Re: [xmca] motive/project

From: Andy Blunden <ablunden who-is-at mira.net>
Date: Thu Dec 18 2008 - 04:50:21 PST

Haydi, the kind of problems with the complexity of an
interdisciplinary concept of activity are precisely why it
is vital to beging with a unit of analysis, and not go down
the postivist road.

I think the issues raised by an interdisciplinary concept of
activity were "over the horizon" for ANL, for the reasons
that Anna and Peter have outlined. I think "word meaning"
(or some correctives to it a la Bakhtin) is a unit of
analysis for the psychology of language and intelligence,
but self-evidently (surely) not for sociology or an
interdisciplinary concept of activity,

Andy

Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Dear Andy,
> This just comes to my mind . Go with your critique upon it . I will be more clarified . You want to find the unit of analysis of *activity* , the *germ cell* , The non-analysable entity . Leontiev stresses it's a *molar* , non-additive entity . He stresses at an early stage , we cannot separate the *subject* or *object* from it . Just at the level of abstraction , could we talk about the latter . It's why he marks it as *the unit of life* . You and some other good fellows take it as a combination ; hence stressing on an *interdisciplinary* investigation of it . Is it not the case with the *word meaning* of Vygotsky ? At the level of abstraction and analysis , is it not possible to go seek components or moments thereof for a *word meaning* ? It's the same with all social concepts , even with physical entities , atom once as the smallest unit now containing in it many many particles . I have limits as arrangements made with respect to levels and units of
> analysis . Leontiev , for the better or worse , marks *subject* and *object* (moments) of activity . By moments , a term the meaning of which Michael Roth once admitted has discovered on one specific day in his enduring non-hindered investigations and studies (pardon if this is a non-permissible quote) , is the same as *molar* , non-additive . For him , it's non-additive !! we take it as something having taken for
> granted as combinatory . The book is , I think , very very hard to understand . My claim is not I have understood it . I try and try . May you , whose great contributions to science/education is known/admitted to every one , do more favor to present the second great book of him along other ones ? The Problem of ... I really need to get the meanings first . David Kellog has one copy of it . Just a trip to Korea and force him to surrender :) ..
> Best
> Haydi
> --- On Wed, 12/17/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Wednesday, December 17, 2008, 11:32 PM
>
> Ineresting connection with Marx's conception of use-value,
> Geoff, a concept which is ultra-objective in this context.
> But ...
>
> I should emphasise that I do not question at all that
> motives arise out of activity, activity taken to be
> something which is culturally and historically constructed.
> And, that a psychology of activity requires a concept of
> motive and need and its source. So, as a psychology ANL's
> construction works OK.
>
> But the issue raised in Anna and Peter's paper, and the
> issue which is of concern to me is: what is a suitable unit
> of analysis for this activity, a genuinely interdisciplinary
> concept of activity? I don't believe that ANL provides that.
> In my opinion, ANL just gives broad gestures to the social
> and cultural origins of man's activity. We need a unit of
> analysis that works in sociology as well as psychology.
>
> Andy
>
> Geoff wrote:
>> Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes
> individual
>> activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
>> boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
>> don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also
> helps to
>> understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
>> perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
>> to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
>> of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
>> model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.
>>
>> Geoff
>>
>> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
>>> andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive
> than "motive." I
>>> feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't
> "want" more to eat,
>>> but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
>>>
>>> We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
>>> Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion,
> but I
>>> missed it. In which case, just point.
>>>
>>> No need to reply right away. :-))
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is
> provisional. He
>>>> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not
> have a
>>>> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are
> to continue in the
>>>> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need
> a "unit of
>>>> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea
> is not that
>>>>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike
> other animals, who are
>>>>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans
> respond to
>>>>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature,
> their social
>>>>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves
> individually,
>>>>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs
> become at once
>>>>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history,
> tools, signs,
>>>>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems.
> Leontiev took his
>>>>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals -
> the ways they
>>>>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their
> needs - and
>>>>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal,
> condition/operation
>>>>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity
> concept to
>>>>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT,
> and that is kind
>>>>> of where we are at today.
>>>>>
>>>>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There
> may be
>>>>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of
> analysis' in some of the
>>>>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the
> 'molecule' and/or
>>>>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule
> and cell of natural
>>>>> science.
>>>>>
>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs
> directly and
>>>>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a
> truism. My problem, as you
>>>>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of
> activity, or what is *an*
>>>>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea
> that "an activity" is defined
>>>>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is
> suggested) is that problems of
>>>>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is
> x for? x is for
>>>>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea
> that human needs
>>>>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
>>>>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks
> and I thought that
>>>>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus
> collective problem, or
>>>>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an
> activity from an
>>>>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or
> just how to separate "an"
>>>>>>> activity out of many.
>>>>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem
> with the idea of
>>>>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that
> human activities are
>>>>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
>>>>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements
> like: the need for survival
>>>>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production,
> creating a new way to meet
>>>>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating
> many new kinds of
>>>>>>> needs as society developed ... different social
> classes have different
>>>>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict,
> including wars ... human
>>>>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for
> existence, control of
>>>>>>> nature, and society itself ...
>>>>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist
> sociology 101, so
>>>>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if
> "need" is not at the
>>>>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is?
> Is this a
>>>>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi.
> As I read them, they
>>>>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system
> of activity" is defined by
>>>>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL
> does say that production
>>>>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new
> needs, but this does not
>>>>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept
> that society is either
>>>>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee
> to meet human needs, or
>>>>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human
> needs then this cannot be
>>>>>>>> believed.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough,
> in fact it's a
>>>>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For
> example, take war. If we set out
>>>>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a
> human need, where does that
>>>>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology?
> Take anything - the Church,
>>>>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence,
> .... all we are going to end up
>>>>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be
> built on this foundation,
>>>>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a
> sociology.
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an*
> activity/*a* motive?"
>>>>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more
> reading than interpretation .
>>>>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of
> *A,C,P* and collect
>>>>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to
> these questions .
>>>>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
>>>>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way
> but to put it in an
>>>>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time
> to have a glance at it without
>>>>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
>>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
>>>>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head
> here, from the
>>>>>>>>> psychological point
>>>>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the
> problem, as I see it, with
>>>>>>>>> Michael's
>>>>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil
> not know the motive of
>>>>>>>>> schooling,
>>>>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
>>>>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and
> structure and such
>>>>>>>>> terms, does it
>>>>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive'
> to an institution, outside of a
>>>>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which
> Leontyev lived?
>>>>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you
> are right as against
>>>>>>>>> David, because
>>>>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the
> sense in which Leonytev means it.
>>>>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose
> actvity", or "doing" or
>>>>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just
> physiological movement. The
>>>>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation*
> is *a* (social) activity.
>>>>>>>>> But what
>>>>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a
> "motive," as Monica asks,
>>>>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the
> objective, goal, or aim of
>>>>>>>>> schooling as
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is
> misplaced here. Motivation
>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency,
> doesn't it? It cannot be
>>>>>>>>> forced from
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When
> trying to get an idea of
>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or
> become a participant in an
>>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her
> conceptual thinking we have
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> understand the individual's
> motivation.
>>>>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the
> outside as in defining the
>>>>>>>>> objective
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force
> participation gives us mixed
>>>>>>>>>> results,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual
> development? Isn't that the
>>>>>>>>> problem?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so
> far in pushing intellectual
>>>>>>>>>> development?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Monica
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>>>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; eXtended
> Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> HI David and others,
>>>>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my
> writings that the problem lies in
>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which
> collapses the German Tätigkeit
>>>>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately,
> because it also gives rise to
>>>>>>>>> problems
>>>>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what
> children do as 'tasks'
>>>>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of
> the activity
>>>>>>>>> 'schooling',
>>>>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction
> (transmission...) of collective
>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the
> goals, in fact, because of the
>>>>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the
> goals of the task. This is no
>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question,
> 'teacher, am I write so
>>>>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very
> thing that they are asked to,
>>>>>>>>> namely
>>>>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient
> themselves intentionally to the
>>>>>>>>> concept,
>>>>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already
> know it, they don't have to
>>>>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and
> he describes those things
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche
> Grundlegung" (Frankfurt: Campus).
>>>>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented
> Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German
> edition of Activity,
>>>>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional
> chapter where Leont'ev
>>>>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in
> schools, motives, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the
> word "motive", and
>>>>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in
> general and to child play in
>>>>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do
> not yet have "motives" in the
>>>>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here.
> Last week we had thesis
>>>>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a
> thesis which tried to
>>>>>>>>> ascertain
>>>>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning
> English in children by the use of
>>>>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild
> exception to these theses is
>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our
> department; nobody ever
>>>>>>>>> fails as a
>>>>>>>>> result.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of
> Chapter Seven of Mind in
>>>>>>>>>> Society,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks
> about the child's "needs"
>>>>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines
> "broadly"
>>>>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to
> act". If he were going to proceed
>>>>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal
> theory of activity, this
>>>>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is
> what drives the child to act,
>>>>>>>>> and action is
>>>>>>>>> defined by its motive.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N.
> (1979, 1981). The problem
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.)
> The concept of
>>>>>>>>> activity in
>>>>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity
> is its object orientation. The
>>>>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is
> devoid of sense. Activity may
>>>>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but
> scientific investigation of it
>>>>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its
> object."
>>>>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific
> investigation is sometimes
>>>>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of
> an activity (e.g.
>>>>>>>>> sleep, whose
>>>>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really
> understand but which will
>>>>>>>>> presumably
>>>>>>>>> be discovered some day).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or
> the time or the
>>>>>>>>>> inclination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as
> sleep or language play or
>>>>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these
> activities as being without any
>>>>>>>>> tangible
>>>>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers
> to this everyday
>>>>>>>>> non-scientific
>>>>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are
> non-scientific expressions devoid
>>>>>>>>> of sense?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an
> activity emerges "in two
>>>>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent
> existence as subordinating
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and
> secondly as the mental image
>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's
> detecting its properties.
>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>> detection can take place only through the
> subject's activity."
>>>>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way
> in which scientific
>>>>>>>>> investigation determines the object
> orientation of an activity, and
>>>>>>>>> not the
>>>>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the
> object (which I think of as
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that
> participants are conscious
>>>>>>>>> of). But
>>>>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they
> take place through
>>>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof
> an object in mind.
>>>>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All
> activity has a looplike structure:
>>>>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make
> contact with the object
>>>>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with
> the help of feedback to the
>>>>>>>>> initial afferent image."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in
> some sense the archetypical
>>>>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT
> orientation! But it is going
>>>>>>>>> to mean
>>>>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain
> play, because as LSV
>>>>>>>>> remarks, play
>>>>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear
> their meaningful
>>>>>>>>> orientation away
>>>>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects.
> (Yes, Lewin and Lewin's
>>>>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of
> this, and with respect to the
>>>>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to
> Lewin than to ANL!).
>>>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL
> then argues that the crucial
>>>>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather
> that mental images are
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical
> activity in the world:
>>>>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent
> agent' that directs activity
>>>>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only
> secondarily its image as a
>>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and
> assimilates its object
>>>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes
> place: the transition from
>>>>>>>>> object to
>>>>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition
> from activity to
>>>>>>>>> subjective product
>>>>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the
> process into a product takes
>>>>>>>>> place not
>>>>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it
> occurs more clearly from
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> point of view of the object that is
> transformed by human activity."
>>>>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and
> decides to play horsie the
>>>>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the
> point of view of the
>>>>>>>>> stick (or from
>>>>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from
> the point of view of
>>>>>>>>> the child.
>>>>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against
> LSV's portrayal of
>>>>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as
> "anything that motivates the
>>>>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between
> desire as a precondition of
>>>>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that
> guides and regulates the
>>>>>>>>> agent's
>>>>>>>>> concrete activity in the object
> environment". Only the latter is the
>>>>>>>>> object of psychology.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can
> find where ANL really goes
>>>>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his
> book "Problems of the
>>>>>>>>> Development of Mind".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather
> startling statement that play has
>>>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does
> not constitute an
>>>>>>>>> activity). He
>>>>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is
> actually still distinct from the
>>>>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's
> activity does not determine and
>>>>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of
> its need for food warmth etc.
>>>>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide
> range of activity that
>>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective
> result."
>>>>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object"
> activity to differentiate human
>>>>>>>>> from animal play!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference
> between animals' play activity
>>>>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we
> first observe in
>>>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that
> it is not instinctive
>>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity
> which by constituting the
>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of
> human objects, determines the
>>>>>>>>> content
>>>>>>>>> of its play."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously
> like the thesis I mildly
>>>>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's
> attitudes are simply
>>>>>>>>> projected
>>>>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected"
> using Likert scales. On pp.
>>>>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is
> a substitute for the
>>>>>>>>> handling of
>>>>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL
> speaks of "let me" and
>>>>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between
> the adult who wants to protect the
>>>>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to
> drive a car and row a
>>>>>>>>> boat. This
>>>>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading
> activity which is indeed
>>>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>>>> to a neoformation without the crisis. He then
> returns uncomfortably
>>>>>>>>> to his
>>>>>>>>> nagging suspicion that that play is an
> activity without an object,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> therefore not an activity at all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On p. 370, he's got this: "As we
> have already said, play is
>>>>>>>>> characerized by its motive's lying in the
> process itself rather than
>>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>>> result of the action. For a child playing with
> wooden bricks, for
>>>>>>>>> example, the
>>>>>>>>> motive for the play does not lie in building a
> structure, but in the
>>>>>>>>> doing,
>>>>>>>>> i.e. in the content of the action. That is
> true not only of the
>>>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>>>> child's play but also of any real game in
> general. 'Not to win but to
>>>>>>>>> play' is the general formula of the
> motivation of play. In adult's
>>>>>>>>> games, therefore in which winning rather than
> playing becomes the
>>>>>>>>> inner motive,
>>>>>>>>> the game as such ceased to be play."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Contrast that with LSV's observation
> in Chapter Seven that children
>>>>>>>>> do NOT like running around without any rules
> or goal, and in games
>>>>>>>>> the meaning
>>>>>>>>> of the game is entirely to win. Of course, we
> might be talking about
>>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>>> children: Leontiev might be talking about pre-
> schoolers, and LSV is
>>>>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>>>>> talking about school-age kids. But the gap is
> remarkable; something
>>>>>>>>> rather
>>>>>>>>> important is getting lept over.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> OK—so then ANL says that in play there
> is a mismatch between
>>>>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and action, in that the operation is performed
> with the meaning of
>>>>>>>>> the stick
>>>>>>>>> and the action is performed with its sense. He
> says that this split
>>>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>>>> given in advance but only arises in play
> action and that children do
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> imagine play without actually playing. If
> this were true, of course,
>>>>>>>>> it would
>>>>>>>>> be very hard to see how children are able to
> plan play, read about
>>>>>>>>> it, or
>>>>>>>>> reflect upon it, much less day-dream or
> indulge in language play.
>>>>>>>>>> No, this isn't going to work. And it
> gets worse. Look at this, from
>>>>>>>>> p. 381:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Games 'with rules' i.e. like
> hide and seek, table games,
>>>>>>>>> etc. differ sharply from such 'role'
> games as playing doctor, polar
>>>>>>>>> explorer, etc. They do not seem to be related
> to one another by any
>>>>>>>>> genetic succession and seem to constitute
> different lines in the devleopment
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> children's play, but in fact the one form
> develops from other (sic)
>>>>>>>>> by virtue
>>>>>>>>> of a need inherent in the child's play
> activity itself (?), whereby
>>>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>>>> 'with rules' arise at a later
> stage."
>>>>>>>>>> So ANL explicitly denies that whole
> discussion (in Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>>> Leningrad lecture) about the intrinsic link
> between games with roles
>>>>>>>>> and games
>>>>>>>>> with rules. (There's a pretty good account
> of this lecture, which I
>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>> always seen as the starting point for his
> elaboration of the zone of
>>>>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>>>>> development, in Chapter Seven, but it's
> well worth reading the
>>>>>>>>> original
>>>>>>>>> lecture, which is at
>>>>>>>>>
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1933/play.htm
>>>>>>>>>> ANL then has to explain why there appears
> to be a developmental
>>>>>>>>>> sequence
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> linking role based play and rule-based games.
> For LSV this is no
>>>>>>>>> problem: they
>>>>>>>>> ARE genetically linked and in fact the child
> creates rule based games
>>>>>>>>> iteratively, by varying the roles in
> systematic ways. But for ANL,
>>>>>>>>> who denies
>>>>>>>>> the genetic link, this is rather harder to
> explain:
>>>>>>>>>> "Why do games with rules only arise
> at a certain stage of
>>>>>>>>>> development,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and not simultaneously with the genesis of the
> first role games? It
>>>>>>>>> depends on
>>>>>>>>> the difference in their motivation. Initially
> the first play actions
>>>>>>>>> arise on
>>>>>>>>> the basis of the child's growing need to
> master the world of human
>>>>>>>>> objects.
>>>>>>>>> The motive contained in this action itself is
> fixed in a thing,
>>>>>>>>> directly in its
>>>>>>>>> object content. The action here is the path
> for the child that leads
>>>>>>>>> it first
>>>>>>>>> of all to the discovery of objective reality;
> the human still emerges
>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>> child in its objectified form. The role of the
> horseman, the play
>>>>>>>>> action of
>>>>>>>>> riding, is playing at horses, the action with
> a block of wood that
>>>>>>>>> the child
>>>>>>>>> 'drives' from one chair to another is
> playing cars.
>>>>>>>>>> And MORE:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "But during the development of these
> games the human relation
>>>>>>>>> included in their object content itself comes
> out ever more clearly
>>>>>>>>> in them.
>>>>>>>>> The tram driver not only 'acts with a
> tram' but is obliged at the
>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>> time to enter into certain relations with
> other people— with the
>>>>>>>>> conductor,
>>>>>>>>> the passengers, and so on. Therefore, at
> relatively early stages of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> development of play activity, a child finds
> not only man's relation
>>>>>>>>> to it
>>>>>>>>> in the object but also people's relations
> with one another. Group
>>>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>>>> become possible not only alongside one
> another but also together.
>>>>>>>>> Social
>>>>>>>>> relations already come out in these games in
> overt form, in the form
>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>> players' relations with one another. At
> the same time the play 'role'
>>>>>>>>> is also altered. Its content now determines
> not only the child's
>>>>>>>>> actions in regard to the object but also its
> actions in regard to the other
>>>>>>>>> players in the
>>>>>>>>> game. The latter also become content of the
> play activity, for which
>>>>>>>>> its motive
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> fixed. Games are distinguished in which
> actions in regard to other
>>>>>>>>> people become the main thing."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> OK--so the reason why there is no genetic
> link is that the child goes
>>>>>>>>> from focussing on material objects in role
> play to focussing on human
>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>>>> in rule play? No, that's not right either,
> because:
>>>>>>>>>> p. 372: "We already know how play
> arises in the preschool child. It
>>>>>>>>> arises from its need to act in relation not
> only to the object world
>>>>>>>>> directly
>>>>>>>>> accessible to itself but also to the wider
> world of adults."
>>>>>>>>>> Mike--it looks like we're not the only
> ones befuddled by
>>>>>>>>> Leontiev's "motive" applied to
> children; he appears to have
>>>>>>>>> thoroughly befuddled himself. Leontiev's
> "motive" applied to
>>>>>>>>> children is a little like the clocks that
> keep going off in
>>>>>>>>> Shakespeare's
>>>>>>>>> Julius Caesar, a thousand years before they
> were invented.
>>>>>>>>>> This is yet another reason for prefering
> Andy's term
>>>>>>>>> "project" in describing play:
> unlike "activity" or
>>>>>>>>> "motive", it's a real Gestalt,
> in that a "project" can
>>>>>>>>> be, for the child, action/meaning, and for
> the adult, meaning/action,
>>>>>>>>> whence
>>>>>>>>> the possiblity of transforming, outside in,
> the one into the other!
>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>> Seoul Natoinal University of Education
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
> Blunden:
>>>>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>>>>>>
> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>>
>>
>

-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 
Skype andy.blunden
Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
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Received on Thu Dec 18 04:51:22 2008

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