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RE: [xmca] Emotions and methodology



Yes, I agree with you, Martin, that in principle to be coherent it seems that it should say: "the relation between mind and matter is an ontological problem".
 
However, Vygotsky is talking here about the distinction, not the relation between subject and object. Although in fact the relation between subject and object is an epistemological problem. Might the distinction between subject and object be an ontological one? Then it is coherent to say that mental objects are by their nature related to the knowing subject, while the body exists only as an object for us (as Hoffding's quote states). So, the distinction between subject and object manifests itself independently from the content of our knowledge.
 
Mabel



> Subject: Re: [xmca] Emotions and methodology
> From: packer@duq.edu
> Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 21:02:54 -0500
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> 
> I've copied below from the Introduction to Hoffding's book where he distinguishes 4 problems: the problem of psychology, of knowledge, of value, and of being, though I haven't found the passage cited by LSV in Crisis (can one search specific books in Wikisource?)
> 
> The problem with these paragraphs from Crisis is this: he writes, "But the distinction between subject and object manifests itself independently from the content of our knowledge." If Hoffding is correct that the relation between subject and object is an epistemological matter, then the distinction cannot manifest itself "independently from our knowledge." What is "independent of our knowledge" would be something "ontological." The first paragraph contradicts the second, as best I can judge.
> 
> Martin
> 
> INTRODUCTION
> The subject matter of the history of philosophy consists of the efforts which individual thinkers have made to explain or perchance to solve the ultimate problems of knowledge and of being. Modem philosophy — i. e. the philosophy of the last three centuries — has been specially concerned with four great problems. These problems, moreover — as I have shown in my Philosophic Problems (Eng. Tr. 1905) — are intimately related to each other, and there likewise exists a most significant analogy between them, in that the antithesis of continuity and discontinuity is of fundamental importance in each of them, except that it manifests itself under different forms.
> 1. The psychological problem originates from the inquiry concerning the essential attributes of psychic life. Is the soul a distinct substance, or does its essential nature consist of a peculiar activity? Is the soul composed of a variety of independent elements, or is it characterized by unity and totality? The discussion of these questions can be of value only as it is based upon a detailed investigation of psychical phenomena and functions. It will likewise appear that the solution of these questions has a very important bearing on the treatment and the solution of the remaining philosophic problems.
> Whilst psychological investigation finds its subject matter in the bare facts of psychic life, there are two further problems which are conditioned by the antithesis of fact and value as it appears in psychic life, the problem of knowledge, and the problem of evaluation.
> 2. The problem of knowledge springs from the inquiry into the presuppositions of knowledge and the limits within which our thought processes are valid (thus including the sphere of psychological investigation). The primary origin of thought is spontaneous, a reaction produced by events which are not the result of thought. To what extent are we then justified in ascribing real meaning to the results of thought? Wherein does the truth of knowledge consist?
> 3. Whilst the problem of knowledge has special reference to the intellect, the problem of evaluation grows out of the inquiry into the validity of judgments pertaining to human conduct and social institution — particularly those that rest on the processes of will and emotion. What constitutes the standard for such a judgment? Upon what foundation does the validity of the concepts of good and bad rest? And is it possible to apply these concepts with logical consistency? The scope of the problem becomes increasingly comprehensive the moment we test the validity of the judgment, not only as pertaining to human conduct and vital forms, but likewise to Being and the universe in general. We then pass from the problem of ethics to that of religion.
> 4. Finally we may also inquire concerning the nature of Being, of which thinking, feeling and volitional being are but a single part. This gives rise to the problem of Being, i.e. the problem of cosmology or metaphysics. Is it possible to elaborate a general world theory according to scientific methods? And what would be the nature of such a theory? If we organize our experiences and infer the ultimate consequences of our knowledge, what principles will furnish an adequate explanation of the universe?
> The nature and method of the treatment of these problems will vary with the instruments of knowledge and the historical conditions of the different periods. And in those problems which lie on the borderland of thought even the personality of the thinker will likewise have its effect. It is for this reason that a comparative treatment of the problems as history presents them is of such great importance. The various statements and solutions of the problem possess more than a purely philosophic interest. They have likewise an important bearing on the history of civilization and on psychology. They are responses in a great discussion which is proceeding through ages. Each response is something more than a mere intellectual structure, it is likewise the sign of a spiritual current. The history of philosophy therefore bears a direct relation to the general history of culture and of mind
> On Nov 15, 2009, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> 
> > http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Brief_History_of_Modern_Philosophy
> > This is Hoffding's book, and it does look like a possible source.
> > 
> > Andy
> > 
> > Andy Blunden wrote:
> >> ... mm. No, I think you are right Mike, he is quoting Høffding isn't he, because the indented paragraph fits what he just said.
> >> Andy
> >> Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>> I'm really not sure where everyone is coming from here! :) Mike, are you referring to the indented paragraph:
> >>> 
> >>> Both mind and body are for us objective, but whereas mental objects [geistigen Objekte] are by their nature related to the knowing subject, the body exists only as an object for us. The relation between subject and object is an epistemological problem [Erkenntnisproblem], the relation between mind and matter is an ontological problem [Daseinsproblem].
> >>> 
> >>> on p. 323 of the English edition? It is not attributed in the English edition, but my assumption is that he is continuing to quote Engels here. I have tried to find it in MECW but failed so far.
> >>> 
> >>> Is this what is at issue?
> >>> 
> >>> Andy
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>> Attached is the paper martin refers to. But where is the equivalent to the
> >>>> indented passage from the Soviet Psych translation and p. 310 vol 3 of
> >>>> collected works (in English?). I may have vol 3 in Russian at work and can
> >>>> check, but it appears to me, as indicated elsewhere in the discussion, that
> >>>> this methodological/ontological chit chat comes from recent British writing,
> >>>> the relationship of which to LSV's writing in cited passages is not clear to
> >>>> me.
> >>>> mike
> >>>> 
> >>>> On Sun, Nov 15, 2009 at 6:35 AM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>> 
> >>>>> Mabel,
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Yes, this is where LSV insists on the importance of not confusing
> >>>>> epistemological issues with ontological ones. It's one of the more puzzling
> >>>>> passages in Crisis, and I suspect there are some problems with the
> >>>>> translation. (Is the indented passage a quotation from Hoffding? Does anyone
> >>>>> have that text?) Nothing here about methodological dualism, however. I don't
> >>>>> think this passage is the place to start to understand better the
> >>>>> distinction between epistemology and ontology, if that is what you want to
> >>>>> do.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> You might consider taking a look here (if so tell me whether or not it
> >>>>> helps):
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Packer, M. J., & Goicoechea, J. (2000). Sociocultural and constructivist
> >>>>> theories of learning: Ontology, not just epistemology. Educational
> >>>>> Psychologist, 35(4), 227-241.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> On Nov 14, 2009, at 11:45 PM, Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>>> Martin,
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Here it is (Andy sent it to me, I have it in hardcopy Vol 3 of Vygotsky's
> >>>>> Collected Works, p. 310):
> >>>>> http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1367
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Mabel
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Emotions and methodology
> >>>>>>> From: packer@duq.edu
> >>>>>>> Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 18:42:06 -0500
> >>>>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Mabel,
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> I confess I don't recognize the term methodological dualism. Where are
> >>>>> you finding this?
> >>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> On Nov 14, 2009, at 5:45 PM, Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> My question to Andy was if he could please give me some references
> >>>>> about the difference-relation between ontological and methodological
> >>>>> dualism? I was aimed to get some contemporary references to this discussion.
> >>>>> I already had read Vygotsky. Does anyone has a suggestion, please?
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> Thank you,
> >>>>>>>> Mabel
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 08:56:07 -0800
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
> >>>>>>>>> From: lchcmike@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> There was a discussion of this topic around your MCA article a while
> >>>>> back,
> >>>>>>>>> Michael. Mabel might be able to use some of the specific techniques,
> >>>>> which,
> >>>>>>>>> I recall, were not too demading in terms of technology, to find a
> >>>>> bridge to
> >>>>>>>>> what her advisors expect.
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Martin's sources are right on. But Mabel is going to have to negotiate
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> rocky
> >>>>>>>>> shoals of her own institutional situation, and invoking XMCA is not
> >>>>> likely
> >>>>>>>>> to win her a lot of friends!!
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Nov 14, 2009 at 8:16 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> In the following piece, we show how emotion (as evidenced in prosody)
> >>>>> is a
> >>>>>>>>>> resource for the coordination of social action. Michael
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> Cult Stud of Sci Educ
> >>>>>>>>>> DOI 10.1007/s11422-009-9203-8
> >>>>>>>>>> Solidarity and conflict: aligned and misaligned prosody
> >>>>>>>>>> as a transactional resource in intra- and intercultural
> >>>>>>>>>> communication involving power differences
> >>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth Æ Kenneth Tobin
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> here
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> On 2009-11-14, at 6:55 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> I'm going to ignore Andy's request to ignore his message to Mabel,
> >>>>> because
> >>>>>>>>>> I'm sure Mabel is not the only person being told this sort of thing.
> >>>>> The
> >>>>>>>>>> claim, I suppose, is that emotion is a subjective experience, and
> >>>>> therefore
> >>>>>>>>>> something mental, internal, personal, private and so inaccessible to
> >>>>> other
> >>>>>>>>>> people, including the researcher, who has access only to the external
> >>>>>>>>>> 'expression' of that emotion, on the face, in movements, etc.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> Nonsense. How to argue against that view? Take a look at Joe de
> >>>>> Rivera's
> >>>>>>>>>> work on emotions as interpersonal movements, towards or away from
> >>>>> people on
> >>>>>>>>>> three interpersonal dimensions of intimacy, openness, and status.
> >>>>> Read Hall
> >>>>>>>>>> and Cobey (1976) on emotion as transformation of the world. Read
> >>>>> Mead's
> >>>>>>>>>> Mind, Self and Society where he challenges Darwin, insisting that "we
> >>>>>>>>>> cannot approach them [emotions] from the point of view of expressing
> >>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> content in the mind of the individual" (p. 17) because to do so
> >>>>> presumes a
> >>>>>>>>>> dualism between consciousness and the biological organism.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> These are some resources that come immediately to my mind. What can
> >>>>> others
> >>>>>>>>>> out there recommend?
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> On Nov 14, 2009, at 4:42 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> You have good muses Mabel (Vygotsky and Marx), pity you
> >>>>>>>>>>> don't have better supervisors. Your approach, studying
> >>>>>>>>>>> microsituations as social, is Vygotsky's approach too, I
> >>>>>>>>>>> think, and excellent one, that is often, I fear, not well
> >>>>>>>>>>> understood. I am probably the last person to ask about that
> >>>>>>>>>>> kind of problem as I have a devil of a problem making myself
> >>>>>>>>>>> understood. Others will know the answers to your questions
> >>>>>>>>>>> better than me, too. But I will mention a few suggestions.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> My supervisors are questioning now, that I do not study emotions,
> >>>>> but
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "the expression of emotions". I know how to solidify my argument in
> >>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>>>>> bit, but could you please give me some references of where should I
> >>>>> read
> >>>>>>>>>>>> about the difference-relation between ontological and
> >>>>> methodological
> >>>>>>>>>>>> dualism?
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> I guess you have already read Vygotsky's comments on
> >>>>>>>>>>> ontological vs methodological/epistemological dualism:
> >>>>>>>>>>> http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1367
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> If you use Google on this one, you will probably find a page
> >>>>>>>>>>> where I am being attacked by someone called Neville for
> >>>>>>>>>>> failing to make this distinction. I am far from sure of the
> >>>>>>>>>>> value of that exchange but you are welcome to read it. I
> >>>>>>>>>>> would not attempt a short summary of this issue.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you are being accused of about emotions.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Martha Nussbaum is a Critical Theorist who writes good stuff
> >>>>>>>>>>> about emotions. And of course everyone reads Antonio
> >>>>>>>>>>> Damassio, with his distinction between feelings and
> >>>>>>>>>>> emotions. Certainly, emotions are only present in
> >>>>>>>>>>> consciousness thanks to their "interpretation" by culturally
> >>>>>>>>>>> acquired concepts.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> ""the expression of emotions" is a strange expression to me.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Are they using "emotions" to refer to forms of consciousness
> >>>>>>>>>>> which are "expressed" in high blood pressure, etc? Or are
> >>>>>>>>>>> they using "emotions" to refer to physiological conditions,
> >>>>>>>>>>> which are "expressed" in the character of behavior. I don't
> >>>>>>>>>>> understand. I am sure others will know. Sounds like a
> >>>>>>>>>>> template accusation.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>>>>>>>>> 
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> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> 
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> > 
> > -- 
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > 
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