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Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation



We are getting to understand each other here at least! :)

You say: "we explain the color changes of the chameleon (and the survival of such creatures) in terms of the purposes they serve."

That's teleology, reference to purpose.

Then you say: "But we can't explain the *evolution* of those characteristics, their appearance in, at first, a few mutated individuals, in terms of any function or purpose."

But you certainly can't explain it mechanically. (EG 1 1:07am on 17 June 5067 BC, an electron jumped out of its orbit in a chameleon at 130degN45degW and caused x mutation and as a result that chameleon ...) You can only explain natural selection by the notion of a change which is "a functional advantage for survival of the gene line" in some way. That means teleology (the purpose is survival of the gene line), and no Great Architect is required. You cannot explain natural selection without reference to what the Standford encyclopedia charmingly called "backwards causation", i.e., survival of the gene line, the end causes the beginning, but cancel the notion of causation here and simply accept that ends can't cause beginnings, it's called teleology not mechanism. Darwin of course never knew about the mechanism; only that progeny resemble their parents. Natural variation is admittedly non teleological (it *has* to be for natural selection to work) but "natural selection" is (by definition) teleological.

I think Hegel probably had British political economy in mind when he wrote that bit about passions.

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,

Perhaps I am misunderstanding your argument. The articles on evolution, in
my reading, say that characteristics which have functional advantage will
tend to be selected because they improve the odds of survival. The notion of
teleology in evolution surely implies that there is a specific direction to
development: so that if we know the laws of the teleology we can predict
what characteristics will appear next. It's true that we explain the color
changes of the chameleon (and the survival of such creatures) in terms of
the purposes they serve. But we can't explain the *evolution* of those
characteristics, their appearance in, at first, a few mutated individuals,
in terms of any function or purpose. You wrote that we can't explain "how it
comes about" that chameleons change color in non-teleological terms. In my
view, how it comes about is explained in terms of natural variation, which
is a non-teleological process.

I was mainly responding to your statement that "teleology is objective and
exists whether we or anyone else knows the end or not." I am probably still
misunderstanding the Hegelian notion of objectvity: what I took you be
saying is that there is a teleology to nature, to the universe as a whole.
You cited Hegel:

"In a similar way. the passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop
themselves and their purposes in accordance with their natural destination
and produce the edifice of human society".

...and it was the notion of a "natural destination" that I was questioning,
specifically Ilyenkov's apparent claim that we *already know* the "objective
laws" of this natural destination.

Martin


On 1/24/09 7:34 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

I don't get your point, Martin. Your link about chamelions
gives a purely teleological explanation of evolution:

"[T]he researchers showed that dramatic color change is
consistently associated with the *use* of color change as a
social *signal* to other chameleons. The degree of change is
not predicted by the amount of color variation in the
chameleons' habitat, as would be expected if *chameleons had
evolved* such remarkable color changing abilities *in order
to* camouflage."

The Standford explanation says "opinion is divided" and
identify teleology (as opposed to "naturalism") with the
work of a Great Architect or simply pinning it on a sloppy
choice of words. "Backwards causation" is an attempt to
subsume teleology under causation which leads to nonsense of
course.

In what sense is "teleology a hypothesis"? Each individual
observation (like the one above on chameleons) is obviously
hypothesis, but are you saying that the whole idea on which
that newspaper article is based, i.e. that there is a
functional explanation to biological traits, is hypothesis?
  (Let's leave aside their imputation of conscious purpose
to reptiles)

All this is nothing to do with "objectivity". As I said, it
seemed to me that you were raising two distinct new issues
in your earlier post, objectivity vs absolute, and teleology
vs mechanism.

Now you accuse me of understanding life as a journey and
introduce the idea of a defined "end". I guess am guilty
here, as I never intended "journey" to imply something which
has a goal at the outset; Hegel repeatedly insists that it
can be seen as a journey only in retrospect (Owl of Minerva
etc). And of course the whole idea of identifying the
absolute with simply the whole is to *negate* the idea of
identifying the absolute with the end (that's the value of
the journey metaphor, to contrast journey and end). So my
point is precisely to avoid your "defined" end of totality,
and avoid imputing "meaning" from outside life itself, and
that's how one avoids the choice of absolute relativism and
dogmatism - we are all part of the same totality. If you
deny any continuity to the billions of human lives, then how
do you avoid absolute relativism, Martin? I accept, BTW,
that totality is also relative, so can we leave "grand
narrative" and "totalising" out of it, as these are actually
distinct issues. You can have a notion of totality without
subordinating every part to the whole absolutely.

Andy



Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,

As always it's taking me a while to translate from Hegelian to English!
Starting with point 2, it's by no means obvious that evolution requires
reference to teleology:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/>

...even with chameleons:

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080129125524.htm>

...so I'll stand by my assertion that the view that there is a teleology to
the universe remains at best a hypothesis. And when you say
"teleology...exists whether we or anyone else knows the end" are you
suggesting that knowing that teleology exists is enough for someone to say
that they know the "objective laws" of the universe? We certainly don't know
the ends, I would argue we are not at all certain that there is a teleology,
and furthermore I don't think we are clear on what basis we could validly
make such a claim.

Regarding your point 1, you seem to be saying that human knowledge is
objective (in the Hegelian sense, and perhaps for Ilyenkov too) because it
is (part of) knowledge of the absolute. But this seems to me to beg the
question - it *assumes* that there is an absolute of which our knowledge is
part.

The claim that there is a journey with a defined end, even if it is one we
don't know - no, *especially* if it one we don't know - seems dangerously
relativizing. If we destroy the environment, that's okay, because it's all
just part of the big plan. I don't need to take any action, because things
will work out in the long run.

But perhaps the more dangerous version is the claim that we *do* know the
ends of the journey. At least a few of us do, the enlightened ones. We have
true knowledge, we are the masters of history.

It's not that an appeal to teleology invokes a Divine Architect, but rather
that the appeal to teleology has the *same effect* as the appeal to a god
who guarantees that our knowledge "conforms" to the things themselves, and
who guarantees that our actions (but not the actions of those who we must
oppose, perhaps destroy) coincide with the grand plan. I see more clearly
now why Hegel's system as been called onto-theology.

Martin
On 1/23/09 11:07 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

OK, as I read you, Martin, so we are on to different issues
here: (1) can knowledge which is relative be nonetheless
objective. And you also raise in relation to the Hegel
quote: (2) the problem of the objectivity of teleology.

(1) As I read Hegel and Marx and ... knowledge is objective
inasmuch as it is integral to forms of practice which are
objective, i.e., practical. That knowledge is always
incomplete (and in that narrow sense "subjective"), in the
process of change and development, along with human
practices, is also true. To make sense of this I know of no
other source other than Hegel: everything is relative (i.e.,
just one step along a journey, within which there are also
many routes) but the whole (i.e., the journey itself) is
absolute. I.e., at any given moment, human knowledge is only
as adequate as our practices at that time and place, but the
entire journey, the whole development of all human knowledge
in all its forms over all time, is absolute. So every
relative knowledge partakes to a degree in the absolute. Yes?

(2) On teleology: teleology is objective and exists whether
we or anyone else knows the end or not. There is a prejudice
among natural scientists to claim that only mechanism is
objective, and falsely claim that teleology invokes a Divine
Architect. But try to explain how it comes about that
cameleons can change colour according to their surroundings
without invoking teleology and having recourse only to cause
and effect. It can't be done. Nonetheless, we know that the
category of teleology in natural selection is not absolute
and produces the clumsy feathers of the peacock. But do we
respond by saying that evolution is wrong? No, we just
refine the definition of the teleological process. Exactly
what we do when we find that a mechanism proves to be an
inadequate representation. Yes?

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,

It certainly all hinges on what Ilyenkov means by "objectively-true," for
sure. I still haven't yet got much beyond page 1, but jumping forward a
bit:

"These laws [I assume he's talking about dialectical logic] are understood
as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the
natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. They
are reflected in the consciousness of mankind and verified by thousands of
years of human practice." (p. 15)

But hang on, have we humans *really* identified the "objective laws... of
the material world"? Let me juxtapose two excepts from your last message
(!):

This is the point: humans change the world, but only
according to its own nature.
In a similar way. the
passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
and their purposes in accordance with their natural
destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."
But Andy, it's one thing to say that we have to know a bit about the world
to get tasks accomplished in it. It's another thing entirely to say that
our
tasks themselves are following some grand plan. Certainly, if there is a
"natural destination" to the universe, and humans are part of that
universe,
then I suppose we are headed in that direction too. But surely you will
agree with me that we do not *know* that there is such a natural direction.
At best this is a hypothesis. It would be circular logic to say that we
know
that nature follows a dialectical law, because it is part of that law that
our knowledge is objective. I'm very reluctant to say that we have already
figured out the laws of the universe, especially when it is claimed that
one
of the consequences of these laws is that human cognition forms an
objectively-true reflection of them. That would be to place ourselves at
the
end of history, wouldn't it? And Marx never made such a claim, to my
knowledge.
Martin

On 1/23/09 9:27 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

Are you counterposing "objectively-true image" with "exact
picture of the world", Martin?

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
Andy, thanks for adding to the height of my reading pile!  :)

Until I complete the assignment (at least partly) I will merely juxtapose
here two quotations whose contrast gives me pause for thought. The first
from the first page of the book by Ilyenkov you've provided:

"And only materialist dialectics (dialectical materialism), only the
organic
unity of dialectics with materialism arms the cognition of man with the
means and ability to construct an objectively-true image of the
surrounding
world, the means and ability to reconstruct this world in accordance with
the objective tendencies and lawful nature of its own development."

The second from Carlos Marx himself:

"The formulation on [in? MP] thought of an exact picture of the
world-system
in which we live is impossible for us, and will always remain impossible.
If
at any time in the evolution of mankind such a final, conclusive system
of
the interconnections within the world... were brought to completion, this
would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit, and, from the
moment
when society had been brought into accord with that system, further
historical evolution would be cut short-which would be an absurd idea,
pure
nonsense" (A Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 234)

Martin


On 1/23/09 5:56 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

Martin,  I have converted to PDF Ilyenkov's book defending
Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism":

http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positivism.pdf

I think you can agree that if such a renowned Hegel
interpreter as Ilyenkov can defend "reflection" and Lenin's
book, then there has to be something in it. The above is
much shorter and easier to read than Lenin's book, BTW.

Sidney Hook is far from alone in the sentiments he
expresses. But you have to take Lenin and Engels and the
Russian CHAT people *as a whole* and this criticism (which I
sympathise with) of the notion of "reflection" as "passive"
is, as you have remarked yourself, constantly contradicted
by the "change the world" notes constantly and discordantly
accompanying every mention of "reflection."

This is the point: humans change the world, but only
according to its own nature. The aeroplane actually obeys
the laws of nature as it flies across the sky. Hegel has a
great bit on this:

"So also when someone starts building a house, his decision
to do so is freely made. But all the elements must help. And
yet the house is being built to protect man against the
elements. Hence the elements are here used against
themselves. But the general law of nature is not disturbed
thereby. The building of a house is, in the first instance,
a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as
means, the several substances required for the work ­ iron,
wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this
material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire,
water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc.
The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the
house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of
rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far
as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey
the law of gravity and press downwards so that the high
walls are held up. Thus the elements are made use of in
accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by
which they become constrained. In a similar way. the
passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
and their purposes in accordance with their natural
destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."

http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction.htm

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
At risk of actually killing the horse I'm flogging, I want to return
one
more time to the debate over 'reflection.' Mike asked me why I would be
sad
to hear that Vygotsky was significantly influenced by Lenin. I've been
reading some of the work in the 1920s and 30s by Sidney Hook, on the
topic
of Marx and Hegel. I'm copying below a fairly long excerpt in which
Hook
takes to task both Engels and Lenin (in 'Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism,'
at least) for viewing ideas as "reflections" of reality - exactly in
the
sense of mirror images or copies. That Lenin did this was the sense I
have
got from reading other comments on Lenin, though I haven't read Lenin
myself.

The problem, as Hook points out, is that the reflection view treats
thinking
as a passive process, that solipsism and skepticism cannot be avoided,
that
in this view knowledge cannot be creative, and consequently knowledge
of
the
world cannot change the world. This, as he notes, is a long way from
Marx.

Martin

The excerpt is from:
Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. The
Journal
of Philosophy, 25(6), 141-155.
[ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014691 ]

"He [Engels] presents the "dialectic" as the method which
corrects the limited and ossified character of classificatory thinking
and claims that it enables one to avoid the predicament of English
empiricism which is peculiarly addicted to this way of thinking.
But Engels failed to understand the real weakness of English
empiricism. Otherwise he would have realized that his uncritical
reference to ideas as reflections, pictures, or images (Abbilder,
Spiegelbilder) of things made him fall into an epistemological trap
whose mazes lead into the cul-de-sacs of solipsism and nominalism-
the very positions he was anxious to avoid. Since sensations, accord-
ing to Engels, gave immediate knowledge, the organizing activity of
thought becomes purely ancillary to classifying and relating sensa-
tions. Practice and experiment, which he later says must serve as
the criteria of truth, are introduced by a double inconsistency. For
if our sensations are copies, we can never know anything of the
originals or even know that there are any, while if sensations give
immediate knowledge there is no sense in trying to check up upon
them by experiments which only give other sensations, just as im-
mediate. The disastrous consequences of the belief in the cognitive
character of sensations comes to light in Lenin's fanatical insistence
upon accepting every word of Engels literally. According to Lenin,
sensation is "a copy, photograph, and reflection of a reality existing
independently of it." He takes Plekhanov to task for regarding
sensations as "signs" or "symbols" of what things are, instead of
adhering to the crude formula, "(sensations) are copies, photo-
graphs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 195). He adds
further on, "the idea that knowledge can 'create' forms and change
the primeval chaos into order, is an idealist notion. The world is
a uniform world of matter in motion, and our cognition, being the
highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this law."
But if knowledge only "reflects" the laws of the world, how can it
change the world? A mirror or a lake reflects the natural scene,
but neither knows nor changes it. This is, indeed, a far cry from
the functional and experimental theory expressed in Marx's gloss
on Feurbach and strange words from one who believed that by "mass
action" and the creation of new machines and forms of distribution,
a better social system will be evolved." (p. 149-150)




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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm

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