If Peter M was reading all this, what would he say? Or Jean? Will
whatever they had to say come through in a review on MCA?
Khwoo nose?
mike
On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Mike, what particular issues do your Russians raise against your
thought that zopeds extend beyond schooling:
* age levels?
* trained teachers?
* learning as the leading activity?
* instituional framework?
* formal structure of schooling?
Andy
mike cole wrote:
Have these very stimulating ideas been taken up by Minerva or
the Owl,
David?
I turns out that in the past week, while not observing Iguanas,
I have been
reading Brothers Karamazov. Perezhivanie land. And thinking
about issues of
learning outside of schools, historically or culturally "before
schools,"
where issues of emotion, broadly construed, come to the fore.
I have been excoriated by Russians for thinking that the idea of
a zoped
extends beyond schooling, but this line of discussion and the
way it has
been re-posed in the discussion brings starkly to mind the kinds
of emotions
that kids ordinarily experience in classrooms. How often, under what
conditions, could these emotions be considered conducive to
development or
the creation of a zoped?
Sometime, but can we generalize about the conditions?
Does Franklin in the blocks.... an example from a preschool, count?
And in the second language learning conditions that you so
eloquently
and intricately seek to instruct us with?
This line of discussion seems important, even if i cannot tie it
to all the
threads swirling around xmca's version of Pandora.
mike
On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 4:37 PM, David Kellogg
<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>wrote:
A while ago someone (perhaps the author himself) circulated
Michael G.
Levykh's remarkable "The Affective Establishment and
Maintenance of
Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development" (Eductional Theory
58 [1]: 83-101)
on this list, but I didn't get around to reading it until
this weekend.
It seems to me that the paper makes three points that are
germane to the
"Play" thread (and also to Beth and Robert's paper, if that
is still under
discussion), but FAILS to make one point which I think is
really important
enough to change the subject line (besides which the "Owl of
Minerva" is
really a joke that probably only Andy fully understands even
though I was
the one who originally made it; I often make jokes that I
don't really
understand, just to see if I will laugh).
First of all, Michael's paper points out that the fashion
for "extending"
the ZPD in an "affective" direction is just reinventing the
wheel; the ZPD
never excluded affective factors in the first place, and in
the first
chapter of Thinking and Speech we are clearly told that
affective factors
are part parcel of every meaningful word and gesture. They
are an enabling
condition--nay, a precondition--not only for communicative
speech but also
for reflective verbal thinking.
Secondly, Michael's paper differentiates between shared
emotions and
private ones, and argues that it's really not enough to have
the latter in
our classrooms. So there is an important sense in which
every successful
class is an artwork, that is, a work of social emotion. He
gives an example
from my own field, foreign language learning, on pp. 98-99
(and in fact the
example he gives, of learners (re)producing some of Carolyn
Graham's jazz
chants in a doctor's ofice, is both positive and a negative
example of
this).
Thirdly, Michael's paper applies this idea of shared emotion
to the
distinction between "obuchenie" on the one hand and the various
misinterpretations, both teaching-learning (Soviet) and
learning-leaning
(Western) given Vygotsky's teachings on teaching. The key
and unexplored
precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the
mistranslation
"instruction" is the creation of shared emotion. The key and
unexplored
precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the
mistranslation
"learning" (which Mike points out in his MCA editorial) is
the sharing of
propositional ATTITUDES and not simply the sharing of
propositions.
This is powerful stuff, and reading it I was quite envious,
because I
always fancied that I was going to be the one who argued
that Vygotsky had
in mind a whole 'nother side to his work, a set of higher
EMOTIONAL
functions that included concepts such as fairness, justice,
solidarity,
altruism...you know, the sort of emotional function that
makes it more
necessary to develop somebody else's idea than to be first
in line to take
credit for a new one.
These higher emotional functions, that have both an ethical
(altruistic) and an aesthetic (realist) element are as much
the foundation
of moral and artistic education as logical memory or
conceptual thinking are
the foundations of science and mathematical education. They
are also every
bit as much culturally produced and socially shared.
But I am not at all convinced that they are esssentially
interpersonal,
that is, that they can arise from what we in Korean call the
"Neo-Na"
(I-thou) or "Jugeoni-Padgeoni" (Give and Accept)
relationship between
individuals, not even generalized into an abstract
universal. I don't think
that they can simply be arrived at by a kind of Piagetian
reversibility in
relations (wash my back and I'll wash yours, as we say in
the Korean
sauna).
Even Bakhtin, who in many places seems to utterly reduce the
sociocultural
to the interpersonal, emphasizes that it is the JOURNEY to
the other's point
of view, and above all the RETURN which is transformative.
In Moby Dick,
Starbuck remonstrates with Ahab, protesting that the whale
is only a dumb
creature, and to hate the animal is blasphemous, because it
means treating
it as man's equal. Ahab responds by making Vygotsky's
distinction between
empirical, everyday concepts and scientific ones:
"Hark ye yet again--the little lower layer. All visible
objects, man,are
but as pasteboard masks. But in each event--in the living
act, the undoubted
deed--there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts
forth the mouldings
of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.If man will
strike, strike
through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except
by thrusting
through the wall?"
Ahab realizes that by his own argument, he could be
committing another type
of blasphemy; the white whale might be SUPERhuman rather
than subhuman, and
he, Ahab, might be engaged in a personal war with God.
So, like a dextrous politician, Ahab shifts his argument:
"Now it's
personal", he tells Starbuck.
"Talk not to me of blasphemy,man; I'd strike the sun if it
insulted me. For
could the sun do that,then could I do the other; since there
is ever a sort
of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations."
The word "jealousy" brings him up short. And then he ends,
rather lamely,
thus:
"But not my master, man,is even that fair play. Who's over
me? Truth hath
no confines."
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Sun, 3/21/10, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
<mailto:packer@duq.edu>> wrote:
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010, 3:41 PM
Larry,
This is what is called, in hermeneutic theory, the
characteristic of
"projection." All understanding of an object, event, or
situation, and hence
all interpretation (which is the articulation of
understanding) is its
projection, in three senses. First, in terms of a practical
project. Second,
as a projectile has been thrown forward from the past into
the future.
Third, it is projected onto a background (rather as a film
is 'projected' in
a screen), so that what shows itself is always in the terms
(loosely
speaking) that this background makes possible.
I don't know whether this will rid you of puzzlement! But
yes it's better
than crosswords.
Martin
On Mar 21, 2010, at 5:11 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
Martin, Andy, Luiz
Thank you for your reflections on tnis topic which I
have to admit leaves
me more puzzled than ever (but it is more interesting than
doing crossword
puzzles.
I wanted to add a few more thoughts from Ingrid Joseph's
notions on this
topic and the dimension of TIME in self-development.
She points out that polyvalent symbolic networks are
dynamic and FUTURE
oriented as social PERSPECTIVES and TIME are dynamically
interwoven.
The PRESENT as-IS functions as an intersection BETWEEN
as-WAS and future
as-if-could-be states. STABILITY of meaning is provided by
the fact that
that the past is projected into the future, whereas CHANGE
results from the
TRANSFORMATION of the past by the future as-if-could-be.
Ingrid states,
"possible futures are nourished by the past, but at the same
time the past
is changed by the ANTICIPATED future" (Crites 1986 as
quoted by Ingrid,
1998 p. 192) Through this DOUBLE MOVEMENT in the present
AS-IS, the present
moves towards its immediate future, and becomes a NEW
PRESENT. and the
process begins again.
If the role of either past (as-was) or future
(as-if-could be) becomes
DOMINANT in a one sided manner, sel-development becomes
blocked and movement
becomes stuck (emotions also become stuck)
Food for continuing thought
Larry
----- Original Message -----,
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010 11:51 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
To: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>,
"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
Big topic, Andy, and I can't afford to get
distracted from
trying to figure out LSV on concepts! But it has to
be said that
science is hermeneutic too. There is not a single
science that
is not concerned with understanding traces, signs,
indices, even
symbols. That's to say, science is all about "taking
something
*as* something" (as Heidegger put it) and so "saying
something
of something," (as Aristotle had it, in his On
Interpretation).
Martin
On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
A while ago I was obliged to deal with the work
of Roy
Bhaskar. What Bhaskar does is insist on the ontology
of natural
science in every aspect of life, including for
example, literary
criticism and cultural anthropology. The editor
makes a nice
point with an anecdote: he is at a seminar on J-P
Sartre. A
student in the audience calls out "Do you really
think that
someone called J-P Sartre existed?" Obivously an
inappropriate
application of relativism, which then opens the way
for his own
dogmatism.>
I was drawn to the conclusion that it is
dogmatism to insist
on one true ontology (here I mean ontology the general,
classical, not the Sartrean sense) for all
activities at all
times. Natural science is an activity which by its
very nature
must assume that there is a natural world out there
whose
properties and forms can be known. This is not true
of any
activity where reality is in a significant degree
formed by and
interconnected with, human activity and in the case
of the
natural sciences breaks down in certain
circumstances at certain
times.>
So I don't accept that naturalistic ontology is
a *myth* of
the natural sciences. It is an essential part of natural
science. But it is not universal. It is just as
dogmatic to
insist on hermeneutic relativism in natural science
as it is to
insist on naturalistic realism in hermeneutics, etc.
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Larry,
Yes, it has for a long time been part of the
myth of modern
science that it discloses things as they 'really
are,' not as
they 'appear' to be. LSV falls into this way of
speaking (or at
least his translators do). The most powerful analyses of
science, philosophical, historical and sociological,
in my
opinion, show that it is thoroughly enchanted.
Science involves
seeing (and thinking of) things 'as if.' So Kuhn
explained
paradigms in terms of 'seeing as' - a duck or a
rabbit. So every
introduction I have seen of gravity in relativity
theory uses
the image of space sagging like a rubber sheet
around masses,
even though this image is inadequate once one gets
deeper into
the math. Seeing space 'as if' it were rubber is a
necessary
step into this branch of science. Each science
has/is its own
imaginary.>> Martin
On Mar 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
Luiz
That was an interesting thread you sent
on play and games
and the tension between the concepts.
It is a fascinating topic.
I want to bring into the conversation a
fascinating
perspective on the place of the fictional and
imaginary in play
(and other activity).
First for some context.
I've always been curious about the
antinomy often reflected
in the tension between imagination/reality and the
literature on
modernity as the disenchantment of the world and the
reaction to
this privleging the as-IS reality over the as-IF
reality.
There is a counter literature on finding ways to
re-enchant the world.
Often science is seen as the villan who
is responsible for
the loss of the as-IF reality, as children move
beyond playful
imagination into the real world.
Piaget's notions of animism as
indicating immature thinking.
INGRID E. JOSEPHS takes a radically
different perspective on
the tension between the imaginary as-IF
constructions and the
figure-ground type relation to as-IS reality.
She wrote an article in HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 1198, Volume 41,
pages 180-195 which explains very clearly this
alternative
interpretation of the as-IS and as-IF dialectic and
how it
infuses meaning with e-motion and explains the
process of
Vygotsky's internalization and Mead's I-ME dialectic.
Following is a quick summary of Ingrid's
perspective on the
imaginary in our devlopment.
Symbol formation implies a TRANSCENDENCE
of the here-and-now
as-IS world by construction of the imaginary as-IF
world.
Ingrid's standpoint is an extension of Hans
Vaihinger's [1911-
1986] "philosophy of the "AS-IF" as his notion of
FICTIONALISM
as an independent version of PRAGMATISM. (as an
aside Alfred
Adler said this book transformed his life).
Vaihinger believed as-If thinking was
foundational for
scientific reasoning.
Ingrid makes a further distinction
between static
nondevelopmental and dynamic/developmental accounts
of as-
IF. "BEING as-if" is static, whereas
"BEING-AS-IF-COULD-
BE" is dynamic. She points out this is similar to
Bretherton's
distinction of AS-IF and WHAT-IF. In dynamic
notions, the as-IF
is a step in the process of forward oriented
preadaptation to
the next MOMENTARY context. Development is based on
as-IF types
of apperception as each person participates in their own
development. Rather than being MORE adaptive or
BETTER Ingrid's
position is that developmental transformations cannot be
prejudged before the act. Whether it is better or
worse is an
evaluative question.
In summary imagination always begins in
the known world of
present and past and then one's horizon of
understanding is
stretched into the realm of the as-IF.. Ingrid
points out this
notion of as-IF is close to Cole's [1992, 1995]
notions of
personal duration. Ingrid states, "In imagination,
not only do
present, past, and future become MUTUALLY RELATED (and
constructed), but both the person and world are
transformed." p.184
Now to the more specific topic of
SYMBOLIC PLAY that is
being explored on this thread. Piaget understood
play as pure
assimilation that is necessary until developmentally
the child
can transcend this immature level of reality and with
development SUBORDINATE the as-IF reality by the
rational
logical, and DECENTERED modes of entering reality.
The as-
If is not ascribed any PRODUCTIVE future oriented
function in
development. In contrast the position Ingrid (and Cole,
Vygotsky, Mead,) are elaborating is that the
AS-IF-COULD-BE
operates throughout the lifespan.
[Note] I'm emailing this section because
my software
sometimes crashes
Larry
----- Original Message -----
From: Wagner Luiz Schmit
<mcfion@gmail.com <mailto:mcfion@gmail.com>>
Date: Thursday, March 18, 2010 8:11 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl
of Minerva
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
I even didn't had time to read all
e-mails (lots and lots
of work to
do), but games and development is
exactly what i want to
study in my
doctorship.
Do you heard about narratology
David? this was used to
study and analisegames for a while, and them other
thing called
ludology emerged...
Take a look at this article:
LUDOLOGY MEETS NARRATOLOGY:
Similitude and differences between
(video)games and narrative.
http://www.ludology.org/articles/ludology.htm
this is my two cents contribution to
the discussion... and
i'm very very
interested too in this
rational/irrational discussion
too... but i don't
have much to contribute now... Only
that William James
already was
debating this =P (being a teacher of
history of Psychology
is very
usefull)
Wagner Luiz Schmit
INESUL - Brazil
Em Ter, 2010-03-16 às 18:13 -0700,
David Kellogg escreveu:
Sorry, everybody!
I wrote:
One of my grads tried to
find the point at which a
story definitively passes over into
a game, and I said it
was a little like trying to find the point where talk
definitively passes over into talk. It is there, but
we always
find texts in talk, and talk in texts, no matter
which side of
the divide we may find ourselves on.
I meant to write "it's a little
like trying to find the
point
where talk passes over into TEXT".
Halliday remarks
somewhere that scientific linguistics didn't really
start until
the invention of the tape recorder.
I was always puzzled by that
remark until I realized that
until the invention of the tape
recorder, TEXT was
synonymous with writing and TALK was synonymous with
speech, and
only people like Bakhtin and Vygotsky knew that
there was a much
deeper, underlying difference having to do with
pastness and
presentness, finalizeability and unfinalizedness.
(When we look at Piaget's work
on conservation it is quite
a
while before we realize how
dependent on VISUALS it is. For
the child, sound is not conserved at all, and of
course neither
is time. It is only with the discovery of language
that the
child can imagine the conservation of sound at all.)
I think that the distinction
between text and discourse is
really the fast moving line between
stories and games that
we want: the story is past and the game is present,
the story is
finalizedness and the game is unfinalized and inherently
unpredictable. So the story is a text, and the game
is an
ongoing discourse.
I think, Andy, that in a game
the problem is not autnomy
per
se. It's autonomy for a purpose, and
purposes are almost by
definition not only beyond the self but even beyond
the present
moment (and this is why Mike is so right to point
out that EVERY
act of culture or even private imagination has an
implicit
notion of "the good life" in it).
Similarly, I don't think
Vygotsky ever prizes volition for
its
own sake; it's always the freedom to
produce and to create
and to imagine "the good life" and to master the
irrational
forces which deprive life of that meaning, including
those found
within the self. It is in that sense that, yes, life
is a game:
it is meaningful through and through and to the very
end. Not, I
think, what the existentialists had in mind!
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of
Education
Wittgenstein claimed that there
is no overt over-arching
and external trait between games
(e.g. a common functional
"motive" or a "goal"). When we read Vygotsky's play
lectures, we
find TWO common points: viz. gratuitous difficulty
and guile-
less deceit, the abstract rule and
the imaginary situation.
But one is always hidden
when the other is abroad.
After all, Wittgenstein's argument
was only that there is
no CLEARLY VISIBLE over-arching trait. And
Vygotsky's reply is
that if the essence of things were visible on the
surface, as
overt motive, or aim, or goal, why then no scientific
explanation would ever be required for anything. His
explanation
of play is not an empiricist-functionalist but a
historical,
genetically, deterministic one, and the owl of
Minerva flies
only at nightfall.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of
Education
--- On *Mon, 3/15/10, Andy
Blunden
/<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>/*
wrote:> >
From: Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialects of
Development- Sameroff
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
Date: Monday, March 15,
2010, 5:33 PM
Way out of my depth in
discussing
play, but here is my take
on "what is the motivation
for play?"
I don't think we can or want to
ascribe a motivation for
participating in play *in
general*.
I.e., the question of
"why does a child play?" cannot
sensibly be answered by the
child. But this still
leaves the
question of the motivation
for any particular play
activity:
what is it that is
motivating a child when
they play?
It seems to me that every
action a
child takes can be
explicable in terms of its
being
part of a project, and the
"Why are you doing that?"
question
gets the same kind of
answer as it would for an
adult at work.
A different kind of
explanation is
required for why a child
is drawn to participate in
what is
after all an "imaginary"
project, then gun does not fire
bullets, the money is not
coin of the realm, etc. I
think in
answering the question at
that level we look at
problems the
child faces in being
exlcuded from the real
world and
their attempts to overcome
that. I don't know. But
from the
beginning a child it trying
to extricate themselves
from the
trap of childishness.
Andy
mike cole wrote:
Your helixes/helices seemed
appropriate to the discussion, Martin.
XXX-history is cultural-
historical genesis. And, as Steve
suggested,
the twisted rope of many
strands may be at the end of the
rainbow of
promises.
I have been pondering David
Ke's question about the
object/objective/motivation
for play. It came together in my
thinking with
Yrjo's metaphor of being
always "just over the horizon" and
its dual
material and ideal nature,
most recently mentioned by
Wolf-Michael. Might it
be the dream of being
coordinated with a world entirely
consistent with
one's own dreams? A world,
extending, as Leslie White put it,
that extends
from infinity to infinity,
in both directions?
probably not, just
wondering.
mike
On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 2:55
PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
<mailto:packer@duq.edu>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>>
wrote:
Larry,
I didn't mean to detract
from the discussion with my playful
helices. I
haven't found time
yet to
read Sameroff's article, so I don't
know if he is
proposing that there
is an
antimony between nature and nurture
in human
development, or in our
*conceptions* of development. I took
Mike
to be
suggesting, in his
recent
message, that when we pay attention to
culture we
can transcend that
antimony, since culture is a 'second
nature' that
provides nurture,
and since
culture is the medium in which human
brains and
bodies grow, and
since all
nurture offered to the growing child
is mediated
by culture, and since
culture has been transforming human
nature
throughout
anthropogenesis
through its
selective evolutionary pressures.
Eric, yes, I should have
added phylogenesis, not just biological
evolution.
What then is the "XX-
genesis" term for history?
Martin
On Mar 14, 2010, at 9:55
PM, Larry Purss wrote:
It seems the
double or
triple helix is a significant way of
trying to
configure dynamic
processes. However, what the particular
specific double
helix referred to in the
article is pointing to is a very
specific tension
BETWEEN two specific
constructs "Nature" and "nurture". The
current debates
raging about
neuroscience
on the one side and the tension with
relational
notions of
development on
the other hand (ie the
self-other-
object/representation triangle)
suggest a dialectical
tension
which the article
says may
be INHERENT to development. To me
this is asking
a question about how the
mind constructs significant social
representations.
What is specific
about this particular double helix
is the
HISTORICAL
salience of this
SPECIFIC
ANTIMONY through centuries of dialogue
and theory.
My question is "Is there
significance to the extended duration
of this
specific antimony
through
centuries. Does this historical
engagement with
the specific notions of
nature and nurture have relevance
for CHAT
discussions. This is
not to say other double or triple helix
models may not
have more
explanatory power
but that is not the specific
question asked in
the article. The
question
being asked specifically is if this
specific
nature/nurture
antinomy is
inherent to the notion of
development? Other
double or triple helix's
could be conceptualized within the
nature/nurture
antinomy but the
question I
believe is being asked is how relevant a
dialectical (or
alternatively dialogically)
nature/nurture
antinomy is to
our primary
(ontological??)
notions of Development as a social
representation.
When I read the
article,
it seemed to capture the tension we are
exploring about the
place
of neuroscience in our theories of
development.
For some scholars
one side
or the other side is in ascendence and
historically one side or
the other is in ascendence. What the
article is
asking is if we must
"INTEGRATE" what is often seen as in
opposition and
realize
nature/nurture is
in a figure/ground type of relational
pattern
(like the ying/yang
visual
representation) and the movement
BETWEEN the two
positions is basic to
development.> > >>> Do others
have thoughts on the specific question Arnie has
asked in his
article about the
historical dynamic of the nature/nurture
antinomy in
developmental
theories as
well as in ontological and cultural
historical
development. This
question
speaks to me about the possible
relevance of
Moscovici's theory of
social representations.
One alternative
answer is
to generate other double or triple
helix models
which may become social
representations over time as they are
debated in a
community of inquiry but
the article as written is pointing to a
very
salient social
representation within our Western
tradition. Does
that
recognition of its
historical roots change how we view this
particular
antinomy?
Larry
----- Original
Message ----
-
From: Martin Packer
<packer@duq.edu
<mailto:packer@duq.edu>> >
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>>>
>
Date: Sunday, March 14, 2010 4:59 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca]
Dialects of Development- Sameroff
To: "eXtended Mind,
Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>>
>>>
That's
right, Steve,
though I'm pretty sure I didn't see this
title until
after I made
the diagram. And of course Lewontin is
referring to
different
factors. And, also, of course, collagen
actually
does have a
triple-helix structure, which
Francis Crick
thought was more
interesting than the double helix of
DNA, but
which got
very little
attention.> > >>>>
Martin
On Mar 14,
2010, at 7:53
PM, Steve Gabosch wrote:
On the
triple helix
metaphor: Richard Lewontin used it
in the title
of his
1998/2000 collection of essays _The
Triple
Helix: Gene,
Organism and
Environment_. His core theme
regarding
biological
development is that solely
considering the
interaction
between gene
and organism makes for bad
biology. The
environment has decisive influence
as well.
- Steve
On Mar
14, 2010, at
10:20 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
On
Mar
14,
2010, at
1:04 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
What
do
others
think
of the double helix (and/or the other
visual
images in the
article). How central is the double
helix
(either as
an "is Like"
or "IS" objectification) to your notions
of the human
sciences?
Larry
...and
I am
pretty
sure
I stole, I mean appropriated, this
from
someone; I've
forgotten who...
<PastedGraphic-2.pdf>
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