Re: [xmca] Ethnomethodology and Hedegaard's Article

[Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>]

David asks a great question - what did LSV mean in Chapt 5 (written  
about 1930) by the terms "pseudoconcept" and "functional meaning"?

Here is more or less how I read Ch 5 on the pseudoconcept, functional  
meaning, and other questions, subject to hearing how other's do.   
After all, I reserve the right to learn new things and change my mind  
- even after I have put up an argument.  So there.  :-))

First, functional meaning.  If the five year old Jens and the  
pedagogue (his Kindergarten teacher) both pointed at a picture of an  
infant whale and agreed it was a "baby whale," that would be  
functional equivalence.  The adult would probably (but not  
necessarily) be thinking of the term conceptually, and the child,  
complexively.  However, regardless of how they individually and  
separately arrived at the common functional meaning, they would be  
communicating about the same object in practice.  The same word is  
being used by both people to point to the same object.  Functionally,  
therefore, their word usage would be equivalent - the functional  
meaning would be the same.

And herein lies the beauty of Vygotsky's developmental theory of  
concept formation.  This brings us to complexive and conceptual  
thinking.  While the adult may have been conceptualizing specifically  
whale calves (newborn and very young whales) in their intended meaning  
of the term, the child, who Vygotsky theorized is probably using  
mostly complexive thinking in the form of pseudoconcepts up through  
adolescence, is likely to be thinking of the meaning of the term  
differently.  To the child left to their concrete-imaginative devices,  
many kinds of things besides whale calves might belong to the meaning  
of the term "baby whale."

In fact, everyday speech even among adults might employ complexes, and  
not concepts, in this kind of case.  In complexive thinking, by a  
child or an adult, in addition to referring to whale calves, the term  
"baby whales" might include any relatively small whale, or when  
looking at a group of whales, might include the smallest one,  
regardless of age, or the youngest one, regardless of size.  Jens, who  
seemed to want to learn things "conceptually," might have fit!  Or  
would he?  Hard to say from the evidence provided, but interesting to  
think about.

If I grasp Vygotsky in Ch 5, the tendency in complexive thinking is to  
think of word meanings not as concepts driven by rule-based  
categories, or by any such scientific conceptualization, but as groups  
of objects, features etc. assembled by employing shifting and not  
necessarily consistent rules - by associating, chaining, collecting,  
etc.   Generally speaking, complex thinking employs forms of  
synthesis, loose association, generalization and even some limited  
abstraction processes that enable the person to engage in essentially  
completely concrete thinking unconstrained by overarching and unifying  
abstract principles.

But, and Vygotsky stresses this point, children live in a world where  
adults, cultural conventions and daily activity drive most of the word  
usage around them, so they learn to assign the right adult words to  
the right objects out of habit and necessity.  School is especially  
effective at drilling children with these skills.  This can create the  
illusion that children are thinking in concepts when they are in fact,  
according to Vygotsky, thinking in complexes.

Hence, the term "pseudoconcept."  A pseudoconcept is functionally but  
not intellectually a concept - intellectually, that is, in terms of  
the verbal/mental operations employed, it is a complex.

In Vygotsky's view, it is not until adolescence (11 or so and on) that  
the schooled child begins to master conceptual thinking.  But it does  
happen, and this is a major transformation in thinking processes - a  
huge accomplishment, and Vygotsky hails it as such.  This is a key  
example, as Vygotsky will argue in Ch 6, of his core education thesis:  
learning leads development.

I might toss in here that Sylvia Scribner suggested in 1981 or so that  
while Vygotsky never mentioned this idea, writing and literacy  
specifically may be the decisive factor in the human development of  
concept formation, both historically and ontogenetically.  In other  
words, writing in particular might be the operative factor in  
schooling's ability to teach children to master true concepts, and for  
humanity as a whole to enter an era of new kinds of thinking  
processes.  She suggests that this transition in Western society may  
have occurred between the Homeric oral tradition and what may have  
been entirely new forms of conceptual thinking and speaking enabled by  
the newly invented phonetic writing tradition, exemplified by Plato's  
Dialogues.  In other words, writing made philosophy possible.  This  
implies that new psychological processes came into being.  Thus,  
Vygotsky's theory of concept formation is not only about individual or  
ontogenetic development, it is also a theory of human social and  
cultural progress - and the evolution of the entire species.

Back to the pseudoconcept ... the pseudoconcept, as I read Vygotsky,  
refers to word usage where functionally equivalent correspondences  
between words and meanings are evident on the outside, but where on  
the inside of one or both sides of the dialogue lurks the concrete,  
creative, roving, and not-always-linear-logical associations of  
complexive thinking.

Vygotsky stresses, but only in brief suggestions, that adults as well  
as children often use pseudocomplexes in everyday activity.  Has  
anyone done any research on this?  That could be very interesting  
indeed ...

One of the intriguing features of the design of the Vygotsky-Sakharov  
blocks, the concept formation test applied in 1928-1929 or so to  
hundreds of children, adults and some schizophrenic patients - (this,  
of course, is the empirical basis of Ch 5) - was that even when a  
child was stumbling toward the right answer, if their reasoning was  
complexive, the existence of pseudoconcepts and other forms of complex  
thinking could be revealed by the testee's commentary to the tester,  
which was strongly encouraged.  Vygotsky and Sakharov called this test  
the method of dual stimulation because the testee encountered not only  
the physical blocks, but a word system for meanings they had to  
discover.  They did this by introducing the nonsense words that the  
blocks would be grouped under at the beginning. It was up to the  
testee to discover the relations that determined these groups by  
trying out different ideas and discussing their moves with the tester,  
who gradually revealed which block belonged to which group during the  
session.  In the process of interacting with the tester, and telling  
them what their reasoning was for guessing at this or that grouping as  
they proceeded, their actual syncretic, complexive, preconceptual or  
conceptual reasoning was revealed.

In Chapter 6 (dictated from his sick bed in 1934), where he shifted  
the focus of his concept formation theory to the development of  
everyday and scientific concepts in children, LSV reported on  
subsequent experiments - such as complexive vs conceptual  
understandings of numbers and arithmetic, and the completion of  
causality statements ending in conjunctions such as "because" and  
"although" such as "the boy fell off his bicycle because ...", which  
revealed some striking differences between everyday (spontaneous,  
complexive) and scientific (schooled, conceptual) thinking and speech  
in pre-adolescent students.

Vygotsky seems to have largely or completely dropped the term  
pseudoconcept in Ch 6 - as well as the term potential concept, which  
is an especially interesting but difficult concept because no  
experimental results accompanied its introduction into T&S.  In Ch 6  
LSV began using the term "preconcept" for both terms instead,  
alongside his Ch 5-termed formations syncretic images (the  
impressionistic thinking of very young children), complexes, and true  
concepts.

Clearly, Vygtosky's concept of how concept formation developed was  
itself developing.  The confusing numbering of stages in Ch 5 suggests  
to me that what became the third stage of four (abstract reasoning -  
analysis, partitioning, segregation - the second phase of he followed  
contemporaries like Groos and called potential concepts), may have  
been added on to an earlier draft of version of what became Ch 5  
(probably a conference report), which may have not initially mentioned  
the abstraction process as a "stage", but when it was so added, the  
earlier sections were inadvertently not updated and renumbered  
accordingly accordingly.  This is just a guess on my part.  This is  
really just an empirical question of the editing and publishing  
process - but exactly what happened to which version and who did or  
did not do what may be a hard question to track down a decisive answer  
to.  But surely, on this question of the contradictory numbering of  
the stages in chapter 5, David, Paula and I are not the first to  
ponder it?  LOL   Thousands have probably noticed it, not to mention,  
translators and publishers who have worried over it.  It wouldn't  
surprise me if the editing error was in the original 1934 Russian  
version, and has been carried over ever since.  But I am just  
speculating.  Anyone know the story?  I have an electronic version of  
Ch 5 (from MIA, courtesy of Andy) highlighted up - the discrepancies  
are actually quite glaring.

As David says, the four stage schema in some parts of Ch 5, but not  
others, which talk of only three stages, is 1) syncretic thinking, 2)  
complexive thinking, 3) abstract thinking (the stage where potential  
concepts appear), and 4) true conceptual thinking.  Vygotsky  
emphasizes that these stages and their inner phases do not necessarily  
occur in sequence.  In reality, they don't appear in the genetic  
sequence they are being presented in to understand their logical  
relations.

Vygtosky called stages 1) and 2) one root, what could be called the  
syncretic-complexive root.  And he explained that stage 3, which could  
perhaps be called abstract processing, comprised the other root, and  
starts very early in life.  Animals, in fact, are capable of certain  
rudimentary, wordless abstraction processes, and some contemporary  
psychologists called these potential concepts, such as when an ape  
when wanting a stick might grab other objects which resemble it  
qualitatively in some way.  As a matter of fact, many of the terms  
Vygotsky was using for concept formation were borrowed and modified  
from the contemporary literature.  Vygotsky also stresses that these  
two roots don't appear by themselves - they are generally found  
together.  One root represents association, synthesis, and the other  
root mentally isolating, partitioning, analysis.  Analysis and  
synthesis are both essential in all stages of concept formation.  He  
was only separating the two roots out, he explained - (abstracting  
them out, to use that term in this context) - for scientific and  
analytical purposes.

Ch 6 (1934), with its introduction of two new terms not mentioned in  
Ch 5 - everyday thinking and scientific thinking - along with its  
fairly severe critique and revision of aspects of the way the stages  
were presented and explained in Ch 5 (1930) - suggests to me the  
possibility that Vygotsky was headed toward an even more thoroughgoing  
reconceptualization of his overall developmental "schema" - but that  
is another discussion.

I should mention that Ch 5 of Thinking and Speech represents, in  
several very important ways, both the inspiration and the tragedy of  
Vygotsky et. al. and their work on concept formation.  This occurred  
to me as I was reading the very helpful chapter on concept formation  
by Van Der Veer and Valsiner in their Understanding Vygotsky (1991)  
the other day.  First, and most important, there is the, beauty magic  
and power of the blocks, of discovering this extraordinary dimension  
regarding the psychological functioning of children and humans of all  
ages.  It is a quite possibly a huge discovery, one that even CHAT  
today may not yet fully grasp.  Vygotsky emphasized its importance.   
But these inspiring discoveries were hard won and accompanied by much  
tragedy.  There was the suicide of Sakharov in 1928.  The 1928-1934  
period was one of terrible changes and blows to scientific life in the  
USSR, dispersing the cultural-historical research movement, among many  
other things.  Vygotsky, of course, was deathly ill when he wrote and  
assembled Ch 5 and Ch 6, and Thinking and Speech as a whole, in 1934.   
And pedology, the study of children that Vygotsky's work on concept  
formation was aimed squarely at building, was abolished as a science  
in the USSR, along with all of Vygotsky's work, in 1936.

We are today still reconstructing that work, trying to pick up where  
Vygotsky, Sakharov and many other left off.  We are still, literally,  
picking up the pieces.  I quite thankful to Paula for her work with  
the blocks, which has helped me understand much more about them.  I  
have always been very curious.  Through her ISCAR papers and  
presentation, I got a list of their colors, shapes, knowledge of their  
very interesting history, etc.  And now I am learning a great deal  
from her collaboration with David, whose insights into T&S and  
Vygotsky, and amazing work leading a team that is translating Thinking  
and Speech into Korean is giving me a terrific course in Vygotsky's  
most important book, and a much better sense of his theory of concept  
formation than I ever had.  Xmca once again shows itself to be a  
marvelous platform for learning.   Who needs textbooks, as Mike  
suggests, when we have so many original writings, and boatloads of  
valuable commentary and debate, and some of the best CHAT scholars,  
thinkers and enthusiasts in the world to discuss this all with on xmca?

Returning to the thread, I like that Mariane has pointed us so  
straightforwardly toward some of the core issues that are essential to  
Vygotsky's theorizing about the social situation of development, the  
SSD.  And I like that David and Mike are holding in their hands at the  
same time both SSD theorizing and concept formation theory for mutual  
examination as we ponder Marianne's article.

At such an intersection of Vygotsky's evocative ideas, we can ponder  
many questions ...

What influence does the SSD have on concept development?   (Vygotsky  
made a strong case, btw, that the mastery of true concepts was NOT a  
biologically-based change - brains did not suddenly get a lot bigger  
at adolescence, for example).  What is the impact of schooling on  
concept formation?  Why does it have that effect?  Is it the reading,  
'riting and 'rithmetic, as Scribner suggests?

What about parents, family?  What about social class (the affluent,  
the poor ... and everyone else)?  And conversely, what influences do  
the particular forms of concept formation employed by an individual in  
a given time of their lives have on that individual's **experience**  
of their living SSD?  How do "skills" and experiences with forming  
syncretic images, complexes, pseudoconcepts, preconcepts, concepts  
etc. **impact** social relations, emotional development, personality  
development?  With what kinds of conceptual formations, just to toss  
out a provocative question, do adults verbally process emotional  
experience?  Do things like social class relations influence this?  How?

To bring this back to Mariane's article and finally end this rambling  
post with a couple more questions - and I think this first one is the  
core question that David was suggesting - through what kinds of  
psychological formations - syncretic images, complexes,  
pseudoconcepts, potential concepts, preconcepts, concepts, etc. - was  
Jens experiencing his day at Kindergarten?  And similarly, through  
which of these kinds of formations - or others - were his pedagogue  
and observer experiencing him - and their own days?

I sure got lots more questions than answers!

Cheers,
~ Steve




On Mar 15, 2009, at 7:32 PM, David Kellogg wrote:

> Mike:
>
> Context is a ragbag in linguistics too. Halliday tries VERY HARD to  
> save it by using Malinowski (context of culture and context of  
> situation). Widdowson does a much better job with "co-text" and "pre- 
> text", but most of what we want to study is still "pre-text".
>
> For DEVELOPMENTAL purposes, the answer to this, and also to the ZPD/ 
> ZPL distinction, is right there in the book that LSV never wrote,  
> "Child Development", in Volume Five. Not culture vs. situation or in- 
> text vs. out-text, but social situation of development, the crisis,  
> the new formso f mental life.
>
> Oh, my note. Well, I meant that PSEUDOCONCEPTS are concepts for  
> others, while true concepts have to be concepts for myself. You are  
> right to point out that they are not functionally equivalent except  
> in rather superficial interactions: the child who thinks a "baby  
> whale" is a baby and not a whale will eventually be undeceived.
>
> Halliday's example, "Some dinosaurs learned to fly and others  
> learned to swim", which has a conceptual Darwinian interpretation  
> and a concrete, complexive anthropomorphic one, will eventually be  
> resolved in favor of the former, so they are not PERMANENTLY  
> functionally equivalent.
>
> But it takes a while! After all Linnaeus and even Lysenko basically  
> have a non-conceptual, phenotypical interpretation of how dinosaurs  
> learned to fly and swim. So functional equivalence is real and  
> durable.
>
> When LSV insists on functional equivalence (p. 144), I think he's  
> talking about functional equivalence within Sakharov's experimental  
> conditions.
>
> Do you think LSV's reference to "three basic stages" on p. 134  
> EXCLUDES concepts? Or that there are THREE "phases" to the third  
> stage, "abstraction", "potential concept", and "true concept"?
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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