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[xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology



Begin forwarded message:

> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> 
> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
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> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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> Guest Editors:
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> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
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> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
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> Victoria Southgate, University of London
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>           CALL FOR PAPERS
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>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
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> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of such abilities is that they involve “theory of mind” or “mindreading”: the ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds (i.e., to have concepts of “belief,” “desire,” etc.) and the contents of such mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any sort of mindreading.
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> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a variety of nonverbal tasks — e.g., the “violation of expectation” paradigm and anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more active responses —suggest that young infants can understand others’ goals, intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age are selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they are able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years of age.
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> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading approaches to basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their theoretical commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how they propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from human developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include but are not limited to:
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> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
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> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they must be operating with a “theory of mind” or the equivalent?
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> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early social cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
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> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play in mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between representational and non-representational approaches?
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> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
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> Invited contributors
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> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
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> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
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> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
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> Important dates
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> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
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> -       Target publication date: July 2011
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> How to submit
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> Prospective authors should register at: https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select “Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives” as an article type to submit a manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website: http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
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> About the journal
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> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN: 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
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>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
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> Editorial board
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> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: Roberto Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU. 
> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; Ned Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny, UCL; Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli, Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; Barry C. Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia; Timothy Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
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> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> Henry Wellcome Building
> Birkbeck, University of London
> Malet Street
> London, WC1E 7HX.
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