Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

How could pluralism be equated to lowest *common* denominator, Robert? Seems
an oxymoron.

Also, reading about Europe between 1918-1940 its hard to believe your Dewey
quote below. The first part seems true enough but the second?

mike


On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 6:21 AM, Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>wrote:

> Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!
>
> Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common denominator or
> does it mean  an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that
> welcomes
> difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all
> trades"?
>
> RL
> On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> >wrote:
>
> > I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really demands
> > too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of all
> > trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of
> none.
> >
> > Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
> > approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred flowers
> > blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he
> addresses
> > is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only
> legitimate
> > method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into elements
> > that forms the basis of the extant genre.
> >
> > In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS by
> > saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with Freud,
> > Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field. But
> > then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud,
> Blondel,
> > and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm, and
> this
> > is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies inevitably
> > end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an
> overambitious
> > bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you frame
> the
> > painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too
> small,
> > but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it, you
> > always end up making your picture too big.)
> >
> > When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to "unify"
> > psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology has
> to
> > be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's
> also
> > calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory
> > culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely wrong
> > paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl, Blondel,
> and
> > Piaget too.).
> >
> > I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would include
> > sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the hyperdigm.
> What
> > we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual psychology",
> and
> > that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology dealing
> > with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
> >
> > One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms to
> > hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the TIME
> > variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
> > sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
> > resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the
> > evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting structures.
> >
> > Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
> > functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
> > psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
> > hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
> > it's where we (teachers) come in!
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> > --- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM
> >
> >
> > Andy,
> >
> > The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks multiple
> > paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
> > whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
> > paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
> > imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets their
> > work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
> > psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy to
> > account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
> > paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent) accomplishments,
> > only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
> > Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from unmediated
> > response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's (1959)
> > famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and Simon
> > (1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
> > Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
> > dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
> > "context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
> > paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology is
> > preparadigmatic.
> >
> > If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but co-existing
> > peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect a
> > genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an alternative
> > to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
> > dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
> > preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
> > consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach through
> > many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying the
> > preparadigmatic status of their science.
> >
> > David
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> >
> > I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating a
> > need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present it,
> > a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before your
> > earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and Speech,"
> > Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote,
> > but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say, not
> > yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every new
> > observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read Vygotsky
> >
> > as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
> > against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter
> > says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
> > *problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
> > opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
> > general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
> > probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to read
> >
> > LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand theory
> > of consciousness.
> >
> > So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena multiple
> > genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in everyday
> > life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!) Only
> > each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems that
> >
> > it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step
> > from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
> > problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.
> >
> > I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of thinking
> >
> > could be presented in a way which was productive.
> >
> > What do you think?
> > Andy
> >
> > David H Kirshner wrote:
> > > Larry and Andy,
> > >
> > > Thanks for kind words.
> > >
> > > Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to address
> > > your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question as
> > > probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
> > > solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
> > > differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
> > > framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on
> > the
> > > basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
> > > regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings of
> > > learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its own
> > > new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
> > >
> > > Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
> > > difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e., individualist)
> > > approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
> > learning
> > > in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
> > crucial,
> > > while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
> > answer
> > > certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
> > > effectively than the other questions.
> > >
> > > We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on
> > the
> > > promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
> > > questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
> > > synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle the
> > > two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
> > times
> > > that they are inherently dialectic.)
> > >
> > > In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the first
> > > choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
> > > uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
> > proponents,
> > > gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns of
> > > the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in this
> > > post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
> > >
> > > The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
> > > particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us make
> > > sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
> > > learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in such
> > a
> > > way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach
> > puts
> > > on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to be
> > > coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of constructivist
> > > and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
> > > precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
> > >
> > > Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
> > > needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
> > > approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
> > offered--it
> > > is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In this
> > > way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in concert
> > > with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
> > > serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.
> > This
> > > is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
> > > instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
> > > framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the world
> > > of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
> > >
> > > For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It constructs
> > > what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
> > > synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
> > practice.
> > > Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
> > > educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
> > concern,
> > > with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
> > > relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
> > > emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
> > > individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
> > learning,
> > > it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways that
> > > are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the purview
> > of
> > > professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres
> > of
> > > teaching.
> > >
> > > This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
> > >
> > > David
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > >
> > > Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
> > >
> > > Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue
> > > over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,
> > is
> > > it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
> > > different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over whether
> >
> > > to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
> > being
> > >
> > > lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
> > > deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame
> > > around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism
> > > exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > David H Kirshner wrote:
> > >
> > >> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
> > >>
> > >> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
> > technology
> > >> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal
> > >>
> > > with
> > >
> > >> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
> > >>
> > >> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
> > >>
> > > technologies
> > >
> > >> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors [for
> > >> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look at
> > >> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
> > tangle
> > >> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
> > >> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and new
> > >> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure the
> > >> kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
> > >> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
> > debate.
> > >> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
> > >>
> > > sociological
> > >
> > >> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
> > >> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
> > >> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
> > >> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
> > >> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
> > >> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
> > >>
> > > metaphor
> > >
> > >> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor which
> > >> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with
> > >>
> > > much
> > >
> > >> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
> > >>
> > > intra
> > >
> > >> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
> > >>
> > > However,
> > >
> > >> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
> > >> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to
> > >>
> > > view
> > >
> > >> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my work
> > >>
> > > in
> > >
> > >> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
> > >> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful to
> > >> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
> > >>
> > > debate
> > >
> > >> (or at least attempting to).
> > >>
> > >> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
> > >>
> > >> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
> > >> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?
> > >>
> > >> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca without
> > >> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
> > >> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology in
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation by
> > >> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
> > >> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
> > >>
> > > another
> > >
> > >> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either party.
> > >>
> > >> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
> > >>
> > > simple
> > >
> > >> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
> > >>
> > > across
> > >
> > >> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
> > >> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if
> > >>
> > > one
> > >
> > >> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
> > genres
> > >> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
> > >> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
> > >> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
> > >> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
> > >> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single paradigm
> > >>
> > > and
> > >
> > >> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
> > >> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
> > >>
> > > teaching"
> > >
> > >> that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.
> > >>
> > > This
> > >
> > >> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote a
> > >> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
> > >>
> > > effects
> > >
> > >> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
> > systemic
> > >> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to be
> > >> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of a
> > >> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
> > >>
> > > this
> > >
> > >> branch of knowledge.
> > >>
> > >> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
> > >>
> > > approach
> > >
> > >> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
> > >>
> > > first
> > >
> > >> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas of
> > >> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
> > >>
> > > addresses
> > >
> > >> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
> > >> language of genres just doesn't register for my students. Typically,
> > >> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
> > >> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
> > >>
> > > into
> > >
> > >> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
> > >>
> > > approaches
> > >
> > >> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
> > >> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes these
> > >> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
> > come
> > >> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
> > these
> > >> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
> > >>
> > >> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic discourse
> > >> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is
> > the
> > >> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
> > >> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
> > >> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning. Because
> > >>
> > > in
> > >
> > >> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to
> > >> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
> > >> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
> > >>
> > > analyses
> > >
> > >> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes that
> > >>
> > > are
> > >
> > >> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
> > >> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
> > >>
> > > resources
> > >
> > >> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
> > >>
> > >> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
> > >> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
> > >> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
> > >>
> > > educators,
> > >
> > >> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
> > sort(s)
> > >> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
> > discourse
> > >> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
> > >> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction of
> > >> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about
> > >>
> > > what
> > >
> > >> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
> > >> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues to
> > >>
> > > be
> > >
> > >> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
> > professional
> > >> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
> > >>
> > >> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
> > >> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant.
> > If
> > >> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
> > >>
> > > theory
> > >
> > >> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching practice
> > >>
> > > is
> > >
> > >> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current prominence
> > >>
> > > of
> > >
> > >> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
> > >>
> > > thread--but
> > >
> > >> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning styles"
> > >> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
> > theory,
> > >> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
> > spiritual
> > >> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical discourse
> > >>
> > > in
> > >
> > >> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
> > >>
> > > universe
> > >
> > >> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
> > >> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than a
> > >> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
> > >> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning, nonetheless
> > >> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate the
> > >> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
> > >> theoretical approaches.
> > >>
> > >> Genres: Why Not?
> > >>
> > >> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it is
> > >>
> > > so
> > >
> > >> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
> > >> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
> > >>
> > > theorizations
> > >
> > >> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory would
> > >> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
> > >> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
> > >>
> > > been
> > >
> > >> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.
> > >>
> > >> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed against
> > >> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
> > psychology.
> > >>
> > > I
> > >
> > >> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
> > >> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.
> > >>
> > >> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
> > >> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists
> > of
> > >> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify the
> > >> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
> > >>
> > > never
> > >
> > >> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
> > >> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
> > >>
> > > through
> > >
> > >> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
> > phenomena
> > >> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot invalidate
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against others
> > >>
> > > by
> > >
> > >> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
> > >> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
> > >> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
> > >> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die, they
> > >> just fade away.
> > >>
> > >> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double lives.
> > >> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> > >> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
> > >> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated
> > the
> > >> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
> > Claims
> > >> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
> > faits
> > >> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
> > >> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.
> > >>
> > >> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or dishonest,
> > >> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What we
> > >> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
> > >> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
> > >> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The ironic
> > >> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
> > only
> > >> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
> > single
> > >> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena of
> > >> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
> > >> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
> > >> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
> > >> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
> > >>
> > >> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
> > >> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
> > >>
> > > haven't
> > >
> > >> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a sociological
> > >> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
> > >> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first preoccupations
> > >>
> > > of
> > >
> > >> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific enterprise,
> > >>
> > > was
> > >
> > >> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
> > >> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
> > >> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
> > >> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
> > (Aristotelian)
> > >> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
> > >> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical thought.
> > >>
> > > So,
> > >
> > >> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result, education
> > >> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and independent
> > >> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
> > >>
> > > psychology
> > >
> > >> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we have
> > >> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
> > construed
> > >> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
> > >> approach.
> > >>
> > >> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
> > >>
> > >> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
> > >>
> > > psychological
> > >
> > >> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
> > >> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above, that
> > >> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> > >> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue
> > >>
> > > that
> > >
> > >> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights that
> > >> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
> > preparadigmatic
> > >> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to address
> > >> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
> > >>
> > > cognitivists
> > >
> > >> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided,
> > on
> > >> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
> > >>
> > > encompass
> > >
> > >> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
> > >> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
> > psychology
> > >> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
> > >> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel with
> > >> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
> > >> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and
> > >> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And
> > >>
> > > then
> > >
> > >> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism and
> > >> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
> > formed
> > >> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
> > >> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a clear
> > >>
> > > and
> > >
> > >> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to inform
> > a
> > >> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
> > >>
> > > theories
> > >
> > >> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
> > >> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
> > >>
> > > theory
> > >
> > >> over contemporary forms.
> > >>
> > >> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach for
> > >> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological schools,
> > >> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning that
> > I
> > >> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt around
> > >> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that metaphorical
> > >> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective that
> > >> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
> > >> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
> > >> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
> > >>
> > > metaphor
> > >
> > >> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
> > >> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
> > >>
> > > "implicit
> > >
> > >> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
> > >> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian based
> > >> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change literature.
> > >>
> > > My
> > >
> > >> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment draws
> > >> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
> > >> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic Vygotsky,
> > >> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
> > >> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put
> > >>
> > > it:
> > >
> > >> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning
> > on
> > >> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
> > >>
> > > static
> > >
> > >> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
> > considers
> > >> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning as
> > >> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static processes
> > >> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
> > social
> > >> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning is
> > >> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how individual
> > >> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
> > >>
> > > national
> > >
> > >> culture.)
> > >>
> > >> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
> > >>
> > > marshaled
> > >
> > >> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
> > >> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
> > learning
> > >> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
> > >>
> > > partial
> > >
> > >> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
> > >> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
> > >> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as did
> > >> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at
> > >>
> > > the
> > >
> > >> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such initiatives
> > >> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,
> > >>
> > > and
> > >
> > >> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
> > >> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
> > >> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice. The
> > >> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that reality
> > >> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete agendas
> > >> for learning that motivate education.
> > >>
> > >> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with interdisciplinary
> > >>
> > > to
> > >
> > >> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
> > >> theoretical frameworks.
> > >>
> > >> David
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > >> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > >> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > >>
> > >> David
> > >> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
> > >>
> > > these
> > >
> > >> models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
> > >>
> > > ways
> > >
> > >> of
> > >> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize a
> > >> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative
> > process
> > >> that
> > >> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
> > >>
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular metaphor
> > >> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
> > >> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
> > >> which
> > >> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
> > >> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
> > >>
> > > metaphorical
> > >
> > >> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
> > >> consciously
> > >> engage with these transformative technological processes to influence
> > >> the
> > >> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common sense
> > >> folk
> > >> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading
> > the
> > >> way
> > >> or charting where the technology has taken us?
> > >> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
> > >> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
> > >>
> > > common
> > >
> > >> sense
> > >>
> > >> Larry
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
> > >> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> Hi David,
> > >>>
> > >>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> changed in
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like the
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> Web,
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> quickly.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that
> > the
> > >>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
> > >>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
> > But
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> I
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> amendment
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
> > >>>
> > > Internet.
> > >
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> You
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
> > making
> > >>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he
> > has
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> no
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
> > >>>
> > > boggling.
> > >
> > >>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists, etc,
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> etc.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the game
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> are
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
> > >>>
> > > vocabulary
> > >
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> to
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> talk about yet.
> > >>>
> > >>> Michael
> > >>>
> > >>> ________________________________
> > >>>
> > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
> > >>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
> > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Larry,
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain studies
> > >>>
> > > as
> > >
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> a
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> substitute for learning theory.
> > >>>
> > >>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For
> > >>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive,
> > >>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning
> > in
> > >>> fundamentally distinct ways.
> > >>>
> > >>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
> > >>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
> > others
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> to
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
> > >>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence of
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> its
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit, but
> > >>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation
> > of
> > >>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare
> > up
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> in
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
> > over
> > >>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
> > >>>
> > > learning.
> > >
> > >>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
> > >>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The cognitivists'
> > >>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly: they
> > >>>
> > > no
> > >
> > >>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
> > >>>
> > > processing
> > >
> > >>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> central
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
> > >>>
> > > point
> > >
> > >>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
> > >>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
> > >>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
> > features
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> of
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
> > fact
> > >>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is being
> > >>> elaborated and developed by that community.
> > >>>
> > >>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood of
> > >>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> renewed
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> pack.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> ...should be lots of fun.
> > >>>
> > >>> David
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>>
> > > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > >
> > >>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > >>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
> > >>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > >>>
> > >>> Mike,
> > >>>
> > >>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image of a
> > >>> steam
> > >>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD
> > is
> > >>> now a
> > >>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].  However
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> this
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a far
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> more
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
> > with
> > >>> these
> > >>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to the
> > >>> "heart"
> > >>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
> > >>> science as
> > >>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative in
> > >>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any "simplified'
> > >>> articles
> > >>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain metaphors
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> that
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
> > >>>
> > > introducing
> > >
> > >>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who love
> > >>> ideas
> > >>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
> > >>>
> > >>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice
> > in
> > >>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".  This
> > >>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
> > >>>
> > >>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
> > >>> debate in
> > >>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning but
> > I
> > >>> would
> > >>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand out
> > >>>
> > > to
> > >
> > >>> start
> > >>> a dialogue among school staffs.
> > >>>
> > >>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> wagon"
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
> > >>> educators
> > >>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
> > >>>
> > > transitory
> > >
> > >>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
> > >>>
> > >>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
> > >>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
> > >>>
> > > sociocultural
> > >
> > >>> concepts.
> > >>>
> > >>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
> > >>> conference,
> > >>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
> > >>> influence
> > >>> her.
> > >>>
> > >>> Larry
> > >>>
> > >>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > >>>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
> > >>>> Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
> > >>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
> > >>>> mike
> > >>>> __________________________________________
> > >>>> _____
> > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>> __________________________________________
> > >>> _____
> > >>> xmca mailing list
> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>> __________________________________________
> > >>> _____
> > >>> xmca mailing list
> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> __________________________________________
> > >>> _____
> > >>> xmca mailing list
> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> __________________________________________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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> > >> _____
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> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
> > --
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> > <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
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> >
> >
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> >
> >
>
>
> --
> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.
> *Assistant Professor
> Social Foundations of Education
> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> Georgia Southern University
> P. O. Box 8144
> Phone: (912) 478-5125
> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> Statesboro, GA  30460
>
>  *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> midwife.*
> *-*John Dewey.
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