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Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24



Nikolai:

Respectfully I must point out you have misunderstood the question.  I was
not referring to the difference between reflexology and Mead's social
behaviorism.  That is a clear and concise distinction.  When I mentioned
behaviorism I was referring to Skinner's child.  Incorrectly or not I have
always lumped Skinner with Pavlov, Watson, Behterov, etc.  Do you see a
distinction there or not?  Just curious.  If you are not interested in
joining this fish fry that is a matter I can certainly understand.

eric


                                                                                                                            
                      "Nikolai                                                                                              
                      Veresov"                 To:      <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>                                               
                      <nikolai.veresso         cc:                                                                          
                      v@oulu.fi>               Subject: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24                            
                      Sent by:                                                                                              
                      xmca-bounces@web                                                                                      
                      er.ucsd.edu                                                                                           
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                            
                      02/10/2009 05:31                                                                                      
                      AM                                                                                                    
                      Please respond                                                                                        
                      to "eXtended                                                                                          
                      Mind, Culture,                                                                                        
                      Activity"                                                                                             
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                            




Eric wrote
>>Now that you have set
 this record straight I am interested in your view of the difference.  I
>> look forward to your reply.

I think there is no reply needed? Eric. The topic of difference between
Russian Pavlov's and Behterev's reflexology and social behaviourism is
already discussed in many places.
Nikolai

----- Original Message -----
From: <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2009 7:13 PM
Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24


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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13 (Mike Cole)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 09:13:02 -0800
> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> <30364f990902090913l5ad0c719h9cbb0c2081cb7590@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=KOI8-R
>
> Nice to have your chronological clarifications, Nikolai.
> I believe the initial word you were looking for in your greeting was
> discussant, althought at times
> it may seem difficult to tell the difference!
>
> I hope you will join us in voting for an article to discussion from MCA
> and
> joint the discussion.
> mike
>
> On Mon, Feb 9, 2009 at 7:53 AM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Nikolai:
>>
>> Very concise and thoughtful summary.  I count myself as among the
>> ignorant
>> who have always equated reflexology and behaviorism.  Now that you have
>> set
>> this record straight I am interested in your view of the difference.  I
>> look forward to your reply.
>>
>> eric
>>
>>
>>
>>                      "Nikolai
>>                      Veresov"                 To:      <
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>                      <nikolai.veresso         cc:
>>                      v@oulu.fi>               Subject: [xmca] Re: xmca
>> Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>>                      Sent by:
>>                      xmca-bounces@web
>>                      er.ucsd.edu
>>
>>
>>                      02/09/2009 01:14
>>                      AM
>>                      Please respond
>>                      to "eXtended
>>                      Mind, Culture,
>>                      Activity"
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Good day to all highly respected disputants
>>
>> As you know I am not actively involved in this discussion list, but I
>> read
>> it carefully. I made my mind to interrupt highly respected participants
>> because of two reasons. First, it seems to me that before doing
>> conclusions
>>
>> the researcher should investigate the topic as deep as possible. Second,

>> my
>>
>> name was mentioned in Andy's message, which gives me right to reply, not

>> in
>>
>> defence, but in respect to make things clear.
>>
>> As A. Pushkin wrote: Mislead me please, since I am glad to be misled.
>>
>> Andy wrote:
>>
>> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for
>> > behaviourism"
>> I
>> > found the style of presentation a bit confusing at times, and then I
>> > read
>> > the translator's (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the
>> > speech
>> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet another
>> document.
>> > So I think to myself "I have been wrong all along!" So I tracked down
>> > the
>> > speech and transcribed it.
>> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the "Consciousness is

>> > a
>> > problem ..." one.
>> >
>> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the two
documents
>> is
>> > an academic nicety (from where I'm coming from.)
>>
>> The papers of Vygotsky (1) "The methods of..." based on his presentation
>> made at 1924 Congress in Petrograd and (2) "Consciousness as a problem"
>> reflect different periods of his scientific evolution. I mean the
>> transition
>> from reflexological model to behaviouristic one. What can mislead the
>> reader
>> of this paper is only the radical lack of academic knowledge of what is
>> the
>>
>> difference between reflexology and behaviourism. It is true, that the
>> papers
>> are connected. But what is also true, that there is a deep difference in
>> approaches in these two papers. I made the comparison of them in my
book,
>> no
>> need to repeat it here, but let us just take two places from each. In
the
>> first paper, criticising the dualism of psychology, he argued the
>> necessity
>>
>> to combine "subjective psychology" and reflexology on the basis of "an
>> objective" method of study of the human consciousness. In the second one

>> he
>>
>> rejected the idea of any reflexological explanation of consciousness:
"we
>> should beware of any direct transportation of reflexological laws into
>> psychology" (Vygotsky 1982, p. 83). There is a number other places in
the
>> both papers, which show the differences between them - what is needed to
>> see
>> them, is just to open your eyes.
>>
>> There is one more point here, which cannot be missed. These two papers
>> belong to two periods and it means that they must be analysed together
>> with
>>
>> the other papers made during the same period. I mean, particularly, that
>> the
>> "Methods of..." is the result of Vygotsky's work in Gomel (definitely
>> before
>> 1924). It means, that Vygotsky was working in the psychology not in 1924
>> but
>> long ago (he himself wrote that he started his studies in psychology in
>> 1917). "Pedagogical psychology" was written also in Gomel, and this book

>> is
>>
>> reflexological, at least it is NOT behaviouristic (social
>> behaviouristic).
>> Even more, it could be a surprise to Andy, that at Petrograd Vygotsky
>> made
>> not one presentation, but three (the Program of the Congress is
available
>> in
>> the Internet and in the book of Gita Vygodskaya). If we take all these
>> papers together we will see very clear, that there is absolutely nothing
>> about social behaviourism in them, including "The methods...". On the
>> contrary,  Vygotsky called himself than a bigger reflexologist than
>> Pavlov
>> (Vygotsky, 1982c, p. 58; Vygotsky, 1994, p. 40). Of course, his
>> reflexology
>>
>> was not Pavlovian, it was in search for the objective method of study of
>> subjective phenomena. This important period of Vygotsky's work is missed

>> in
>>
>> Jussi's paper, which is very sad since it completely destroys his
overall
>> construction.
>>
>> On the other hand, "Consciousness as a problem..." also was not a lonely
>> paper made from nothing. It reflects the period when LSV was working in
>> Moscow in a field of defectology (1924-19245), particularly with deaf
and
>> dumb children. In his experimental studies he went to the conclusion
that
>> the concept of reflex is not valid to explain the point and it is needed

>> to
>>
>> search for another concept. Here again to understand the point we have
>> not
>> to separate the "Consciousness as a problem..." from the other works of
>> that
>> period. I doubt whether Andy knows LSV papers made during that period
>> (1924-1925), whereas they ALL reflect the movement of Vygotsky from
>> reflexology to behaviourism. Behaviouristic model was not satisfactory
>> and
>> LSV had to reject it very soon, but this is another story I have no time

>> to
>>
>> discuss. I just want to say, that before comparing papers and made
>> conclusions that the "only difference is their academic nicety" one have

>> to
>>
>> investigate all the matters, which are behind and which are clear for
>> those
>>
>> who have academic background. Otherwise the analysis will remain
>> superficial. A golden ring and a wooden wheel also look similar, and so
>> what?
>>
>> Nikolai
>>
>>
>> From: <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2009 6:32 AM
>> Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>>
>>
>> > Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >
>> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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>> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>> > xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >
>> > You can reach the person managing the list at
>> > xmca-owner@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >
>> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> > than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
>> >
>> >
>> > Today's Topics:
>> >
>> >   1. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Andy Blunden)
>> >   2. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Mike Cole)
>> >
>> >
>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >
>> > Message: 1
>> > Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2009 15:29:57 +1100
>> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Behaviourism
>> > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> > Message-ID: <498A6B45.2050109@mira.net>
>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
>> >
>> > Apologies all. :( In typical fashion, after declaring
>> > ignorance of this topic, I try to "correct" others, then
>> > have to "correct myself", then withdraw my correction, and
>> > now want to correct myself again. :( "Shoot first, answer
>> > questions later!"
>> >
>> > I have always based my understanding of Vygotsky's entrance
>> > into the world of psycholgy on Mike's Introduction to "The
>> > Making of Mind" referring to the speech at the 2nd Congress
>> > of blah blah blah in January 1924. That was why I objected
>> > to the claim that Vygotsky started out as a "social
>> > behaviourist" or *any kind* of behaviourist.
>> >
>> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for
>> > behaviourism" I found the style of presentation a bit
>> > confusing at times, and then I read the translator's
>> > (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the speech
>> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet
>> > another document. So I think to myself "I have been wrong
>> > all along!" So I tracked down the speech and transcribed it:
>> >
>> > http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm
>> >
>> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the
>> > "Consciousness is a problem ..." one.
>> >
>> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the
>> > two documents is an academic nicety (from where I'm coming
>> > from.)
>> >
>> > So I just want to ask teh advocates of Vygotsky I, II and
>> > III a couple of questions to help me understand:
>> >
>> > (1) By "social behaviourist" do you mean a follower of GH
>> > Mead? Or do you mean someone thinking along the lines to
>> > which GH Mead would come? Can you define the central idea?
>> >
>> > (2) The idea of construction of self (I) via Other (me) is
>> > not sufficient basis for calling someone "social
>> > behaviourist" is it? Whether you track this idea to Hegel
>> > (1807), Mead (1932), Kojeve (1937), or elsewhere?.
>> >
>> > (3) Do you agree that Vygotsky's January 1924 speech is a
>> > full-on attack on Behaviourism, which was at that time the
>> > dominant creed at the Congress? He also attack the otehr
>> > speakers at the Congress.
>> >
>> > (4) Do you think it makes sense to call someone engaged in a
>> > critique of all existing views, who knows they do not yet
>> > have an adequate theory and are just at the beginning of
>> > their critique, any "ism" ?
>> >
>> > Serious questions. I'm trying to understand where you guys
>> > are coming from.
>> >
>> > Andy
>> >
>> > Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >> Mmmm. After re-reading this material myself, I have to now put myself
>> >> into a "Don't Know" basket. Interesting material, but I withdraw my
>> >> attempts to make any claims about it.
>> >> Andy
>> >> Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>> On the question of Vygotsky as a "social Behaviourist before 1929",
I
>> >>> have scanned two pages From the Introduction to Б─°Mind in
>> >>> Society,Б─²
>> >>> by
>> >>> Mike Cole and Sylvia Scribner, pp 4-6
>> >>>
>> >>> POSTREVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY IN RUSSIA
>> >>>
>> >>> In the early decades of the twentieth century psychology in Russia,
>> >>> as
>> >>> in Europe, was torn between contending schools, each of which
offered
>> >>> partial explanations of a limited range of phenomena. In 1923 at the
>> >>> first all-Russian psychoneurological congress K. N. Kornilov
>> >>> initiated
>> >>> the first major organizational and intellectual shift in psychology
>> >>> following the revolution. At that time the prestigious Institute of
>> >>> Psychology in Moscow was headed by G. I. Chelpanov, an adherent of
>> >>> Wundt's introspective psychology and a foe of behaviorism. (He had
>> >>> published the sixth edition of his book, The Mind of Man, a critique
>> >>> of materialist theories of the mind, in 1917, just before the
>> >>> revolution.) Chelpanov assigned a restricted role to Marxism in
>> >>> psychology, asserting it could help explain the social organization
>> >>> of
>> >>> consciousness but not the properties of individual consciousness. In

>> >>> a
>> >>> talk entitled "Contemporary Psychology and Marxism" Kornilov
>> >>> criticized Chelpanov both for the idealistic basis of his
>> >>> psychological theory and for the restricted role he assigned to
>> >>> Marxism in psychology. Kornilov, who called his own approach
>> >>> reactology, sought to subsume all branches of psychology within a
>> >>> Marxist framework that used behavioral reactions as the basic data.
>> >>>
>> >>> Kornilov's critique of Chelpanov in 1923 won the day. Chelpanov was
>> >>> removed as director of the Institute of Psychology and was replaced
>> >>> by
>> >>> Kornilov, who immediately brought together a corps of young
>> >>> scientists
>> >>> dedicated to formulating and promoting a *behavioral, Marxist theory
>> >>> of psychology*.
>> >>>
>> >>> Vygotsky must have produced quite a sensation one year later at the
>> >>> second psychoneurological meeting when he gave a talk entitled
>> >>> "Consciousness as an Object of the Psychology of Behavior." Whatever
>> >>> else one extracted from Kornilov's reactological approach, it quite
>> >>> clearly did not feature the role of consciousness in human activity,
>> >>> nor did it accord the concept of consciousness a role in
>> >>> psychological
>> >>> science.
>> >>>
>> >>> Vygotsky was *dissenting* from newly established authority. He was
>> >>> not, however, promoting a return to the position advocated by
>> >>> Chelpanov. In his initial speech and a series of subsequent
>> >>> publications, he made it clear that in his view none of the existing
>> >>> schools of psychology provided a firm foundation for establishing a
>> >>> unified theory of human psychological processes. Borrowing a phrase
>> >>> from his German contemporaries, he often referred to the "crisis in
>> >>> psychology" and set himself the task of achieving a synthesis of
>> >>> contending views on a completely new theoretical basis.
>> >>>
>> >>> For Vygotsky's Gestalt contemporaries, a crisis existed because
>> >>> established theories (primarily Wundt's and Watsonian behaviorism)
>> >>> could not, in their view, explain complex perceptual and
>> >>> problemsolving behaviors. For Vygotsky, the crisis went much deeper.
>> >>> He shared the Gestalt psychologists' dissatisfaction with
>> >>> psychological analysis that began by reducing all phenomena to a set
>> >>> of psychological "atoms." But he felt that the Gestalt psychologists
>> >>> failed to move beyond the description of complex phenomena to the
>> >>> explanation of them. Even if one were to accept the Gestalt
>> >>> criticisms
>> >>> of previous approaches, a crisis would still exist because
psychology
>> >>> would remain split into two irreconcilable halves: a "natural
>> >>> science"
>> >>> branch that could explain elementary sensory and reflex processes,
>> >>> and
>> >>> a "mental science" half that could describe emergent properties of
>> >>> higher psychological processes. What Vygotsky sought was a
>> >>> comprehensive approach that would make possible description and
>> >>> explanation of higher psychological functions in terms acceptable to
>> >>> natural science. To Vygotsky, explanation meant a great deal. It
>> >>> included identification of the brain mechanisms underlying a
>> >>> particular function; it included a detailed explication of their
>> >>> developmental history to establish the relation between simple and
>> >>> complex forms of what appeared to be the same behavior; and,
>> >>> importantly, it included specification of the societal context in
>> >>> which the behavior developed. Vygotsky's goals were extremely
>> >>> ambitious, perhaps unreasonably so. He did not achieve these goals
>> >>> (as
>> >>> he was well aware). But he did succeed in providing us with an
astute
>> >>> and prescient analysis of modern psychology.
>> >>>
>> >>> A major reason for the continued relevance of Vygotsky's work is
that
>> >>> in 1924 and the following decade he constructed a penetrating
>> >>> critique
>> >>> of the notion that an understanding of the higher psychological
>> >>> functions in humans can be found by a multiplication and
complication
>> >>> of principles derived from animal psychology, in particular those
>> >>> principles that represent the mechanical combination of
>> >>> stimulus-response laws. At the same time he provided a devastating
>> >>> critique of theories which claim that the properties of adult
>> >>> intellectual functions arise from maturation alone, or are in any
way
>> >>> preformed in the child and simply waiting for an opportunity to
>> >>> manifest themselves.
>> >>>
>> >>> In stressing the social origins of language and thinking, Vygotsky
>> >>> was
>> >>> following the lead of influential French sociologists, but to our
>> >>> knowledge he was the first modern psychologist to suggest the
>> >>> mechanisms by which culture becomes a part of each person's nature.
>> >>> Insisting that psychological functions are a product of the brain's
>> >>> activity, he became an early advocate of combining experimental
>> >>> cognitive psychology with neurology and physiology. Finally, by
>> >>> claiming that all of these should be understood in terms of a
Marxist
>> >>> theory of the history of human society, he laid the foundation for a
>> >>> unified behavioral science.
>> >>>
>> >>> --------------------------
>> >>>
>> >>> The text referred to above and  described on this list as I
>> >>> understand
>> >>> it, as evidence of Vygotsky's adherence to a variety of
behaviourism,
>> >>> is at:
>> >>>
>> >>>
http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm
>> >>>
>> >>> Nicolai Veresov's commentary on it claims errors in Mike Cole's
>> >>> narrative; but whether Vygotsky's article belongs to 1924, 1925 or
>> >>> 1926, it is all within what has been spoken of as his "social
>> >>> behaviourist" phase:
>> >>>
>> >>>
>>
http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> For my part, I read this material as documenting that behaviourism
>> >>> was
>> >>> declared to be the Marxist Psychology in 1923 (coincident with the
>> >>> death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin to leadership of the USSR) and
>> >>> in the eyes of the vast majority of "Marxists", within and outside
>> >>> the
>> >>> USSR, remains so to this day.
>> >>>
>> >>> As I see it, the counter claim begins from Vygotsky's speech in 1924
>> >>> (or 1925 or 1926).
>> >>>
>> >>> Andy
>> >>>
>> >>> Jussi Silvonen wrote:
>> >>>> Hi everybody!
>> >>>>
>> >>>> First, I'd like to thank Jonna for introducing my paper and
starting
>> >>>> the discussion.  I'm sorry about the delay of my comments -
>> >>>> sometimes
>> >>>> there is life also outside the academy (luckily not too often, as
>> >>>> you
>> >>>> know), which keeps us out of the office for few days.
>> >>>> There are already too many issues in this ongoing and extremely
>> >>>> interesting discussion to comment in one e-mail. So I will simply
>> >>>> start by listing some of the issues mentioned so far. After that I
>> >>>> try to a little bit clarify my motivations and point of view, to
>> >>>> focus the discussion.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Before that, anyhow,  I have to make confession. I don't know
>> >>>> Russian
>> >>>> and read Vygotsky only in English and in German. I compiled a
>> >>>> bibliography of English translations of LSV's works I know so far
>> >>>> (=102), which shows the textual base of my paper. You can find it
on
>> >>>> my site:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> http://joyx.joensuu.fi/~jsilvone/papers/Vygo_bibliography.pdf
>> >>>>
>> >>>> (I added original dates of LSV's papers in the references and
>> >>>> cross-referenced overlapping versions of  translations, hope this
>> >>>> could help those not having the Collected Works in their library).
>> >>>> Comments on the bibliography are welcomed, too. Those reading LSV
in
>> >>>> Russia can probably tell, if something (or what) essential sources,
>> >>>> related to my arguments, are missing.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> 1.
>> >>>> Reading very fast the comments so far, at least following topics or
>> >>>> arguments were represented:
>> >>>> - The question of periods in Vygotsky's work. According to David
>> >>>> there would be almost a consensus about three Vygotskies ( LSV I,
>> >>>> II,
>> >>>> III), but this point was questioned. My special contribution to
this
>> >>>> debate, however, is not the statement of three periods as such, but
>> >>>> the opinion that Vygotsky was committed to behaviorism in one
moment
>> >>>> of his thinking. This point obviously requires more discussion, as
>> >>>> Steve and others remarked.
>> >>>> - The question of the tools by which we should conceptualize the
>> >>>> (possible) periods in LSV. My suggestion was that we could
integrate
>> >>>> some ideas / concepts from Althusser and Foucault to our attempt to
>> >>>> understand critically and self-reflective way the development (or
>> >>>> non-development) of our tradition. Some agreed to some degree, but
>> >>>> the idea was strongly criticized, too (at least Andy).
>> >>>> - The problem of semiotics or semiotic mediation in LSV is one of
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> key issues in my argumentation, connected to the hypotheses about
>> >>>> epistemological break between LSV II and III. Somebody read my
>> >>>> thesis
>> >>>> as a statement about the priority on supremacy of semiosis / sign
>> >>>> mediation. What I actually said, was that Vygotsky always related
>> >>>> different forms of mediation to each other, and that inside this
>> >>>> methodological frame his point of view moved from instrumental
>> >>>> approach to a semiotic one. I agree with most of David's remarks on
>> >>>> this question, but this point requires some clarifications, too.
>> >>>> - In some comments were seen missing contexts in my analysis. No
>> >>>> discussion about Leibnitz, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Kant,
>> >>>> Hegel, Goethe and other key figures in Western philosophy (Andy). I
>> >>>> agree, absolutely. The focus of my paper is in the conceptual
>> >>>> development in Vygotsky's work, not in the history of philosophy.
>> >>>> And
>> >>>> the distinction between traditional and non-traditional, or
>> >>>> Cartesian
>> >>>> and post-Cartesian comes not from Althusser but is a common
>> >>>> statement
>> >>>> in Vygotskyan traditon (classical and non-classical in Asmolov,
>> >>>> Elkonin etc). What I try to do is make sense of this distinction ,
>> >>>> to
>> >>>> conceptualize it someway. Can we do this without a reference to the
>> >>>> long perspective of philosophy, is a good question, anyway.
>> >>>> - One other missing context seen in my paper is Vygotsky's relation
>> >>>> to Marxism and dialectical materialism. It is not possible to
>> >>>> understand Vygotsky outside the Marxian frame, is claimed. This
>> >>>> problem is in brackets, just like the philosophy question, but it
is
>> >>>> worth to debate. Some people (f.e. Elhammoumi) really see Vygotsky
>> >>>> as
>> >>>> a Marxist per excellence, but I think this is a too limited
approach
>> >>>> to Vygotsky. He was not a Marxist at all, if we take Marxism in the
>> >>>> form as it exist in Vygotsky's life time. In my interpretation
>> >>>> Vygotsky took a Marxian position, which was incompatible with the
>> >>>> Marxist-Leninist state-ideology of the USSR  This argument requires

>> >>>> a
>> >>>> discussion about the concept of dialectical materialism as a
>> >>>> methodology, about Marx and Marxism, even about "the Stalinist
>> >>>> machine" and Marxist philosophy. I'm not sure how many would be
>> >>>> interested in this, but I'm ready to go on this, too.
>> >>>> - The concept of CHAT was also touched.  Should we talk about CHAT,
>> >>>> or about CH/AT, or even about CHP vs AT? Or maybe CH?AT would
>> >>>> express
>> >>>> best way the state of art ?
>> >>>> - The was also the question of the actual history of cultural
>> >>>> historical school in Russia, the developments after Vygotsky's dead
>> >>>> and so on. My paper is focused on texts only, but can read Vygotsky
>> >>>> without understanding of the context of his work? In brackets, I
>> agree.
>> >>>> - And I could add here for example the inconsistent way I used
>> >>>> Foucault, which nobody, for some strange reasons, mentioned.
>> >>>> I picked up topics above fast without any deep reflection.  I guess
>> >>>> any of these topics would be worth of  discussion. Before to going
>> >>>> on
>> >>>> my own comments, I clarify a little the background and the
>> >>>> motivation
>> >>>> of my paper.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> 2.
>> >>>> It seems to me that some of the comments are based on too fast
>> >>>> reading of my paper, resulting in misunderstanding of what I am
>> >>>> trying to do. My paper is not meant to be an exhaustive description
>> >>>> of all aspects and contexts in LSV's thinking. Many things are
>> >>>> consciously put in brackets to make the problematic I am interested
>> >>>> in, more focused and clear. I am interested in Vygotsky semiotics.
>> >>>> But how I became interested in this topic, then?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> One motivation to start a journey through the Collected Works was
my
>> >>>> dissatisfaction about the way we express our tradition. Some people
>> >>>> are talking about Socio-cultural research, some others
>> >>>> Cultural-historical psychology. In nowadays Russia they have
>> >>>> cultural
>> >>>> psychology debating with activity theory. Other labels can be,
>> >>>> possibly, found out. And then we have the Mike's way to talk about
>> >>>> Cultural-historical-activity theory. I agree with David's
evaluation
>> >>>> "that Mike and other founders of CHAT founded it as a loose
>> >>>> federation between two rather incompatible Vygotskies, the Vygotsky
>> >>>> of mediated action and the Vygotsky of word meaning, with the
>> >>>> assumption that a common tradition and a set of common practices
>> >>>> would hold it together." I understand, somehow, the motivation
>> >>>> behind
>> >>>> the label CHAT. It can be understood as an umbrella like
>> >>>> construction, as a space for discussion and for practices. What's
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> problem, then?
>> >>>> If you take a look at the footnotes of my paper, you can realize
I'm
>> >>>> writing in Finnish context. At least in Finland the CHAT tradition
>> >>>> is
>> >>>> very strong in empirical investigations, but theoretical
>> >>>> contributions are rare. Especially works on the history of "CHAT"
>> >>>> are
>> >>>> missing, and the possible contradictions between the founders of
the
>> >>>> tradition are almost taboos.   Consequently CHAT is presented as a
>> >>>> coherent theory, in a way which makes discussion about some
>> >>>> methodological problems - semiotic mediation for example -
difficult
>> >>>> or even impossible.
>> >>>> When involving in ISCRAT I realized the fragmented state of the
>> >>>> tradition. In Finland we have one coherent conception (CHAT), on
the
>> >>>> international plane there are plenty of school and interpretations.
>> >>>> The strange thing was, that everybody seemed to claim to be the
real
>> >>>> Vygotskians. After that impression, it was easy to ask the most
>> >>>> simple question: is there something in the founding what could - at
>> >>>> least to some extent - explain the situation. And now I have my
>> >>>> hypothesis: there are not one, but three Vygotskies, giving
>> >>>> possibilities to different theoretical discourses.
>> >>>> If now go back to the CHAT concept, we can see what it problematic
>> >>>> in
>> >>>> it. On one hand it is meant to be an umbrella type concept bringing
>> >>>> together different parts of the common tradition. But on the other
>> >>>> hand it is presented as a research theory, as a tool for empirical
>> >>>> research (at least in Finland). We have a common tradition which
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