Mmm, well I had a read of the relevant passage in Hegel again last night,
Steve, and again modified my opinion of its meaning. Here is a link to the
point which is the nearest Hegel comes to this relation:
http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334
I find this prettty opaque quite honestly, but I think if you read it on
the assumption that Hegel is talking about the differentiating out of (c)
individual consciousness (which is what Hegel meant by "psychology") from
(a) animalistic action/reaction and (b) the collective consciousness of a
cultural group, you might just get some sense out of it.
LSV put it this way:
"All cultural development of the child passes through three basic stages
that can be described in the following way using Hegel’s analysis." (LSV
CW
v. 4 p. 104) My paraphrase of the rest of the paragraph: the development
of
a gesture as (1) reaching for an object, (2) a reaction arises, but not on
the part of the object, but another person, who completes the grasping for
the child, and in being directed towards another person, the gesture
becomes
contracted, and (3) becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as
good as any a representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link
to.
-----------
Vygotsky may have learnt about this passage secondhand from Lewin. But
everyone knew about the Hegelian phrases "thing-in-itself", "thing-for-us"
and "thing-for-itself", since these were part of the popular discourse
around Hegel in Marxist circles. So I presume "concept-in-itself," the
"concept-for-others" and the "concept-for-myself" is a kind of play on
these
concepts. But "concept-for-myself" is just not something you'd find in
Hegel. The concept is always objective for Hegel.
-----------
Now what Vygotsky meant by it:
"Concept-in-itself" I take to be the unconscious use of words by a small
child as an indivisible part of an action, a "handle" for a thing. This is
close to the Hegelian idea, because the child is not yet conscious of
having
a concept or thing-name at all; it is indissolubly connected to the object
itself.
"Concept-for-others" I take to mean the use of a word for communicative
action, e.g. asking an adult for assistance, and it is directed at the
adult.
"Concept-for-myself" is the use of language by the child to control its
own
actions, speech growing in, as they say, towards silent speech. I don't
know
if I entirely concur with Kozulin in saying this, but the idea you quote
from Kozulin is certainly closely connnected, because the use of words to
achieve intelligent *control* of one's own actions is surely closely
connected with awareness of one's own consciousness (and behaviour). And I
think you can link LSV and Hegel with (a) and (b) but I can't see it with
(c).
That's where I'm at with all this Steve.
Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:
Thanks, Andy. I think I am being a little dense here, because now I am
uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as well! LOL
I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't think
they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**. I might even be
able
to more or less correctly answer a question or two about what Vygotsky
said
on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be doing so on the basis of
pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can memorize the genetic order that
Vygotsky says that the concept-in-itself, the concept-for-others and the
concept-for-myself appear in the child - but not because I really
understand
**why** they appear in that order, or because I understand just **what**
these kinds of concepts actually are. I couldn't, offhand, give you
clear
examples of these three kinds of concepts. Your quote from Hegel is
helpful, but I have not fully conceptualized Hegel's treatment of these
ideas, either. I'm not so sure how I'd get very far on a school quiz on
that! LOL
So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points. First, what
did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself," "concept-for-others"
and
"concept-for-myself"? Second, what are some examples of these kinds of
concepts? Third, why does he claim that the first two, as a rule,
precede
the latter in a child's intellectual development?
For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper, from
Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.
Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):
"It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic preconditions
of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the pseudoconcept in
the
form of the “concept-in-itself” and the “concept-for-others”, because
these
occur earlier in the child than the “concept-for-myself”: he further
asserts
that this sequence is not restricted to conceptual development because it
occurs as a “rule rather than the exception in the intellectual
development
of the child” (p. 124)."
Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of
Thought
and Language they refer to (pg 124):
"The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in the
child earlier than the concept-for-myself. The concept-in-itself and the
concept-for-others, which are already present in the pseudoconcept, are
the
basic genetic precondition for the development of real concepts. This
peculiar genetic situation is not limited to the attainment of concepts;
it
is the rule rather the exception in the intellectual development of the
child." (7)
In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page
268), Kozulin comments:
"7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has
far-reaching philosophical implications. First of all, if the conscious
awareness of one's own intellectual operations ("concept-for-me") is only
a
secondary achievement, which follows the practical use of these
operations,
then the individual cannot be considered a self-conscious center of
activity. [Note from Steve: I don't grasp what Alex just said.] The
individual appears rather as a "construction" built at the crossroads of
the
inner and outer realities. Second, the phenomenon of functional
equivalence
between real and pseudoconcepts warns us against taking the functional
appearance of communication for its ultimate content. The usage of "one
and
the same" words and subsequent "understanding" may be illusory. Such
illusion of understanding, based on the confusion between functional and
essential characteristics, constantly emerges in child-adult
communication,
in the dialogue between different social groups, and in contacts between
different cultures. For further discussion of this point, see Alex
Kozulin,
"Psychology and Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of Their
Interaction," *The Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."
<end>
On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I understand,
is
derived from Hegel)?
Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself", but
the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself, then
for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e., self-consciousness, is
quite
consistent with Hegel's idea. It's really a play on Hegel.
For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
"But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to
myself.
In forming this absolute division between what is mine and myself, Mind
constitutes its existence and establishes itself as external to itself.
It
postulates itself in the externality."
Andy
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/
Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca