[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: zuhanden/vorhanden Re: [xmca] When does an action begin and end?
---the worker's "vorhanden" of the hammer is different than the
scientist's----see also Alfred Schutz's interpretation on this;
---Heidegger doesn't say anything about meaning, and especially he
explicitly emphasizes that there is nothing that comes to words, that
word gets. Instead, Heidegger emphasizes the existence of an already
existing word shot through with significantion in which the words find
their place. This is also the way in which, for example, Jacques
Derrida reads Heidegger.
---with respect to words, Heidegger says that we our saying them
presupposes our hearing, and hearing presupposes understanding. Again,
it is not the words that get meanings constructed, signification
precedes the word, written or spoken.
---on the relation of the written and spoken word, I recommend
Derrida, who spent his life writing on this, especially he spends time
to show how the Greek already thought in terms of imprint when they
theorized the relation between the soul, which gets copied into the
speech of the speaker
I am not at home to give you the exact page numbers so we have to do
with the statements above.
On 18-Aug-09, at 7:38 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:
"Broken tools" is not the central idea, it's just the lead example.
Heidegger would say we can use tools zuhanden-ly without (in the
context of this thread) being "conscious" of them in the same way as
when we think about them as vorhanden -- like a scientist engaged
not in using it, but in theorizing about it. When a tool stops
working, then we shift attitude from using it in its Zuhandenheit to
attending to it consciously in its Vorhandenheit. The broken tool is
just the classic example in H, but I think the concepts might apply
also to the Zuhandenheit of the printed words when reading for the
meaning, versus the Vorhandenheit of the printed text when it, for
whatever reason, becomes the focus of conscious attention.
I don't want to say more about this since others on this list are so
much more knowledgeable than I am about Heidegger.
I don't know much about reading instruction, but I do know
absolutely how it was in my Chinese classes. It was in the third
year class that we could read texts in Chinese characters aloud at a
reasonable pace. When others were reading aloud, I could follow the
text with understanding. When I was the one reading aloud, I was one
of the more proficient lectors in the class; but when I reached the
end of my reading I could say nothing about what I had just read.
On Tue, 18 Aug 2009, Mike Cole wrote:
Sorry this came to me via gmail in two disparate threads.
So Andy IS talking about operations-actions.
Tony asks about broken tools, which, in a way, typos are.
To put a tiny bit more flesh on my questions about consciousness. A
procedure in my college classes when issues of
reading instruction come up is to ask a student to read a passage
assigned readings out loud. Sans typos, the standard
reaction, even with text that student can discuss pretty well, is
person who reads out loud cannot say anything about the
content of the paragraph read.
What does this mean for the discussion of consciousness?
Why is reading aloud a standard practice in reading instruction
xmca mailing list
Lansdowne Professor, Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A548
University of Victoria
xmca mailing list