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Re: [xmca] Vladislav Lektorsky's notion of the subject



OK, Larry has selected Lektorsky's chapter in the 2009 book to read.

Larry, instead of running on to consider 15 different concepts of the inner world, shouldn't we wait on a second and think about Lekotrsky's claim? What do you think of the claim that the very idea of an "inner world" or "self" is a cultural-historical construct, i.e., that in say Aristotle's times, such a concept did not exist and therefore that it would simply not be sensible to talk of people having such a "self"?

Andy

Larry Purss wrote:
I went on Google Scholar and typed in "Vladislav Lektorsky"
The book "Learning and Expanding with Activity" came up free to download.
I'm sending an attachment if others are interested.
Chapter 5 "Mediation as a Means of Collective Activity" by V. Lektorsky is
on pages 75 to 87.

Page 80 explores Lektorsky's perspective of the notion of the subject. I'll
quote what he says.

"The idea of the "inner world" is very important in cultural and social
contexts. The subject as the unity of consciousness, the unity of an
individual biography, and the center of making decisions can exist only as
the center of "the inner world". *But the appearance of the "inner world" is
possible only when the IDEA of "the inner" arises in culture*, in other
words, when it is realized in forms of collective activity. This means that
there may exist cultures and forms of activity including forms of
communication where the subjects have no feelings of the ego and "the inner
world".
     The ego of an individual subject may be UNDERSTOOD to be a
complicated, changing, and somewhat problematic formation.  It has
different layers, which sometimes are INTERPRETED as different egos,
engaged in communication WITH EACH OTHER and formed in different kinds of
activity and n different relations with other people. Ego identity can be
confused and fragmented.  Thus, an individual subject can be UNDERSTOOD to
be a collective subject. A specific feature of such a collective subject is
that it is embodied in a single physical body and has a unity of
consciousness and a central ego, REGULATING activities of different
subegos.  In cases of multiple personalities a central ego is absent so
several egos coexist in the same body."

I am not endorsing this particular perspective, but offer Lektorsky's
version of the "self" formed within activity theory as an example that
"self" "agency" "subjectivity" "individuality" "ego" "person" "agent"
"agency" "free will" "self-determination" "self-regulation" "personality"
"personhood" and the RELATION between these various terms are being
fully explored and expressed within activity theory as ARISING phenomena.
I would like to propose that dialogical hermeneutical notions of "situated
agency" have a place/space within this constellation of terms.

Larry
-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857

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