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Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences



On 25 December 2011 10:10, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I don't know Markell, but I read Williams as what I call billiard table
> recognition. As you correctly say, individuals in the modern state get
> recognition first of all through Right, and then on top of all that
> through participation in a whole variety of mediating projects.
> Mediation is the alpha and omega of Hegel and I don't see a single
> glimmer of understanding of this in the writers I mentioned. Why? They
> express the spirit of their age, in which individuals bang around like
> billiard balls on a level playing field. They want to do away with
> religion, but all they have to replace it with is individualism.
>
> There is a lot of be said for Mead and his rendering of the master-slave
> narrative, but I think he remained unclear, and his subjects seem to be
> able to generate the means of mediation from within themselves. OK up to
> a point, but as Hegel says ...
>
> Also, what is overlooked is that the subjects of Hegel's narratives are
> not first of all individuals, but are social subjects, and only
> derivatively from that, persons.
>
>
>
> Andy
>
> Greg Thompson wrote:
>
>> Yes, Andy, your quote from Hegel makes clear that Hegel is tracing out
>> subjective spirit as it emerges through recognition in phylogenetic
>> history. But this is not to say that the process of recognition is all
>> said and done once human social life has developed past this state.
>> What does follow from this historical transformation, imho, is that
>> recognition will take on a new quality with the emergence of civil
>> society and the State - recognition becomes mediated in a whole new
>> way; recognition becomes mediated through culture. This is not your
>> father's recognition. It is not about struggle and battle, but it is
>> about gaining rich individuality through the complex macrosocial array
>> of identities that are on offer in society (and which are realized
>> with respect to the complex metapragmatics of exhibiting and,
>> critically, being recognized as having had exhibited, the signs and
>> symbols of having had been such and such type of person in a given
>> moment). To put it in a slightly different idiom, identity is like a
>> right - it exists consequentially only through the recognition of
>> others (writ large, i.e. recognition via thirdness (Peirce) or, if you
>> prefer, a generalized other (Mead), in short, through recognition
>> through culture). And just as property creates possibilities for
>> agentive action, e.g. raising cattle or raising capital, so too do
>> various identities create possibilities for agentive action (something
>> that the con-man is well aware of, but which most of the rest of us
>> seem too stuck in our "own" skin to realize).
>>
>> I also happen to think that this importance of culture to mediation
>> comes through in both Markell's and Williams' readings of Hegel,
>> although I think it is more clearly articulated in the former than in
>> the latter (though I do have some issues with both). And I will need
>> to go back through my notes and through your writings on Williams,
>> Andy, to see where I think that you've got Williams wrong (but I'm not
>> about to make a similar claim about your reading of Hegel - you're way
>> out of my league in that regard!).
>>
>> But that will have to wait as there are more pressing matters right
>> now (presents to wrap and cookies to eat and notes to leave!).
>>
>> And a very merry Christmas to you Andy.
>> And to all a good night.
>> -greg
>>
>> p.s., to mike I'm not sure at all how to connect this to Leontiev.
>> Have much work to do in that connection... Motivation maybe?
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> To let Hegel speak for himself. In The Subjective Spirit, after the
>>> "master-servant" narrative, he says:
>>>
>>>  "To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the
>>>  standpoint just outlined, we must here remark that the fight for
>>>  recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in
>>>  the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate
>>>  individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the State because
>>>  here the recognition for which the combatants fight already exists.
>>>  For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest
>>>  on it" (1830/1971 §432n).
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> I have written/spoken eslewhere and at length on R R Williams (as well
>>>> as
>>>> Robert Brandom, Axel Honneth and others) and I regard their postmodern
>>>> interpretation of recognition-without-culture. I regard it as the main
>>>> barrier to an understanding of CHAT or Hegel of our times.
>>>>
>>>> Functionalism is interesting in the way you mentioned, in that it
>>>> prefigured more contemporary currents which also do away  with any
>>>> centre of
>>>> power but cast power as flowing through "capillaries" - a more radical
>>>> conception of power-wthout-a-centre actually.
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for providing a link back to the Leontiev/functionalism
>>>>> discussion, Andy.
>>>>>
>>>>> The links appear to go right through your home hegelian territory and
>>>>> link us up
>>>>> to current discussions of "recognition." They also link up with ideas
>>>>> linked to
>>>>> Zygmund Bauman's "Liquid Modernity." And to the many other people whose
>>>>> work
>>>>> I know too little of.
>>>>>
>>>>> With respect to functionalism, casting national aspersions aside  :-))
>>>>> , it never occurred to me during my years getting trained to be a
>>>>> learning
>>>>> theorist in the
>>>>> Skinnerian tradition, to consider the question of "where does the
>>>>> function come from" or "who is exerting power here?"  We starved the
>>>>> rats
>>>>> and they ran or died. Or coerced sophomores using grades as "part of
>>>>> their
>>>>> education."
>>>>>
>>>>> Then I went to Moscow. Where the caste of characters under discussion
>>>>> were my hosts. Like I said. I am a slow learner on all these
>>>>> complicated
>>>>> matters. At the rate I am going I am never going to figure it all out!
>>>>>
>>>>> :-)
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 9:05 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>   In my view, Mike, there were some basic questions asked and
>>>>>   answered by A N Leontyev in launching the enquiry we know as
>>>>>   "Activity Theory" are uneliminable, that is, he took a step which
>>>>>   has to be valued and continued. But it was a step at an extremely
>>>>>   fundamental level. It absolutely left open Stalinist-functionalist
>>>>>   directions and well as emancipatory directions. Personally, I
>>>>>   think the impact of the "planned economy" and the "leadership"
>>>>>   which understood "the laws of history" and the state which
>>>>>   represented a "higher stage of society" and so on, left a mark on
>>>>>   the whole current. But its basics, its fundamentals remain intact.
>>>>>   It only remains to agree on what those were.
>>>>>
>>>>>   By-the-by, the home of "functionalism" is the USA.
>>>>>
>>>>>   By-the-by again, in the early 80s I was a member of a Trotskyist
>>>>>   party which put Ilyenkov on a pedastal, and published new
>>>>>   translations of his work in English, which also came very close to
>>>>>   endorsing Lamarkism. It debated it, but the Party perished before
>>>>>   the debate was resolved.
>>>>>
>>>>>   Andy
>>>>>
>>>>>   mike cole wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>       I am being very slow  here. How does this discussion resolve
>>>>>       or help me to
>>>>>       think more clearly about the issues in the subject line? the
>>>>>       issues over
>>>>>       different interpretations of Leontiev, their relation to
>>>>>       functionalism,
>>>>>       stalinism, fascism, etc?
>>>>>       mike
>>>>>
>>>>>       On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 3:34 PM, Greg Thompson
>>>>>       <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>>>       <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>>>> >>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Larry,
>>>>>           IMHO, you're hitting the heart of the matter with
>>>>>           recognition and
>>>>>           agency - self-assertion vs. self-emptying seems a nice way
>>>>>           to think
>>>>>           about the central problematic (and I agree with your
>>>>>           preference for
>>>>>           the latter). If you are interested in developing a more more
>>>>>           self-emptying Kyoto-like notion of recognition, I've got a
>>>>>           couple of
>>>>>           suggestions (and I'm sure I've made these suggestions in a
>>>>>           different
>>>>>           context before, so apologies for redundancy).
>>>>>
>>>>>           First, I'd strongly encourage a read of Robert Williams'
>>>>>           Ethics of
>>>>>           Recognition. In Williams' read of Hegel, you find an
>>>>>           articulation of
>>>>>           recognition that is much more like the Kyoto understanding of
>>>>>           recognition and which is against the crass version you get
>>>>>           from the
>>>>>           existentialists where recognition always about a fight or
>>>>>           struggle for
>>>>>           recognition. As evidence of the cultural tendency toward
>>>>>           self-assertion, it is very telling that one small
>>>>>           paragraph in Hegel's
>>>>>           oeuvre would get picked up as the thing that most people
>>>>>           for most of
>>>>>           the 20th century would equate with Hegel's notion of
>>>>>           "recognition."
>>>>>           But that approach is shortsighted and Williams really
>>>>>           nails this
>>>>>           point. (although I am persuaded by Willaims'
>>>>>           interpretation, I don't
>>>>>           have any skin in the game of whether or not this is a more
>>>>>           or less
>>>>>           "authentic" interpretation of Hegel - I just happen to
>>>>>           believe that
>>>>>           the position Williams articulates is far more productive
>>>>>           than the
>>>>>           struggle-for-recognition model that has been on offer from
>>>>> the
>>>>>           existentialists).
>>>>>
>>>>>           Second, to provide some further support for this claim,
>>>>>           I'd also
>>>>>           suggest checking out Johann Georg Hamann, who is said to
>>>>>           have been a
>>>>>           significant influence on Hegel (but don't read Isaiah
>>>>>           Berlin's stuff
>>>>>           on Hamann, he misses the point). Hamann didn't really
>>>>>           publish much. He
>>>>>           was most noted for his letters to his friend, Immanuel
>>>>>           Kant and in
>>>>>           which he repeatedly tells Kant that he's got it all wrong
>>>>>           (and does it
>>>>>           in a style that makes the point through medium as well as,
>>>>>           if not more
>>>>>           than, message - a point which itself speaks to one of his
>>>>>           central
>>>>>           points about the importance of poetics). In these letters,
>>>>>           Hamann has
>>>>>           a wonderful sense of the intractability of human life, and
>>>>> the
>>>>>           fundamental wrong-headedness of the desire for sovereign
>>>>>           agency. I'd
>>>>>           be happy to share more if there is any interest.
>>>>>
>>>>>           Oh, and I forgot there is a third author of interest in
>>>>>           this regard,
>>>>>           Patchen Markell's Bound by Recognition gives a compelling
>>>>>           portrait of
>>>>>           what he calls "the impropriety of action" - the sense in
>>>>>           which our
>>>>>           actions are not our property alone. Markell's book argues
>>>>>           that tragedy
>>>>>           (and its twin, comedy) derives from this very human
>>>>>           problem. Also
>>>>>           great stuff.
>>>>>
>>>>>           All three of these readings I suggest as a way of pointing
>>>>>           out that
>>>>>           within Western traditions there is a trope that is closer to
>>>>>           self-emptying than self-asserting. Unfortunately it
>>>>>           doesn't articulate
>>>>>           as well with Enlightenment perspectives because it is
>>>>>           often, as with
>>>>>           Hamann, articulated through Christianity. This presents
>>>>>           something of a
>>>>>           marketing problem since the Enlightenment put Christianity
>>>>>           as a thing
>>>>>           of the past and as the kind of believing that small minded
>>>>>           people do
>>>>>           (the kind that tote guns and don't believe in evolution),
>>>>>           and thus a
>>>>>           not very appealing thing for most Westerner's "natural" (i.e.
>>>>>           "cultural") inclination to self-assertion. So I think that
>>>>>           as a matter
>>>>>           of packaging, Buddhism, with its stripped down religious
>>>>>           ideology,
>>>>>           probably has more appeal to most post-Enlightenment
>>>>>           Western thinkers.
>>>>>
>>>>>           And I wanted to add that I feel like your posts are
>>>>>           speaking directly
>>>>>           to me and maybe we can carry on this conversation in more
>>>>>           detail
>>>>>           somewhere down the road (in a different thread, I
>>>>>           suspect). So many
>>>>>           thanks for your words (even if they weren't "intended" for
>>>>>           me - a
>>>>>           fortuitous impropriety to be sure!).
>>>>>
>>>>>           Anyway, hope all is well,
>>>>>           greg
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>           On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 1:02 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>>           <lpscholar2@gmail.com <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>                             I'm enjoying this line [circle? spiral?] of
>>>>> inquiry.
>>>>>
>>>>>               David,  you wrote
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>               The mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>>               tiring to believe one
>>>>>               thing and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law predicts
>>>>>               that eventually it
>>>>>               is the former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>
>>>>>               I want to go out on a speculative limb that tries to
>>>>>               weave together some
>>>>>                               of
>>>>>                             Wittgenstein's notions that are also
>>>>> expressed in John
>>>>>               Shotter's
>>>>>               exploration of conversation.
>>>>>
>>>>>               The question of the relation and distinction between
>>>>>               "taking a position"
>>>>>               and "developing dispositions"  In David's quote above
>>>>>               "believing" one
>>>>>                               thing
>>>>>                             [a position] and "saying" [practicing
>>>>> another]  will
>>>>>               over time eventually
>>>>>               lead to the practice winning out over the belief.
>>>>>
>>>>>               Their are a group of scholars in Japan referred to as
>>>>>               "the kyoto school"
>>>>>               who are engaged in the project of having an indepth
>>>>>               conversation between
>>>>>               Buddhism and German Continental philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>>               A central difference the authors of the Kyoto school
>>>>>               are articulating is
>>>>>               different notions [and values] of "intersubjectivity"
>>>>>               as epressed in the
>>>>>               contrasting concepts
>>>>>               "self-assertion" and "self-emptying".
>>>>>
>>>>>               They suggest many Western notions of intersubjectivity
>>>>>               and recognition
>>>>>                               are
>>>>>                             in pursuit of recognizing our assertoric
>>>>> stance or
>>>>>               position towards
>>>>>                               words,
>>>>>                             self, other, & world. This assertive
>>>>> position can be
>>>>>               expressed in
>>>>>               emancipatory notions of "finding one's VOICE" and
>>>>>               overcoming being
>>>>>               "silenced".  Anger and conflict leading to overcoming
>>>>>               resistance from
>>>>>               within classes, races, genders. Through recognition
>>>>>               [being seen and
>>>>>               listened to develops the capacity to move from a
>>>>>               silenced "voice" to an
>>>>>               assertive "voice"] one stands up and speaks back to
>>>>>               the dominating
>>>>>               constraints and the shame and humiliation that
>>>>>               silences voices.
>>>>>
>>>>>               As Shotter [in Christine's quotes above shows] the
>>>>>               assertoric position of
>>>>>               challenging dominant structures and power can be seen
>>>>>               as expressing a
>>>>>               particular "attitude" or "style" or "posture".
>>>>>
>>>>>               This style or attitude valorizes "the assertoric
>>>>>               stance" in the world"
>>>>>               which develops into an enduring "disposition" if we
>>>>>               keep "saying" this
>>>>>                               form
>>>>>                             of recognition and emancipation.
>>>>>
>>>>>               However, the Kyoto School, in deep conversation with
>>>>>               this assertoric
>>>>>               "position" and "disposition" suggests or gestures
>>>>>               toward an "alternative"
>>>>>               [not truer, more real, but an alternative]
>>>>>               They suggest Buddhist practice and "saying" can guide
>>>>>               or mediate another
>>>>>               in*formation of "self" that they express in the
>>>>>               concept of "self-emptying
>>>>>               This is NOT a passive or resigned form of agency but
>>>>>               rather an active
>>>>>               intentional positioning of self that attempts to
>>>>>               foreground the
>>>>>               "fallibility" and "uncertainty" of ALL positioning and
>>>>>               assertoric
>>>>>                               stances.
>>>>>                             This is a deeply intersubjective practice
>>>>> of
>>>>> valuing
>>>>>               "emergence" and
>>>>>               "openning spaces" in which to INVITE the other to
>>>>>               exist by the practice
>>>>>                               of
>>>>>                             mving our self from center stage.  Finding
>>>>> one's
>>>>>               "voice" from this
>>>>>                               position
>>>>>                             of ACTIVE INTENTIONAL self-emptying [and
>>>>> creating the
>>>>>               openning space for
>>>>>               the other's "voice" to emerge] is a very different
>>>>>               "attitude" or "stance"
>>>>>               or "posture" to take leading to a very different
>>>>>               "disposition" from
>>>>>                               within
>>>>>                             a very different form of "saying" and
>>>>> "practice".
>>>>>
>>>>>               I "read" scholars such as Wittgenstein, Shotter,
>>>>>               Gadamer, Buber, Levinas,
>>>>>               as exploring this alternative in*formation of "self"
>>>>>               that is less
>>>>>               assertoric in finding one's "voice" and moving towards
>>>>>               a posture of
>>>>>               self-emptying that embraces FALLIBILITY, UNCERTAINTY,
>>>>>               AMBIVALENCE, NOT
>>>>>               KNOWING, at the heart of this particular way of
>>>>>               becoming human.
>>>>>               I do believe this is an historically guided
>>>>>               perspective that embraces
>>>>>               multiple perspectives and multiple practices.
>>>>>               Intersubjectivity and dialogical hermeneutical
>>>>>               perspectives and the
>>>>>               multiple formations this conversation can take
>>>>>                [expressing alternative
>>>>>               moral committments] is the concept at the center of
>>>>>               this possible
>>>>>                               inquiry.
>>>>>                             I'm not sure how "possible" it is for
>>>>> persons in North
>>>>>               America to
>>>>>                               consider
>>>>>                             such alternative moral compasses as
>>>>> explored
>>>>> by the
>>>>>               Kyoto School. [it may
>>>>>               be beyond our horizon of understanding to envision as
>>>>>               a possibility].
>>>>>               It is also difficult to grasp Wittgenstein's attempt
>>>>>               to "see through"
>>>>>               theoretical positions as a practice and disposition.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>               Self-asserion is often viewed as the only path to
>>>>>               intentional stances and
>>>>>               postures in finding one's voice to participate in
>>>>>               GENERATIVE
>>>>>               conversations.  Is there merit in engaging with
>>>>>               another tradition
>>>>>                               exploring
>>>>>                             agentic ACTORS actively practising
>>>>> "self-emptying"
>>>>>               motivated by the deep
>>>>>               disposition and committment to generative dialogical
>>>>>               ways of practice.??
>>>>>               As I said in my opening remarks, this is going "out on
>>>>>               a limb". Is
>>>>>                               conflict
>>>>>                             and anger the ONLY motivators that can be
>>>>> harnessed to
>>>>>               transform the
>>>>>               world??
>>>>>               I'm also aware that my position as a "white male" with
>>>>>               a secure job may
>>>>>                               be
>>>>>                             calling me to take a naive "utopian"
>>>>> perspective.
>>>>>               At the minimum I want to suggest that it is these types
>>>>> of
>>>>>                               "conversations"
>>>>>                             across "traditions" such as the Kyoto
>>>>> School
>>>>> scholars
>>>>>               are engaged in
>>>>>                                which
>>>>>                             invite us into a world conversation which
>>>>> puts into
>>>>>               play the monolithic
>>>>>               bias towards the assertoric stance in the world.
>>>>>
>>>>>               I'm preparing for "challenges" to this alternative
>>>>>               "attitude" but am
>>>>>               putting it out there in a spirit of the holiday season
>>>>>               to think outside
>>>>>                               our
>>>>>                             Western notions of "self-assertion" and
>>>>> finding one's
>>>>>               voice.
>>>>>
>>>>>               Larry
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>               On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 12:04 AM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>                               vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>>           <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
>>>>> >>wrote:
>>>>>                                 Ivan:
>>>>>
>>>>>                   At the beginning of  the Philosophical
>>>>>                   Investigations, Wittgenstein
>>>>>                                     quotes
>>>>>                                 Augustine, who describes the
>>>>> indescribable
>>>>>                   experience of learning a
>>>>>                                     first
>>>>>                                 language in Latin, and remarks that his
>>>>> model of
>>>>>                   language (a big bag of
>>>>>                   names) is OK, but only for a very restricted
>>>>>                   application; there are many
>>>>>                   things we call language for which it is not
>>>>>                   appropriate. And thence to
>>>>>                                     his
>>>>>                                 famous discussion of complexes, in the
>>>>> form of
>>>>>                   games and language games.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   I think what I said was that Wittgenstein's
>>>>>                   account of language is
>>>>>                   pragmatic in a linguistic sense. Pragmatics is
>>>>>                   about the use of
>>>>>                                     language,
>>>>>                                 as opposed to its usage (which is more
>>>>> or less
>>>>>                   what Augustine is
>>>>>                   describing, language as a dictionary written in
>>>>>                   some form of mentalese,
>>>>>                   where every language is necessarily a foreign
>>>>>                   language).
>>>>>
>>>>>                   And I think what Wittgenstein says about language
>>>>>                   applies to every
>>>>>                                     account
>>>>>                                 of language, even his own; it is
>>>>> appropriate, but
>>>>>                   ony for a very
>>>>>                                     restricted
>>>>>                                 application. In that way it is like a
>>>>> metaphor (as
>>>>>                   we see in the
>>>>>                                     language
>>>>>                                 games section, and the tool box
>>>>> section,
>>>>> it really
>>>>>                   IS a metaphor). So I
>>>>>                   think we need to ask the question where it stops
>>>>>                   being appropriate.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   As Andy points out, it doesn't describe conceptual
>>>>>                   thinking very well.
>>>>>                                     But
>>>>>                                 that is not because the pragmatic
>>>>> account of
>>>>>                   language is a subset of
>>>>>                                     some
>>>>>                                 larger conceptual account; I think that
>>>>> the
>>>>>                   relationship is quite the
>>>>>                                     other
>>>>>                                 way around: scientific concepts are a
>>>>> rarefied,
>>>>>                   specialized subset of
>>>>>                   semantic meaning, and of course semantic meaning
>>>>>                   took many centuries of
>>>>>                   billions of daily interactions to be precipitated
>>>>>                   from everyday
>>>>>                                     pragmatics.
>>>>>                                 Now it seems to me that on this scale
>>>>> of
>>>>> things,
>>>>>                   the cultural individual
>>>>>                   really is quite unchanging and hidebound, rather
>>>>>                   like a bottle. We
>>>>>                                     rejoice
>>>>>                                 that Western women do not bind their
>>>>> feet--and
>>>>>                   instead mutilate their
>>>>>                   chests with silicon implants. We rejoice in not
>>>>>                   stoning women for
>>>>>                                     adultery
>>>>>                                 and congratulate ourselves on no longer
>>>>> insisting
>>>>>                   on the male ownership
>>>>>                                     of
>>>>>                                 sexuality that this entails, but we so
>>>>> stigmatize
>>>>>                   child sexual abuse
>>>>>                                     that
>>>>>                                 children's lives, and not simply their
>>>>> putative
>>>>>                   purity, are now at risk
>>>>>                   from pedophiles, and nobody reflects that what is
>>>>>                   really threatened
>>>>>                                     here is
>>>>>                                 the parental ownership of sexual access
>>>>> to their
>>>>>                   children.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   This morning's New York Times, just for example,
>>>>>                   has a thoroughly silly
>>>>>                   article on North Korea by one Nicolas Kristof. We
>>>>>                   are told that
>>>>>                   apartments in Pyeongyang are all equipped with
>>>>>                   telescreens that
>>>>>                   make propaganda announcements of, e.g., the
>>>>>                   leaders' golf scores. We
>>>>>                                     have a
>>>>>                                 similar telescreen in our apartment in
>>>>> Seoul,
>>>>>                   which announces municipal
>>>>>                   elections and tells where to find the local leader
>>>>>                   of the anti-communist
>>>>>                   militia. The difference is that when we do it is
>>>>>                   feels normal.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Kristof certainly does not feel hidebound; he is
>>>>>                   quite comfortable in
>>>>>                                     his
>>>>>                                 own skin. Nevertheless, he tells a
>>>>> wildly
>>>>>                   brainwashed account of the
>>>>>                                     way in
>>>>>                                 which North Korea developed nuclear
>>>>> weapons. He
>>>>>                   correctly remembers
>>>>>                                     that in
>>>>>                                 1994 an agreement was negotiated to
>>>>> build nuclear
>>>>>                   power plants in North
>>>>>                   Korea (he carefully omits to say that these would
>>>>>                   be non-weaponizable
>>>>>                   and built by South Korean companies). Now,
>>>>>                   according to Kristof, the
>>>>>                   Clinton administration only did this because they
>>>>>                   fooishly assumed that
>>>>>                                     the
>>>>>                                 regime would collapse before the
>>>>> reactors were
>>>>>                   actually built! Wisely,
>>>>>                                     the
>>>>>                                 Bush administration caught the North
>>>>> Koreans
>>>>>                   "cheating", and tore up the
>>>>>                   agreement.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   What really happened, as anybody with a memory
>>>>>                   longer than the Bush
>>>>>                   adminstration will tell you, was that the North
>>>>>                   Koreans asked for, and
>>>>>                                     got,
>>>>>                                 a codicil that would supply them with
>>>>> fuel oil for
>>>>>                   energy as a stopgap
>>>>>                   measure (if you look at the widely circulated
>>>>>                   satellite picture of North
>>>>>                   Korea at night you will see why they insisted on
>>>>>                   this). The Clinton
>>>>>                   Administration always boasted that the fuel oil
>>>>>                   they supplied was
>>>>>                                     unusably
>>>>>                                 poor, but that was not enough for the
>>>>> Bush
>>>>>                   adminstration. They simply
>>>>>                   reneged on the agreement. But the North did not
>>>>>                   renege: they had
>>>>>                                     promised
>>>>>                                 they would develop nuclear weapons if
>>>>> the deal
>>>>>                   fell through, and that is
>>>>>                   what they did.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Why does Kristof tell this transparent lie?
>>>>>                   Doesn't it go against the
>>>>>                   usual NYT ethos of telling the truth about
>>>>>                   checkable and trivial
>>>>>                                     matters so
>>>>>                                 as to be able to deceive with the
>>>>> necessary
>>>>>                   authority when it comes to
>>>>>                                     the
>>>>>                                 essentials? I think, alas, Mr. Kristof
>>>>> simply
>>>>>                   cannot control himself any
>>>>>                   more (see his WILDLY improbable tale about a
>>>>>                   husband executing his own
>>>>>                                     wife
>>>>>                                 for writing a highly implausible letter
>>>>> to Kim
>>>>>                   Jeong-il himself). The
>>>>>                   leather mask has become a face.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   And I think that is probably what happened to poor
>>>>>                   Leontiev as well. The
>>>>>                   mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>>                   tiring to believe one
>>>>>                                     thing
>>>>>                                 and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law
>>>>> predicts
>>>>>                   that eventually it is
>>>>>                                     the
>>>>>                                 former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   It is that sense in which what Mike says is true:
>>>>>                   Vygotsky's psychology,
>>>>>                   as a scientific system, describes the development
>>>>>                   of institutionalized
>>>>>                   lying just as accurately as it describes the
>>>>>                   development of higher
>>>>>                   concepts. What I wanted to say was that his
>>>>>                   earlier sense that ideas are
>>>>>                   always embodied, and some bodies are gifted with
>>>>>                   an extraordinary
>>>>>                   foresight, is also true. I think Vygotsky knew
>>>>>                   that he would die, but he
>>>>>                   also knew that his ideas, so long as they were
>>>>>                   true ones, would live.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   David Kellogg
>>>>>                   Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                   --- On Wed, 12/21/11, Ivan Rosero
>>>>>                   <irosero@ucsd.edu <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                   From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu
>>>>>                   <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>                   Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>>                   functionalism and Anglo
>>>>>                                     Finnish
>>>>>                                 Insufficiences
>>>>>                   To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>                   <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>                   Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 6:50 PM
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                   David, if you agree with the summary Larry has
>>>>>                   presented, I remain
>>>>>                                     confused
>>>>>                                 by your analogy.  I read Larry's
>>>>> presentation of
>>>>>                   Kitching/Pleasant as
>>>>>                   saying that action cobbles together further sense
>>>>>                   within already-given
>>>>>                   sense that is simultaneously ideal-material, and
>>>>>                   therefore subject to
>>>>>                   culturally and historically specific constraints
>>>>>                   and possibilities.  But
>>>>>                   surely, this includes the bottle and the person
>>>>>                   too, both as moving
>>>>>                   entities (the bottle, unless highly heated, a much
>>>>>                   more slowly moving
>>>>>                   entity).  I am not invested in any particular
>>>>>                   reading of Leontiev, but
>>>>>                                     your
>>>>>                                 analogy as presented suggests a kind of
>>>>> essential
>>>>>                   fixity to the person
>>>>>                   which I want to believe you don't really mean.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   To be fair, your emphasis is on the wine in the
>>>>>                   bottle.  But, in this
>>>>>                                     case,
>>>>>                                 a slowly moving bottle is rather less
>>>>> interesting
>>>>>                   than a human being,
>>>>>                                     with
>>>>>                                 a rather less historically complex
>>>>> relationship to
>>>>>                   the liquid it gives
>>>>>                   shape to.
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Does what Andy refer to help here?  What kind of
>>>>>                   concept-complex (is it
>>>>>                   enough to call it Stalinism?) helps to explain the
>>>>>                   Leontiev at issue
>>>>>                                     here?
>>>>>                                 Or, if the critique was there from
>>>>> early
>>>>> on, what
>>>>>                   kind of
>>>>>                                     concept-complex
>>>>>                                 would help to explain his writings'
>>>>> wide
>>>>> acceptance?
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Or, do we forgo all this and just grab Leontiev,
>>>>>                   as you say, "on a good
>>>>>                   day"?
>>>>>
>>>>>                   Ivan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                   On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 3:55 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>                                     vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>> <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>
>>>>>                                     wrote:
>>>>>                                Mike wrote that as he grows older, he
>>>>>                       becomes less attached to his
>>>>>                       position (expressed in his editorial
>>>>>                       commentary to Luria's
>>>>>                                           autobiography,
>>>>>                                     "The Making of Mind") that ideas
>>>>> really are
>>>>>                       highly embodied things.
>>>>>                                           Mike
>>>>>                                     says that as he grows older, he
>>>>> becomes more
>>>>>                       and more attached to
>>>>>                                           Luria's
>>>>>                                     position that only ideas matter.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       But as I grow older, I become more and more
>>>>>                       attached to Mike's
>>>>>                                           original
>>>>>                                     position that individuals really
>>>>> matter. Wine
>>>>>                       has no shape of its
>>>>>                                           own; it
>>>>>                                     really depends on what bottle we
>>>>> put
>>>>> it in,
>>>>>                       and the form of ideas
>>>>>                                           depends
>>>>>                                     very much on the character of the
>>>>> individuals
>>>>>                       wo carry them.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       On paper, the theoretical positions of
>>>>>                       Vygotsky and Leontiev are not
>>>>>                                           that
>>>>>                                     far apart. So when Mike asks what
>>>>> presents
>>>>>                       Vygotsky's ideas from being
>>>>>                       pressed into service by the Stalinist state, I
>>>>>                       think the answer has
>>>>>                                           to be
>>>>>                                     referred to the individual who
>>>>> carried this
>>>>>                       idea after all.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       I think it is not accidental that one was
>>>>>                       amenable and the other was
>>>>>                                           not,
>>>>>                                     that one's ideas were deformed and
>>>>>                       degenerated, and the others still
>>>>>                                                   amaze
>>>>>                                                 by their freshness and
>>>>> color. Nor is it
>>>>>                       accidental that one lived and
>>>>>                                           one
>>>>>                                     died.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       But of course death is simply the moment when
>>>>>                       our thinking and spoken
>>>>>                       speech must come to an end, and our written
>>>>>                       speech, like a hermit
>>>>>                                           crab,
>>>>>                                     must find a new home in the minds
>>>>> and mouths
>>>>>                       of others. And by that
>>>>>                       measure, it was Vygotsky who lived on, yea,
>>>>>                       even in the mind and the
>>>>>                                                   mouth
>>>>>                                                 of Leontiev. Well,
>>>>> Leontiev on a good day!
>>>>>
>>>>>                       David Kellogg
>>>>>                       Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>>                       PS; I think I am (once again) with Larry. I
>>>>>                       think that if we read
>>>>>                                           (late)
>>>>>                                     Wittgenstein as a linguistic (not a
>>>>>                       philosophical) pragmatist, that
>>>>>                                           is,
>>>>>                                 as
>>>>>                                                 someone who believes
>>>>> that meaning in language
>>>>>                       comes from sense in
>>>>>                                                   activity,
>>>>>                                                 Wittgenstein is
>>>>> perfectly consistent with what
>>>>>                       Marx writes in the
>>>>>                                           German
>>>>>                                     Ideology (that language is
>>>>> practical
>>>>>                       consciousness, real for myself
>>>>>                                                   because
>>>>>                                                 real for others).
>>>>> Wittgenstein is
>>>>>                       Vygotsky-compatible in other ways,
>>>>>                                           too,
>>>>>                                     e.g. his argument about
>>>>> preconceptual
>>>>>                       "families" and his argument
>>>>>                                           about
>>>>>                                 the
>>>>>                                                 tool like nature of
>>>>> signs.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       dk
>>>>>
>>>>>                       --- On Wed, 12/21/11, mike cole
>>>>>                       <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>                       <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                       From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>                       <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>>                       Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>>                       functionalism and Anglo
>>>>>                                                   Finnish
>>>>>                                                 Insufficiences
>>>>>                       To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>>                       <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>>                       Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>                       <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>                       <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>, "Morten
>>>>>                       Nissen" <Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk
>>>>>                       <mailto:Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.**dk<Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>                       Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 2:12 PM
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                       Very helpful, Larry. Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       As I read the Leontiev materials what was at
>>>>>                       issue in 1949 is whether
>>>>>                                                   there
>>>>>                                                 is any "third space" of
>>>>> the self in the "unity
>>>>>                       of consciousness and
>>>>>                       activity." I take Stalinism
>>>>>                       in these materials to refer to the way that
>>>>>                       idealism is joined with
>>>>>                                                   belief
>>>>>                                                 in some sort of
>>>>> "autonomous" realm of thought.
>>>>>                       Zinchenko's work on
>>>>>                       micromovements of the eye and perceptual
>>>>>                       action seem to me now
>>>>>                                                   significant
>>>>>                                                 in exactly this
>>>>> respect:
>>>>> they point to a rapid
>>>>>                       simulation process
>>>>>                                           which
>>>>>                                 is
>>>>>                                                 not mechanically
>>>>> connected to externalized
>>>>>                       action (as one example). If
>>>>>                                                   you
>>>>>                                                 know the future of
>>>>> history and what is good
>>>>>                       for everyone, all such
>>>>>                       processes risk deviation from "the true path."
>>>>>                       The motives of the
>>>>>                                                   "healthy"
>>>>>                                                 individual are supposed
>>>>> to coincide with those
>>>>>                       of the "collective" (as
>>>>>                       represented by the general secretary of the
>>>>>                       central committee of the
>>>>>                       communist party). Functionalism as command and
>>>>>                       control statism.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       If we accept THIS version of CHAT, seems to me
>>>>>                       that Phillip is
>>>>>                                           corrrect -
>>>>>                                     Use the ideas for something called
>>>>> communism,
>>>>>                       fascism, ANY form of
>>>>>                       collective social project.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       David says this is Leontiev's (AT) problem,
>>>>>                       not Vygotsky's (CH)
>>>>>                                           problem.
>>>>>                                     Larry points
>>>>>                       to Wittgensteinian marxism that appears to
>>>>>                       provide a way to select
>>>>>                                           wheat
>>>>>                                     from chaff (or discover a different
>>>>> level of
>>>>>                       chaff!).
>>>>>
>>>>>                       My guess is that German, Russian, and other
>>>>>                       thinkers have already
>>>>>                                           carried
>>>>>                                     this conversation pretty far....
>>>>> Morten's
>>>>>                       citation of German work
>>>>>                                           points
>>>>>                                 to
>>>>>                                                 this conclusion.
>>>>>
>>>>>                       But how are we poor non_Russian, non_German
>>>>>                       reading unfortunates
>>>>>                                                   wandering
>>>>>                                                 in the woods to find
>>>>> our
>>>>> way?
>>>>>
>>>>>                       mike
>>>>>
>>>>>                       On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 12:08 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>>                       <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>>                       <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>>                       wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>                                                           Hi Andy,
>>>>> Christine, Mike
>>>>>                           I have been hibernating on Mayne Island, a
>>>>>                           small Island between
>>>>>                                                         Vancouver
>>>>>                                                     and Vancouver and
>>>>> Vancouver Island.
>>>>>                           [school break for the holidays]
>>>>>                                                 No
>>>>>                                         internet except at the small
>>>>> library]
>>>>>
>>>>>                           I was interested in this comment from
>>>>>                           Morten Nissen on Andy's book
>>>>>
>>>>>                           Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the
>>>>>                           “opposite” side: the
>>>>>
>>>>>  functionalism
>>>>>                                                           of Leontiev’s
>>>>> way of relating subject with
>>>>>                           society. This has to do
>>>>>                                                 with
>>>>>                                     how
>>>>>                                                           objects and
>>>>> motives appear to coincide in
>>>>>                           Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>>                                                 image of
>>>>>                                     the
>>>>>                                                           true society,
>>>>> that is, the society of
>>>>>                           original communism and that of
>>>>>                                                         the
>>>>>                                                     Soviet Union.
>>>>>                           Andy, it is this notion of "coinciding"
>>>>>                           that I have difficulty with
>>>>>                                                         when
>>>>>                                                     reading about
>>>>> Activity Theory.
>>>>>
>>>>>                           Leontiev's statements such as "Education
>>>>>                           is the decisive force which
>>>>>                                                             forms
>>>>>                                                           man
>>>>> intellectually. This intellectual
>>>>>                           development MUST CORRESPOND TO
>>>>>                                                         THE
>>>>>                                                     AIMS AND THE NEEDS
>>>>> OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.
>>>>>                            It must fully agree with
>>>>>                                                         REAL
>>>>>                                                     human needs"
>>>>>
>>>>>                           I'm been browsing through an edited  book
>>>>>                           by Gavin Kitching and
>>>>>                                                 Nigel
>>>>>                                         Pleasant titled "Marx and
>>>>> Wittgenstein:
>>>>>                           Knowledge, Morality,
>>>>>                                                 Politics."
>>>>>                                         These authors take an
>>>>> interesting
>>>>>                           perspective on materialism &
>>>>>                                                 idealism
>>>>>                                         that gives idealism its place
>>>>> in
>>>>> our human
>>>>>                           being [in contrast to
>>>>>                                                 how I
>>>>>                                     read
>>>>>                                                           Leontiev}
>>>>>                           These authors are exploring a
>>>>>                           Wittgensteinian Marxism that examines
>>>>>                                                             Marx's
>>>>>                                                           notion that
>>>>> "The tradition of all the dead
>>>>>                           generations weighs like a
>>>>>                           nightmare on the brain of the living" A
>>>>>                           Wittgensteinian Marxist
>>>>>                                                 reading
>>>>>                                         [from the authors perspective]
>>>>> would make
>>>>>                           3 points.
>>>>>
>>>>>                           1] Tradition and circumstances cannot be
>>>>>                           understood in ABSTRACTION
>>>>>                                                 FROM
>>>>>                                         the traditions and
>>>>> understandings that
>>>>>                           people have of these
>>>>>
>>>>>  circumstances.
>>>>>                                                           2] WHATEVER
>>>>>  such varied understandings
>>>>>                           may consist (class, culture,
>>>>>                           gender etc) nonetheless some KINDS of
>>>>>                           actions by historical subjects
>>>>>                           [agents, actors] will prove impossible IF
>>>>>                           these actions are entered
>>>>>                                                         into
>>>>>                                                 in
>>>>>                                                           disregard to
>>>>> the traditions and
>>>>>                           circumstances directly GIVEN,
>>>>>                                                         ENCOUNTERED
>>>>>                                                     and transmitted
>>>>> from
>>>>> the past
>>>>>                           3] A principle WAY in which the TRADITIONS
>>>>>                           OF THE DEAD GENERATIONS
>>>>>                                                         weighs
>>>>>                                                     like a nightmare on
>>>>> the brain of the
>>>>>                           living is that ANTECEDENT
>>>>>                                                         historical
>>>>>                                                     circumstances often
>>>>> make it IMPOSSIBLE TO
>>>>>                           THINK AND FEEL (and
>>>>>                                                 therefore
>>>>>                                         act)in certain ways.
>>>>> Historically created
>>>>>                           material culture restricts
>>>>>                                                         and
>>>>>                                                     enables the making
>>>>> of PARTICULAR KINDS of
>>>>>                           history. People do not
>>>>>                                                 try to
>>>>>                                     do
>>>>>                                                           things and
>>>>> then for "material reasons"
>>>>>                           find they cannot do things. (
>>>>>                                                             cannot
>>>>>                                                           make history
>>>>> as THEY PLEASE ) Such
>>>>>                           traditions and circumstances
>>>>>                                                 DEEPLY
>>>>>                                     FORM
>>>>>                                                           what it is
>>>>> that present generations can
>>>>>                           DESIRE TO DO. and CONCEIVE
>>>>>                                                 OF.
>>>>>                                     (as
>>>>>                                                           well as what
>>>>> actions they can conceive of
>>>>>                           as being
>>>>>                                                 possible/impossible,
>>>>>                                         feasible/unfeasible)
>>>>>
>>>>>                           It is human action in and on the world
>>>>>                           that inextricably LINKS
>>>>>                                                 THOUGHT
>>>>>                                         (and language) TO MATERIAL
>>>>> REALITY.
>>>>>                           Historical traditions and
>>>>>
>>>>>  circumstances
>>>>>                                                           are the
>>>>> outcomes of previous generations
>>>>>                           actions [intended &
>>>>>                                                         unintended]
>>>>>                                                     which place
>>>>> constraints on present
>>>>>                           generations. Constraints on what
>>>>>                                                         they
>>>>>                                                     can think, feel,
>>>>> desire (and how they act)
>>>>>                           By keeping these 3 points in mind the
>>>>>                           authors suggest we can avoid
>>>>>                                                             falling
>>>>>                                                           into the DEEP
>>>>> CONFUSIONS which have always
>>>>>                           attended the
>>>>>                                                 material/ideal
>>>>>                                         distinction.
>>>>>                           The most DIRECT and comprehensible way to
>>>>>                           SEE THROUGH this
>>>>>                                                         material/ideal
>>>>>                                                     distinction is to
>>>>> see that all action is
>>>>>                           simultaneously mental &
>>>>>                                                             physical,
>>>>>                                                           material &
>>>>> ideal.  Neither material or
>>>>>                           ideal is an "epiphenomena" of
>>>>>                                                         the
>>>>>                                                     other.
>>>>>
>>>>>                           In my reading of Leontiev in the chapter
>>>>>                           from the book posted I
>>>>>                                                 don't
>>>>>                                 see
>>>>>                                                     the nuances
>>>>> recognizing the depths of the
>>>>>                           "ideal" within Marx's
>>>>>                                                 theory.
>>>>>                                         This edited book, by putting
>>>>> Marx into
>>>>>                           explicit conversation is
>>>>>                           elaborating a Wittgensteinian Marxism or a
>>>>>                           Marxist Wittgenstein.
>>>>>
>>>>>                           Larry
>>>>>
>>>>>                           On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 7:39 PM, mike cole
>>>>>                           <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>                           <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>>                                                 wrote:
>>>>>                                             Below are two quotations
>>>>> from Morten
>>>>>                               Nissen's review of Andy
>>>>>                                                       Blunden's
>>>>>                                             book
>>>>>                               on activity theory. Full review in
>>>>>                               current issue of MCA.
>>>>>
>>>>>                               After presenting the quotation, a
>>>>> comment.
>>>>>                               mike
>>>>>                               -------------------
>>>>>
>>>>>                               Morten Nissen on Leontiev,
>>>>>                               functionalism, and Stalinism
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               ….behind this terminological trouble
>>>>>                               lies a deep theoretical
>>>>>                                                       problem
>>>>>                                 in
>>>>>                                                         Leontiev’s
>>>>> social theory. This problem
>>>>>                               was identified in the German
>>>>>                                                               and
>>>>>                                                         Scandinavian
>>>>> reception (Axel & Nissen,
>>>>>                               1993; Holzkamp, 1979;
>>>>>
>>>>> Osterkamp,
>>>>>                                                         1976) but
>>>>> almost
>>>>> completely ignored in
>>>>>                               the Anglo-Finnish (with
>>>>>
>>>>>  Miettinen,
>>>>>                                                               2005, and
>>>>> Kaptelinin, 2005, as the
>>>>>                               noble exceptions to the
>>>>>                                                       rule)—and
>>>>>                                             Blunden, as it were,
>>>>> attacks
>>>>> it from
>>>>>                               the “opposite” side: the
>>>>>                               functionalism
>>>>>                               of Leontiev’s way of relating subject
>>>>>                               with society. This has to do
>>>>>                                                               with
>>>>>                                                         how
>>>>>                               objects and motives appear to coincide
>>>>>                               in Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>>                                                       image
>>>>>                                 of
>>>>>                                                         the
>>>>>                               true society, that is, the society of
>>>>>                               original communism and that
>>>>>                                                       of
>>>>>                                 the
>>>>>                                                         Soviet Union.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               >From the perspective of this
>>>>>                               functionalist utopia, a psychology
>>>>>                                                       could
>>>>>                                             become relevant only in the
>>>>> face of
>>>>>                               the undeveloped and the
>>>>>                                                       deviant:
>>>>>                                 as
>>>>>                                                 in
>>>>>                                                               fact,
>>>>> according to Leontiev (1978),
>>>>>                               children and disturbed provide
>>>>>                                                       the
>>>>>                                             tasks of psychology in the
>>>>>                               institutions of the Soviet Union. To
>>>>>                               paraphrase:
>>>>>                               The child who puts down her book still
>>>>>                               has not grasped the harmony
>>>>>                                                       of
>>>>>                                             society’s needs with the
>>>>> desire to
>>>>>                               learn that she *must*
>>>>>
>>>>>                               develop—she has not yet developed
>>>>>                               those “higher cultural needs.”
>>>>>
>>>>>  Bourgeois
>>>>>                                                               society
>>>>> is
>>>>> another matter, where sense
>>>>>                               and meaning are divided in
>>>>>                               principle, but this matter—that of
>>>>>                               ideology and social
>>>>>
>>>>>  critique—Leontiev
>>>>>                                                         sets aside and
>>>>> forgets. An elaborate
>>>>>                               critique of Leontiev’s
>>>>>
>>>>>  functionalism
>>>>>                                                               was given
>>>>> already in 1980 (Haug,
>>>>>                               Nemitz,& Waldhubel, 1980), and the
>>>>>                               background was explained by Osterkamp
>>>>>                               (1976) in her groundbreaking
>>>>>                                                               work
>>>>>                                                 on
>>>>>                                                               the
>>>>> theory
>>>>> of motivation.
>>>>>
>>>>>                               ------------------------------**--
>>>>>
>>>>>                               Comment.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               When I first read these passages as
>>>>>                               part of the attempted "swap of
>>>>>
>>>>> ideas"
>>>>>                                                               that
>>>>> Morten and  I tried to organize
>>>>>                               around
>>>>>
>>>>>                               our reviews of Andy's book in Outlines
>>>>>                               and MCA, I commented how
>>>>>                                                       sad it
>>>>>                                     was
>>>>>                                                               that the
>>>>> elaborate critique that goes
>>>>>                               back to
>>>>>
>>>>>                               1980 is not in English and fully
>>>>>                               engaged by both European and
>>>>>                                "Ango-Finns"
>>>>>                               (although how poor  Viktor got into
>>>>>                               that category
>>>>>
>>>>>                               I do not know!).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               Seems like real interchange around
>>>>>                               these issues is long overdue.
>>>>>                                                       But
>>>>>                                     given
>>>>>                                                               the
>>>>> progress of the last couple of
>>>>>                               years, I'll not be
>>>>>
>>>>>                               holding my breath!
>>>>>
>>>>>                               --------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               But thinking about the issues as well
>>>>>                               as my limited language (and
>>>>>                                                               other)
>>>>>                                                         capacities
>>>>> allow.
>>>>>
>>>>>                               mike
>>>>>                               ______________________________**
>>>>> ____________
>>>>>                               _____
>>>>>                               xmca mailing list
>>>>>                               xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>                               <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>                               http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**
>>>>> listinfo/xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>                               ______________________________**
>>>>> ____________
>>>>>                       _____
>>>>>                       xmca mailing list
>>>>>                       xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>                       http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>                       ______________________________**____________
>>>>>                       _____
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>>>>>                       http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  ______________________________**____________
>>>>>                   _____
>>>>>                   xmca mailing list
>>>>>                   xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>                   http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>                   ______________________________**____________
>>>>>                   _____
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>>>>>                   http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  ______________________________**____________
>>>>>               _____
>>>>>               xmca mailing list
>>>>>               xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>               http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>           --
>>>>>           Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>>>           Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
>>>>>           Department of Communication
>>>>>           University of California, San Diego
>>>>>           ______________________________**____________
>>>>>           _____
>>>>>           xmca mailing list
>>>>>           xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>           http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>                     ______________________________**____________
>>>>>       _____
>>>>>       xmca mailing list
>>>>>       xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>       http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>   --
>>>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>>>> ------------
>>>>>   *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>   Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>>>>   Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**>
>>>>>   Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>>   <http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>> ------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>
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> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
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>  <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118>
>
Despite my general approach that Historical Dialectics (Marxian
Social-Cultural theory) and Pragmatism mutually repair the lacuna in their
respective representations of human social and cultural practice, and a
very critical response to Leninism, Lenin's critique of American
Pragmatism, rough as it is, is right on target.

[15] <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118> *
> Pragmatism—*a subjective-idealist trend of bourgeois (mainly American)
> philosophy in the imperialist era. It arose in the seven ties. of the last
> century in the U.S.A. as a reflection of specific features of the
> development of American capitalism, replacing the hitherto prevailing
> religious philosophy. The main propositions of pragmatism were formulated
> by Charles Peirce. As an independent philosophical tendency it took shape
> at the turn of the century in the works of William James and Ferdinand
> Schiller and was further developed in the instrumentalism of John Dewey.
>
> The pragmatists consider that the central problem of philosophy is the
> attainment of true knowledge. However, they completely distort the very
> concept of truth; already Peirce looked on cognition as a purely
> psychological, subjective process of achieving religious belief. James
> substituted the concept of “usefulness”, of success or advantage, for the
> concept of truth, i.e., for the objectively true reflection of reality.
> From his point of view, all concepts, including religious ones, are true
> insofar as they are useful. Dewey went, even farther by declaring all
> scientific theories, all moral principles and social institutions, to be
> merely “instruments” for the attainment of the personal aims of the
> individual. As the criterion of the “truth” (usefulness) of knowledge,
> the pragmatists take experience, understood not as human social practice
> but as the constant stream of individual experiences, of the subjective
> phenomena of consciousness; they regard this experience as the solo
> reality, declaring the concepts of matter and mind “obsolete”. Like the
> Machists, the pragmatists claim to have created a “third line” in
> philosophy; they try to place themselves above materialism and idealism,
> while in fact advocating one of the varieties of idealism. In contrast to
> materialist monism, the pragmatists put forward the standpoint of
> “pluralism”, according to which there is no internal connection, no
> conformity to law, in the universe; it is like a mosaic which each person
> builds in his own way, out of his own individual experiences. Hence,
> starting out from the needs of the given moment, pragmatism considers it
> possible to give different, even contradictory, explanations of one and the
> same phenomenon. Consistency is declared to be unnecessary; if it is to a
> man’s advantage, he can be a determinist or an indeterminist, he can assert
> or deny the existence of God, and so on.
>
> By basing themselves on the subjective-idealist tradition of English
> philosophy from Berkeley and Hume to John Stuart Mill, by exploiting
> particular aspects of the theories of Kant, Mach   and Avenarius, Nietzsche
> and Henri Bergson, the American pragmatists created one of the most
> reactionary philosophical trends of modern times, a convenient form for
> theoretically defending the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie. It is
> for this reason that pragmatism spread so widely in the U.S.A., becoming
> almost the official American philosophy. There have been advocates of
> pragmatism at various times in Italy, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and
> other countries. Lenin, V.I. (1908) MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM: Critical
> Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, Chapter 4. Parties in Philosophy
> and Philosophical Blockheads
>



-- 
Victor Friedlander
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