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Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery



I accept, Rod, that there is a sense in which mind, self, subjectivity or whatever is a product of society. I think it was Fichte who first spoke of the Self being "summonded" to exercise its freedom by another self which recognises it as a free person; i.e. free will is a social product. Thus, the origin of the idea of "recognition" in this sense, and after Herder, of Activity Theory.

But you cannot (can you?) /dissolve/ the moral responsibility which accrues to citizens (i.e., individuals who are deemed to be able to exercise legal rights) into cultural and historical determination, /with no remainder/?

But also, it is one thing to say that selves (like bodies) are products of their environments, but what was it that Marx said in /Theses on Feuerbach/?:

   "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and
   upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed
   circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who
   change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated.
   Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one
   of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of
   circumstances and of human activity or self-change
   [/Selbstveränderung/] can be conceived and rationally understood
   only as *revolutionary practice*."

It is not the "man-made" aspect of artefact I am concerned with here.
Rather I asking where you locate the *actor* who is acting where we have an artefact-mediated action?

Andy



Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
'Guns don't kill people, people kill people' but people who enable people to have easy access to guns and people who manufacture and sell guns would have to be included in that second 'people'.

This is getting down to an argument about free will, I guess. To what extent can we put a boundary around a person's responsibility for their actions when deciding how to respond to those actions? Do parents bear moral responsibility for actions of the children they have made? Do legislators bear moral responsibility for actions of the citizens they have made (a distinctly uncomfortable use of 'made' there)?

I remember reading recently that it has been argued that the increased prevalence of PTSD in soldiers may be due to 'advances' in the training of soldiers, specifically  in the development of techniques to overcome people's reluctance to kill other people. Who 'makes' the decision whether or not to fire, the soldier alone or the whole complex that has trained, briefed and instructed the soldier? Similarly, who 'makes' the decision to set up dodgy mortgage deals, the broker alone or the society which educated the broker?

I appreciate that this is a dodgy line of argument (and one which I think has been dealt with before on xmca) - it can be argued that what matters is what, as a society, we have to say about what people do, whether or not people are 'free' to take responsibility for their actions.

Why should a mind be less artefactual because it has moral responsibility? Are legal systems artefacts? Religions?

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 17 October 2010 12:20
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery

I see what you mean, Rod. In Martin's sense of an artefact being
something made by people, I guess it is indisputable.
But there is an important distinction I would have thought, too. Viz.,
that mind acts as a *cause *and bears *moral responsibility* for what it
does.
My understanding of 'artefact' is that an artefact is a *means* and *not
an end* in itself.

How do you see it?
Andy

Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
Minds don't just happen without intervention from (and opportunities to participate in) a social/cultural environment. There is plenty of scope for arguments about who makes up our minds (how much is down to us and how much to those around us) but they do have to be made.

It could be argued that the whole purpose of education is the making (forging, tuning, fettling) of minds. In some systems this has a distinctly 'outside in' flavour - 'We'll make a man of you' - in others it has a more romantic feel, 'providing a fertile environment in which buds can open into flowers and fruits' - but I am not aware of any society which leaves children to 'happen' without any adult intervention.

My own belief (not at all my own, of course, just remixed from bits picked up from others) is that it is the interest of adults in what children are up to which makes us different from other species. Bothering to teach children how to do things, how to behave, the meaning and value of things etc. sets up the conditions necessary for all sorts of 'mental functions' and I think it is interesting that human reared animals also reliably demonstrate 'more advanced' abilities (especially in the use of signs to communicate) than those reared in the wild - their 'minds' are, at tleast to a degree, 'made' by their involvement in human cultural practices.

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 17 October 2010 10:40
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery

"so our *minds* are artefacts"? I don't get that, Rod.
andy

Rod Parker-Rees wrote:

There may be a connection between this thread and the 'LSV on the preschool stage' thread where Martin Packer referred to the arcuate fasciculus, the dense bundle of axon connections between Broca's area (speech production) and Wernicke's area (processing of speech).

I believe Steven Mithen has argued that speech may have acted as a mediating link between other areas of mental activity which had previously developed and functioned much more independently. Once we were able to hear ourselves talking about aspects of our lives we were better able to distribute information around our brains (Mithen gives examples such as combining ideas about tool use and ideas about relationships with people to allow us to conceive of using people as tools, or combining knowledge about natural history with knowledge about people to develop shamanic beliefs and practices).

If we go along with this then we could argue that social interaction (first mimetic and later mediated by speech) has shaped the development of our minds both phylogenetically and ontogenetically so our minds are artefacts, shaped by our participation in social/cultural practices.

If, as I think evidence suggests (sorry to be so vague) the arcuate fasciculus is a relatively late development, this would suggest that externalised (interpersonal) communication predated internal consciousness and that language provided us with the means to become aware not only of what others say to us (and we to them) but also of what we 'say' to ourselves - so the Great-We proceeds the individual consciousness. Julian Jaynes argued that it is only relatively recently that we have fully accepted 'our' thoughts as being 'ours' rather than the voices of spirits or other 'outside' beings. Perhaps we are now beginning to return to a recognition that 'our' thoughts may not be as much 'our own' as we once believed, using the lovely image which was offered earlier, the words, values, beliefs and principles which help to define who we are come to us pre-owned or pre-occupied, like footprints in the sand.

The history of attitudes to childhood also charts the swings from celebration of the 'artificiality' of a civilised adult (when children are seen as primal, savage and rather unpleasant) to celebration of all that is natural and unspoiled (when children are all innocence and loveliness). I think many people today would prefer to believe that they 'just happened' rather than accept that they have been fabricated (the mantra of all reality TV participants is 'I just want to be myself').

There is another thread to be followed in charting the unfortunate shift in the meaning of 'tool' to the point where it can now be used as a term of abuse!

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: 16 October 2010 20:03
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery

Andy, Lucas, Carol...

It seems to me we're using the term 'artifact' in two related but distinguishable ways. First, to say that something is a product of human activity, rathe than solely natural processes. Second, to say that something mediates human activity.

I think a plausible case can be made that the human body is an artifact in both senses. The NYTimes article I sent recently illustrates that past cultural activity has shaped the form and functioning of the human body today. Lactose tolerance, which sadly I lack, was a mutation that conveyed advantage to those carrying it once farming and milking of cattle became widespread, and so it became increasingly common. Those of you who today drink milk and eat cheese have bodies are the products of our ancestors' activities in the milk shed.

But, second, the human body can surely mediate human activity, as Marx described clearly. When I sell my labor power I am contributing my body as a mediator between capital and commodity. A less sobering example would be the developmental stage of the Great-We, when the infant needs and uses the bodies of adults to get anything accomplished. The first gestures and holophrastic utterances are calls for others to act on the infant's behalf, doing what his or her own body is not yet capable of.

Martin

On Oct 16, 2010, at 5:27 AM, Lucas Bietti wrote:



Andy,


Thanks for the remark and my apologies if I was not clear enough. I understand
your point about the historicity and cultural and social trajectories of
artifacts and I agree on that. What I was suggesting was that gesturing could be
an activity in which the body would act as an artifact without counting on
external devices -if we claim that *the body is an artifact*. I was wondering
how the mind-body unity and necessary interanimations would be operating in
dreaming?


Lucas






On October 16, 2010 at 4:51 AM Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:



Lucas,
I think the distributed mind idea emphasises certain aspects of human
life, namely the involvement of *other people* in the production of
artefacts and participation in institutions and other forms of social
practice. But it should be remembered that an artefact is typically the
product of *other people* working in institutions; as Hegel said: "the
tool is the norm of labour." So both ideas are making the same claim but
with slightly different emphasis.

But when you say "if we believe that the body is crucial for perception
and cognition, ..." surely this is not up for debate? And yet you seem
to be suggesting that the body might not be needed for cognition and
consequently, the body might not be an artefact. I'm really lost here. :)

Andy
Lucas Bietti wrote:


Carol and Andy,


As far as I know, the point of the extended mind/distributed cognition
approach
is the idea that in many cases cognitive processes are extended/distributed
across social and material environments. So in writing both the pencil and
paper
are acting as mediating interfaces enabling us to perform certain cognitive
tasks (e.g. basic math operations) that, otherwise, we would not be able to
perform.


Extended and distributed approaches to the mind don't consider the body as
an
artifact. The basis for the these approaches is that cognitive processes are
embodied and situated in concrete activities. That's why cognitive and
sensory-motor interanimations are part of the same mind-body unity.
Gesturing
can be thought as a cognitive-embodied activity in which the body acts as an
artifact to represent and convey meaning. In gesturing the mediating
interface
is the space. However, if we believe that the body is crucial for perception
and
cognition, in my view, there would be no reason to claim that the body is an
artifact -or I missed something of the discussion.


Lucas




On October 16, 2010 at 3:13 AM Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>
wrote:




Andy
In a small and trembling voice, 'cos we don't want to get into dualisms
here--surely artefacts mediate with other artefacts--the pencil mediates
writing? I don't feel I am in the right league to answer this questions,
but
I think we are pushed back to this position.
Carol

On 16 October 2010 08:33, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:




Understood, and an interesting example it was too. I was just trying to
get
back to Paula's interesting question which started the thread.
Jenna got a thread going on the blind person's cane, where that part of
the
mind which is in artefacts become completely subsumed into the body, from
a
psychological point of view. Paula then pointed out that from a
psychological point of view we can take parts of our body to be tools.
So the question is raised: psychologically speaking, where is the border
line between body and things?
Lucas added the idea of "distributed cognition" so that the activity of
other people is seen also to be a part of mind.
But, and I think this is an challenging one: if the human body is an
artefact, what is it mediating between?

Andy


Carol Macdonald wrote:




Actually Andy
I thought I was giving an historically interesting example.  Maybe it's
because we have 350 000+ people a year dying from AIDS that health is so
high in our national consciousness. So excuse the example: you are lucky
you
didn't get an historical account of HIV/AIDS!!

Raising children is also interesting across the cultures in our country.
But
I have work to do so must stop here.

Carol

On 16 October 2010 02:44, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:






We shouldn't take this "the body is an artefact" down an entirely
negative
line of course, Carol.
Every parent will tell you the efforts that went into raising their own
darling children.

Andy

Carol Macdonald wrote:






TB is very interesting historically in the way we have responded to it.
Firstly, you got ill from it and died from it, like the poet Keats.
   Then
people were isolated in sanatoria and given drugs and then they
recovered.
And now, you are infectious until you start taking your medication, and
then
if you faithfully take it, then you get better. And most recently, you
are
likely to get TB as an opportunistic infection when you are HIV+, and
it's
harder to shake off because your immune system is compromised.

Recently my niece had a group of friends round for supper and then was
diagnosed with TB the following day.  She had to inform everybody, and
they
had to be checked, but within 48 hours, when she was on medicine, she
didn't
have to tell/warn anybody. Astonishing for someone who regularly swims
5km
before breakfast!! If she had been Keats, her symptoms would have been
more
than a slight cough at night.

carol

On 15 October 2010 14:42, Leif Strandberg <leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com





wrote:





and TB

Is Karin Johanisson (Prof in Medical History, Univ of Uppsala, Sweden)
translated...

her books are really interesting

Leif
15 okt 2010 kl. 14.26 skrev Martin Packer:

   Lactose intolerance - just one example of cultural continuation of







biological evolution...

Martin

.
<Wade 2010 Human Culture, an Evolutionary Force.pdf>


On Oct 15, 2010, at 5:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

   I am intrigued Rod. You conclude from this interesting story that
the







body is not ("may not be") an artefact, but "virtual maps" within
the
brain
are? I presume because these neural structures are "constructed,"
whereas
other parts of the body are not?
What do you mean?

Andy

Rod Parker-Rees wrote:








In 'The body has a mind of its own' by Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew
Blakeslee (2007 Random House), there is a chapter which begins with
an
account of research by Dr Atsushi Iriki and colleagues in Japan.
This
research involved training monkeys to use rakes as tools to
retrieve
food
and then using arrays of microelectrodes implanted in their skulls
to
study
the visual receptive fields of visual-tactile cells in the
posterior
parietal cortex of the monkeys. What Iriki found was that these
visual-tactile cells, which usually responded to information only
in
a
region within the monkeys' arms length, began to respond to more
distant
information (within arm+rake's length) but ONLY when the monky was
using the
rake as a tool - when the mankey was passively holding the tool the
response
drew back to its normal range. The chapter goes on to describe
studies
in
virtual reality in which participants learn to control avatars
which
have
strikingly different physiology - e.g. a lobster - controlled by a
complex
code of combined body movements which is never shared with
participants,
they learn to control the movement of their avatar just by trial
and
error
but they soon become able to 'automate' the process - focusing on
what
they
want to do rather on what they have to do to do it.

Our bodies may not be artefacts but our cerebellar virtual maps of
how
our bodies work and what we can do with them surely are.

I have just started wearing varifocal glasses and am in the process
of
retraining my body's ways of seeing (learning to move my head and
neck
rather than just move my eyes) already I am finding that things
'stay
in
focus' more as my head and neck get my eyes into position without
me
having
to tell them where to go!

For me this links with the discussion about bodies and tools and
possibly extends (rake-like) beyond it - how much of the tool is
defined by
its form and how much by the cultural history of how, by whom,
when,
where
and for what it has been and could be used?

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 15 October 2010 06:02
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery

My claim is, David, not just that (for example) my fingers are
functionally artefacts because I use them to play the piano, but
also
they
are genetically artefacts because they are the products of art.
"Labour
created man himself" as old Fred said. If we are going to claim
that
thinking is artefact-mediated activity, then we must accept our
bodies
as
artefacts, or abandon other important definitions of artefact, as
mediator
of activity, material product of human labour and the substance of
culture.
We fashion our bodies for the purpose of constructing a culture
just
as
surely as we fashion our buildings, our domestic animals, our food
and
clothing and everything else.

You can define a word how you like, but the importance of realising
that
our bodies are products of human labour which we use as both
instruments and
symbols, just like our white canes and spectacles,  is demonstrated
by
intersubjectivists who simply overlook the role of artefacts as
mediators
altogether. In part this is possible because they subsume the human
body
into the notion of 'subject', something which also allows them to
scoot over
all sorts of tricky philosophical problems entailed in recognizing
the
active participation of subjectivity in what would otherwise be
simply
a
complex series of material interactions. The result,
contradictorily
is a
far worse Cartesian dualism than the one they tried to avoid.

No, I thought long and hard about this, and the conclusion is
inescapable: the human body is an artefact.

Andy
/ //// /

David Kellogg wrote:

   Sometimes I would really like to be a mosquito in the room when
Martin







is giving his course on developmental psychology. But I would
probably want
to bite the student who asked if the replacement of social
relations
in
language (e.g. discourse) by psychological ones (e.g. grammar) is
a
"fact"
or just one of Martin's ideas; the question strikes me as rather
more
bumbling and humbling.
Fortunately, I have my own Thursday night session, which this
semester
is all about systemic functional linguistics and conversation
analysis. Last
night we were discussing the difference between them, and I
pointed
out that
the systemic view is quite consistent with the idea of language as
an
artefact and the conversation analysis view is much less so.
Take, for example, the problem of repair. A teacher walks into a
classroom.
T: Good morning, everybody.
Ss: Good morning, everybody!
T: !!!!
The conversation is broken. But in order to repair it, the teacher
does
not pull over and stop. The teacher has to keep going. The teacher
has to
find out what exactly the kids mean, if anything (are they simply
repeating
what they heard, as seems likely, or are they including their
classmates in
their reply to the teacher?)
This means that even quite simple conversations (the sort we have
with
third graders) are quite gnarly and knobbled; they have
convolutions
and
introvolutions, knots and whorls and burls of negotiation.
   Conversations
exhibit very few of the genetic or structural of mechanical tools,
and in
fact only resemble "tools" only if we take a quite narrowly
functionalist
squint and presuppose a coinciding will that wields them. It even
seems to
me that they are misconstrued when we say that they are artefacts.
I think the Romantics, especially Herder, would agree with this
view:
I
think they would have been rather horrified at Andy's idea that a
body is an
artefact in the same sense as a tool is an artefact.  They would
point out
that it is not genetically so; the body is a natural product and
not
man
made. It is also not structurally so: unlike other artefacts, much
of
its
structure reflects self-replication and not other-fabrication.  Of
course,
we may say that a body is FUNCTIONALLY like an artefact, because
we
use it
as a tool in various ways. But if we privilege this particular
interpretation of the body over the genetic, or the structural,
account, it
seems to me we get a pretty functionalist view of things. A body
involved in
a conversation is not an artefact; it's more like a work of art,
and
the
gratuitous and organic complexity of conversation is an indelible
sign of
this.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Thu, 10/14/10, Paula M Towsey <paulat@johnwtowsey.co.za>
wrote:


From: Paula M Towsey <paulat@johnwtowsey.co.za>
Subject: RE: [xmca] Tom Toolery
To: ablunden@mira.net, "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" <
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, October 14, 2010, 5:40 AM


Hello Andy-of-the-5-o'clock-shadow

Yet it's a different kind of gnashing of teeth (and wailing and
weeping)
when the baboons at Third Bridge get stuck into the tinned
supplies...

Paula



_________________________________
Paula M Towsey
PhD Candidate: Universiteit Leiden
Faculty of Social Sciences



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 14 October 2010 13:19
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery

My answer, Paula: yes.
My body, with its various parts, is an artefact; according to
context,
symbol or tool.
My face and my 5 o'clock shadow is a symbol just as much as the
shirt
I
wear. My teeth a tool just as much as a can opener.

Andy

Paula M Towsey wrote:

   For some inexplicable reason while watching Mike's blind man
with

a







stick video, I remembered smsing Carol with a quirky question: if
a
researcher without a knife is trying to open an airline packet of
peanuts,
and she resorts to using her teeth, what tool is she using?

Though, perhaps the better question would be - is she using a
tool.?


_________________________________

Paula M Towsey

PhD Candidate: Universiteit Leiden

Faculty of Social Sciences



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