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Re: [xmca] Types of Generalization: concepts and pseudoconcepts



Two very quick comments on your message, Andy, and then a question on Davydov's interpretation of Vygotsky on complexive thinking, where I am wondering if Davydov is getting Vygotsky right.

First - calling the **scientific** concept a **microcosm** of the concept as a whole is an interesting idea, Andy. Is this a Vygotsky formulation? Could you point me to it? Or what Vygotsky says that leads you to believe he was thinking along these lines?

Second, my reference to rationality the other day was to Davydov (not Vygotsky). Davydov, interestingly, characterizes both empirical and scientific concepts as rational. Clearly, Vygotsky would not limit rational thinking to just science per se, either. But here is where it gets very interesting.

Davydov seems to be dividing rational thinking into **two** divisions, or genera: empirical and scientific (general conceptualizations and theoretical concepts). Vygotsky, for his part, apparently maintained the existence of only **one** genus of rational conceptualization (true concepts), to which he counterposed its developmental precedent - spontaneous (everyday) child thinking. In turn, as we know, Vygotsky subdivided spontaneous child thinking into syncretic formations and complexive thinking. (He never discussed or researched in very much detail how these categories psychologically apply to adults, unfortunately ...)

As for what Vygotsky said and might have thought about the question of various **species** of concepts, I'd be very interested in that. Any references come to mind?

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Now to my question about an interesting passage in the Davydov Types of Generalization, Ch 6, in the section "The Problem of Generalization in the Works of L. S. Vygotskii". You quote from this passage in your essay, Andy.

I might briefly mention the critical stance from where I am coming from: I am really liking Davydov a **lot** - his grasp of sign mediation theory (Vygotsky), activity theory (Leontiev), and the concept of the ideal (llyenkov), for example, is very enlightening for me, and very useful. But so far, I am stumbling a bit over his theory of concepts in general, as well as his theory of concept formation in psychology - and in particular, how he fits in, or perhaps doesn't fit in, Vygotsky's concept of complexive thinking into his system.

The passage below **seems** to me to be interpreting Vygotsky's concept of the complex to mean the **opposite** of what Vygotsky means - which is **very** uncharacteristic of Davydov. Am I reading the Davydov and the Vygotsky correctly? If this is the case, it might shed some light on how Davydov understands what Vygotsky calls complexive thinking, and perhaps his role in the history of that concept, which seems to have been set aside somewhat (and one of the reasons Paula's efforts are so welcome).

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Davydov:

"Thus, having previously established the identical nature of pseudoconcepts and concepts in their object attribution, Vygotskii then indicates the objective basis for this phenomenon – ****a generalization of a single type underlies both of them**** [emphasis added by sg] . It is obtained in different ways (different intellectual operations), takes on a different form (merging with the real object in the complex, and an abstracted nature in the concept), but, in principle, reflects the same content." (Types of Generalization in Instruction, pg 87 - in Chapter 6, The Problem of Generalization in the Works of L.S. Vygotskii).

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[Vygotsky next seems to be saying just the opposite. See what you think. -sg]

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Vygotsky:

"A complex, like a concept, is a generalization or blend of various real heterogeneous themes. But the association with whose help this generalization is formed, can be of many different types. Any association can result in the inclusion in the complex of a certain element, as long as it is available, and this is the most characteristic feature of the complex building process. Whilst associations of a single type which are logically identical to one another form the foundation of concepts, the ones found at the root of complexes include many varied factual associations, which frequently have nothing at all to do with one another. ****In a concept, the objects are generalized according to one feature, but in a complex they are based on various factual grounds.**** [emphasis added by sg] Therefore, material and uniform associations and affiliations between objects are reflected in concepts, whilst complexes present factual, random and concrete ones."

p 220, Thinking and Concept Formation in Adolescents, (originally from Ch 10 Pedology of the Adolescent (Russian) published 1930), in The Vygotsky Reader (1994)

*********************

Comment by Steve: Davydov seems to be saying that Vygotsky's complex and concept indeed generalize objects in "different ways" and in different forms - but do so, in Vygotsky's theory, with only one "single type" of generalization. So, consequently, according to Davydov, Vygotsky's complex and concept reflect the same **content**. Vygotsky, however, seems to explain just the opposite - that the forms of generalizations of the complex and concept - **and** their **contents** - are vastly different between the complex and the concept.

Am I reading something wrong? (It certainly wouldn't be the first time ...)

 - Steve




On Sep 13, 2009, at 5:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

Steve, I think Vygotsky is neither clear nor consistent, but making all due allowances, he was right; Davydov is clear and consistent, but he is wrong on occasions. Pity Vyvogotsky did not live longer. But it means we have to put a consistent and tenable understanding together ourselves.

Firstly I believe Vygtosky took the "scientific concept" only as a microcosm of the concept, and recognised that the everyday life of an adult is full of concepts (i.e. proper concepts). He gives "dog" as an example. In general concepts originate out of "expert systems" of some kind, i.e., institutions, but not necessarily science: e.g. sport, the Church, literature, ... This will not be the first occasion that LSV's use of a micrcosm has caused people to think that he thinks the micrcosm is the whole.

So Vygotsky reognizes many types of concept, and I don't think Vygotsky limited "rationality" to science. He began life as a literary critic after all.

On how individuals acquire knowledge, you are right of course, that whatever form a child's knowledge takes, it is acquired through artefact-mediated collaboration with adults, at least until the age of ~7 when interaction with peers starts to rival interaction with adults.

One of LSV's strentghs v-a-v Davydov is that LSV really concerns himself with the transition - this is where wolves in sheeps clothing comes from. But Davydov simply regards everyday non- conceptual thinking as a barrier to learning scientific conceptual thought. He doesn't really see a transition at all.

Andy

Steve Gabosch wrote:
It seems as though Vygotsky's theory recognized only one kind of adult, rational concept, which he called at various times the "true concept," the "scientific concept," etc. In Ch 6 of T&S Vygotsky contrasted his theory of the true concept with the "spontaneous" or "everyday" concept, which he seems to have associated with various forms of complexive thinking, including the pseudoconcept, the potential concept, the preconcept, etc. On the other hand, Davydov's theory, appreciative of the accomplishments and critical of the shortcomings of Vygotsky's work on concept formation, recognizes not just one but **two** kinds of rational concepts, which he calls the empirical concept (more precisely, the "general conceptualization") and the theoretical concept (the "content-based generalization"). I find his general arguments for this persuasive, and consistent with a philosophical book I have found influential on my thinking about concepts - as did Davydov - Ilyenkov's The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital (1960). However, so far as I can tell, while Davydov discusses Vygotsky's work on complexes, he did not fully incorporate this work into his theory. Why not? Or has he? More on this below.
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Andy, in speaking of an "absolutely non-empirical social factor" in human activity I take it you are affirming the CHAT principle that cultural knowledge is, for a large part, derived by the individual **indirectly** through the words, artifacts and actions of other people, through **cultural** interaction, and not just **directly** through individual **sensory** experience. Is this what you mean? Also, Andy, you suggest that for you or me, a 'rook' is a concept, but for a child, it is probably a potential concept (or might be, may I add, a pre-concept, or a pseudo-concept). How is that different from suggesting that for concept-trained adults, cev, bik, mur and lag are concepts, even though for a child they might be a pseudo-concepts? Not quite understanding your argument ...
***************
The problem may lie in whether we are using the term "concept" in the one-rational-concept-system theory of Vygotsky or the two- rational-concept-system theory of Davydov. I was using Vygotsky's system. One reason I am having trouble easily jumping from LSV's system to VVD's is some confusion I am having over terminology, along with Davydov's (for me, so far) unsatisfying account of complexive thinking. Interestingly, Davydov seems to only employ the term "true concept" twice in Types of Generalizations. Once as part of a quote from Bruner et al, and once in the section in Chapter 6 on Vygotsky's work on concept formation, nearby some of the quotes you cite. Here is what Davydov says about true concepts: "From the standpoint of dialectical logic, concepts, as they are encountered in our everyday speech, are not concepts in the proper sense of the word. They are, rather, general conceptions of things. But it is indisputable that they are a transitional stage from complexes and pseudo-concepts to true concepts in the dialectical sense of the word [65, pp. 196-197]." In a sense, this may be the same problem that you point to in your essay, Andy, where Vygotsky was using the generic term "concept" to refer to both all concept formations at all developmental levels as well as to their most highly developed forms. Davydov, and perhaps you, may sometimes be doing something similar - "concepts," "true concepts," "concepts in the proper sense of the word," etc. Maybe a clearer taxonomic nomenclature is needed. Or maybe there is something I am not yet quite getting. Davydov's suggestion that general conceptualizations are **transitional** between "everyday" speech, that is, "complexes and pseudo-concepts," seems very important to me. Is there a place where he specifically develops this idea, or perhaps, where someone else does? Understanding how to fully incorporate what we know about complexive thinking into a general theory of concept formation might help me to make the leap from Vygotsky to Davydov.
- Steve
On Sep 12, 2009, at 8:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
One, what do you mean by "an absolutely non-empirical social factor"

One. When I say "absolutely non-empirical" I do not try to deny that all knowledge begins from the senses. For example, if I drive on the left because the law requires me to, I still have to be able to read signs, understand speech etc. to know and obey that law. But you wouldn't call that "empirical" would you? Concepts come to us through using artefacts in joint actions with other people, i.e., activity, not passive contemplation. See "Theses on Feuerbach." Conceptual knowledge presupposes all the senses, but is not thereby "empirical."


any game. In chess, for example, rooks and pawns are "concepts" - yes?

Two. I thought about exactly this one as well. So if playing a good game of chess, knowing the moves for Kings and Knights etc., and how to play a good strategy, implies *conceptual* thought, then all the primary school children who participate in chess championships are alredy masters of true concepts. And it doesn't stop there, does it? The implication is that *logical thinking* is ipso facto, conceptual thought. But primary school kids in general use logical argument, apply strategies in games, learn arithmetic and grammatical rules, etc, etc.

So why is LSV so insistent that conceptual thought is possible only for adolescents? I couldn't find the reference, maybe someone can, but I am sure LSV believes that logical thinking and argument by giving reasons "belongs" to the 7-11 age group, not 15+ - like with LSV's example of a "dog", "rook" may be a concept for you, but for a child "rook" is a potential concept.

The point is that "machine-like" logical thought is not conceptual thought. It relies on pre-concepts, or what Davydov calls (charitably in my view) "empirical concepts" or on one occasion "general notions."

Does that help?
Andy


--
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Andy Blunden
http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea

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