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Re: [xmca] Question



I seem to have entirely lost the context here, and as someone else saed, it depends on who said it. But if it is in the CHAT tradition, an "ideal action" would be, I guess, an action which has effect only thanks to symbolic content, e.g. saying something.

Andy

Larry Purss wrote:
Mike

The term "ideal action" triggered a response about "anticipatory action" or
"imaginary action" as  forms of "reflective action"
It is action which coordinates  POSIIBLE  ALTERNATIVE responses to a
particular societal situation.
I'm not sure how these notions are linked up with "ideal action" BUT
anticipatory action is "real" in the sense that it ACTUALLY MODIFIES SOCIAL
ACTS.

Larry

2010/8/2 mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>

I do not know origin of this, but suspect it could be early Vygotsky.
Sometimes it seems to me that some words, perezhivanie one of them,
activity
another, appear sometimes in LSV as technical terms, sometimes as everyday
terms.

If we use a deweyesque notion of experience, i find no problem in talking
about consciousness as the experience of experriencing.

I am still puzzling over the meaning of an ideal action (!).
mike

2010/8/2 Elina Lampert-Shepel <ellampert@gmail.com>

I agree with mathematical logic, Achilles, but I do not think we talk
about
reflex here.
Elina

2010/7/31 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>










Elina, Bela, Mike,

I had read this as something as a "duplicated" character of
consciousness... "Perezhivanie (nominative singular ok?) perezhivanii
(genitive plural, ok?)" - this is a "second" kind of perezhivanie, "a
perezhivanie from(of?) other perezhivanya"... I guess I could prefer
the
mathematic metaphor of "second potency" (x^2) than "duplication" (x.2),
but
this is not the more important... You can remember that Vygotsky also
defined consciousness as "reflex (nominative) of a reflex (genitive)"
too,
is not correct? Than, the "reflexiveness" of consciousness, i.e., its
"duplicated character" is justly represented by this "x of x"... even
x=
reflex or x=perezhivanie... spite perezhivanie and reflex must be not
the
same in may naive opinion... But I'm not so sure about the Russian
words
for
"reflex" in Pavlovian meaning of the term, and the word "reflection" as
"image" (obraz???)... This two are the same? Of course one thing is I
have a
perezhivanie from given reality, and another thing is I have another
perezhivanie from that perezhivanie that I have from the first reality,
this
is what Vygotsky was calling "consciousness", in my naive
understanding...
This put in discussion the "meta-character" of cognition AND affective
process, in consciousness social (semioticaly mediated) genesis...


Thank you.

Achilles.

***************************************
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2010 07:40:19 -0700
Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
From: lchcmike@gmail.com
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

Not to cause confusion, Bella, but I read it as follows:

Consciousness is perizhivania of perezhivania, in exactly the same way
that
perezhivanie is simply the (crux of/sut') perezhivania of objects.
Awkward
to translate, but i can't see why reflection gets in there.
Seems to change the meaning to introduce reflection.
mike
2010/7/30 Bella Kotik-Friedgut <bella.kotik@gmail.com>

"Сознание есть переживание переживаний, точно таким же образом, как
переживания просто суть переживания предметов."

My translation of the meaning would be: consciousness is a reflection
of
experiences the same way as just experience are simple reflection of
objects

2010/7/31 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>

Thank you Elina, for your solidarity in respect my own "thinking in
pronounced voice"...

See, I have a question:  "Сознание есть переживание переживаний
[soznanie
-
est' perezhivaniye perezhivaniy]" (Vygotsky, 1925)...
["consciousness
is
a
'living through' of a 'living through'"(?)]. Can we talk about
consciousness
as something like a "meta-perezhivanie", in this case? :-)

If so, this will be included in "meta-cognition"? Or meta-cognition
can
be
included in this meta-"affective-cognitive unit"? I am not so
actualized
in
the contemporary conceptual definitions of "cognition", I guess...
this
is
because I am asking for.

Thank you very much.

Achilles.

P.S. Quote from Vigotski, 1925:

<<Отдать отчет и значит перевести одни рефлексы в другие.
Бессознательное,
психическое и означает рефлексы, не передающиеся в другие системы.
Возможны
бесконечно разнообразные степени сознательности, т. е.
взаимодействия
систем, включенных в механизм действующего рефлекса. Сознание своих
переживаний и означает не что иное, как имение их в качестве
объекта
(раздражителя) для других переживаний. Сознание есть переживание
переживаний, точно таким же образом, как переживания просто суть
переживания
предметов. Но именно способность рефлекса (переживания предмета)
быть
раздражителем (предметом переживания) для нового рефлекса -- этот
механизм
сознательности и есть механизм передачи рефлексов из одной системы
в
другую.
Это приблизительно то же, что В. М. Бехтерев называет подотчетными
и
неподотчетными рефлексами. >> (VYGOTSKY, L. S. (1925/2005) Soznanie
kak
problema psikhologuii povedeniia. Iz knigui ______. Psikhologuia
razvitiia
tcheloveka. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Smisl; Eksmo. - s. 30).
**************************************

Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2010 14:11:38 -0400
Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
From: ellampert@gmail.com
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

Dear Achilles,
 Thank you very much for the contribution. There can't be an
interruption
as
it is a polylogical space I suppose.If we connect the Vygotskian
description
of development of self/ "ya" in the ontogenesis, then it points to
the
important connections between reflexivity and self consciousness.
 - Crisis of seven years. Generalization of "perezivaniya" or as
Vygotsky
calls it logic of feelings. The dual position of the child in play
(
Imaginary situation:" I am a soldier in pain as I was wounded " and
Real
situation: My Mom is calling me for dinner and I am hungry) allows
the
child
to reflect on one of this "perezivanij' as the other, as object of
reflection. In the process of the crisis of seven years as it is
noted
in
your last quote, the child because of the ability to distinguish
external
and internal, evaluate her own success and failure develops
self-esteem
and
self -evaluation. It seems to me that reflection as a psychological
tool
of
experiencing imaginary and real position in play as well as the
psychological tool that helps the child to look at herself as the
other
is
the condition for the development of the initial forms of
self-evaluation
and self esteem through the crises of seven years.

Interestingly enough in the research of Alexander Dusavitskii it
was
argued
that when elementary school students in Davydov-El'konin classrooms
were
asked to evaluate themselves, they would always evaluate their work
lower
that it was, because the self-evaluation that emerged through the
crisis
of
seven years was not developed in the context of learning activity.
How
to
evaluate my own learning was "terra incognita" for them.

 *But the question is what is the role of "perezivaniye' in the
development
of self-consciousness? * "Perezhivaniye" captures the unity of
affect
and
intellect and this unity seems very important for the development
of
self-consciousness.

These are my thoughts so far...




2010/7/30 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>

Hi Mike and Elina,
This will not so deep as all you are talking about, but when I
was
reading
here I remember of your discussion, I made a little connection,
because
an
"auto-consciousness" influx for "auto-concept" (see the text
about
the
Crisis of Seven Years), and the first consciousness of child own
perezhivaniia, etc... Then this influx for me to the problem of
the
concept
of our own "Ya" ... Please if this could seems much
extemporaneous,
by
my
part, delete this message... But, let me try:
I - From Slovar' L.S. Vigoskogo (ed. A.A. Leont'ev, 2007):
Я - Понятие о <<Я>> развивается у
ребенка из понятия о других. (31.1, 163) Тот факт, что с
дошкольного
возраста человек начинает по-мнить
последовательность событий, -- это то, что
старые психологи называли единством и тождеством <<Я>>. (5.2,
130)
<...> ребенок учит-ся в игре своему <<Я>>: создавая фиктивные
точки
идентификации -- центры <<Я>>: irde социальная
природа <<Я>>. Ср. Rollenspiel (ролевая игра). <...> ребенок
имеет
уже <<Я>>, но не осознает его, имеет внутренние процессы, но не
сознает
их --
в игре prise de conscience о себе и своем сознании <...>
Обозначение
<<Я>> в
игре, осознание мысли, <<я хочу>> -- в игре <."> Парадокс <<Я>>:
в
игре
то
радует, что я хочу,
эгоцентри-ческая деятельность; но здесь же ограничение изнутри от
своего
мо-ментального
<<Я>>. (23.1, 291)

См. Возраст, Игра, Понятие
See: "prise de conscience о себе"

The actual references:
* 33.1: Эйдетика // Хрестоматия по ощущению и восприятию. М.,
1975.
С.
275-281 (1930)
* 5.2: Обучение и развитие в дошкольном
возрасте // Выготский. М.,1.С. 123-134
(1933)
* 23.1: Из записок-конспекта Л.С.
Выготского к лекциям по психоло-гии детей дошкольного возраста //
Эльконин
Д.Б. Психология игры. М., 1978. С. 289-294 (1933)
************************

II - From "Seven Years Crisis" (Tom IV):
"В 7-летнем возрасте мы имеем дело с началом возникновения такой
структуры
переживаний, когда ребенок начинает понимать, что значит <<я
радуюсь>>,
<<я
огорчен>>, <<я сердит>>, <<я добрый>>, <<я злой>>, т. е. у него
возникает
осмысленная ориентировка в собственных переживаниях. Точно так,
как
ребенок
3 лет открывает свое отношение с другими людьми, так семилетка
открывает
сам
факт своих переживаний. Благодаря этому выступают некоторые
особенности,
характеризующие кризис семи лет.
1. Переживания приобретают смысл (сердящийся ребенок понимает,
что
он
сердит), благодаря этому у ребенка возникают такие новые
отношения
к
себе,
которые были невозможны до обобщения переживаний. Как на
шахматной
доске,
когда с каждым ходом возникают совершенно новые связи между
фигурками,
так и
здесь возникают совсем новые связи между переживаниями, когда они
приобретают известный смысл. Следовательно, весь характер
переживаний
ребенка к 7 годам перестраивается, как перестраивается шахматная
доска,
когда ребенок научился играть в шахматы.
2. К кризису семи лет впервые возникает обобщение переживаний,
или
аффективное обобщение, логика чувств. Есть глубоко отсталые дети,
которые
на
каждом шагу переживают неудачи: обычные дети играют, ненормальный
ребенок
пытается присоединиться к ним, но ему отказывают, он идет по
улице,
и
над
ним смеются. Одним словом, он на каждом шагу проигрывает. В
каждом
отдельном
случае у него есть реакция на собственную недостаточность, а
через
минуту
смотришь -- он совершенно доволен собой. Тысячи отдельных неудач,
а
общего
чувства своей малоценности нет, он не обобщает того, что
случалось
уже
много
раз. У ребенка школьного возраста возникает обобщение чувств, т.
е.,
если
с
ним много раз случалась какая-то ситуация, у него" (page 379,
S.S.
Tom.
IV -
1984)
"возникает аффективное образование, характер которого так же
относится
к
единичному переживанию или аффекту, как понятие относится к
единичному
восприятию или воспоминанию. Например, у ребенка дошкольного
возраста
нет
настоящей самооценки, самолюбия. Уровень наших запросов к самим
себе,
к
нашему успеху, к нашему положению возникает именно в связи с
кризисом
семи
лет.
Ребенок дошкольного возраста любит себя, но самолюбия как
обобщенного
отношения к самому себе, которое остается одним и тем же в разных
ситуациях,
но самооценки как таковой, но обобщенных отношений к окружающим и
понимания
своей ценности у ребенка этого возраста нет. Следовательно, к 7
годам
возникает ряд сложных образований, которые и приводят к тому, что
трудности
поведения резко и коренным образом меняются, они принципиально
отличны
от
трудностей дошкольного возраста.
Такие новообразования, как самолюбие, самооценка, остаются, а
симптомы
кризиса (манерничанье, кривляние) преходящи. В кризисе семи лет
благодаря
тому, что возникает дифференциация внутреннего и внешнего, что
впервые
возникает смысловое переживание, возникает и острая борьба
переживаний.
Ребенок, который не знает, какие взять конфеты -- побольше или
послаще,
не
находится в состоянии внутренней борьбы, хотя он и колеблется.
Внутренняя
борьба (противоречия переживаний и выбор собственных переживаний)
становится
возможна только теперь. (etc.)"(page 380. S.S. Tom IV - 1984)
*********************
Well, here in this second quote, I'm no so insecure as about the
"concept
of Ya". Because I understand that there is something related to
your
discussion, in important ontogenetic terms... I only remain don't
contributing about the own "name" that you search for... But the
process
itself seems to be within the same semantic field.
Thank you, and forgive me the interruption.
Best wishes.Achilles,from Brazil
*************
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 21:03:45 -0400
Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
From: ellampert@gmail.com
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
CC:

Mike -
I can relate to a LOT of trouble. Both notions are used in many
different
ways in the contexts of development and learning. A few weeks
ago,
during
Vygotsky Summer School, Gennadiy Kravtsov and I had a long
conversation
about my cross-cultural research on reflection or as you say
"reflexia".
He
talked about reflection/reflexivity in the context of
"self-consciousness"
and we discussed reflexivity as a condition for the development
of
self-consciousness. He believes that the notion of
"self-consciousness"
(
that I distinguish from reflexivity) was never developed fully
in
cultural-historical tradition. Knowing that there is still lack
of
bridge
between Russian and the rest of the world cultural-historical
research,
I
wanted to learn whether there are studies that connect
reflection
(
"reflexia") and self-consciousness. It is interesting that you
mentioned
both "reflexia" and "self-consciousness' in the context of
meta-cognition.
It seems to me that learning activity theory conceptualized
reflection
as
a
metacognitive process, although Vygotsky never discussed it as
a
cognitive,
or metacognitive process. There is also an important language
difference,
Russian language doesn't have an everyday use of the word
reflection,
it
only exists as a philosophical or psychological notion.

Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of
higher
psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky
meant
by
function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and
as
we
discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-),
but
Gennadi
and I believe that reflection and will are not higher
psychological
functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for
the
ISCAR
symposium on these issues.

In any case, I was just wondering if there are studies on the
development
of
self-consciousness and/or reflexivity that are not necessarily
rooted
in
Russian philosophical thought.

As you can see, I am in the state of questioning, so directions
for
further
questioning will be highly appreciated.

Elina

On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 7:49 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com
wrote:
Elina--

I spent a great many sessions with Russian grad students who
were
interested
in this issue. We had a LOT of trouble with the fact that
there
seem
to
be
a
whole lot of words that appear to refer in overlapping ways
with
"self-consciousness."  Terms in the family of reflectivity,
reflexivity
came
up a lot among the Russian students, but they were trying
hard
to
figure
out
what the right English words were for whatever Russian term
was
being
used.
Not just "samo-soznanie" was used in their conversations as
well,
with
meta-cognition slipping in along with "reflexia."

I am unsure what to suggest. What is occasion for the
question?
mike

On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 9:14 AM, Larry Purss <
lpscholar2@gmail.com
wrote:
Elina

I wanted to express my appreciation of the quote you sign
off
with
by
Tagore.  It  captures the central imperative of
foregrounding
 context
and
traditions in the emergence of self-consciousness [the
string]
BUT
that
without the string there is no violin.
I find myself often reflecting on the implications this
perspective
elaborates.

One suggestion I would like to suggest on the emergence of
self-consciousness is Andy's vimeo podcast on the
Historical
roots
of
cultural-historical theory. [Hegel is central]

Larry
On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 6:23 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel
<ellampert@gmail.com>wrote:

Hi, everyone,
I would appreciate if anyone can recommend publications
on
self-consciousness in cultural-historical tradition. I am
interested in
any
references on this issue.
 Thanks in advance,
 Elina

--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist
one
end
of
it
and
it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a
violin
string
is
supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it
in
my
violin
and
tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a
violin
string.
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore
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--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end
of
it
and
it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin
string
is
supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my
violin
and
tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a
violin
string.
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore
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--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of
it
and
it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string
is
supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my
violin
and
tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin
string.
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore

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--
Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut

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--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of it and
it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string is
supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my violin and
tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin string.
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore

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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss


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