On 19 April 2011 02:01, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Huw, I think any scientific theory should aspire to be
philosophically rigorous. Philosophial rigour though is not
something that depends on results as "scientific" rigour does. For
example, is we use the concept of "activity" in our scientific
work as a relation between the mental and the physical for
example, then we need to be aware that this introduces a dichotomy
which is ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, it is almost
impossible to talk about, let alone explain, Activity without
referring to "states of mind" and so on. This is the difficult
distinction between communicative action and concepts.
The mental/physical distinction looks like a dead-end to me beyond the
sphere of social discourse, though I understand your gist here to be
about coherence. Yes, I'd only offer mild surprise that you'd
willingly employ an incoherent theory. The distinction between the
"-graphy" aspects of science and the "-ology" may be apt.
On concepts: It is true that a concept **can** be conceived of
within a matrix of similarity and differences, but I think that is
a view which really misses what a concept is and fails to capture
the full breadth of meaning of the word. It has the effect of
replacing the study of a concept with the study of "features"
ultimately leading to an arbitrary decision on what counts as an
"irreducible" "chunk" or "feature". I think there is a difference
between problems of recognition or categorisation, on one hand,
and conceptulisation on the other. Concepts actually always have
fuzzy boundaries, and focus on boundary problems often misses the
essence.
Yes. Most definitely. Although these fuzzy boundaries exist (or are
far greater in proliferation) when the subject/organism/host of the
epistemology entailing the concepts is considered as an open system
rather than a closed system. I agree about the semiotic aspects,
although I fear if it is insisted that this aspect part of the
definition of a concept (rather than part of it's generation), you
will create more confusion and disagreement in your wake, especially
in the positivist camp.
The only other pithy point I have to make about the commonalities &
differences view of concepts right now is that you can cover a lot of
ground with a few mirrors. The uniqueness and variety of our minds
and behaviour is also a function of the uniqueness and variety in the
world, sometimes this variety and fuzziness may simply be a reflection
of it, not something intrinsic to our own epistemology.