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Re: [xmca] Aristotle's PRACTICAL philosophy as providing historical perspective



Hi Christine

A further comment on phronesis contrasted with dominant social *science*
models.

You wrote,

How can 'general laws' be sought to understand dynamics of social practices
and yet an openess be maintained , principles of a mode of enquiry not
contrained by previous meanings of 'general laws'? In this it seems that the
shift to 'methodology' (or epistemological mode) is to enable an open stance
against 'theoretical incursions', in 'practical philosophy' fashion .
However, whereas "practical philosophy was designed precisely to protect
practice against unwarranted theoretical incursions (Carr refers us to
Dunne, 1993) action research was DESIGNED  to provide research METHODOLOGY
that would INTEGRATE theory and practice by drawing on theoretical knowledge
FROM psychology, philosophy, sociology, and other fields of social science
in order to test its EXPLANATORY power and practical usefulness.Action
research that I have encountered fashions an approach to enquiry upon
reflection rather than 'by design' and a purpose is for ameliorative action
- not the provision of methodology ( the two are intertwined). Practical
usefulness yes, but not an  explanatory  that becomes predictive of future
form.


I would like to add a quote by Sanford Scram to this line of thinking.  He
was writing about political *science* but the framework is appropriate to
this conversation.
 Ssram suggests that a case can be made that the dominant paradigm operates
according to the following HIERARCY of assumptions.

- poltical science exists to promote understanding of the TRUTH about
politics.-
- political science research contributes to this quest by adding to the
accumulation of an expanding base of objective knowledge about - the growth
of this knowledge is contingent upon the building of theory that offers
EXPLANATIONS of politics.
- the building of theory is dependent on the development of universal
GENERALIZATIONS regarding the behavior of political actors
- the development of a growing body of generalizations occurs by testing
falsifiable causal hypotheses that demonstrate their success in MAKING
PREDICTIONS
- the accumulation of a growing body OF PREDICTIONS about political behavior
comes from the study of VARIABLES in SAMPLES involving large numbers of
cases
- this growing body of OBJECTIVE CAUSAL knowledge can be PUT in service of
society, particulary by influencing public policymakers.

[Beyond Paradigm: Resisting the Assimilation of Phrnetic Social Science,
Journal of Politics and Society, 2004, vol 32 p417-433]

This summary in point form when read alongside David Kellogg's recent post
in response to Martin causes me to reflect if the two conversations can be
linked to highlight the *prejudice against prejudice* in the dominant social
science model?

Larry

.



On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 8:37 AM, christine schweighart <
schweighartgate@hotmail.com> wrote:

>
> Dear Larry,
>  I find the poeisis praxis distinction very helpful, especially when
> orienting to participative research. Many of my difficulties have arisen
> from being required to specify research outcomes- to a level of detail where
> data categories and procedure of analysis are required beforehand - quite
> common in the practice of gaining approval for  PhD proposals etc, but
> problematic in participative research. If 'participative' is taken beyond
> what I might call a superficial degree, to a collaborative status where the
> design of enquiry reaches collaboration with depth of working  upon research
> themes together- the' praxis' values arise in the process, and guide the
> relevance of categories etc around an emerging shared sense of 'good'.
>
>  Lewin's 'search for laws' doesn't quite fit this praxis, it seems to me.
> Whilst not all participants might aspire to write research resumes, many do,
> and those that might not elaborate documented finding might still share a
> motive of improving social practices beyond their immediate work setting.
> Professional bodies have historically  been contexts for knowledge
> production beyond immediate work settings, however their 'good' in knowledge
> production and sharing is somewhat different to an academic one, often more
> self-serving,
>
>  In the paper contrasting Lewin ( for AR) the' experimental' ethos is one
> that contemporary AR has modified.
>
> "(c) the main aim of social research (as conceived by Lewin)
> is to formulate general laws about the dynamics of societal practices, with
> an eye to using these
> laws as part of planning interventions into societal practice."
>
> and principles  1 &2 of  figure 1
>
> " 1. Improvement of societal practices is a direct consideration and
> important orienting focus in forming research questions.
> 2. It is sometimes necessary to intervene into societal practices as part
> of
> gaining basic knowledge, which makes it impossible to maintain a
> separation of social science from social action."
>
> Principle 1 assumes an a priori research question - this is not open to
> collaborative orientation to a sense of form of  'good life' emerging in
> praxis.
> Yet in principle 2. an apparent contradiction of 'gaining basic knowledge'
> is open. What is 'basic knowledge' referring to here? It might be such that
> a meaning held in a 'research question' arises from such knowledge.
>
> How can 'general laws' be sought to understand dynamics of social practices
> and yet an openess be maintained , principles of a mode of enquiry not
> contrained by previous meanings of 'general laws'? In this it seems that the
> shift to 'methodology' (or epistemological mode) is to enable an open stance
> against 'theoretical incursions', in 'practical philosophy' fashion .
> However, whereas "practical philosophy was designed precisely to protect
> practice against unwarranted theoretical incursions (Carr refers us to
> Dunne, 1993) action research was DESIGNED  to provide research METHODOLOGY
> that would INTEGRATE theory and practice by drawing on theoretical
> knowledge
> FROM psychology, philosophy, sociology, and other fields of social science
> in order to test its EXPLANATORY power and practical usefulness.Action
> research that I have encountered fashions an approach to enquiry upon
> reflection rather than 'by design' and a purpose is for ameliorative action
> - not the provision of methodology ( the two are intertwined). Practical
> usefulness yes, but not an  explanatory  that becomes predictive of future
> form.
>
> Jack Whitehead uses this quote from Lyotard a lot to evoke an ethos of his
> educational action research:
>
>
>
> "A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the
> text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by
> pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a
> determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or to
>  the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is
>  looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules
>  in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done." (Lyotard,
> p. 81, 1986)
>
>
>
> Lyotard, F. (1986) The Postmodern Condition: A report on Knowledge.
> Manchester; Manchester University Press.
>
>  Jack Whitehead's  living theory perspective is  represented in:
>
>
>
> Farren, M., Whitehead, J. & Bognar, B. (2011) Action Research in the
> Educational Workshop. Palo Alto; Academica Press.
>
> Christine
>
>
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