and this
            paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places where a
        writer
            attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage
        people to
            work on that whole process, rather than picking out one
        action,
            important as that also is.

            The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented
            here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the
            wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special
            issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical
            sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In
        general, I find
            the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled."
            This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the
        most
            challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a
        *leap*. In
            general I would say it is a sudden insight that more
        resembles a
            moment of discovery than a "construction."

            One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the
        concept
            of concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something
            which I also advocate) is that the reader may easily slip
        into the
            illusion that the given moment (here the discovery of the germ
            cell) or action, is a once-off moment. In fact, the
        germ-cell may
            be discovered in what turns out to be a misconception, but may
            nonetheless run the full gammet up to objectification and
        "a new
            stable form of practice" before falling into contradiction
        with
            itself and entering into conflict with a new germ cell,
        and being
            sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which
        figures
            in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.

            But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his
            reseach reports are equally much teaching and learning
            instruments, and this neat seven-step program functions as an
            excellent guide to practice. But one should remember that
        a real
            concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB readers of
        Vygotsky).
            Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than
            "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
            cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a
            "new stable form of practice" signalling the end of the
            intervention and time to settle up and go home. The process of
            concept development never stops.

            Andy

            Christine Schweighart wrote:

                Hi Andy,
                In  the third action, developing an abstraction -
        Yryo's work
                uses a generic model in dual stimulation. This draws
        upon his
                historical development as argued in his research.
                 Is it not also possible to explore this third action
        as an
                abstraction without that particular model structure,
         I ask
                because I'm reading this section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm
                "The task of logic as a science grows out of the real
        needs of
                the developing cognition of the phenomena of the
        surrounding
                world. The question with which a thinking man turns to
        logic
                as a science is not at all the question of how
        abstractions
                should be made in general, how one can learn to
        abstract the
                general from the sensually given facts. To do that,
        one need
                not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has
        to have a
                command of one’s native language and the ability to
                concentrate one’s attention on the sensually given
                similarities and differences.

                The question with which one turns to logic and which
        can only
                be answered by logic involves a much more complicated
                cognitive task: how is one to work out an abstraction
        which
                would express the objective essence of facts given in
                contemplation and notions? The manner in which
        processing a
                mass of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation
                expressing the real nature of the object under study –
        that is
                the actual problem, whose solution is identical with
        that of
                the problem of the nature of concepts as distinct from
                abstract general notions."

                and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon
        notions
                from 'action 2' ...

                 Christine.

                On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden
                <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:

                    Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one
        article per
                issue,
                    but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this
        excerpt from
                    Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the
        abstract
                to the
                    concrete," which we were recently discussing, but
        without
                resolution.

                    --------------------------

                    Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is
        achieved
                through
                    specific epistemic or learning actions. Together
        these actions
                    form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical
                sequence of
                    epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract
        to the
                concrete
                    may be described as follows:

                    •         The first action is that of questioning,
                criticizing, or
                    rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice
        and existing
                    wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call
        this action
                    questioning.

                    •         The second action is that of analyzing the
                situation.
                    Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
                transformation
                    of the situation in order to find out origins and
        explanatory
                    mechanisms.

                    •         The third action is that of modeling a new
                explanatory
                    relationship in some publicly observable and
        transmittable
                medium.
                    This means constructing an explicit, simplified
        model of
                the new
                    idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic
        situation and
                    offers a perspective for resolving and
        transforming it.

                    •         The fourth action is that of examining
        the model,
                    running, operating, and experimenting on it in
        order to fully
                    grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.

                    •         The fifth action is that of implementing
        the model,
                    concretizing it by means of practical applications,
                enrichments,
                    and conceptual extensions.

                    •         The sixth and seventh actions are those of
                reflecting on
                    and evaluating the process and consolidating its
        outcomes
                into a
                    new stable form of practice.


                    --------------------

                    MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.

                    Andy



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    *Andy Blunden*
    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
    Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
    http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden



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*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden

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