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Re: [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: [xmca] guess who

Interesting what you say about Dewey and his use of the word "experience". I had thought it was an unfortunate choice of word myself. If you can source that quote, I'd be interested, Michael.
On Meadiation. Reading him _with Vygotskian eyes_, there is mediation in Mead, archetyically, the gesture. It impossible to communicate otherwise. But my reading of Mead and his present-day interpreters is that Mead didn't see it that way. He tended to see it like you say: "it is the activity that controls the communication" not the mediating elements.
You remarks, Michael, about there being no "inside the head" also show why the label "social behaviorism" is not entirely misplaced. But the words Mike highlighted in red: "In giving a behavioristic statement of consciousness ..." show how contradictory this can be. Absent the emphasis on gestures and it's hard to disagree with anything in the quote Mike gave.
I do think Mead is much richer than his philosophical foundations seem to suggest. His I/Me dialectic is still the best rendering of Hegel's psychology you'll find anywhere, I think. Others can only follow. 

Andy

Michael Glassman wrote:

Andy, where do you see mediation as an important issue to Meade?  I don't know, it seems to me he sees different types of communication as instruments used to move the action forward.  The signs, language, gestures whatever don't control the activity, it is the activity that controls the communication.  The reason I use the word activity is because if you read the word experience in Mike's quotes earlier, I believe (am almost sure) he is using Dewey's conception of experience - as an ongoing experiment in Nature (part of Nature).  Later in his career Dewey said he regretted using experience which could be so easily misperceived and wished he had used activity instead (wouldn't that have made things confusing).
I worry that Mead's view of intersubjectivity might be a little different than how people discuss intersubjectivity when talking about Vygotsky. I think for Mead - for Pragmatists - there is no inside the head (I think it is much easier to compare Mead to Skinner than to Watson in terms of social behaviorism and its connections). It strikes me that when Mead is talking about intersubjectivity he is not talking about a meeting of minds where we are aware of what others are thinking - he is talking more about this idea that there really is not objective quality because our actions are always goal oriented and based in experience/activity. They take on meaning (for want of a better word) in terms of their role in actions. Because we are social creatures, and act with others in order to attain our goals we come to understandings based on these actions (meaning is based on levels of social capital? I think a number of sociologists might agree with this.) Michael 

________________________________

From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden
Sent: Sun 11/1/2009 9:26 PM
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: [xmca] guess who



Mead is a favourite of the intersubjectivists I was talking
about, and the reason for it is this. Because Mead takes
the gesture as the archetypal form of mediation, rather than
an external artefact, and then, sees thought arising through
the withering away of this mediating element, the
intersubjectivists don't see any place for mediation. For
intersubjectivist thinkers, people are a lot of atoms
running around sending messages to one another.

I fully accept that this does a terrible disservice to Mead,
but I do think that his whole approach opens itself to this
misuse. There is no clear differentiation between the
mediating element, which is a social product, and the
subject, which also, to me, seems to be incompletely
differentiated from its body.

Andy

mike cole wrote:

Nick V can answer for himself. Reading Mead now in the context of a
communication course is very thought provoking. A good deal i am
struggling with. The following may be of use to the discussion.

These quotes and the entire essay on the self are to be found at.

http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/124ad49b8085d7cd

The selection is meant only to index the complexity of ascribing to Mead
any sort of Watsonian style behaviorism and to note places where he
provides an interesting point of translation between LSV and others of
interest on this discussion group.
mike
-----------------


It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want
to bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self,"
which is a reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and
object. This type of object is essentially different from other objects,
and in the past it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which
Indicates an experience with, an experience of, one's self. It was
assumed that consciousness in some way carried this capacity of being an
object to itself. In giving a behavioristic statement of consciousness
we have to look for some sort of experience in which the physical
organism can become an object to itself. (p. 21 of my edition).

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only
indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members
of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the
social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own
experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by
becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an
object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his
experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the
attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social
environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and
they are involved.

We are finding out what we are going to say, what we are going to do, by
saying and doing, and in the process we are continually controlling the
process itself. In the conversation of gestures what we say calls out a
certain response in another and that in turn changes our own action, so
that we shift from what we started to do because of the reply the other
makes.

The conversation of gestures is the beginning of communication. The
individual comes to carry on a conversation of gestures with himself. He
says something, and that calls out a certain reply in himself which
makes him change what he was going to say


On Sun, Nov 1, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    In February, Nikolai Veresov
    http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2009_02.dir/0100.html
    posted xmca on this question. See
    http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
    where he says "'Methods of reflexological and psychological
    investigation' represented the reflexological concept of human
    consciousness and Vygotsky called himself a bigger reflexologist
    than Pavlov."

    On the notion of "social behaviorism" I tend to agree with you
    exactly, but http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Social_Psychology/Identity
    is an example of Mead being defined as "social behaviorism," even
    though he is _so_ different from Watson etc.

    But I would be more interested in hearing responses to your original
    response Mabel, about interactionist theories.

    Andy

    Mabel Encinas wrote:


        Hi, Andy.
        I agree with you about the fact that Vygotsky is criticising
        reflexology in the excerpt I quoted (below). I disagree though
        that Vygotsky was seen as a reflexologist either then or later
        (it might be that someone has considered so). Vygotsky was
        definitely not a reflexology. He openly criticises the
        simplification that Pavlov does to psychology and the
        physiological reductionism of his approach, and he is very much
        interested in consciousness, a field that is completely out of
        the focus of reflexology. Then, I do not agree with your point
        that the quote I include has to do with behaviourists, as they
        do not consider consciousnes (self or any other) something that
        could/should be scientifically studied. Could you please tell me
        why do you think so?
         Thank you.
         Mabel
> Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 23:22:59 +1100 
         > From: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
         > To: liliamabel@hotmail.com <mailto:liliamabel@hotmail.com>

         > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
         >
         > Mabel, it is a very interesting quote, but my thesis is that
         > in that speech Vygotsky is conducting an immanent critique
         > of reflexology. I am sure that everyone present at the time,
         > as well as every interpreter since believes that he was at
         > the time a reflexologist. But evidently a reflexologist who
         > didn't believe in reflexology. Already in the excert you
         > quote we see the unmistakeable reflection of the American
         > social behaviorists!!
         >
         > By the way, since you have this volume, check out pp. 325-28
         > on the question of consciousness./
         >
         > Andy
         >
         > Mabel Encinas wrote:
         > > Hi.
         > >
         > > I agree with your point, Andy, and actually I think that
        the concept of
         > > mediation is related (or subsumed) to the concept of
        practice. In my
         > > view that is what is missing in interactionist theories
        (and more
         > > generally in communicative theories). Practice implies the
         > > transformation of the world/and the subjects, not only
        their meaning as
         > > such.
         > >
         > > On the other hand, I agree, Larry, with the importance of
        the present
         > > moment and its affective load, although I do not know
        Stern's work and I
         > > do not work with psychoanalisis. What is intriguing to me
        is that
         > > Vygotsky sets the 'self' perception in quite another way,
        Tony (and this
         > > is related to the subject of consciousness recently held
        here, in which
         > > unfortunately I could not participate). He says in Vol 3.
        of the
         > > Collected works (p. 77):
         > >
         > >
         > > ... the mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of
         > > consciousness are one and the same. Speech is, on the one
        hand, the
         > > system of the 'reflexes of social contact' and, on the
        other hand,
         > > the system of the reflexes of consciousness par excellence,
        i.e., an
         > > apparatus for the reflection of other systems.
         > >
         > > The key to the problem of another person's Ego, of the
        knowledge of
         > > another person's mind lies here. The mechanism of knowledge
        of the
         > > self (self-consciousness) and knowledge of others is the
        same. The
         > > usual theories about the knowledge of another person's mind
        either
         > > accept that it cannot be known, or they try to build a
        plausible
         > > mechanism with the help of various hypotheses. In the theory of
         > > /Einfühlung/ and in the theory from analogy the essence of
        such a
         > > mechanism is the same: we know others insofar as we know
        ourselves.
         > > When I know another person's anger, I reproduce my own anger.
         > >
         > > In reality it would be more correct to put it the other way
        around.
         > > We are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of
        others and
         > > by the same method as we are conscious of others, because
        we are the
         > > same vis-à-vis ourselves as others are vis-à-vis us. */I am
         > > conscious of myself only to the extent that I am another to
        myself
         > > /*(I added emphasis in this previous sentence, as you might
        not have
         > > html). i.e. to the extent that I can again perceive my own
        reflexes
         > > as stimuli. In principle there is no difference in mechanism
         > > whatsoever between the fact that I can repeat aloud a word
        spoken
         > > silently and the fact that I can repeat a word spoken by
        another:
         > > both are reversible reflex-stimuli.
         > >
         > > That is why the acceptance of the hypothesis proposed will lead
         > > directly to the sociologizing of all consciousness, to the
         > > acceptance that the social moment in consciousness is
        primary in
         > > time as well as in fact. The individual aspect is
        constructed as a
         > > derived and secondary aspect on the basis of the social
        aspect and
         > > exactly according to its model.
         > >
         > >
         > > I think this is not a trivial difference, but I guess this
        difference
         > > and the issue of practice, are at the core of the
        distinction between a
         > > sociocultural approach and interactional approaches.
         > >
         > > Mabel
         > >
         > >
         > >
         > > > Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 17:24:34 +1100
         > > > From: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
         > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

         > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
         > > >
         > > > Larry, I too am interested in the relation between CHAT and
         > > > the "intersubjective" people because intersubjective
         > > > theories are found in American Hegel interpretation and in
         > > > Critical Theory along with appropriations of psychoanalysis
         > > > and American Pragmatism, but the ones I've read find very
         > > > unsatisfactory. I would like to see Critical Theorists in
         > > > particular paying attention to CHAT.
         > > >
         > > > The main problem I have with the intersubjective stuff I've
         > > > read is that they lack any concept of mediation, by which I
         > > > mean the use of artefacts in thinking and communicating.
         > > > They mistakenly imagine that individual "subjects" can
         > > > communicate directly without mediation. What do you mean
         > > > when you say "mediated"
         > > >
         > > > Andy

         > > >
         > > > Larry Purss wrote:
         > > > > The topic of the social construction and development of
        the self in
         > > Mead and the parallels with cultural historical theories of
         > > intersubjectivity is fascinating. I have just finished
        reading "Daniel
         > > Stern's book "The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and
        Everyday Life" He
         > > is a member of the "Boston Change Process Study Group" which is
         > > exploring the potential for change enacted in the moment to
        moment (2 to
         > > 10 second) intersubjective spaces created in enactements.
        This work is
         > > embedded in the larger focus on intersubjectivity being
        elaborated
         > > within "relational psychoanalysis". One of the historical
        roots of this
         > > approach comes from Harry Stack Sullivan and "interpersonal
         > > psychoanalysis" Sullivan's work was a conversation between
        Mead's theory
         > > of the relational self and psychoanalysis. This
        conversation is today
         > > transforming all branches of psychoanalytic theory and
        practice and
         > > there are many books and journal articles focusing on
         > > "intersubjectivity" and the quality of
         > > > "mutual" recognition to facilitate change. This
        perspective can be
         > > applied to learning and developmental theory to emphasize
        Mead's project
         > > of the social self.
         > > > > I work in school systems and try to use this
        intersubjective
         > > relational lens to deepen my understanding of "mediated
        learning" as a
         > > process of "implicit relational knowing" (see Daniel Stern)
        as well as
         > > explicit relational knowing and practices. Intersubjectivity as
         > > experienced in the moment to moment enactments that are
        elaborated
         > > within the interactions of mediated learning are grounded
        in affective
         > > attunement as foundational to cognitive learning.
         > > > > I hesitate to bring "psychoanalytic" models to this
        website because
         > > of the reaction to traditional Freudian models of reified
        psychic
         > > structure and all that baggage. However I happen to be
        intrigued by both
         > > "mediated learning" and "intersubjectivity" as ways to look
        at the micro
         > > units of analysis.
         > > > > As an aside Daniel Stern was one of the researches,
        with Jerome
         > > Bruner, and others who studied "baby talk" and the
        development of
         > > language in moment to moment transactions. Twenty years
        later Daniel
         > > Stern and the Boston Change Process Study Group are still
        working at
         > > this micro unit of the present moment and the creation of
         > > intersubjective spaces.
         > > > > Stern (p.43 "The Present Moment") quoted William James
        as he
         > > described the stream of consciousness as like a bird's life
        made up of
         > > an alteration of flights and perchings. Stern's book
        elaborates the
         > > present moments are like the perchings. The flights are the
        spaces
         > > between moments of consciousness. These "flights" are
        inaccesible and
         > > ungraspable. "Consciousness is thus free to switch focus
        from one
         > > present moment to the next, and the sense of the self as
        experiencer is
         > > never felt to be interrupted, even though the perchings are
         > > discontinuous. These present moments are the stuff of
        subjectivity
         > > during ordianary mental states" (p.43)
         > > > > Mediated learning in the ZPD can be enriched by
        exploring Mead's
         > > and Stern's and other scholars who are exploring
        intersubjectivity and
         > > the development of the self.
         > > > >
         > > > >
         > > > >
         > > > > ----- Original Message -----
         > > > > From: Tony Whitson <twhitson@UDel.Edu>
         > > > > Date: Saturday, October 31, 2009 7:12 pm
         > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
         > > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>,
        "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
         > > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
         > > > > Cc: Ben DeVane <ben.devane@gmail.com
        <mailto:ben.devane@gmail.com>>
         > > > >
         > > > >> Mead was also my first guess (and it really was a
        guess, since I
         > > > >> haven't
         > > > >> actually read Mead)
         > > > >>
         > > > >> But I thought the more interesting thing about the
        provocation
         > > > >> is that
         > > > >> even though it seemed like exactly what I would expect
        from
         > > > >> Mead, I could
         > > > >> not be certain, because there are a number of others
        we are
         > > > >> interested in
         > > > >> who could just as well have said the same. That's what
        I find
         > > > >> most
         > > > >> interesting in this.
         > > > >>
         > > > >> And I do think this is part of Hegel's legacy, such
        that even
         > > > >> Lacan could
         > > > >> have said much the same as this, although with somewhat
         > > > >> differing
         > > > >> implications.
         > > > >>
         > > > >> On Sat, 31 Oct 2009, mike cole wrote:
         > > > >>
         > > > >>> Got it first try. Mead got his PhD with Dilthey. My
        own guess
         > > > >> is that this
         > > > >>> goes back to at least Hegel, but others would know
        better.
         > > > >>>
         > > > >>> (Dishes done, snuck away)
         > > > >>> mike
         > > > >>>
         > > > >>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 7:51 PM, Ben DeVane
         > > > >> <ben.devane@gmail.com <mailto:ben.devane@gmail.com>>
        wrote:
         > > > >>>> We just got done reading Mead in our pragmatism
        reading group here,
         > > > >>>> and it sounds very Meadish (Vygotsky crossed with
        Dewey), so
         > > > >> that's my
         > > > >>>> guess. Honest I didn't look it up on Google.
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>> I really enjoyed the Holland & Lachicotte, and Edwards
         > > > >> chapters on the
         > > > >>>> parallels between Mead and Vygotsky in the Cambridge
         > > > >> handbook. Highly
         > > > >>>> recommended for anyone unfamiliar with Mead's work.
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>> -Ben
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 8:09 PM, mike cole
         > > > >> <lchcmike@gmail.com <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>> wrote:
         > > > >>>>> In preparing for class just now i fell across this
        sentence.
         > > > >> Obvious who
         > > > >>>>> wrote it without looking it up on google?
         > > > >>>>>
         > > > >>>>> "*The self is something which has a development*,
        it is not
         > > > >> initially>> there
         > > > >>>>> at birth, but arises in the process of social
        experiences
         > > > >> and activity,
         > > > >>>> that
         > > > >>>>> is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
         > > > >> relations to that
         > > > >>>>> process as a whole and to other individuals within
        that process"
         > > > >>>>>
         > > > >>>>> My own relations are saying get the hell off the
        computer,
         > > > >> the doorbell
         > > > >>>> is
         > > > >>>>> ringing and the goblins are on the move. So off i go.
         > > > >>>>> mike
         > > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
         > > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
         > > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
         > > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
         > > > >>>>>
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>>> --
         > > > >>>> ***********************
         > > > >>>> Ben DeVane
         > > > >>>> Ph.D Candidate
         > > > >>>> Games+Learning+Society Research Group
         > > > >>>> University of Wisconsin-Madison
         > > > >>>> ***********************
         > > > >>>>
         > > > >>> _______________________________________________
         > > > >>> xmca mailing list
         > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
         > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
         > > > >>>
         > > > >> Tony Whitson
         > > > >> UD School of Education
         > > > >> NEWARK DE 19716
         > > > >>
         > > > >> twhitson@udel.edu <mailto:twhitson@udel.edu>
         > > > >> _______________________________
         > > > >>
         > > > >> "those who fail to reread
         > > > >> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
         > > > >> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
         > > > > _______________________________________________
         > > > > xmca mailing list
         > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
         > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
         > > > >
         > > >
         > > > --
         > > >
        ------------------------------------------------------------------------
         > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
         > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
         > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea

         > > >
         > > > _______________________________________________
         > > > xmca mailing list
         > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
         > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
         > >
         > >
        ------------------------------------------------------------------------
         > > Windows Live Hotmail: Your friends can get your Facebook
        updates, right
         > > from Hotmail®.
         > >
        <http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_4:092009>
         >
         > --
         >
        ------------------------------------------------------------------------
         > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
         > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
         > Ilyenkov $20 ea
         >

        ------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Windows Live: Make it easier for your friends to see what you're
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        <http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_2:092009>


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    Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
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