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Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz

OK Victor, so you have a disagreement with Martin. He says consciousness is matter; you say consciousness is activity. I have the same objections to both. The rest of what you wrote I agree with, of course. 

Andy

Victor wrote:

Andy
The answer to your question whether consciousness is activity is a determined, yes. And, it does indeed include self-directed thoughts. The relation between the categories, activity, that includes the category, consciousness, is of course a part of my argument that consciousness is an activity.
“Sein ist.” I believe is the way Hegel described the very kernel of consciousness, the act of self knowing. In other words, it is the knowing that you are. Naturally, knowing that you are is equivalent to and is implicitly knowledge of nothing and it is this contradiction between being and nothingness that ignites the development of consciousness, indeed of the whole of Hegel’s theory of knowing.
Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over but has passed over — into nothing and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.
Or, alternatively, to quote A. Blunden’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of being:
The philosophy of Being is first of all "awareness". …Pure Being is the world an instant before you see it, it is the world through the eyes of a new born baby. Like the Zen teaching that demands of the devotee absolute awareness, absolute "thoughtlessness", it is, for consciousness, an unattainable moment - even though it is equally the beginning of all consciousness!
It appears to me that Hegel regarded consciousness as the motor of the development of knowledge. True, as EVI writes, Hegel’s theory of thought was not wrong, just incomplete, and this goes for his theory of being no more or less than for the rest of his system. Hegel did not and could not, given the aims of his thought and the science of his time, develop an explanation of the causes of self awareness. To do so would have necessitated embedding the theory of being, of consciousness, in something other than human consciousness, say in the material understanding of life as autonomous, responsive activity driven first and foremost by the mechanics of self-replication, i.e. survival, and reproduction or the persistence of self through the generation of off-spring. Need I write more? 



Victor Friedlander 28 09 2009

----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 1:00 PM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz



Well, a couple of good things have come out of this
discussion so far Victor. (1) No-one has proposed that
consciousness does not exist and (2) Everyone goes to great
length to avoid dichotomies of any kind. This would never
have been the case a few years ago, or I suspect on any
other list. But we seem to have the opposite problem.

You say that "Matter is a broad generalization regarding a
state of being (unconscious of course) while consciousness
concerns a broad range of activities all of which concern
communication." This is not too bad, but I could criticize
it. I presume you are not excluding self-directed thoughts?
And if consciousness includes "a broad range of activities"
does that mean that consciousness is a type of activity?
What is the relation between activity and consciousness then?

Andy

Victor wrote:

Andy,

That was quick!



The point of my argument regarding the “nature” of tools was not that
they are material and ideal, but that their materiality and ideality is
a function of the mode of activity in which they are used.  When we
talk, write, or otherwise communicate information about them or through
them they are necessarily ideal, when we use them to enhance our
capacity to transform material conditions to satisfy our needs, they are
material, i.e. the subjects of sensation rather than of rational
consciousness.   The dichotomy is not in the objects, but in the ways we
use them which are of course a function of our objectives regarding
their use.



 As I indicated in my first communication the distinction between
consciousness and matter is a combination of categories, the referents
of which are too disparate to suffer pairing.  Matter is a broad
generalization regarding a state of being (unconscious of course) while
consciousness concerns a broad range of activities all of which concern
communication. Matter pairs well with spirit or essence, as EVI deftly
demonstrates in his article on the Ideal and Vygotsky in his discourse
on thought and speech in Thought and Language.



A search for an appropriate contrapositive to consciousness that is more
or less analogous to the role of matter in the matter-essence dichotomy
would be sensation. Sensation, not in the purely passive sense of
reception of stimuli, but in the fuller sense used by Marx is his
passage in Capital describing labour activity.

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and
controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes
himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and
legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to
appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By
thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time
changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels
them to act in obedience to his sway…. At the end of every
labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination
of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of
form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose
of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he
must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary
act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands
that, during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in
consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is
attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried
on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play
to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced
to be.



 Considering that tools and most other things fit equally well the
categories of sensation or consciousness we should be able to describe
the what’s when’s and how’s they are moved between them. Marx’s
description of the labour process exactly describes this movement
between activity informed by consciousness and by sensation that
comprises human labour.



Less than a week ago I would have argued that the existence of a
material world outside of and independent of human consciousness is
evidenced by the ontological precedence of sensation over consciousness,
however two or three days ago I came across a number of articles etc.
treating the issue of the relation between classical and quantum
physics, and as you put it “the nature of that world? Well that is a
different matter altogether”.



Victor Friedlander 28 09 2009

----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 11:23 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz



Good to hear from you, Victor. I'll just make a couple of
quick points.

On this list, I think it is generally agreed (following
Ilyenkov) that "ideal" is not an opposite to "material" -
for example, all artefacts are both ideal and material.

Secondly, I personally think a dichotomy between tools and
symbols is untenable. There is a whole spectrum of ways in
which an artefact is connected to its social significance.

Finally, you say: "The distinction between materia and
consciousness understood as things, as objects, is a
hopeless task" - of course, I agree! (Well, I've never come
across the word "materia" and it's not listed in the
20-volume Oxford English Dictionary, so I'm just taking it
in context = objects).

This is not the question at issue. The question remains how
to define consciousness. My position is that consciousness
is a *category* not a thing, and matter is the category
indicating everything that exists outside of consciousness,
not an object or collection of objects, particles or waves
or any such construction of consciousness. Lenin and
Ilyenkov agree on this, and I agree with both of them.

The extistence of a material world outside of and
independent of human consciousness is something that is not
really up for a compromise position or a middle road. It is
one of those things which are true or false.

The nature of that world? Well that is a different matter
altogether.

Andy

Victor wrote:
I’ve been following the discussion here for some time. I am currently 
working on and in the interface between activities informed by
consciousness, i.e. conscious thinking, and activities addressing
material, i.e. sensable, conditions; hence my interest in the debate.



    Despite the many lines of reasoning and the wide range of subjects
considered, the issues reflected upon all concern the tiresome issue of 
the dichotomy between the material and ideal, and an argument can be
developed from almost any point in the discussion. The question of
whether an object of interest is ideal or material, i.e. whether it is a 
symbolical representation or a sensable object, is dependent on the
activity in which it is a component.  If we are designing a spade or
axe, discussing which tool to use for a particular practical objective, 
or using them as metaphors in a literary product, then they are
certainly idealizations.  That is to say they are abstractions (not
necessarily the same abstractions as this depends on the focus of the
plan, practical objective, or metaphor) represented by discrete
symbolical forms such as pictorial icons, spoken words and sentences, or graphically represented speech, the significance of which is a function 
of their formation and use by the community of users that depends upon
them for effective transmission of information. On the other hand, the axe and spade used respectively to cut up firewood and to hack a hole in the ground are in large part material, sensable objects the sensing and 
handling of which are concrete and continuous involving constant
adjustments of bodily activity to realize the object of their use.
True, as Steve, citing EVI, reminds us, the object and formation of 
the instruments of labour are in part the products of ideation, the
conventions for the production and use of the means of production, but
these are practically meaningless in the absence of concrete productive 
activity. A plan or discussion on the design or management of material
conditions, without human labour is almost as non-existent as an
unexpressed notion. The conditions and objectives of productive activity 
matter not a whit, be it tracking wild boar in a thicket, hammering a
nail into a board, or typing out a response on the key board of a 6 year old computer, the same concrete, continuous exercise of sense and other bodily activities is a very different mode of activity than the use and 
management of symbolical formations. I might also add, Andy, that this
kind of physically directed, hardly if at all conscious activity is no
less acquired knowledge than the conscious behaviour essential for the
effective use of symbolical forms and management of ideation.



    The distinction between materia and consciousness understood as
things, as objects, is a hopeless task, and I agree with Steve that the 
concept of consciousness as a given, definable only in contrast to
materia is too abstract to bear much if any significant information.
Consciousness is an activity, while material is a state of being. If we 
replace materia with sensation, which is an activity, and focus on the
distinction between conscious activity and activity that is in essence
management of sensation, such as work activity, the distinction as well 
as the linkages between the two is sufficiently concrete to merit
discussion.  This is in a sense what Hegel attempts to describe in his
presentation of the most fundamental act of consciousness, “being is.”
Being is the act of awareness of existence, the issue of giveness or
non-giveness is an irrelevancy.



    On the other hand I regard Steve’s differentiation between social
and individual consciousness as trivial. The very concept of social
consciousness attributes to collectivities a form of activity which is
properly that of the individual participant in social interaction.
Differentiation between social practice in which all participate and
individual consciousness - the means whereby the individual participant 
gauges the effectiveness of his activity relative to the known
conditions of the environment of his operations - only makes sense so
long as the ontological and operational dependence of each on the other 
is firmly sustained.   I believe this is significance of the full
citation from the final paragraphs of chapter 8 of EVI’s Dialectical
logic: “The ideal is nothing else than a concatenation of the general
forms of human activity realised by individuals, which determine the
will and aptitude of individuals to act as an aim and law”.



Victor Friedlander 28 09 2009

----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 6:48 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz



You did a reasonable summary of the debate Steve.I will
conclude my case by repeating the Ilyenkov quote I sent on
25/9, p. 302 of "The Ideal in Activity," by Ilyenkov:

"These concepts are matter and consciousness (psyche, the
ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.). 'Consciousness' – let
us take this term as Lenin did - is the most general concept
which can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with the
most general concept of 'matter', moreover as something
secondary, produced and derived. Dialectics consists in not
being able to define matter as such; it can only be defined
through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites is
fixed as primary, and the other arises from it."

My "Cs is what is give to us" was an effort to explain this.
Hegel avoided the misunderstandings that arose by using just
a subject and verb without a predicate: "Being is."

Andy

Steve Gabosch wrote:
I don't suggest that you deny that individual consciousness is derived from social consciousness, Andy. Far from it. I'm saying that phrase 
you brought up for discussion unfortunately obscures it.

It's probably time to wind this thread down, so let me kind of
summarize, and then you can cap it off.  I'm suggesting that pesky
phrase we are kicking around ... "what is given to us is
consciousness"
... obscures the fundamental derivative relationship between social
and
individual consciousness. Emphasizing this derivative relationship is 
important in activity psychology, in my view, because social and
individual consciousness have fundamentally different origins,
relationships to objective reality, laws of development, etc.

As Jay, Mike and many others have pointed out, the term
"consciousness"
by itself is fraught with confusion and conflates many different
things. Now, one could argue that it is really just the same problem all over again when one tries to analyze "individual consciousness" or 
"social consciousness," but my optimistic answer is that we can make
some important headway by making this fundamental distinction, and
from
there we may be able to ask better questions about origins, relations, 
development, etc. than we can if we lump the two together as
"consciousness," as is done in so many other areas of social science. 

Anyway, I don't think you can find support for the epistemological
claim
"what is given to us is consciousness" from Ilyenkov, Lenin, or any of the classical dialectical materialists for the reasons I've mentioned. 
If you do come across something, please pass it along, it would be
interesting.

Best,
- Steve





On Sep 27, 2009, at 5:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:


But Steve, in making this very point you counterpose individual and
social consciousness. And tell me (or maybe you can ask Ilyenkov!),
how does social consciousness exist without individual consciousness? 

(There are answers to this question which go to suppositions about
forms of life which may have existed a million years ago, but I'm
talking about real people today.)

And whenever did I deny that individual consciousness is
derivative of
social consciousness anyway?

Andy

Steve Gabosch wrote:

OK, I'm following your responses and points.  Thanks.
So, Andy, to try to narrow this down:  are you purposely bundling
together individual and social consciousness into this single term
"consciousness"?
The reason I ask is that Ilyenkov works very hard in the essay
Martin
is reading, The Concept of the Ideal, to distinguish individual
consciousness and will from social consciousness.  Moreover, he
argues for a very specific relationship between the two - that
individual consciousness is derived from social consciousness, and
not the other way around.
Just as Marx said that social being determines social consciousness, 
Ilyenkov argues that social consciousness determines individual
consciousness.
In Ilyenkov's view, social consciousness is what humans are
given, or
confronted with - not individual consciousness.  I looked for some
supporting quotes and wound up with a creative post you'll see in
the
Humans are Signs/Ideal thread.  See quotes 4 - 7.
- Steve
On Sep 26, 2009, at 6:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
True Steve, I can find: "experience is what is given to us ..." and "the objective world given to us in consciousness ..." but the only definition of "consciousness" around this area is its contrast with 
matter. I tried to clarify this in this discussion by saying that
(as Martin has corrected understood) "What is given us is Cs" i.e., 
immediately, from the material world or anywhere else. As Hegel
says
though, "there is nothing in Heaven, Earth or anywhere else
which is
not both immediate and mediated." So to say that Cs is what is
given
"immediately" does not deny that it is mediated.

Your suggestion to define Cs as "psychic activity of animals and
humans" only shifts the problem to "psychic" - what is psychic? and throws in a far-from-basic assumption about what is going on inside my pussy cat's head. I am given my own consciousness, but figuring 
out what and if my cat is thinking is a problem of future
scientific
investigation, and hardly suitable for a definition: an outcome not 
a starting point.
You say that I "conflate different things." Yes, I put forward the category without first listing the things which count as "forms of 
Cs." I think this is the right way to go, from whole to parts.

A definition of Cs was what Mike asked for. I don't think it
suffices to make a list of things and say "Cs is all these things, 
... and maybe some I forgot to mention," not for a fundamental
definition. It would be better to say "Let's not define Cs."

Andy



Steve Gabosch wrote:

Andy,
Thanks for looking over those statements by Ilyenkov.  What
passage
by Ilyenkov causes you to believe he says that
**consciousness** is
what is given to humans?  He says material reality, social being
and social consciousness are what are given.  He very carefully
never uses a catch-all, misleading term like "consciousness."
Well, that's my reading of him.
Here is my problem with the phrase: "what is given to us is
consciousness".
The term "consciousness," as it is used in this phrase, conflates, obscures and confuses. It conflates fundamentally different kinds 
of consciousness and experience (sensation, individual
consciousness, social consciousness, social being - not to mention dementia, animal psychic activity, sleep, etc. etc.) It obscures 
the material basis of these forms of consciousness.  And it
confuses their relationships with each other.
It might help to ask: what **is** given to humans? (at birth, and 
thenceforth ...)
Here is the beginning of an answer, helped a bit by Ilyenkov.
From
birth the human is confronted by reality on multiple levels:
material reality (their body, objects, gravity), sensation
(hunger,
hearing), social being (a system of social and material
relations),
and social consciousness (ideality, historical culture).   Soon,
another kind of reality emerges: individual human consciousness.
These processes and realities, in their simultaneously material
and
ideal forms, reappear every moment of a human's life.
The phrase "what is given to us is consciousness" seems to obscure far more than it reveals. What benefits are obtained from making such a one-sided statement that excludes referencing the material 
foundations and relations underlying this "consciousness"?
I want to emphasize that neither Lenin nor Ilyenkov ever made such a claim. (In my humble reading, anyway). You may be able to get Hegel's solidarity with that phrase, but the classical dialectical 
materialists argued quite the opposite.
As for a general definition of the term "consciousness", given the scope of phenomena that would have to be included, I might venture 
something like "the psychic activity of animals and humans."
Sometime when the time is right we might revisit the dialectics of nature discussion (including problems with the Stalinized "diamat" 
version).  There are some significant issues there.
Best,
- Steve
On Sep 25, 2009, at 9:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

OK, Steve I've read through your quiz, and evaluated each claim
attributed to Ilyenkov by asking myself: "Is there are a context 
in which I would agree with this?"

The only one where I have reservations is the "dialectics of
nature" one:
28. These laws [dialectics] are understood as the objective laws 
of development of the material world, of both the natural and
socio-historical world, of objective reality in general.
I remain of the view that this claim is unclear and has, over the 120 years since Engels' Dialectics of Nature was published in the 1920s, been the source of a lot of confusion and also reasons to 
not think. In general I am always wary of claims that have the
form: "human society is like this because nature is like this,"
such as social Darwinism. It basically adds up to "God made
man in
His own image."

There is an element of truth in the claim, but only by making a
drastic reduction to the meaning of "dialectics" which is already 
verging on meaninglessness anyway.

But I do NOT want to change the subject to dianat!! I want to
keep
focussed on:

1. How do we define consciousness?
2. What's wrong with my suggestion (21/9/2009) based on the
categorical distinction referred to in the early questions in
your
quiz, which Ilyenkov obviously agrees with:

"Consciousness is what is given to us; matter is what exists
outside and independently of consciousness."

Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:

Ain't no answer sheet!  LOL  This "quiz" is nothing more than
comparing Ilyenkov's actual answers to one's own views.
I've simplified this thing.  It did need streamlining.  There
are
now 25 Ilyenkov propositions.
If my editing is accurate, Ilyenkov's points are preserved in
each numbered sentence below.  I kept the numbers from the
previous version.
Martin's very helpful reading of these passages confirms and
clarifies my interpretations.  Thank you, Martin.  I've added
headlines (in my words) to clarify Ilyenkov's key themes.  As
can
be seen, I've also used some of Martin's nicely worded summaries 
for this task (and could have used more - I'm kind of
duplicating
what he did).
Some of these statements by Ilyenkov seem to me to be in
conflict
with some of the points you have been recently making, Andy.
See
what you think.
This is an 'open book' quiz, by the way - you are welcome to
consult any texts ... :-))
from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism**, 
Chapter One, by EV Ilyenkov, 1979, New Park, material below
edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009, downloaded from
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm 

Ilyenkov is addressing the epistemological question:  What is
the
relationship between consciousness and the world itself?
**********
A.  << No middle path is possible.>>
**********
1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path …
**********
B.  << Consciousness is derived from, produced from, and
secondary to matter.>>
**********
3. These concepts [that is, the two general concepts which must 
be clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness.
4.  [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the
ideal,
spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.
6. ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general sense] can only be
defined by clearly contrasting it with ‘matter’ [in its most
general sense.]
7. [Moreover, consciousness can only be contrasted with matter] 
as something that is secondary, produced and derived.
9.  … [Matter] can only be defined through its opposite, and
only
if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other
arises
from it.
**********
C.  <<For materialists, matter is the basis of epistemology.
For
idealists, the basis is consciousness.>>
**********
12.  Lenin's position … [is as follows]:  for materialism …
matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is the 
basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) …
13.  … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is
consciousness ...
**********
D.  <<Just as social being, (that is, material and economic
relations) precedes and exists independently of social
consciousness, social consciousness (as does matter) precedes
and
exists independently of individual consciousness.>>  <<Btw,
Martin has an interesting objection to Ilyenkov's claim that
'primary' things exist independently of 'secondary' things
insofar as humans are concerned.>>
**********
15.  [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] …
'collectively-organised' … experience …
16.   … the relationship of matter to consciousness is
complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the
very
beginning precedes individual consciousness as something already 
given, and existing before, outside, and independent of
individual consciousness.
17.  Just as matter does.
**********
E. <<Individual consciousness is formed to a greater degree by 
social consciousness than it is by the material world.  At the
same time, as explained by Marx, social consciousness is derived from social being, the system of material and economic relations 
between people.>>
**********
20.  ... social consciousness ... forms ... [the individual’s]
consciousness to a much greater degree than the 'material world' 
[does].
22.  But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not
'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the
system of material and economic relations between people.
**********
F. Martin summarized the next sentences very nicely as follows: 
"<We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in thought
that the world is *cognised.*>"
**********
24.  It is … not true that the world is cognised in our
sensations.
25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just 
as it is given to a dog.
26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations, but 
in the activity of thought ...
**********
G. <<Lenin explained that dialectical logic is the science of
discovering the universal laws of human and natural development. 
These are the objective laws of development of the material
world, which includes the natural world, the socio-historical
world, and objective reality in general.  These laws are
reflected in the historical consciousness of humanity.>>
**********
27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science of 
those universal laws … to which the development of the entire
aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively subordinated.
28.  These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as
the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in 
general.
29.  ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of
mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice.
**********
H.  <<Martin: "<Thought arises in material activity, even in
animals. In humans it takes a more advanced form, in which
activity is adjusted to signs.>"  I continue:  However, if one
proceeds from the perspective of individual experience, the sign will be taken as the starting point in the theory of knowledge, 
which will lead to idealist-leaning errors.">>
**********
35.  Thought arises within and during the process of material
action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only
later
is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and time), 
finding [the] 'sign' form only in man.
36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally formed world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of knowledge. 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion, since 
in individual experience, words (and signs in general) are in
actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation as are
the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings, etc. etc. 
38.  Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic'
variation.
**********
I.  Martin again: "<It is a mistake to try to understand human
knowledge in terms of individual consciousness or experience.
But
it is also a mistake to try to understand knowledge in terms of 
*social* consciousness.>"
**********
39.  If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the
point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then
idealism is inevitable.
40.  But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective
experience', if the latter is interpreted as something
independent of being, as something existing independently, as
something primary.
************
<end of 'quiz'>
************
- Steve
On Sep 25, 2009, at 5:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

I can't understand your quiz, Steve. Could you perhaps make
us a
shorter version with answers at the end of the post?
Andy

Steve Gabosch wrote:

I have something fun, entertaining and educational for
everyone
on xmca!
It just so happens that I took a close look at the Ilyenkov
passages following Andy's quotes, did a little tinkering with 
the text, and came up with something fun: the Ilyenkov
Epistemology Quiz, which anyone can take right on their own
personal computer!
Ilyenkov asks some fundamental questions regarding
epistemology: "Where is the clear-cut dividing line etween … 
philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? …
which
of these two points of departure is determining the direction 
of all your thought, regardless of the subject of your
reflection … ?  Here … is the question: take your thought,
your
consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is
the relationship between them?"
This can also be called: The How Much Do You Agree With
Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test ...
(Hmm.  Somehow, it doesn't seem likely that this will become
the rage on Facebook ... does it? ... LOL ...)
Taking this "quiz" is very simple. It is comprised of 40
propositional statements by Ilyenkov, which I edited for
clarity, about the relationship of consciousness and
materiality, from the first chapter of his short book
"Leninist
Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism" (1979, New
Park).  To take the quiz, simply list the propositions that
you
agree with, and those you don't agree with, count them all up, 
and give Ilyenkov a score.
Read critically like this, sentence by sentence, Ilyenkov is
surprisingly clear.  But one still has to think pretty hard
about what he is saying.  Hopefully, people will find it
worthwhile to do so.
Here is a little explanation of the editing I did to create
this (this is the fine print part - can be skipped).  What I
have done is edit 15 of Ilyenkov's paragraphs (starting where 
Andy's quotes began) into what wound up becoming 40
propositional statements.  They read quite coherently.  This
material makes for a decent introduction to both Ilyenkov and 
dialectical materialism.  I eliminated his references to the
Machists to keep things focused on his propositional
statements
about epistemological issues, and took out various other (for 
this purpose) secondary passages for the same reason.  This
makes him a little easier to grasp - he has a tendency to make 
a lot of side points as he goes.  Also, I did some sentence
rearranging to help clarify the specific proposition that is
being made.  There are a couple sentences which could be
interpreted in different ways if they are not read very
closely, so I included my interpretations below them.  And I
spelled out one or two important implications that Ilyenkov
makes but does not explicitly state.  (He makes these
points in
many other places in his writings, so they are supportable.)
Everyone will see what I did - I am trying to be completely
transparent. If I have misinterpreted or muddled Ilyenkov in 
any way, please let me know!
I would be very interesting to compare notes on what
propositions, formulations, ideas etc. people agree and
disagree on. Some may disagree quite sharply on some points, and others may find themselves surprisingly in agreement with 
Ilyenkov on some issues but didn't know it.  Some might find
this stimulating ideawise.  Others who are bored by
philosophical discourse might save this for later if they need something to put them to sleep tonight! LOL This little quiz might even help clarify aspects of this interesting discussion 
on consciousness.  Fun for the whole family!  :-))
Andy, after carefully reading your posts about the how
"consciousness is what is given to us" and "the idea of matter 
is derived from consciousness" - as well as other things you
have said from time to time - it will be very interesting to
see how you "score" Ilyenkov's positions on epistemology.  I
would actually be quite interested in everyone's thoughts ... 
**********************
The Internet Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz also known as The How 
Much Do You Agree With Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test
from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism** 
by EV Ilyenkov, edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009
downloaded from
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm 


***********************
a. Where is the clear-cut dividing line between  …
philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? …
b.  … which of these two points of departure is determining
the
direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject of
your reflection … ?
c.  Here … is the question: take your thought, your
consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is
the relationship between them?
1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path …
2. In philosophy the 'party of the golden mean' is the 'party 
of the brainless', [that is, those that attempt the middle
path
are destined to fail if they] ... try to unite materialism
with
idealism in an eclectic way, by means of smoothing out the
basic contradictions, and by means of muddling the most
general
... and clear concepts.
3.  These concepts [the two general concepts which must be
clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness.
4.  [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the
ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.
5. 'Consciousness' – let us take this term as Lenin did – is the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly 
contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', as
something secondary, produced and derived.
6. [[sg interpretation: ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general
sense] can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with
‘matter’ [in its most general sense.]]]
7. [[sg interpretation: …moreover … [consciousness can only be 
contrasted with matter] as something that is secondary,
produced and derived.]]
8. Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as 
such …
9.  … it [matter] can only be defined through its opposite,
and
only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the
other
arises from it.
10.  [[sg interpretation: Dialectics can only define things
through their opposites, and furthermore can only do so if one 
of these opposites is fixed as primary and the other as
arising
from it.]]
11.  [[sg interpretation of an implication made above: In
dialectical materialism, the material is primary; and
consciousness, its opposite, arises from it.]]
12.  Lenin's position … [is as follows]:  for materialism …
matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is
the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) …
13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is 
consciousness ...
14.  [Consciousness for the idealist can take a multitude of
forms and can appear] under one or another of its pseudonyms
(be it the 'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it
the
'system of forms of collectively-organised experience' or
'objective spirit', the individual or collective psyche,
individual or social consciousness).]
15.  [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] …
'collectively-organised' … experience …
16.   … the relationship of matter to consciousness is
complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the
very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something 
already given, and existing before, outside, and
independent of
individual consciousness.
17.  Just as matter does.
18. [[sg interpretation: Just as social consciousness does, 
matter, from the very beginning, precedes individual
consciousness as something already given.]]
19.  [There is] …  even more [to it] than that.
20. This social consciousness – forms ... [the individual’s] 
consciousness to a much greater degree than [does] the
'material world'.
21.  [Social consciousness] of course, in its individualised
form, [takes] … the form of the consciousness of one's closest 
teachers, and after that, of the entire circle of people who
appear in the field of vision of a person …
22.  But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not
'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the 
system of material and economic relations between people.
23.  [[sg interpretation:  According to Marx, social
consciousness, which is secondary, is derived from social
being, which is the system of material and economic relations 
between people.]]
24.  It is … not true that the world is cognised in our
sensations.
25.  In sensations the external world is only given to us,
just
as it is given to a dog.
26.  ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations,
but in the activity of thought ...
27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science 
of those universal laws … to which the development of the
entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively
subordinated.
28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as 
the objective laws of development of the material world, of
both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective
reality in general.
29.  ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of
mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice. 
d.  What is … 'thought'?
30. … [A materialist] line of thought [about what thought is] 
proceeds from Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an
inherent capability, characteristic not of all bodies, but
only
of thinking material bodies.
31.  With the help of this capability, a body can construct
its
activities in the spatially determined world, in conformity
with the 'form and disposition' of all other bodies
external to
it, both 'thinking' and 'non-thinking'.
32. Spinoza therefore includes thinking among the categories 
of the attributes of substance, such as extension.
33.  In this form ... [thinking] is, according to Spinoza,
characteristic also of animals.
34.  For him [Spinoza] even an animal possesses a soul, and
this view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who considered 
that an animal is simply an 'automaton', a very complex
'machine'.
35. Thought arises within and during the process of material 
action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only
later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space
and
time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man.
36.  A completely different picture arises when, proceeding
from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally
formed
world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of
knowledge.
37.  It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion,
since in individual experience, words (and signs in general)
are in actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation 
as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings,
etc. etc.
38.  Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic'
variation.
39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then 
idealism is inevitable.
40.  But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective
experience', if the latter is interpreted as something
independent of being, as something existing independently, as 
something primary.
<Ilyenkov moves on to other questions at this point in the
text.>
<End of quiz.>
So how did you score Ilyenkov?
Cheers,
- Steve_______________________________________________
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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
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http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov 
$20 ea

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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
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