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Re: [xmca] Abstract to Concrete



Good Morning Christine
This is an intriguing commentary and reflection on the method of dual
stimulation and the ZPD. I hope Andy responds to your articulated sequence
which may model learning processes.

However, I wanted to ask you to elaborate on your summary comment when you
wrote: I will break in to the flow with my questions or comment.

[C]
"Though still focussing on moving from notions and dual stimulation there
are conditions conducive and if the germ cell isn't already there , then
such rational thinking isn't what is affording (the aha moment), 'the
conditions' are other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was
deepening my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading VV
Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice , ' Activity
Structure and Content - and his view that nothing can be said about
activity without understanding how 'spititual or organic desire' and how
it's tranformed into a need. Needs and desires make the basis on which
emotions function.

[LP] Christine, Davydov is deepening your understanding of IIyenov by
shifting awareness to the centrality of conditions *as other aspects which
are implicated. These other aspects which are outside the main focus of
Activity theory ARE *spiritual and organic DESIRE* and how desire gets
transformed into a need. Needs and desires are the basis [root, source,
foundation, ground, center etc] on which emotions FUNCTION [tend toward?].
Christine, this is a profound shift Davydov is making and you are
ventriloquting in *developing* the concept of avtivity theory. I hope
others will add further commentary on this shift to needs and desires as an
aspect of the *motive force* of activity theory that may be underdeveloped
or which may be *overflowing* the fuzzy boundaries of the concept.

 [C] He says later the general functions emotions perform is
that they enable a person to set a certain vital task; but they enable a
person to decide from the very beginning whether physical , spiritual and
moral means to fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken
up. Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions' for
whatever 'actions' of whole process.

[LP] Christine, your question whether these aspects of need and desire MUST
be available to enable a person to set a certain task and be able to
*decide* whether the response will be physical,  spiritual, or moral is a
question opening deeper *realms* to understanding activity systems to the
questions Mike was asking about  social goods, including moral goods as the
basis [root, source, origin, foundation, ground]of developing activity
systems

[C] In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to Winnicott's.
Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts' what happens?

[LP] Christine, could you elaborate on the contrast between *transitional
objects* and *formal objects*

Christine, as I read your comment, I was also reflecting on Dewey's theory
of aesthetic *experience* which is an example of all experience for Dewey.
The concepts he plays with are *rhythm* and *recurrence*  All activity as
occurences participates in rythmic sequences of activities. These
rhtyhm's can be perceived as mechanical with pre set units in relational
interaction. However aesthetic recurrence is another type of relationship
in which persons operate within these previous rhythm's repeating as
recurrences BUT as aesthetic experience the persons *summarize* what has
previously occured and then through their needs, desires, and motivated
intents participate in the *developing* rhythm *expanding  of an expanding
horizon of understanding.

Thanks Christine for drawing our attention to the basis in activities to
the fundamental need for *social goods, including moral goods.

Larry




On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 7:42 AM, Christine Schweighart <
schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote:

> Thank you Andy, there are typos.  My doubt about  dual stimulation does
> arise from its role in intervention. When you say 'just here' I'm taking
> you to mean just between notions and grasping abstract concept 'germ cell',
> though as transitory objects in action research are just those kind of
> concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating  phenomena and also
> enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which isn't a 'wild'
> transition' but is intervention based on the value of achieving evaluation
> using theoretical analysis.
>
> There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional' with what is
> already abstract ( but brought in by a researcher/teacher/some other), this
> does happen , though the resources to enable conditions favourable for
> exploration in intervention settings are often far different to  'Ok what's
> the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it a go'.
> When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades"
> rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
> cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a "new stable
> form of practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a form of
> theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them differently, ( my
> influences/background's different.:)
> •         The first action is that of..
>  expressing disquiet with some situation or practice
>
>     •         The second action is that of ..
> identifying relationships that are significant to those attending to the
> expressions or feeling of disquiet
>  ( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on theoretical
> thinking already - so either this is present in  practice , from varius
> discipines but not necessarily affording analytical insight across groups
> etc. So  what is set out below as  'second'  is problematic
>     *Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical transformation
>     of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
>     mechanisms.*
>
>     •         The third action is that of ...
> identifying abstract concepts , and " *modeling a new explanatory
>     relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
>     This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
>     idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
>     offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it.*" ( as there
> are various potentialities)
>
>     •         *The fourth action is that of ....
> examining the  ( relevant aspects through) model* *S*,
>     *..... experimenting on it in order to fully
>     grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations..*
>  in relation to actual living practice.
>
>     •         The fifth action is that of ...
>
>    * concretizing * developing thinking and taking action to evaluate and
> refine *by means of practical applications, enrichments,
>     and conceptual extensions.*
>
>     •        * The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on
>     and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a
>     new stable form of practice.*
>
> Though  still focussing on moving from notions and dual stimulation there
> are conditions conducive and if the germ cell isn't already there , then
> such rational thinking isn't what is affording (the aha moment),  'the
> conditions' are other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was
> deepening my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading VV
> Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice , ' Activity
> Structure and Content - and his view that nothing can be said about
> activity without understanding how 'spititual or organic desire' and how
> it's tranformed into a need.  Needs and desires make the basis on which
> emotions function.  He says later the general functions emotions perform is
> that they enable a person to set a certain vital task; but they enable a
> person to decide from the very beginning whether physical , spiritual and
> moral  means to fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken
> up.  Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions'  for
> whatever 'actions'  of whole process.
>
> In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to Winnicott's.
> Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts' what happens?
>
> Christine.
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos, please send
> > them to me.
> >
> > Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" - getting to
> the
> > abstract heart of the problem - and is therefore exactly what Ilyenkov is
> > talking about in the passage you cite. But whether the concept of double
> > stimulation helps just here I don't know. And also, I personally think it
> > is worth devoting some time to grasping the *whole process* of concept
> > formation and this paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places
> where
> > a writer attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage people
> to
> > work on that whole process, rather than picking out one action, important
> > as that also is.
> >
> > The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented here is
> > proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the wild," as that is
> > the title he himself chose for the special issue. But it looks much more
> to
> > me like the ideal-typical sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention.
> > In general, I find the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or
> > "modelled." This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the
> most
> > challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In general
> I
> > would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a moment of
> discovery
> > than a "construction."
> >
> > One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the concept of
> > concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something which I also
> > advocate) is that the reader may easily slip into the illusion that the
> > given moment (here the discovery of the germ cell) or action, is a
> once-off
> > moment. In fact, the germ-cell may be discovered in what turns out to be
> a
> > misconception, but may nonetheless run the full gammet up to
> > objectification and "a new stable form of practice" before falling into
> > contradiction with itself and entering into conflict with a new germ
> cell,
> > and being sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which
> figures
> > in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.
> >
> > But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his reseach
> > reports are equally much teaching and learning instruments, and this neat
> > seven-step program functions as an excellent guide to practice. But one
> > should remember that a real concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB
> > readers of Vygotsky). Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades"
> > rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
> > cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a "new
> stable
> > form of practice" signalling the end of the intervention and time to
> settle
> > up and go home. The process of concept development never stops.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Christine Schweighart wrote:
> >
> >> Hi Andy,
> >> In  the third action, developing an abstraction - Yryo's work uses a
> >> generic model in dual stimulation. This draws upon his historical
> >> development as argued in his research.
> >>  Is it not also possible to explore this third action as an abstraction
> >> without that particular model structure,  I ask because I'm reading this
> >> section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov: http://www.marxists.org/**
> >> archive/ilyenkov/works/**abstract/abstra1d.htm<
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm>
> >> "The task of logic as a science grows out of the real needs of the
> >> developing cognition of the phenomena of the surrounding world. The
> >> question with which a thinking man turns to logic as a science is not at
> >> all the question of how abstractions should be made in general, how one
> can
> >> learn to abstract the general from the sensually given facts. To do
> that,
> >> one need not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has to have a
> >> command of one’s native language and the ability to concentrate one’s
> >> attention on the sensually given similarities and differences.
> >>
> >> The question with which one turns to logic and which can only be
> answered
> >> by logic involves a much more complicated cognitive task: how is one to
> >> work out an abstraction which would express the objective essence of
> facts
> >> given in contemplation and notions? The manner in which processing a
> mass
> >> of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation expressing the real
> >> nature of the object under study – that is the actual problem, whose
> >> solution is identical with that of the problem of the nature of
> concepts as
> >> distinct from abstract general notions."
> >>
> >> and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon notions from
> >> 'action 2' ...
> >>
> >>  Christine.
> >>
> >> On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net<mailto:
> >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one article per issue,
> >>     but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this excerpt from
> >>     Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the abstract to the
> >>     concrete," which we were recently discussing, but without
> resolution.
> >>
> >>     --------------------------
> >>
> >>     Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is achieved through
> >>     specific epistemic or learning actions. Together these actions
> >>     form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical sequence of
> >>     epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract to the concrete
> >>     may be described as follows:
> >>
> >>     •         The first action is that of questioning, criticizing, or
> >>     rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice and existing
> >>     wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call this action
> >>     questioning.
> >>
> >>     •         The second action is that of analyzing the situation.
> >>     Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical transformation
> >>     of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
> >>     mechanisms.
> >>
> >>     •         The third action is that of modeling a new explanatory
> >>     relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
> >>     This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
> >>     idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
> >>     offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it.
> >>
> >>     •         The fourth action is that of examining the model,
> >>     running, operating, and experimenting on it in order to fully
> >>     grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.
> >>
> >>     •         The fifth action is that of implementing the model,
> >>     concretizing it by means of practical applications, enrichments,
> >>     and conceptual extensions.
> >>
> >>     •         The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on
> >>     and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a
> >>     new stable form of practice.
> >>
> >>
> >>     --------------------
> >>
> >>     MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.
> >>
> >>     Andy
> >>
> >>
> >
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