Re: [xmca] déjatel¹ nost¹

From: Andy Blunden <ablunden who-is-at>
Date: Tue Sep 02 2008 - 16:59:49 PDT

Steve, your post is indeed *very* long.

(1) Apologies for the arcane sentence structure in that
comment. Marx was saying contradictions of material life
generate changes in the Zeitgeist and not the other way
around. Of course Marx is right against Hegel on this point!
The distinction I was making was between Zeitgeist and the
"finer grain" of individual consciousness.

(2) Continuing my advice against a "unit of analysis" for
everything, or what Albert Einstein hankered after, a
unified science of everything and world government to boot.
I think it is better to try to organise the world and our
knowledge of it a bit at a time, so to speak. And I would
probably be the first person to be accused of ognoring that
advice. :(

Hegel claimed:

“The beginning cannot be made with anything concrete,
anything containing a relation within itself. For such
presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition
of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the
result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a
first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a
first and an other implies that an advance has already been
made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning,
the beginning itself, is to be taken as something
unanalyzable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and
therefore as being, as the completely empty being.” (Science
of Logic §114)

I.e., if you want to roll everything up in a single science,
you have to start with a really, really, really abstract
concept. Better to take the sciences one at a time, I think.


Steve Gabosch wrote:
> This is a long post. I am indulging in this to expand on some things
> that have been brought up, and to try to articulate some ideas that have
> been half-forming in my head for a while. I appreciate the opportunity
> to participate in this discussion and offer my thoughts out. Xmca
> continues to be a vital part of my education.
> This discussion of units of analysis has been especially stimulating for
> me. It began with Andy's excellent question about Leontiev's use if the
> term "molar," in the thread Molar, Molecular and Additive Behavior
> (somehow the title of this thread got switched). That we went from
> molar and molecular perspectives to units of analysis at multiple levels
> is logical.
> *****************
> What I am questioning is whether "activity" is really the "simplest
> component of something which exhibits all the properties of the whole,"
> to use Andy's definition of unit of analysis.
> Does each and every activity exhibit all the properties of the
> mechanisms of social and individual development? Is every activity -
> activity in Leontiev's sense, where a motive drives a series of goals
> requiring actions that are comprised of operations driven by conditions
> - a "microcosm" of the aggregate "mechanisms" or forces of
> cultural-historical change? I am not at all imagining that activity
> theory would be set aside based on negative answers to these questions,
> but rather, it would be better understood by seeing activity in its
> larger context, within a larger "component" of human existence.
> What could that larger component be?
> I am entirely open to the possibility that activity does indeed exhibit
> all the properties of the whole. Pursuing this kind of questioning,
> looking "upward" to larger components, can help demonstrate that. The
> other possible direction to investigate is also worth looking at - is
> there a component smaller than activity that is the simplest unit that
> still exhibits all the properties of the whole? Some CHAT researchers
> have thought about this and advocated action, others, the act. But if
> we follow a Marxist sociology, looking upward from activity might lead
> us to class struggle, which in turn could lead us to the largest
> contradiction of social development, the contradiction between the
> material forces and social relations of production, which at times can
> become so tense and strained that social revolutions break out and usher
> in new social structures and relations.
> The consensus in CHAT today is that activity is the simplest such
> component of human existence. It may be. In trying to understand that,
> I am asking questions about alternatives.
> I agree that thinking along the lines of grander contradictions than
> just activity, which is based on the motives of individuals, is a "huge
> leap" from the usual framework upon which psychology is usually based:
> the individual.
> Even activity theory as it is presently theorized is considerably
> farther outside the comfort zone of most approaches to psychology, in
> the way it views human psychology as a convergence of biological and
> social lines of development that is driven by the cultural-social, and
> mediated by the biological, with activity as the context of all
> behavior, interaction and development. This approach views human
> psychological development as driven by social relations, which includes
> the individual's reactions to, acting upon, and self-transformations by
> these relationships and activities.
> But does the level of analysis of the "unit" activity, essential to
> understanding the contexts and mechanisms of any human operation or
> action, give us full access to understanding these social relations?
> This is what Elhammoumi is addressing - he says the basic unit of
> analysis must be the social relations of production, not just activity.
> Looking the other direction, does activity theory give us all the tools
> we need for a "finer grain" of analysis? Some CHAT-oriented critiques
> suggest that activity theory so far has not done well at providing
> explanations about subjectivity, emotions, etc. Important beginnings
> have been suggested by Vygotsky, Leontiev and others, but this area of
> study is much less developed in CHAT than, for example, the concrete
> analysis of learning, work, more recently, play, and close looks at many
> kinds of actions and sequences of actions in the context of activities.
> What units of analysis and explanations could CHAT develop, in the
> context of activity, which could study and explain the so-called
> "subjective"? Vygotsky's "perezhivanie," roughly, emotional experience,
> has been suggested as one. Wolff-Michael Roth intriguingly suggested
> identity, motivation and emotional valence in a recent article on
> emotions at a workplace. This is very hot territory to explore in CHAT
> these days. This problem is what motivates me to look both "down" and
> "up" the levels of analysis CHAT offers or could develop for new
> questions and possible answers. For me this includes looking beyond the
> accepted edges and boundaries, wondering what might be discovered on the
> other sides.
> As Wayne suggested as a thought question, perhaps even the social
> relations of production idea is not quite "there" yet. This is where
> the idea of looking at the convergence of the social relations and the
> forces of production for clues emerged.
> As for Andy's suggestion that "it is a big mistake to look for a 'unit
> of analysis' for everything," this is precisely the mistake I am making,
> and trying to make, and encourage others to make. It is not clear to me
> why this mistake should be discouraged. It strikes me as one of the
> important ways that science advances. To be sure, many units of
> analysis that are mistaken, that is, not adequate or appropriate for a
> given phenomena or area of inquiry, have been and will be proposed.
> Perhaps I am or will make such mistakes. But creating a division of
> reality where units of analysis can be discovered, and others where they
> can't, does not feel at all right to me. I wouldn't know where to begin
> doing that.
> But these kinds of "mistakes," proposing analytical units and basic
> units of analysis for phenomena, can provide vigorous dialogue and cause
> many to ask questions in new ways, which in turn can provoke new
> discoveries, not infrequently by accident and in unexpected places,
> which in turn can open up new lines of thinking within that overall
> dialogue. As I see it, the quest for the "right" units of analysis for
> each and every phenomena and each "level" they exist on ("right" in the
> sense that the contemporary body of world scientific knowledge is being
> fully utilized) is one of the central activities of scientific work. As
> the general body of scientific knowledge progresses (or gets
> sidetracked), units of analysis are constantly revised and debated,
> providing still more sources of constant conflict over what are the
> "correct" units of analysis for various phenomena and the various
> "levels" and perspectives these phenomena can be seen from. Many
> mistakes are indeed made along this road, which become the basis of many
> debates, sometimes quite heated. But this is the nature of the
> scientific process, is it not?
> As for the relationship between activity, class struggle, and the
> conflict between the forces and relations of production - and what
> analytical units and basic unit(s?) of analysis could encompass all of
> these - that is a good question, and a difficult one. A special problem
> with the pursuit of a unit of analysis suitable for all three "levels"
> is that we are interested in being able to apply this unit of analysis
> on the individual, psychological level. That is a tall order. This
> challenge involves trying to take large macro-historical processes and
> view them on the micro-individual level without losing the integrity of
> these macro processes, or lose sight of the individual and all its
> parts, including the subjective. Daunting. Since I am not a genius -
> and even geniuses need a lot of help and teamwork - I know I very much
> need help and guidance to pursue this kind of inquiry. And that it could
> take some time to make real progress, and that it could be a detour from
> a better set of questions.
> I want to emphasize that trying to add in class struggle and the
> conflict between the forces and relations of production on top of
> activity is intended to also help discover units of analysis, again from
> the starting point of activity, mediation etc., for understanding
> subjectivity and emotions and other interior processes. By looking at
> the macro and sharpening our tools there, perhaps we can make more
> headway into the micro.
> I tossed out, without strong arguments to back it up, the suggestion
> that "social situation," in the way Vygotsky used it, might be a
> candidate for a such a macro-level unit of analysis.
> Other possible candidates and insights that occur to me to look at, off
> the bat, are certain units of analysis for these macro levels that are
> used extensively in sections of the Marxist left and elsewhere, such as
> "political consciousness" and "class consciousness." These political
> "sub-cultures" also tend to use the concepts of "subjectivity" and
> "objectivity" extensively, not just as ways of critiquing various points
> of view, but of psychologically evaluating modes of individual
> participation.
> And there are other terms and concepts along these lines in these, and
> other political tendencies. Given the roots in Marxism and other
> ideologies many of these groups have, there may be conscious ideas and
> cultural repertoires in such arenas that could provide new scientific
> clues for how to view and describe the psychology of an individual in
> the context of activity, class struggle, and the conflict of the forces
> and relations of production.
> Of course, the huge examples of the USSR, China, and other countries
> that have been officially "Marxist" have developed numerous "official"
> answers to these kinds of questions, albeit in the context of a highly
> deformed class struggle, where workers were violently disenfranchised
> from political power and participation as a social class, and where
> "Marxism" was used as the official ideology to justify the continuation
> of a bureaucratic caste with its iron boots standing on the throats of
> workers, oppressed nationalities, intellectuals, and many others.
> Thought control, censorship and brutal repression of alternative views
> was the norm, not to mention large losses of many lives and talents. In
> my opinion, Stalinism was a great setback for Marxism, and most
> importantly, the development of the world working class. I believe we
> are still experiencing repercussions of that massive defeat of working
> class consciousness, allegiance, and power. The break in the continuity
> of CHAT following Vygotsky's death is an example. Oops, I am digressing
> ...
> Cuba, which has remarkably managed to avoid the development of such a
> bureaucracy and the crushing of working class consciousness and
> activism, might be another place where ideas and terms that address how
> these macro-levels of social organization and conflict can be applied on
> the individual level might be found. Some of Che Guevara's writings
> point in this direction. Wayne Au's article relating Lenin's views on
> the current reality of consciousness and more advanced levels of
> consciousness to Vygotsky's zone of proximal development is another
> example.
> And there are many other places to look, including many ideas floating
> around within CHAT and related sub-disciplines.
> Now, Andy, as for your first sentence in your post earlier today, about
> Marx, the contradictions of material life, and the Zeitgeist of an age,
> it sounds to my ears like you are not reflecting, you are disagreeing
> with the quote from Marx I pointed to. You seem to be saying that the
> "means of the contradictions of material life etc." **IS** [my emphasis]
> the "*consciousness of an age*, what an epoch thinks of itself, the
> Zeigeist". This sounds to my ear that you are consciously equating
> material contradictions and consciousness. That seems to be what you
> mean by "is" and the way your sentence is structured. If I am reading
> this wrong, please correct me.
> Marx clearly explained that he believed these two things were not only
> different, but the contradictions of the existing material conditions
> must be explained in terms of this consciousness.
> Here is the Marx quote again:
> "Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about
> himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its
> consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be
> explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict
> existing between the social forces of production and the relations of
> production."
> This discussion about the relationship of consciousness to conflicting
> conditions is important in any look at units of analysis on the
> psychological level, as well as in political, cultural, sociological,
> economic, historical and other approaches. It is also critical on the
> philosophical and methodological level. It could be argued that this is
> precisely one of the areas where Marx turned Hegel "right side up," that
> Hegel's idealism, which tended to view consciousness as determining
> being, was corrected by Marx's materialism, which saw social being as
> determining social consciousness. At the same time, as Vygotsky
> explained, this relationship can get reversed on the individual level,
> which operates under different laws of motion and development than the
> historical and cultural, which Marx was investigating.
> Marx very clearly explains in this quote how at least certain forms of
> consciousness must be explained in terms of the contradictions of
> material life. I asked a question yesterday about how generalized we
> can get with that idea - can we say, and what would justify saying, that
> **all** forms of consciousness must be explained in terms of the
> contradictions of material life?
> It is fine to take Hegel's or anyone's side over Marx's, or any position
> in between, of course. I always find your views and questions and
> scholarship refreshing and full of insights, Andy. I am very glad you
> are on this list, I have learned a lot. Maybe Hegel was right over Marx
> on certain things, or correctly addressed things Marx didn't, and much
> can be learned by studying all that, as you do. Of course, maybe both
> were wrong on various, or even many things. And for sure, quoting Marx
> himself or trying to be "consistent" with him hardly makes one
> automatically right! We can learn much from Hegel, Marx, and many
> others, and interpret and side with or against them on various issues,
> but what counts, of course, is what we do. And that is one of the
> things I like so much about CHAT: it offers some new ways to not only
> think about, but do something about the world.
> - Steve
> On Sep 2, 2008, at 6:38 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> My response Steve, is that what Marx says is to be understood by means
>> of the contradictions of material life etc, is the *consciousness of
>> an age*, what an epoch thinks of itself, the Zeigeist, if you like.
>> This is a fair call. It is a huge leap from there to claim that every
>> passing individual thought is determined by these grand
>> contradictions. Clearly, a finer grain of analysis is needed. I think
>> it is a big mistake to look for a "unit of analysis" for everything,
>> so to speak.
>> BTW, and I am sure you have noticed as well, that Marx refers to the
>> rather austere conflict between forces of production and the social
>> relations of production as what is driving this historical change, not
>> "class struggle" - despite what he says elsewhere about "The history
>> of all societies histherto ... etc" - though some people do take issue
>> with Marx on this!
>> Andy
>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>> Yes, exactly, Mike, that is just what I was thinking. This very
>>> useful quote you offer may be Marx's most succinct statement of
>>> historical materialism. It is from the preface to the 1959 "A
>>> Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy."
>>> The following sentences after your quote are interesting to examine
>>> closely. I have a couple questions about them.
>>> Here is the first sentence. When he refers to "this conflict" he is
>>> speaking of the conflict between the material productive forces of
>>> society with the existing relations of production.
>>> "In studying such transformations it is always necessary to
>>> distinguish between the material transformation of the economic
>>> conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision
>>> of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or
>>> philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become
>>> conscious of this conflict and fight it out."
>>> In the second sentence, he explains that one cannot explain
>>> revolutionary transformations in terms of consciousness, but rather,
>>> the consciousness of those times must be explained from the conflict
>>> ..."
>>> "Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about
>>> himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its
>>> consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be
>>> explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict
>>> existing between the social forces of production and the relations of
>>> production."
>>> Consider this modification of the second part of the above sentence,
>>> which attempts to generalize the above to the highest level to all
>>> historical periods, and not just during revolutionary transformations:
>>> **All** "consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of
>>> material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces
>>> of production and the relations of production."
>>> Do you think this modification might be true? What would it take to
>>> demonstrate or negate it?
>>> I ask because if this statement is arguably true, it might contain a
>>> clue regarding this unit of analysis/analytical units/concrete
>>> universal discussion we are having.
>>> Brainstorming a little, a possible form this contradictory conditions
>>> approach could take at the psychological level might be an
>>> individual's "social situation," as in Vygotsky's "social situation
>>> of development." The researcher would be tasked, according to this
>>> line of reasoning, with methodically analyzing where a person "sits"
>>> and develops within and with the world of contradictions around them,
>>> especially tensions between the social forces of production and the
>>> relations of production - and perhaps also the class struggle - even
>>> if these aspects of society appear remote or hidden at the level of
>>> the individual, using currently available tools of observation and
>>> analysis.
>>> Finding ways to understand how these very large, cultural-historical
>>> processes psychologically impact each individual in very specific
>>> ways would be a major problem to solve. Perhaps new or modified
>>> tools and methods are needed. Knowing the analytical units,
>>> especially the basic unit of analysis or the concrete universal, (if
>>> I am using these words correctly), would of course be essential.
>>> But first, one would need to look at the veracity of the above broad
>>> statement about consciousness before proceeding with this line of
>>> thinking.
>>> - Steve
>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 10:48 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>> Steve -- As in
>>>> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into
>>>> definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely
>>>> relations of
>>>> production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their
>>>> material
>>>> forces of production. The totality of these relations of production
>>>> constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
>>>> on which
>>>> arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
>>>> definite
>>>> forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life
>>>> conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual
>>>> life.
>>>> It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but
>>>> their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a
>>>> certain
>>>> stage of development, the material productive forces of society come
>>>> into
>>>> conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely
>>>> expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property
>>>> relations within
>>>> the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of
>>>> development of the productive forces these relations turn into their
>>>> fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the
>>>> economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of
>>>> the whole
>>>> immense superstructure.
>>>> e.g. the always dynamic relations between modes and relations of
>>>> production
>>>> is the core contradiction that is the engine of change.
>>>> On Mon, Sep 1, 2008 at 10:30 AM, Steve Gabosch
>>>> <> wrote:
>>>>> I think you are onto something very important, Wayne. Perhaps social
>>>>> relations of production does not capture the dynamic contradiction
>>>>> you point
>>>>> out - by itself, it is still just an element, albeit an important
>>>>> analytical
>>>>> unit, like class in relation to class struggle. Vygotsky's unit of
>>>>> analysis, word meaning, is about the contradiction between speech and
>>>>> thought, originally separate processes that converge and transform,
>>>>> creating
>>>>> something ontogenetically new in each child, word meaning. This
>>>>> idea of
>>>>> converging lines of development might be helpful to think about in
>>>>> this
>>>>> discussion. I think something more general than just capitalism is
>>>>> needed,
>>>>> as I think you were thinking, although I like the one you bring up
>>>>> because
>>>>> it is a good example of the kind of contradiction you are
>>>>> suggesting. A
>>>>> more general one might be the contradiction between the forces of
>>>>> production
>>>>> and the relations of production. How does that contradiction manifest
>>>>> itself in concrete entities? Now I'm puzzling over that ...
>>>>> - Steve
>>>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 10:10 AM, Wayne Au wrote:
>>>>> Steve,
>>>>>> Great, thought provoking idea here. It makes me want to go one
>>>>>> more step
>>>>>> "back" - so to speak. Assuming we're operating within a Marxist,
>>>>>> dialectical
>>>>>> materialist framework, then perhaps we should consider identifying a
>>>>>> particular process, one driven by contradiction, as our unit of
>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>> This is another turn on what you said about Marx and Engels
>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>> "class struggle" as the unit of analysis.
>>>>>> So, working from that platform, then we might be able to say that
>>>>>> class
>>>>>> struggle is an expression of the contradiction between social
>>>>>> production
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> private accumulation that is inherent within the production of
>>>>>> capital (in
>>>>>> our given system at least). Can we then consider that a
>>>>>> contradiction/process constitutes our unit of analysis? That,
>>>>>> playing with
>>>>>> your words, "Activity could be understood as mutually
>>>>>> constitutive" of the
>>>>>> process/contradiction that produces "the aggregate social
>>>>>> relations in a
>>>>>> particular society"?
>>>>>> Just a thought.
>>>>>> Wayne
>>>>>> On 9/1/08 9:43 AM, "Steve Gabosch" <> wrote:
>>>>>> Andy wrote:
>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what object is served by
>>>>>>>> work then the answer is "expansion of capital". I caould give 1000
>>>>>>>> examples of Marx making ths claim. The idea that the object of
>>>>>>>> one's
>>>>>>>> labour is profit is always problemtatic for people that work in the
>>>>>>>> public sector, especially in education or health, but if you
>>>>>>>> were in
>>>>>>>> the USSR where the state is paying the wages, it would seem strange
>>>>>>>> indeed. The idea that one's work is part of the reproduction of the
>>>>>>>> community in a division of labour seems far more appealing. But
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> turned out to be a passing episode in twentieth century history.
>>>>>>> Perhaps you didn't mean this, but it sounds like you are saying that
>>>>>>> all work serves the accumulation or expansion of capital. But as
>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> know, there are many kinds of work that don't. Here are three
>>>>>>> examples, as I see it:
>>>>>>> 1) House work (cleaning your own house) does not produce surplus
>>>>>>> value.
>>>>>>> 2) Cuban workers today don't contribute to the accumulation of
>>>>>>> capital, except in some small businesses and enterprises (such as
>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>> restaurants, farms), where how much gets accumulated is highly
>>>>>>> restricted. There is no capitalist class of any significance in
>>>>>>> Cuba
>>>>>>> today.
>>>>>>> 3) Public sector workers in the US are not producing surplus value.
>>>>>>> The health and education sectors especially are examples of workers
>>>>>>> and other oppressed layers demanding and fighting for social
>>>>>>> programs
>>>>>>> that enhance their quality of life, forcing the capitalists to
>>>>>>> devote
>>>>>>> a small percentage of the surplus value they accumulate to such
>>>>>>> programs - which have been under attack for some years now by the
>>>>>>> capitalists and political forces that support them precisely because
>>>>>>> these programs do not produce surplus value - they consume it.
>>>>>>> When one begins to look at economies, blocks of capital, wages,
>>>>>>> government, public service workers, workers states, classes, and
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> such issues, many of the core features of activity theory appear
>>>>>>> on a
>>>>>>> new level of analysis: historical materialism. There are of course
>>>>>>> other world views, but this is the one Vygotsky used. Vygotsky said
>>>>>>> he was applying historical materialism to psychology, which he
>>>>>>> explained would require the discovery of new laws of development
>>>>>>> and a
>>>>>>> new basic unit of analysis.
>>>>>>> Andy and I had some conversation about class and activity offline
>>>>>>> recently and I said that "class" is a unit of analysis in
>>>>>>> Marxism, as
>>>>>>> in "class analysis" and "the history of all hitherto existing
>>>>>>> society
>>>>>>> is the history of class struggle" (Communist Manifesto).
>>>>>>> But on further thought, that is incorrect. Marx and Engels say it
>>>>>>> right in that quote - they say **class struggle**, not "class".
>>>>>>> Thinking about this, a common error in sociology is to use class as
>>>>>>> the unit of analysis. Classes are only elements of class struggles.
>>>>>>> Class is an analytical unit, but not a basic unit of analysis.
>>>>>>> Relating this to CHAT, as I see it, classes are to class
>>>>>>> struggles as
>>>>>>> actions are to activity. Class struggle is a unit of analysis in
>>>>>>> historical materialism in the way that activity is seen as a unit of
>>>>>>> analysis in cultural historical psychology.
>>>>>>> But is activity really the **basic** unit of human existence? As
>>>>>>> David was saying, there is a difference between units of analysis
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> analytical units. Is activity an analytical unit, but not the basic
>>>>>>> unit of analysis? This would not overturn any work CHAT has done,
>>>>>>> just shift its attention to a different basic unit of analysis, and
>>>>>>> "demote" activity to an analytical unit, albeit a very useful and
>>>>>>> powerful one.
>>>>>>> Mohammed Elhammoumi argues in a paper he will present at ISCAR that
>>>>>>> the unit of analysis is the social relations of production. If that
>>>>>>> is the case - I find this idea thought provoking - then activity
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> be an element in that larger entity - activities are carved out
>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>> existing social relations and artifacts (artifacts include nature
>>>>>>> insofar as humans directly interact with it). Activity could be
>>>>>>> understood as mutually constitutive with the aggregate social
>>>>>>> relations in a particular society, in the way that Michael describes
>>>>>>> actions and activity as mutually constitutive. Interesting to think
>>>>>>> about.
>>>>>>> Steve
>>>>>>> On Aug 31, 2008, at 7:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>> Thanks for all that Michael. I actually hardly slept last night
>>>>>>>> going over in my mind the points you made. I think I can see my way
>>>>>>>> through this now, and that "(a system of) activity" or "an
>>>>>>>> activity"
>>>>>>>> is indeed a very good candidate for a "unit of analysis". You will
>>>>>>>> doubtless get something from me on your editor's desk in a
>>>>>>>> couple of
>>>>>>>> months on the topic. But altogether I feel much better about ANL
>>>>>>>> now. Thank you.
>>>>>>>> But the questions about word meanings here are still outstanding:
>>>>>>>> (1) "activity" - as used in Hegel and Marx and Leontyev when he
>>>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>>> "[The processes that mediate the influences of the objective world
>>>>>>>> reflected in the human brain] are those that realise a person's
>>>>>>>> actual life in the objective world by which he is surrounded, his
>>>>>>>> social being in all the richness and variety of its forms. In other
>>>>>>>> words, these processes are his activity."
>>>>>>>> - is not a unit of analysis, but a presupposition, whilst "an
>>>>>>>> activity" or "system of activity", you have convinced me, is a good
>>>>>>>> "unit of analysis" for the study of the social life of human
>>>>>>>> beings.
>>>>>>>> As when Marx says:
>>>>>>>> "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
>>>>>>>> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be
>>>>>>>> made in
>>>>>>>> the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and
>>>>>>>> the material conditions under which they live, both those which
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> find already existing and those produced by their activity." (The
>>>>>>>> German Ideology, 1a, 1845)
>>>>>>>> My concern is that we use the same word and I suspect the
>>>>>>>> observation that we have here two qute distinct concepts is not
>>>>>>>> something which is widely recognised.
>>>>>>>> (2) "activity" and "work" - I am going to spend some time revising
>>>>>>>> how ANL takes labour as the prototype of an activity and the bases
>>>>>>>> on which "an activity" and "a type of activity" are delineated or
>>>>>>>> developed. This is my major concern.
>>>>>>>> But look. Marx, Capital Vol 1:
>>>>>>>> "As a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the
>>>>>>>> soul of capital. But capital has one sole driving force, the drive
>>>>>>>> to valorize itself, to create surplus value, to make its constant
>>>>>>>> part, the means of production, absorb the greatest possible amount
>>>>>>>> of surplus labour. Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like,
>>>>>>>> lives
>>>>>>>> only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour
>>>>>>>> it sucks." - Capital, p.342
>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what object is served by
>>>>>>>> work then the answer is "expansion of capital". I caould give 1000
>>>>>>>> examples of Marx making ths claim. The idea that the object of
>>>>>>>> one's
>>>>>>>> labour is profit is always problemtatic for people that work in the
>>>>>>>> public sector, especially in education or health, but if you
>>>>>>>> were in
>>>>>>>> the USSR where the state is paying the wages, it would seem strange
>>>>>>>> indeed. The idea that one's work is part of the reproduction of the
>>>>>>>> community in a division of labour seems far more appealing. But
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> turned out to be a passing episode in twentieth century history.
>>>>>>>> I.e., the most important "activity" today is "capital." That seems
>>>>>>>> to have been lost somewhere, at least to some extent.
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>> I am not trying to give you advice. I am talking about my own
>>>>>>>>> experiences of having struggled.
>>>>>>>>> One of the things Marx criticized his contemporaries for is that
>>>>>>>>> they looked at value abstractly. He wrote Das Kapital as a
>>>>>>>>> concrete
>>>>>>>>> analysis of value, its one-sided expressions in use-value and
>>>>>>>>> exchange-value, and how these concretized themselves in possible
>>>>>>>>> cases. Any time I want to think about activity abstractly, I get
>>>>>>>>> into trouble, which resolve themselves when I take concrete cases
>>>>>>>>> of activity and work them through, culturally and historically. I
>>>>>>>>> then realize that activity concretizes itself very differently,
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> activity of schooling is very different in U.S. suburbia then
>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>> in inner-city neighborhood schools in Philadelphia. Not when I do
>>>>>>>>> an abstract analysis, but when I go concretely into the nitty-
>>>>>>>>> gritty details of everyday life in the schools.
>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 8:07 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Oh Gosh, Micahel I thought we were going to have a good ol'
>>>>>>>>> flame! :) and I was just getting started.
>>>>>>>>> OK. As I said, I will study those quotes, and their contexts,
>>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>> I can, and think some more about it, but I really don't think I
>>>>>>>>> want to shift to "concrete cases" to clarify a concept if the
>>>>>>>>> concept isn't clear at the start. That's just not my style, if you
>>>>>>>>> know what I mean. I am not anywhere saying that the work Leontyev
>>>>>>>>> and others have done with these ideas is not perfectly good, valid
>>>>>>>>> science. But there *are* problems, there *are* limts to the
>>>>>>>>> applicability of these ideas, and I am exploring them.
>>>>>>>>> More later, and thanks heaps for laying hold of those quote and
>>>>>>>>> your explanations so speedily!
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, After I sent off the mail I thought you might
>>>>>>>>>> misunderstand. I do understand and know your background. I meant
>>>>>>>>>> to say rather than discussing activity in the general, take a
>>>>>>>>>> concrete one and talk about it. I meant discuss concrete cases. I
>>>>>>>>>> think if you were to have taken a concrete case of activity from
>>>>>>>>>> your experience and discussed activity in this situation some of
>>>>>>>>>> the problems that appear when you discuss it in the abstract
>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>> not show up.
>>>>>>>>>> Sorry for having written a message that could have been and was
>>>>>>>>>> mistaken in its intention.
>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> C'mon Michael. I spent 30 years as a union activist transforming
>>>>>>>>>> activity and thinking about what I was doing. At 62 I am now
>>>>>>>>>> reflecting on that work. I don't need to be told to "go out" and
>>>>>>>>>> put someone under my microscope and observe them.
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, it is and is not a system of actions. Actions and
>>>>>>>>>>> activity stand in a constitutive relationship. There are no
>>>>>>>>>>> actions independent of activity and no activity independent of
>>>>>>>>>>> action. One of the problems that can arise is because---as we
>>>>>>>>>>> have done today----we talk about activity in the abstract, and
>>>>>>>>>>> this is what Marx didn't like about Hegel, we talk about ideal
>>>>>>>>>>> things, not about concrete sensual activity, which you only get
>>>>>>>>>>> when you analyze real activity rather than the idea of activity.
>>>>>>>>>>> I see you struggle with the idea, when what you should be doing
>>>>>>>>>>> is go out and study concrete activity. What you need to do is
>>>>>>>>>>> study concrete everyday activity, that is, actual cases where an
>>>>>>>>>>> activity realizes itself. And here you will find that people act
>>>>>>>>>>> but in the process concretize the activity in THIS rather than
>>>>>>>>>>> other possible ways. Their actions are not JUST actions, they
>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>> oriented toward the activity, which only comes about in and
>>>>>>>>>>> through the actions; yet the actions presuppose the activity
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> they realize.
>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:25 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies. I sent two mails just to Michael instead of the list
>>>>>>>>>>> by mistake!
>>>>>>>>>>> I will think about this some more. "Activity" here means a
>>>>>>>>>>> system
>>>>>>>>>>> of actions which have a common societally-determined object,
>>>>>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>> the collective hunt in his famous example. But it seems to me
>>>>>>>>>>> that the idea of "activity" (in this sense) as a "unit of
>>>>>>>>>>> analysis" poses some problems.
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, you can always identify structure, the question is
>>>>>>>>>>>> whether you can understand it own its own or only in its
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation to other structures. I think it is the latter. So even
>>>>>>>>>>>> within the unit you can identify all sorts of things, but they
>>>>>>>>>>>> are not independent and constitute each other. That is why
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yrjö's website is a bit deceiving, because he talks about
>>>>>>>>>>>> elements----I think the word appears 6 times----when Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>> and Leont'ev always talk about doing unit analysis. So there is
>>>>>>>>>>>> structure, just that it cannot be understood independently of
>>>>>>>>>>>> other structures, each of which is a one-sided expression of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> unit, which is activity. Or so I read it.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Well spotted, Michael.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In that same paragraph he says: "activity is ... a system that
>>>>>>>>>>>> has structure" so he is here referring to what might be called
>>>>>>>>>>>> the "*system of* activity", as opposed to acts or operations,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and actions - this entity that Robert explained to me is
>>>>>>>>>>>> constituted as an entity by means of system-theoretic means.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Is that right?
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think he does say something that is at least very close to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> naming it unit analysis on p.50:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is a molar, not an additive unit of the life of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> physical, material subject. In a narrower sense, that is, at
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> psychological level, it is a unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>> life, mediated by psychic reflection, the real function of
>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>> is that it orients the subject in the objective world. In other
>>>>>>>>>>>> words, activity is
>>>>>>>>>>>> not a reaction and not a totality of reactions but a system
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> has structure, its own internal transitions and
>>>>>>>>>>>> transformations, its own development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where I would accentuate as follows:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is "a *unit of life*", "a system that has structure,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *its own* internal transitions and transformations, *its own
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *development."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> OK, thanks for that Michael. I understand Tätigkeit, so that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> settles some questions, though not all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have another question about Activity to add to these.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, Davydov, Engstrom (to take just three) all talk
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit of analysis", "germ-cell" or single instance (as in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pavolv's study of the reflex), but in the works of AN Leontyev
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I have access to (on he makes no reference
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to any of these terms. This seems not accidental to me
>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually. Can anyone clarify this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Did Leonteyv (a) think that "activity" passes as a "unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> analaysis", (b) disagree with the idea that a science should
>>>>>>>>>>>>> begin from a Unit of analysis, or (c) define subject-activity-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> object as the "unit of analysis somewhere?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I need citation, I'm afraid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not just the Russian. In German there is the parallel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "Tätigkeit" (deiatel'nost') and Aktivität
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (aktivnost'). In the former there is an orientation----toward
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object/motive, which is not in the latter, and the former is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> oriented toward and a result of society (Gesellschaft),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whereas the latter is not (necessarily). When Leont'ev is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> translated into German, you find the words Tätigkeit and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adjective "gesellschaftlich" (societal) whereas in English
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is activity and social----and that has made all the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference, to quote Robert Frost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 4:18 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I wonder if our Russian speakers could indulge me again
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point of clarification. déjatel'nost' (or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> деятельность) is the Russian word for "activity".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. I understand that in Russian the use of definite and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indefeinite partcles (a and the) is rare, so in the title to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AN Leontyev's famous book, does déjatel'nost' mean "an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity" or "activity" - with the connotation of substance
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that a word has in English if used without a or the. When we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have "act, action and activity," is that third category the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same word, déjatel'nost'?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. déjatel'nost' can also be translated as "work". How strong
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the connection between "work" and "activity" in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Russian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind when talking of "activity theory"? Does that sound like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "work theory"? Or is this just like any ambiguous word. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean, English speakers would not think that in this context
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "activity" referred to autonomous physiological processes,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which can also be called "Activity". When "Theses on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Feuerbach" is translated into Russian, can Russian readers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the diffrence between "work" and "activity"?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fascinating response, Robert. So let's see if I understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you right. A mass of interconnected actions can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understood
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as some *whole* (and not just an arbitrary collection of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> individual things) if we can perceive some kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *constraint*, operating over the domain, which limits the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domain of possible configurations? Is that it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert Bracewell wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy and all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with Michael that the relationship between activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and action is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive one, but I think this points to a big
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical gap in CHAT
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. If actions are the constituents of activity,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises as to how the constituents are arranged in order to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constitute
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity (and there may be other types of constituents in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity also). As
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leont¹ev said, this arrangement cannot be serial (e.g.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> chains of s-r
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pairs), nor additive in the sense of accumulative (as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contrasted with the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical sense). So how are we to theorize the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arrangement? The issue of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging constituents to achieve higher order structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been treated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by both linguistics and artificial intelligence. The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> general
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constrain the possible relationships between constituents--
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in linguistics
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this usually done via a grammar, in AI via a program. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CHAT I think our
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> task may be to build on Leont¹ev and figure out these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constraints.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --Bob Bracewell
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 8/29/08 1:24 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth" <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think he expresses the constitutive relation between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actions and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity. Activity is not just the sum of actions, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> presupposes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them but is itself presupposed by the actions that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constitute it. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am pasting the definition from OED, which appears to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with this (my) reading of Leont'ev. Leont'ev and Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want to do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit analysis, not element/al analysis. That is, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identify structures within activity, these cannot stand on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like elements. What they are is dependent on all the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be identified, with which they stand in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive unit,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and which are subordinate to activity. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> molar, adj.3
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> esp. an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> integrated set of responses serving to bring about a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> common
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> goal, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinguished from an elementary unit of behaviour such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR adj. 5); of or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relating to (the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> study of) such behaviour.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 29-Aug-08, at 7:11 AM, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is just my perspective, but I still believe Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Theory goes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> back to roots in work done by Stanislavsky - in particular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "On Being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an Actor" and his book on character development. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument that Stanislavsky makes is that you should never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consider
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each scene individually, as encapsulated and whole, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guess
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say there should be no reification of a scene. You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consider
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a scene, and the actions of a character, not only in terms
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire play, but in terms of what has come before and what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after - that activity is part of an ongoing process.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Stanislavsky
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was working off the new form of playwrights such as Ibsen,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strindberg
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and especially Chekhov of course. To give an example,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nora
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> walks out on Torvald and her father at the end of "A
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Doll's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> House"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scene makes little sense in an of itself, and if you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes of the play as simply being additive you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shocked. But if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you consider it as part of a moral activity, with a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> building
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> motivation that leads to a choice of action it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extraordinarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complelling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway, that's my two cents.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Fri 8/29/2008 9:53 AM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Molar, Molecular and Additive behaviour
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Can anyone help me out here. Leontyev says:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "But human practice is not just a series or a sum of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actions. In other words, 'activity is a molar, not an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> additive unit'."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OED says:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Molar, Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> esp. an integrated set of responses serving to bring
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> common goal, as distinguished from an elementary unit of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour such as a physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adj. 5); of or relating to (the study of) such behaviour.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1932 E. C. TOLMAN Purposive Behavior "On the one hand,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Watson has defined behavior in terms of its strict
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> physical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and physiological details, i.e., in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> receptor-process, conductor-process, and effector-process
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> per se. We shall designate this as the molecular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of behavior. And on the other hand, he has come to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognize
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that behavior is more than and different from the sum
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological parts. Behavior has descriptive and defining
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties of its own. And we shall designate this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latter as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the molar definition of behavior."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I missing something. By "not additive" does Leontyev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply mean that there's more to it than S -> R ?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the work made by max plank and run by san
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> francisco's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploratorium
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss, Ph.D.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Escuela de Psicología
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Av Vicuña Mackenna - 4860
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 7820436 Macul
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Santiago, Chile
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fono: 3544605
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: 3544844
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> e-mail: <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> web personal:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> web institucional:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---- Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blunden +61 3 9380 9435
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <winmail.dat>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>>>>>>>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Wayne Au
>>>>>> Assistant Professor
>>>>>> Department of Secondary Education
>>>>>> CSU Fullerton
>>>>>> P.O. Box 6868
>>>>>> Fullerton, CA 92834
>>>>>> Office: 714.278.5481
>>>>>> Editorial Board Member: Rethinking Schools
>>>>>> (
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> andy.blunden
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list

Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 
Skype andy.blunden
xmca mailing list
Received on Tue Sep 2 17:01 PDT 2008

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Oct 01 2008 - 00:30:04 PDT